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Note on Terminology 
and Romanisation and 
Monetary Values
Note on Terminology and Romanisation
In general, Chinese place names, personal names and terms are rendered 
into pinyin unless they are domesticated into English or are so common 
in the English-language historical literature of the Canton trade system 
that it would be confusing to do otherwise. Thus, Beijing is referred to as 
‘Peking’, although ‘Pekin’ was used by the British at the time. Guangzhou 
is referred to as ‘Canton’, and its port, Huangpu, 12 miles downstream, as 
‘Whampoa’. The Zhujiang River is called the ‘Pearl River’, and the ‘Bogue’ 
or ‘Bocca Tigris’ refers to the Humen Strait situated at the start of the Pearl 
River. Chinese Government officials are referred to as ‘mandarins’; these 
include the Hoppo, the chief superintendent of customs at Canton, who 
oversaw the activities of officially appointed Chinese merchants, referred 
to as the Hong merchants. The names of Chinese merchants of Canton 
and Macao have been left in their romanised form. Identifications, as 
far as they are possible, follow Van Dyke (2011). Chinese and Manchu 
officials have been identified where possible. The names of the senior 
mandarins who greeted the British in northern China have been rendered 
into pinyin based on Fu (1966, vol. II, pp. 627–681). Their anglicised 
names are given in Appendix E.
Original spellings such as ‘Embassador’ and British spellings of Chinese 
names have been retained in direct quotations.
BRITAIN’S SECOND EMBASSY TO CHINA
xii
Note on Present-Day Values of Money in 
the Period of the Amherst Embassy
This study bases the value of the British Pound on the index agreed 
on in 2003 by the House of Commons Library, Bank of England and 
Office of National Statistics, where £10,000 in 1778 was approximately 
equivalent to £1 million in 2003 (Hague, 2004, p. 42).
Figure 1: Lord Amherst in his peer’s robes.
Note: Engraving by S . Freeman, published in 1846, after painting by Sir Thomas Lawrence 
in 1821 .




In early August 1816, Lord William Pitt Amherst, designated British 
Ambassador of the Special Mission to the Chinese Empire, arrived off 
the coast of northern China on board the man-of-war, HMS Alceste. 
Disembarking from the embassy ships with his suite on 11 August, 
Amherst, then 43 years of age, travelled in a procession of Chinese junks 
to the port of Dagu where he stepped onto Chinese soil. His primary 
mission, in his capacity as the second British ambassador to arrive 
in China, was to proceed to the imperial court at Peking to seek the 
assistance of the Jiaqing emperor with placing British trade at Canton on 
a reliable basis. Recent disputes between provincial Chinese Government 
officials and members of the Select Committee of the British East India 
Company had stopped the important tea trade, risking the supply of tea 
to Britain and threatening a substantial loss of revenue for both Company 
coffers  and the British Treasury.1 The personal intervention of the 
emperor was considered necessary to check the capricious and vexatious 
actions of the Canton Government and the Chinese Hong merchants 
who facilitated the trade. The embassy also sought to secure the means of 
a direct and official communication with the imperial court at Peking to 
facilitate negotiation and conciliation of any future disputes. Amherst’s 
mission was an abysmal failure. He never appeared before the Jiaqing 
emperor and his embassy was expelled on the day it reached Peking.
1  Sales of tea in Britain in 1815 amounted to 22,758,155 lbs worth £4,058,092 (Tuck, 2000, p. x, 
fn. 9). For the British at this time, tea is described by historians as an ‘indispensable necessity of daily 
life’ (Porter, 2001, p. 193).
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Two earlier British embassies had been dispatched to China under the 
auspices of the British East India Company and authorised by the British 
Government. The first, led by Lt Col. Cathcart in 1788, was aborted on 
his death on the outward voyage.2 The second was the famous Macartney 
Embassy to the Qianlong emperor (r. 1735–1796) that arrived in China 
in 1793. Armed with impressive gifts showcasing the latest cutting-
edge advances in British science and technology to impress the emperor 
of British ‘excellence’, Macartney hoped to open the door to expanded 
trade with China. Despite Macartney being received with politeness 
and hospitality, his attempts to engage the emperor or his court in any 
negotiation were comprehensively rebuffed. Nevertheless, the Macartney 
Embassy has been the subject of extensive historical research and is 
a  major topic in Anglo–Chinese history (see Bickers, 1993; Fairbank, 
1942; Hevia, 1995; Peyrefitte, 1992; Pritchard, 1936). This is in contrast 
to the Amherst Embassy, which has received little scholarly attention, 
generally being relegated (at best) to a historical footnote as a follow-up 
to Macartney. Accordingly, the aim of this study is to present the first 
comprehensive and detailed account of the Amherst Embassy from its 
conception to its conclusion, and to reassess its historical importance for 
Anglo–Chinese relations and British perceptions of China in the period 
leading to the First Opium War.
In approaching an in-depth study of the Amherst Embassy and its 
aftermath, initial attempts to structure it around an overriding theme or 
themes started to distort or complicate the setting out of what actually 
happened. In the end, a detailed, largely narrative treatment proved 
critical in being able to make more reliable judgements about the roles 
played by its key members, especially its leader, Lord Amherst.
A central research question addresses why the British believed that the 
Amherst Embassy would succeed in its objectives at the Qing court3 
where the earlier and better-prepared Macartney Embassy had failed. 
The importance of the precedent established by the Macartney Embassy 
during its diplomatic encounter with the Qianlong emperor becomes 
clear, as does its critical role in governing the Amherst Embassy’s reception 
2  Charles Cathcart died of tuberculosis at Java. Amherst visited his tomb at the Anjere Roads on his 
outward voyage to China (Journal of Jeffrey Amherst, son of Lord Amherst, on his father’s mission to China 
(n.d., n.p.) in British Library (BL) India Office Records (IOR) MSS EUR F 140/37).
3  This study refers to the Chinese court of 1644–1911 as the ‘Qing court’. The Amherst Embassy 
is often referred to as being sent to the Jiaqing court, which refers to the Jiaqing emperor (r. February 
1796 – September 1820) who was the seventh emperor of the Qing dynasty.
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at the Qing court. The British belief that the Macartney Embassy had 
established a new basis for the conduct of Anglo–Chinese relations 
is a central argument of this study.
The carriage of the embassy is examined through Amherst’s leadership role 
and the embassy’s encounter with Qing officialdom. It seeks to reappraise 
Amherst’s performance, judged by historians to be inept and indecisive 
due to his decision to follow the advice of Sir George Thomas Staunton, 
the second commissioner in the embassy, not to kowtow before the Jiaqing 
emperor, thereby resulting in the premature dismissal of the embassy.
A full understanding of the Amherst Embassy is possible only within the 
commercial context of the Canton trade system whose rules governed all 
Western trade in China and the traditional tributary system that governed 
Chinese foreign relations. These are major scholarly themes in Anglo–
Chinese historiography, outlined briefly in Chapter 2. This chapter also 
includes a short summary of the Westphalian principles of diplomacy that 
governed British diplomatic practice. Also included is a brief outline of 
the political instability of the Pearl River Delta—the maritime approach 
to Canton—resulting, in part, from international tensions at the time of 
the Napoleonic Wars.
The decision in 1815 to send another embassy is traced from the origin 
of the idea in 1800 through to its immediate causes resulting from events at 
Canton and Macao in 1814. These are discussed in Chapter 3, primarily 
through the activities of Staunton, an active advocate of a second embassy 
throughout his long service at Canton.4 Staunton had gained widespread 
fame in England as the 12-year-old boy who had held a brief conversation 
in Mandarin with the Qianlong emperor at the time of the Macartney 
Embassy. He had kept up his Mandarin studies on return to England 
and was the first Chinese linguist posted to Canton with the East India 
Company.5 He was also acknowledged as Britain’s leading sinologist.
The fourth chapter shifts attention to London. The response of both 
the British Government and the Secret Board of Directors of the East 
India Company to the dispatch of an embassy to the Qing court is 
4  George Thomas Staunton is not to be confused with his father Sir George Leonard Staunton who 
was the Secretary in Lord George Macartney’s Embassy to the Qianlong court in 1793. References 
to  ‘Staunton’ in this study always refer to the younger Staunton, while his father is referred to as 
G. L. Staunton.
5  G. L. Staunton returned to England from China with a Chinese servant engaged specifically to 
enable his son to practice his Chinese (De Gray, 1860, p. cxxiv).
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examined, making clear John Barrow’s key role as the instigator of the 
Amherst Embassy.6 Barrow, an influential senior official in the Admiralty, 
was not only a veteran of the Macartney Embassy, but was also an active 
commentator on China through his reviews in the Quarterly Review 
journal as well as a close friend and correspondent of Staunton. Of critical 
importance was his reliance on outdated intelligence, resulting from the 
12-month turnaround in mail between London and Canton, for shaping 
both his arguments for another embassy in 1815 and for his assessment 
that it would be received positively by the Qing court and, thus, promise 
favourable outcomes.
Amherst’s appointment as ambassador is examined in Chapters 4 and 
5. This section is set within the framework of his personal life and 
professional experience, as well as his research and preparation for his 
mission. While the body of knowledge on European missions to China 
available to the British in 1815 appears meagre by modern standards, 
Amherst nevertheless assiduously set about the task of learning as much 
as he could from the experience of previous missions before his departure 
for China. Chapter 5 also describes the choice of presents for the emperor 
and his officials,7 as well as the fitting out of the HMS Alceste for its long 
journey to China. 
The journey to China via Madeira, Rio de Janeiro, Cape Town and Batavia 
outlined briefly in Chapter 6 also includes reference to initial British 
reactions to scenes at Brazil, providing an interesting contrast with their 
later reactions to China. Additionally, it looks at the manner in which the 
members of the embassy ‘as Englishmen abroad’ reacted to their mission 
and conducted themselves on the outward voyage in 1816.
The inclusion of several East India Company representatives based at 
Canton in the ambassadorial suite marked a major difference between 
the Amherst Embassy and the earlier Macartney Embassy. These men 
included Staunton, the Reverend Doctor Robert Morrison, John Francis 
Davis and Thomas Manning, who spoke Mandarin and had considerable 
local experience in dealing with the Cantonese authorities. They joined 
the Alceste and the other ships of the embassy squadron in the waters off 
Macao, out of sight of local Chinese officials, as a result of a prearranged 
6  For an excellent short biography of Barrow, see Osborne’s introduction to the reprint of John 
Barrow’s A voyage to Cochinchina (1806/1975, pp. v–xvii).
7  A full list of the presents and their cost is provided in Appendix B.
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secret rendezvous. The ships commenced their voyage northwards to 
Dagu on 13 July 1816, which is the subject of Chapter 7. Their arrival 
in the north of China marked a brief period of cordial and spontaneous 
encounters with local Chinese, revealing a relaxed social atmosphere in 
marked contrast to later official occasions.
Amherst was met by mandarins sent by the Jiaqing emperor to organise 
his reception at Peking within days of arrival in northern China, and 
their negotiations comprise Chapter 8. These are discussed in detail, 
which is essential to fully appreciate the stress and strain generated by 
the negotiations, not only for Amherst and his commissioners but also 
for the  Qing envoys, over a period of several intense weeks. Such  an 
understanding of the daily trials and tribulations of the diplomatic 
encounter reveal new insights and information on the progress of the 
embassy that challenges the accepted narrative that Amherst was inept 
and dependent on Staunton for its conduct. Attention is focused on two 
major diplomatic receptions arranged for Amherst. The first, examined 
in Chapter 8, is an imperial banquet held at Tianjin on 13 August 
1816 within three days of his arrival in China that was critical for the 
outcome of the embassy. The second event was Amherst’s arrival at the 
Yuanmingyuan Summer Palace on the outskirts of Peking in the early 
morning of 29  August 1816 from where he was expelled on the same 
day. The trauma of his treatment at Yuanmingyuan and his expulsion 
from Peking, as well as the unfolding repercussions from this event, are 
described in Chapter 9.
The only worthwhile activity remaining for the British after their premature 
dismissal from the Qing court was the opportunity to acquire new 
information about China as the embassy proceeded down the canals and 
waterways from Peking to Canton. Their impressions of Chinese culture, 
society and the environment gathered over a four-month period served to 
confirm and consolidate earlier British knowledge of China collected by 
the Macartney Embassy and are examined in Chapter 10. This analysis is 
followed in Chapter 11 by a discussion of the public reaction in Britain, 
including the media, to the treatment of the Amherst Embassy, while the 
concluding Chapter 12 provides a retrospective evaluation of Amherst 
and his embassy.
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Secondary Sources on the 
Amherst Embassy
Scholars, it has been noted, have paid scant attention to the Amherst 
Embassy. Alain Peyrefitte’s (1992) study of the Macartney Embassy has 
a brief chapter on the Amherst Embassy, while James Hevia’s (1995) 
postcolonial anthropological analysis Cherishing men from afar devoted 
only a couple of pages to the mission. Hevia concentrated on the importance 
of the precedent of the earlier reception of the Macartney Embassy for the 
response of the Qing court to Amherst and blamed the failure of the latter 
embassy on British behaviour in the former embassy. Hevia argued that 
their misinterpretation of correct Qing ceremonial procedure signified by 
Macartney’s refusal to kowtow ensured the impossibility of the British 
being incorporated into the ‘centering process’ of Qing guest ritual, which 
functioned to place foreign envoys into a hierarchy of desirable or inferior 
relations (p. 123). He concluded, correctly, that Amherst was received 
within the framework of stricter ceremonial protocols than those imposed 
on Macartney.
Staunton’s career at Canton and on his return to England in 1817 is the 
subject of an unpublished PhD dissertation by Jodi Eastberg (2009).8 
Her analysis of Staunton at Canton and his role in the Amherst Embassy 
is detailed and comprehensive, but failed to place the Anglo–Chinese 
diplomatic encounter within the wider context of the Chinese tribute 
system. Shunhong Zhang’s (2013) book, British views on China at 
a  special time (1790–1820), presented a thorough coverage of extracts 
from contemporary British publications on the nature of British views on 
China formed in response to the Macartney and Amherst embassies, but 
provided no analysis of their failure.
Some recent publications have discussed aspects of the Amherst Embassy. 
Stephen Platt’s (2018) wideranging account of the events leading to the 
First Opium War provided a colourful account of the personalities and 
events leading to the British decision to send an embassy in 1816. Platt 
covered the major issues surrounding the background and progress of 
the embassy but, like Peyrefitte (1992), dismissed Amherst by flippantly 
describing him as an intellectual lightweight and arrogant fool for ‘fussing 
pointlessly over the kowtow’ (p. 181). This assessment, due perhaps to 
8  I thank Shih-Wen Chen for bringing this thesis to my attention.
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the sweeping and general nature of his book, short-changes Amherst. 
Platt neither focused on the important context of the failure of earlier 
Western missions to the Qing court nor consulted Amherst’s personal 
papers held in the British Library; these reveal Amherst’s research and 
clearly indicate that he had a strong grasp of the complex issues involved. 
Platt also failed to place the diplomatic encounter within the crucial 
context of the Chinese tributary system and ignored the fact that, had 
Amherst kowtowed and placed himself and his monarch in the position of 
a tributary vassal, the Qing court would never have deigned to negotiate 
terms on a basis of equality.
Peter Kitson, Professor of Romantic Literature and Culture at the 
University of East Anglia, made several references to the Amherst 
Embassy in his book, Forging Romantic China (2013). His aim was not 
to present a historical account of the embassy, but to examine the process 
whereby knowledge of China entered the British Romantic imagination 
through the literary works of Lamb, Byron, Shelly, Coleridge and others, 
as well as discussion on chinoiserie influence in the form of porcelains and 
gardens. Macartney’s and Amherst’s refusal to kowtow before the Qing 
emperor is explained within the framework of a narrow cultural context 
of the British asserting their values of firmness and rectitude, equality and 
reciprocity. Once again, the fundamental political significance of such an 
act functioning to denigrate the status of the British sovereign and his 
ambassador to a tributary vassal is overlooked.
Another book edited by Kitson and Robert Markley, published in 
2016 to mark the 200th anniversary of the event, contains two essays 
on the embassy.  Kitson makes a serious historical error by suggesting 
that Amherst was a ‘former Governor of Bengal’ before taking up his 
assignment to China, thereby insinuating that Amherst had prior firsthand 
‘Asian’ experience (p. 60); in fact, Amherst had been an ambassador to 
the Two Sicilies from 1809 to 1811, and was not appointed governor of 
Bengal until 1823. Kitson further asserted that the embassy of 1816 was 
‘a mechanism disguising Britain’s involvement in the opium trade’, but 
then admits, accurately, that there is no historical evidence in the records 
of the British Government or the East India Company to substantiate 
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such  a  claim (2016, pp. 56–82).9 The present study, which relies on 
extensive archival material, shows that the ‘opium trade’ was never raised 
specifically in any connection with the Amherst Embassy. Markley’s (2016) 
essay suggested that the impoverished state of the Chinese countryside seen 
by the British in 1816, resulting in an inaccurate assessment of poverty 
and backwardness, was caused by the effects of a volcanic eruption on 
the Indonesian island of Sumbawa in April 1815 that critically degraded 
the environment in northern China. Such a claim overlooks the long-
term economic recession experienced during the Jiaqing reign, which 
was characterised by rapid population growth, food shortages, extensive 
ecological degradation of waterways and soil fertility, and inadequate 
government maintenance of canals and rivers (Rowe, 2011).
Kitson also published an article in 2017 on the Amherst Embassy, focusing 
on the ‘catastrophe’ of its reception, which provides a useful short overview 
of the published material and draws heavily on Hevia’s (1995) work in its 
concluding section on ‘The Kowtow Controversy’. Gao Hao has written 
two articles specifically on the Amherst Embassy. Gao (2014) referred to 
British reactions to China on their return journey from Peking to Canton, 
and argued that the embassy enjoyed unprecedented freedom to explore 
the countryside and Chinese cities—a point accepted unconditionally 
by Kitson (2016). Gao’s other article (2016, p. 610) claimed that the 
embassy was marked by a discordant ‘inner kowtow’ debate following 
a division of opinion on the kowtow among the senior members of the 
embassy. Both assertions are not supported by a detailed examination of 
the primary sources.
Eun Kyung Min’s (2004) thought-provoking article examined British 
responses to China at the time of the Amherst Embassy in the context of 
British concepts of commercialism and civility. She made an important 
distinction between the members in the embassy who travelled directly 
from England, who read the kowtow as a mere formality to achieve their 
goals, and the reaction of East India Company men from Canton who 
9  Kitson (2016) stated, ‘Given the importance of the opium trade in funding the Company’s trade 
in tea with China … it is surprising to note that there is no obvious mention of the trade and British 
participation within it, in any of the documents, published or otherwise, relating to the Embassy’ 
(p. 66). I have found a reference in the East India Company records dated 15 November 1815, where 
the Select Committee voiced its concern over the need for more money from the sale of opium ‘to 
meet our demands’, but this appears unconnected with both the initiative for, and the conduct of, 
the specific goals of the Amherst Embassy (Papers consultation with the President and Sir George 
Staunton, dated 15 November 1815, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 2).
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saw the kowtow in Chinese symbolic terms and interpreted it as a sign 
of servitude, unbecoming for a British ambassador to perform (Reverend 
Doctor Morrison, Chief Interpreter on the Amherst Embassy, as quoted 
in Min, 2004, p. 168). One of her themes, namely, Macartney’s belief 
that a Chinese observance of the ‘manners, tempers, and discipline’ at the 
time of his embassy resulted in Chinese admiration for the British nation 
and a love for them as individuals, is developed in the present study as an 
important factor in shaping British perceptions of the likely reception of 
the Amherst Embassy.
Ulrike Hillemann presented a useful and insightful five-page summary 
of the Amherst Embassy in her book, Asian empire and British knowledge 
(2009, pp. 75–80). She concluded that, because of Amherst’s treatment 
at the Qing court, British perceptions of the Chinese emperor changed 
from one of a dignified, rational and enlightened despot to an uncivilised 
Tartar (p. 80), but made no mention of the tribute system’s significance 
in dictating Chinese terms during the diplomatic encounter.
Recent scholarship in English has resulted in several published historical 
accounts of both the Qianlong and Jiaqing reigns that draw extensively 
on Chinese archival sources. Matthew Mosca’s (2013) examination of 
Qing foreign policy initiatives towards Tibet and British India at this 
time provided the background for the broader context of Anglo–Chinese 
international relations, including the decline of Qing military power noted 
during the Anglo–Nepal War (1814–1816) (p. 184). Similarly, Wengsheng 
Wang’s (2014) examination of the internal turmoil confronting the reign 
of the Jiaqing emperor and his response to it in the immediate period 
before the Amherst Embassy was invaluable for illuminating the specific 
context in which the British were received at Peking.
Patrick Tuck’s Introduction to the reprint of Sir George Thomas 
Staunton’s Notes of proceedings and occurrences, during the British embassy 
to Pekin, in 1816 (1824/2000, pp. vii–xlii) remains the most thorough 
and comprehensive examination of the political context of the Amherst 
Embassy. Tuck’s detailed and focused analysis falls on Staunton’s role as 
the second commissioner in the embassy whose advice to Amherst not to 
kowtow before the Jiaqing emperor, Tuck argued, resulted in the embassy’s 
failure (p. vii). His conclusion that the embassy was a ‘fiasco’ denigrates 
Amherst’s reputation and dismisses the embassy as incompetent and 
historically insignificant (p. viii).
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Primary Sources
The author’s lack of Chinese linguistic ability has resulted in this study 
being based on English-language sources only and needing to rely on 
English translations of Chinese documents and edicts published in 
Lo-Shu Fu (1996) and Dun Li (1969). Within this context, this study 
seeks to provide a detailed and comprehensive account of the Amherst 
Embassy from a British perspective that nonetheless highlights the 
profound cultural differences that separated the West and, in this case, 
Britain from China at this time. It also underlines the continued failure 
of European-style diplomacy to engage the Qing court in this period as it 
had during the Macartney Embassy some decades earlier. As a corollary, 
it needs to be noted that the British in the first decades of the nineteenth 
century had very limited access to information on the Qing Government 
and its thinking beyond the immediate and very different environment 
of Canton. The information that they did have at hand is documented 
and presented in the subsequent chapters of this study. It is this body 
of knowledge, taken from British primary sources, that highlights the 
limitations and inadequacies of the ‘intelligence’ available to the British 
in the task they had set themselves. It is important to note that the 
assessments and value judgements about China referred to in this study 
are those of the British observers and commentators writing at this time.
Members of the Amherst Embassy published several accounts of their 
experiences in China on their return to England. Well known to scholars 
and referred to extensively in this study, these include the journal of 
Henry Ellis, Third Commissioner in the embassy, published in 1817 and 
acknowledged as the ‘official’ account of the mission. Clarke Abel, the 
surgeon and naturalist with the embassy, published his account in 1818, 
while Robert Morrison’s Memoir of the embassy was published in 1820. 
Staunton’s Notes of proceedings and occurrences, during the British embassy 
to Pekin, in 1816 was printed privately in 1824. John Francis Davis’s 
account in his Sketches of China, published later in 1841, is also widely 
referenced. The ships of the embassy squadron departed for a survey of the 
Korean coast and the Ryukyu Islands after Amherst disembarked at Dagu, 
and their experiences were subsequently the subject of two published 
accounts. The first was by John M’Leod, the physician on board the 
Alceste, whose book the Voyage of His Majesty’s Ship Alceste was published 
in 1818. Basil Hall, the captain of HMS Lyra, which accompanied the 
Alceste, wrote several versions of his experiences along the Korean coast 
11
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and at the Ryukyu Islands, including Narrative of a voyage to Java, China, 
and the Great Loo-Choo Island published in 1840.10 Reference to these are 
made in passing in this study, but no examination is made of either the 
surveys or British experiences at these places.
This study refers to three unpublished journals that have received little 
attention from historians of the Amherst Embassy. The first is by the 
Rt Hon.  Jeffrey Amherst, Amherst’s 14-year-old son who accompanied 
the embassy as a page to his father, found in the British Library.11 Zhang 
(2013) listed this journal in his bibliography but made no reference to 
it in his text, although he does refer, in passing, to the second resource, 
namely, the ‘Diaries’ of Amherst’s private secretary, Henry  Hayne.12 
William Fanshawe Martin, who travelled with the embassy as a ‘First 
Class Volunteer’ and midshipman on the Alceste, also left an account of his 
experiences in China.13 This is also a rarely referenced resource, although 
Gao (2016) cited it in relation to the kowtow question. A resource 
that appears to be unknown to historians of the embassy is a volume 
of private letters sent to Amherst from his sister, Elizabeth Hale, who 
lived in Canada. While these contain little coverage of his appointment as 
ambassador to China, they are nevertheless valuable for the insight they 
provide into Amherst’s private life (Hall & Shelton, 2002).
The official records of the Amherst Embassy are found in the British 
Library. Historians of the embassy have focused exclusively on the India 
Office Records (IOR) of the East India Company for China 1815–17 
(referred to as the G/12/196, G/12/197 and G/12/198 files),14 which 
include the Papers relating to the embassy to China in the year 1815/1816 
and Papers relating to the embassy to China in the year 1817/1818. Further 
10  Hall had previously published his Account of a voyage of discovery to the west coast of Corea, and 
the Great Loo-choo Island (1818). The present study refers to his Narrative of a voyage to Java, China, 
and the Great Loo-Choo Island: With accounts of Sir Murray Maxwell’s attack on the Chinese batteries, 
and of an interview with Napoleon Bonaparte, at St. Helena (1840/1865).
11  Journal of Jeffrey Amherst, son of Lord Amherst, on his father’s mission to China (n.d.) in BL IOR MSS 
EUR F 140/37. Only a few pages of the original journal have survived. It was transcribed by Constance 
Amherst in February 1870 and is found in the Amherst Papers, BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/37.
12  ‘Diaries of Henry Hayne’ in China through Western eyes: Manuscript records of traders, travellers, 
missionaries and diplomats, 1792-1842 (Vols. 1–4) (1996). Hereafter referred to as ‘Hayne, n.d.’.
13  William Fanshawe Martin, ‘Journal’, Martin Family Papers, 1793-1860, BL ADD MSS 41346-
41475.
14  East India Company Factory Records Part 2. China: India Office Records cited as BL IOR G/12/196 
and BL IOR G/12/197 for April 1815–1817.
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extracts of these files are found in H. B. Morse’s The chronicles of the 
East India Company trading to China, 1635-1834 (1926/1966, Vol. 3), 
covering the period 1805–1820.
The seminal reference for the historical context of the first Anglo–Chinese 
diplomatic encounter is Lord Macartney’s An embassy to China: Lord 
Macartney’s journal 1793–1794, first published in 1962.15 This volume 
contains Macartney’s account of his visit to the court of the Qianlong 
emperor as well as Cranmer-Byng’s detailed notes on Chinese officials and 
the places visited by the embassy. Earlier extracts of Macartney’s journal 
are found in the second volume of Barrow’s (1807) biography of Lord 
Macartney. Barrow’s account of his own impressions of China at the time 
of the Macartney Embassy, Travels in China, first published in 1804, was 
instrumental for influencing the views of China held by the members 
of the Amherst Embassy.
The major primary resources for this study are two other archives, one 
that  has received little or no previous attention from historians of the 
Amherst Embassy, and one that is referred to only by Eastberg (2009) in 
her study of Staunton and Platt, Imperial twilight (2018). The first consists 
of the papers of William Pitt Amherst, 1st Earl of Amherst, found in the 
British Library under the filing code of the BL IOR MSS EUR F 140.16 
The collection includes official and private correspondence and official 
papers covering Amherst’s appointment as envoy to Naples (1809–1811), 
ambassador to China (1815–1817) and his term as governor-general of 
Bengal (1823–1828).
The second archive is housed at Duke University and consists of 
Sir  George  Thomas Staunton’s private letters sent to his parents from 
Canton during his stay in China in the period 1800–1817.17 These letters 
provide valuable insight into conditions at Canton and are similarly 
referred to extensively in this study in Chapter 3 in the period leading to 
15  Cranmer-Byng (1962, pp. xi, 332) records that the original journal remained with Lord 
Macartney’s descendants until sold in 1854. The journal of three volumes remained in a private 
library in England until sold to a private collector in Peking in 1913. In 1917, the volumes were 
sold again and taken to Tokyo where they remained in the Oriental Library. Cranmer-Byng’s (1962) 
transcription represents the first time the journal was published in its entirety.
16  Amherst Papers, BL IOR MSS EUR F 140.
17  Letters from the Papers of George Thomas Staunton to his mother during his time working for 
the East India Company in Canton, Rare Book, Manuscript and Special Collections Library, Duke 
University. Retrieved from www.china.amdigital.co.uk. Hereafter referred to as the ‘Staunton Letters’ 
with the place and date of writing provided where known. I thank Shih-Wen Chen for bringing this 
archive to my attention.
13
1 . INTRODUCTION
the dispatch of the embassy. Staunton’s memoirs, printed privately in 1856, 
are an invaluable resource for his reflective insights into his experiences at 
Canton and his subsequent life in England. His other book, on China’s 
commercial relations with Britain, published in 1821, contains a number of 
useful essays on the state of British trade at Canton.
A slim but interesting primary source not previously cited by historians is 
referred to in this study, namely, Lord Amherst’s ‘Dinner Book’ (in Kent 
History and Library Centre, Amherst Manuscripts: Family Papers, 
U1350-E16), which lists the dinner guests invited to his Mayfair residence 
in the immediate period before and after his mission.
Selected direct quotations from contemporary sources and accounts of 
the embassy written by its members have been used liberally throughout 
this study to convey an accurate sense of period and especially the English 
reaction to an alien environment. One of this study’s objectives is to depict 
as vividly as possible what the ambassadorial party looked like on its progress 
through China and how its members reacted to the daily challenges facing 
them. Direct quotations best achieve this goal. Inevitably, as noted above, 
this study is told from a British perspective, providing their views and 
opinions of China and the Qing court formed at the time.
Some of the personalities associated with the Amherst Embassy are notable 
for several firsts. Staunton’s translation of a pamphlet on inoculation into 
Mandarin in 1805 was the first information on the medical procedure 
available to the Chinese and was later distributed to Chinese officials 
at the time of the Amherst Embassy.18 Morrison, the senior interpreter 
of the embassy who arrived at Canton in 1807, was the first Protestant 
missionary sent to China. He was also the author of A dictionary of the 
Chinese language as well as the translator of several biblical texts into 
Chinese.19 Accounts of the embassy also contain the first reference to 
‘Hong Kong’ island in British sources, as the embassy used Hong Kong 
to replenish its supply of fresh water before sailing to northern China. 
18  In May 1805, the Company’s surgeon, Dr Pearson, received some smallpox vaccine from 
a Portuguese ship recently arrived at Macao (Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, pp. 16–17). Abel (1818, 
pp. 218–219) wrote that Pearson’s first attempts at inoculation were ‘pertinaciously opposed’ but 
were accepted eventually by the Cantonese Government and were strongly supported by the Hong 
merchants.
19  These works included Hora Sinica: Translations from the popular literature of the Chinese (1812); 
A grammar of the Chinese language (1815); A dictionary of the Chinese language: Chinese and English 
arranged according to the radicals (1815); and A view of China for philological purposes, containing a 
sketch of Chinese chronology, geography, government, religion & customs (1817).
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Travelling on board the Alceste was the wife of the boatswain, Mrs Loy, 
arguably the first European woman to visit northern China (M’Leod, 
1818/1820, pp. 133–134).
The members of the embassy subscribed to the earlier views of Macartney 
who made a distinction between the behaviour of ‘the Chinese’ and 
their Manchu or ‘Tartar’ overlords.20 Staunton (1824), for example, 
complained of the ‘puffed-up Tartar family on the throne’ whose uncivil 
and rude conduct was assessed as contrary to every ‘Chinese’ principle of 
conduct (p. 125). Amherst referred to the Qing court as the ‘Tartar court’ 
and the kowtow as the ‘Tartar ceremony’ in his official reports of the 
embassy. Morrison (1839, pp. 8–9) also made this distinction in relation 
to the kowtow ceremony. Similarly, the British attributed the actions of 
Qing court officials or mandarins towards them as governed by a fear 
of incurring the suspicion or disapproval of their superiors who reported 
directly to the emperor (Ellis, 1817, p. 202).
This study examines the Amherst Embassy using a traditional historical 
approach addressing causes, responses and outcomes resulting from 
a brief but intensive encounter between the British and Chinese. Timothy 
Hampton’s (2009) book, Fictions of embassy, is referenced extensively in 
this study for the practices of Westphalian diplomacy and the protocols of 
diplomatic action. Some aspects of the encounter, however, lend themselves 
to inter-disciplinary analysis. Accordingly, the imperial banquet given for 
Amherst on his arrival at Tianjin is examined within an anthropological 
context as this was an occasion rich in ceremony and ritual. Consideration 
is also given to British sensory experiences as the embassy travelled through 
China where alien sights, smells, sounds, tastes and touch had a profound 
impact on the visitors’ sensibilities.21 Reference to the work of sensory 
historians assisted in enabling a greater understanding of British reactions 
and perceptions of China at this time (e.g. Howes & Lalonde, 1991). 
Finally, Richard Sennett’s (1994) book, Flesh and stone, explained the 
importance of bodily comfort as a major factor in the way people respond 
culturally to their environment. His theme that ‘a stressed and unhappy 
experience of our bodies makes us more aware of the world in which we 
live’ (pp. 24–25) is especially relevant, it will be seen, to the conduct of 
the Englishmen of the Amherst Embassy during their time in China.
20  Porter (2001, p. 234) referred to Macartney’s view of the ‘foreignness of the Qing Dynasty’ 
whose rulers were not ‘Chinese’ but Manchu or ‘Tartar’.
21  This study’s main references for placing British reactions to the Chinese sensory environment are 
the essays found in Howes (2005).
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The Political Setting of the 
Amherst Embassy
China’s worldview had a major impact on the fortunes of the Amherst 
Embassy and it is important to understand this context for framing what 
was a significant diplomatic event in Anglo–Chinese relations in the 
opening decades of the nineteenth century. British interest in China at 
this time was based solely on trade and profit and not on territory or 
conquest, unlike its activities in India and elsewhere around the globe. 
The  dispatch of the Amherst Embassy represented a genuine British 
endeavour to negotiate a better trade relationship at Canton and, in 
the event that these negotiations were successful, to secure further trade 
concessions from China.
The Amherst Embassy, like its predecessor the Macartney Embassy of 
1793, was received at the Qing court within the context of the traditional 
tributary system that governed Chinese international relations. The specific 
problems at Canton that initiated the dispatch of both embassies were 
caused by the constraints of the ‘Canton trade system’ established by the 
Qing court by 1760 to both contain and govern expanding European trade 
with China. An understanding of this system, as well as the principles and 
practices enshrined in the Westphalian system of European diplomacy 
that governed British diplomatic actions, provides a vital context for the 
approach, activities and reactions of the Amherst Embassy in its efforts 
to negotiate with the Qing court. Brief outlines of the British East India 
Company (henceforth referred to as ‘the Company’), the political–military 
environment of the Pearl River (on which Canton was situated) in the 
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immediate period before the Amherst Embassy, as well as the importance 
of the growth of British nationalism at this time, are also included to 
provide a wider context for an understanding of the embassy.
The Tribute System
The ‘tribute system’ has been the subject of extensive scholarship and 
debate by Western historians.1 General references define it as ‘a system 
under which foreign states submitted to Chinese suzerainty by exchanging 
gifts for trading privileges in China’, where the emperor, designated the 
Son of Heaven, demanded ‘submission from those outside the empire 
who were considered barbarians’ (Perkins, 1999, p. 533). Foreign 
countries wishing to trade with China sent missions to the Chinese capital 
to submit to the sovereignty of the Chinese emperor, acknowledged by 
performing the kowtow before him. In return, permission was granted 
for the right to trade at stipulated times and designated ports along the 
Chinese coast (Perkins, 1999, p. 533). The tribute system applied to all of 
China’s external relations but for the purposes of this study of the Amherst 
Embassy, the focus is on maritime Southeast Asia, the direction from 
which early Western maritime traders approached China.
O. W. Wolters, in his seminal study of Sino-Malay relations in the 
fourteenth century, explained the manner in which the Chinese emperor 
was perceived as the Son of Heaven that situated him above all other earthly 
sovereigns (1970, pp. 24–25). The emperor’s efficacy was due to his being 
the repository of de (moral power or ‘superior virtue’) that functioned to 
legitimise his authority as well as defining Chinese cultural superiority 
and positioning him above all other sovereigns, who by definition were 
considered inferior or barbarians. Chinese, as well as barbarians, were 
attracted to the concept of de.2 Foreign rulers drawn to de sent periodic gifts 
or tribute brought by envoys in ‘acknowledgment of their cultural homage’ 
1  References on the ‘tribute system’ are numerous and include Andornino (2006), Fairbank 
(1942), Fairbank and Teng (1941) and Hevia (1995). Wills (2009) argued that, by the time of the 
Qing dynasty, the tributary system applied only to a handful of vassal states such as ‘Korea, Ryukyu, 
Vietnam, and Siam’ (p. 182). Nevertheless, for the purposes of this brief summary, reference made to 
the longer historical tradition of the tribute system serves to illustrate its cultural context beyond its 
economic aspect and is useful for a deeper appreciation of its role in Chinese external relations.
2  Staunton’s (1821) translation of the Narrative of the Chinese embassy to the Khan of the Tourgouth 
Tartars, in the years 1712, 13, 14, & 15 refers to the Khan being attracted to China: ‘I have admired 
from afar your heavenly court, and the most excellent and most resplendent virtues of your Emperor; 
the contemplation of such sublime perfection made me wish to draw near, so as actually to behold 
the heavenly countenance’ (p. 204).
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to the Chinese emperor, thus ensuring order and security built up through 
a system of alliances.3 The tribute system rested on an ideological platform 
that distinguished between civilisation and barbarism where compliance 
with correct ritual behaviour was essential for the tribute system’s operation. 
The historian Simon Leys stressed the importance of rites in the Confucian 
order where ‘the true cohesion of a society is secured not through legal 
rules but through ritual observances’ (1997, p. xxv). Wolters (1970) quoted 
Confucius on the nature of de to explain its function in the context of 
ensuring order in international relations:
If such a [well-ordered] state of affairs exists, yet the people of far-
off lands still do not submit, then the ruler must attract them by 
enhancing the prestige [de] of his culture; and when they have been 
truly attracted, he contents them. And where there is contentment 
there will be no upheavals. (p. 25)
The concept of submission and being attracted to embrace Chinese 
culture was an anathema to the British and, it will be seen, the antithesis 
of Westphalian principles. But Wolters explains that the verification of 
the power of de and its efficacy to attract vassal princes made possible the 
formation of an extensive trade network founded on the maritime trade 
routes to China. Emperors who ruled ‘all under heaven’ showed compassion 
to the men who had ‘travelled from afar’ and bestowed protection and 
titles on vassal princes who returned to their homelands with their right 
to rule legitimised by the Chinese emperor and transformed due to their 
contact with Chinese civilisation (Cranmer-Byng, 1962, p. 6). In this way, 
peace resulting from the tribute system operated as an external network of 
control, whereby security and stability reigned in the distant western oceans 
as Chinese influence spread out in a series of concentric circles to embrace 
the outlying petty states of maritime Southeast Asia (Hamashita, 1997).
The tributary system has been described by Richard Smith (2013, pp. 79–81) 
as a highly sophisticated, remarkably flexible and perfectly rational system 
of managing the world. Its specific nature changed in response to different 
historical forces impacting on China at different times; for example, during 
the Yuan dynasty, the power of de was replaced by military force. The historian 
Anthony Reid (1996, p. 17) wrote that in keeping with the Mongol’s view 
as ‘world conquerors’, submission to the emperor was enforced in Java in 
1293 through the dispatch of 20,000 soldiers by Kublai Khan to punish 
3  These are Alexander Woodside’s (1971, p. 235) words used in the context of the Vietnamese 
tributary system, but are applicable to this context.
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King Kertanegara for ‘his insolence’. The tribute system was restructured at 
the time of the Ming dynasty by the Hongwu emperor (r. 1368–1398) who 
restricted foreign maritime trade to official tribute missions and prohibited all 
private overseas trade (Wang, 2003, p. 53).
The incoming Qing dynasty in the seventeenth century adopted the 
essential tenets of the Ming policy, but with the consolidation of Qing rule 
in the early 1680s the Kangxi emperor (r. 1661–1722) issued an important 
and innovative edict that separated trade from tribute.4 A distinction was 
made between traditional tribute vassal states that were still bound by the 
conventions of the tributary system and other non-tributary commercial 
countries that were now permitted to trade with China without having to go 
through the formality of sending an embassy. The tribute system remained, 
however, and the imperial audience represented its core ceremony (Wills, 
2009, p. 2) where visiting ambassadors or princes performed sangui jiukou, 
or ‘three prostrations and nine knockings’ (Rawski, 1998, p. 149) of the 
head (to the ground) before the emperor.5 Trade with vassal states such as 
Siam, for example, continued to operate at the diplomatic level and was 
permitted only at times of periodic missions to the Qing court to pay 
tribute. General, non-tributary trade and maritime trade with Southeast 
Asia now fell entirely into the hands of Chinese native private traders who 
were allowed to travel and trade abroad (Wills, 2009, p. 2).6
A number of Chinese ports were now opened to European trade including 
Shanghai, Ningbo, Dinghai, Wenzhou, Quanzhou, Chaozhou and 
Xiamen (Zhao, 2013, p. 111). English ships started arriving in greater 
numbers by the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries seeking 
Chinese luxury goods for a growing English market, but their numbers 
were still very small as evidenced by the fact that in 1723, for example, only 
four British ships visited Canton (Howard, 1994, p. 24).7 This number is 
in stark contrast with the growth of a massive Asian junk trade carried on 
throughout Chinese ports by native Chinese traders and sailors—a fact 
often lost sight of in Western historical accounts given their emphasis on 
European trade with China at this time.
4  Evelyn Rawski (1998, p. 198) pointed out that the Qing were quick to demonstrate they were 
prepared to carry on Ming state rituals.
5  The British referred to the kowtow ceremony as ‘san-kwei-kew-kow’, referred to as ‘thrice 
kneeling and nine times bowing the head to the ground’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 124).
6  Thai traders of Chinese ethnicity soon learned how to circumvent the official rules and traded 
openly to China as ‘Chinese natives’ using Chinese-style junks (Cushman, 1993, p. 129).
7  The Macclesfield, an English ship, returned from Canton with a cargo of Chinese products in the 
1699–1700 season that was responsible for creating a demand for Chinese luxury products (Howard, 
1994, p. 22).
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The Canton Trade System
Figure 2: Painting by an unknown Chinese artist of the foreign factories 
or ‘hongs’ on the Canton waterfront in 1805 showing the location of the 
British factory situated between the Swedish and Dutch factories.
Source: Wikipedia Commons .
The growth of the chinoiserie craze in Europe, and especially in Britain, in 
the first half of the eighteenth century saw a rapid increase in the number of 
European ships arriving annually at Chinese ports.8 The Qianlong emperor 
responded and, by 1760, edicts had been issued aimed at containing, 
controlling and regulating Western trade with the Chinese empire, which 
remained in effect until the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 at 
the settlement of the First Opium War. Referred to as the ‘Canton trade 
system’ by Western historians, the decree laid down several stipulations for 
Western trade.9 Trade was confined to the port of Canton and permitted 
only between November and March, after which all Western traders had to 
retire to the Portuguese settlement of Macao or return to Europe. Western 
merchants, known as supercargoes, were restricted to a six-acre enclave, 
measuring 400 yards in length and 300 yards in width, on the riverfront 
8  See Van Dyke (2007) for a comprehensive history of Chinese trade with Western nations.
9  For a full account of these regulations, see the Memorial dated 1759 written by the governor-
general of the Liangguang provinces, Li Shiyao, on ‘Five Rules to Regulate Foreigners’ in Li (1969, 
pp. 29–34).
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in the suburbs of southwest Canton where they lived and worked in their 
respective warehouses or national Factories.10 They were forbidden to enter 
the walled city of Canton and foreign women were not allowed. Westerners 
were forbidden to learn or speak Chinese and all communication between 
them and the Chinese Government was conducted only through officially 
appointed Chinese linguists. The reliability and truthfulness of the linguists 
in translating Western concerns and grievances was often suspect, but 
European traders had no other mechanism for reporting these to the 
Chinese Government. A major grievance was the fact that Western traders 
were not protected by a formal treaty governed by rights and obligations, 
nor was there any certainty that guaranteed their continuing presence at 
Canton. Further, periodic transgressions of Chinese law by British sailors 
caused serious disputes between the provincial government and Company 
officials who were understandably opposed to Englishmen being judged 
and sentenced by Chinese law.
The relationship between the Select Committee of the Company, which 
held the British tea monopoly and formed the major British merchant 
institution in China, and local authorities was critical for the wellbeing 
of trade at Canton. The provincial government was in the charge of the 
governor-general or viceroy who presided over the provinces of Guangdong 
and neighbouring Guangxi, and who worked in association with the viceroy 
of Canton (Cranmer-Byng, 1962, p. 8). The most important figure from 
the Company’s Select Committee’s perspective was the Hoppo, or chief 
superintendent of customs, who worked independently of the viceroy 
and was the emperor’s financial representative at Canton. The  Hoppo 
was appointed for three years, having purchased his commission at the 
imperial court. Cranmer-Byng (1962) adds that:
During his term of office [the Hoppo] would have to remit 
considerable sums of money to the Imperial Treasury, to say 
nothing of magnificent ‘presents’ to the highest officials at Court: 
yet during his short period of office as Hoppo he usually managed 
to amass a fortune for himself. (p. 8)
10  A ‘Factory’ refers to a trading establishment in a foreign port and were also known as ‘Hongs’ in 
Canton (Conner, 2009, pp. 4–5). Factory buildings were leased from Chinese Hong merchants and 
built in a European style. The ground floor held the offices, storerooms or godowns, counting rooms 
and facilities for the ‘compradore’ and the servants. The compradore was responsible for food and 
other supplies for the Factory. The public rooms and dining rooms were situated on the first floor, 
while the private and sleeping accommodation of the Company members occupied the second floor. 
Teas were weighed, packed and sealed in crates and sent to the Company ships waiting at Whampoa 
(Crossman, 1991).
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The Hoppo oversaw the small group of licensed Hong merchants 
consisting of 12 members who formed themselves into an association 
known as the co-Hong (Cranmer-Byng, 1962, p. 12). All foreign trade 
at Canton was handled and controlled by co-Hong merchants whose 
members ‘acted together under pressure from the local officials to ensure 
control over the foreign merchants’ (Cranmer-Byng, 1962, p. 12).11 As a 
result of their role as the intermediaries between foreign merchants and 
the provincial government, Hong merchants were often caught in the 
middle between the demands of government officials or mandarins and 
those of the Company. Cranmer-Byng (1962) concludes that the actions 
of the provincial officials were critical for both the supercargoes and 
Hong merchants:
The Supercargoes were constantly afraid that the Co-Hong 
merchants would be used by the Canton officials as an even more 
efficient tool for ‘squeezing’ the foreign merchants. Its members 
were exposed to the greed and extortion of the local officials, 
especially the Hoppo and his crew, and bankruptcies were 
frequent. (p. 12)
Nevertheless, the historian Paul van Dyke has evaluated the Canton 
trade system as an extremely sophisticated and successful mechanism for 
controlling and regulating the great amount of Western trade conducted 
through Canton, where commerce flourished, foreign investment flowed 
into the port and foreigners ‘were attracted to China in increasing 
numbers’ (2011, p. 3). From the Company’s perspective, however, the 
system became intolerable at times, specifically because the supercargoes 
were ‘at the mercy of the whims of the local officials’ and because they 
did not have any mechanism of appeal to the emperor (Cranmer-Byng, 
1962, p. 13).12
11  Cushman (1993, p. 29) added that, in addition to the Hong merchants who were in charge 
of Western shipping, two other co-Hong merchants were delegated at this time; one was in charge 
of Siamese tribute and trade, and one was in charge of the native coastal trade from Fukien and 
Chaozhou arriving and departing at Canton.
12  This assessment applies to the period before the Macartney Embassy, but it will be seen that it 
was just as applicable at the time of the Amherst Embassy.
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The Westphalian System of 
European Diplomacy
A diplomatic exchange at the Qing court at the time of the Amherst 
Embassy was fraught with difficulties due to the difference in British and 
Chinese values and the institutional practices governing their respective 
diplomatic processes. The British approach was governed by the principles 
of the Westphalian system of diplomacy established in 1648 by the Treaty 
of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in Europe (Hampton, 
2009, p. 116).13 Fundamental to its operation was the concept of all 
sovereign nation states, regardless of size or power, being treated equally 
under international law. The ambassador’s main task was to uphold his 
sovereign’s honour at a foreign court (Mattingly, 1995/2010, p. 211).
Westphalian diplomacy, according to the historian Tim Hampton, involves 
three forms of action governed by set customs, ritual and law. The first is 
negotiation, which is the chief function of the ambassador, where the role 
of language as the message transmitter is fundamental in cross-cultural 
exchanges in addition to the need to understand gestures and body 
language. Therefore, diplomacy is not only a cultural exchange, but also 
a site of ‘linguistic negotiation’ (Hampton, 2009, pp. 5–6). This process 
is the most fragile of political encounters. The British travelled to the 
Qing court in 1816 to appeal to the emperor and conduct negotiations 
that would place trade at Canton on a more reliable basis. Included in the 
ambassadorial party were a number of Mandarin-speaking Englishmen 
who it was hoped would facilitate this process.
The second form of action taking place within Westphalian diplomacy 
is mediation, which, in a Western context, refers to the axiom that the 
interests of one party affects the interests of all parties (Hampton, 2009, 
p. 8). Again, the British were hopeful that their goal of greater trade with 
China and subsequent economic gains would be recognised as beneficial 
to both parties.
13  This system saw 176 plenipotentiaries from 194 European rulers codify laws between sovereign 
states based on the principle of the law between nations (Hampton, 2009, p. 117).
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The third form of action is representation, which refers to the complex 
question of who, precisely, the ambassador is representing (Hampton, 
2009, p. 8). This was a fundamental issue in the context of the Amherst 
Embassy where instructions were received from both the British 
Government and the Company Directors.
Ultimately, Western diplomacy centred on the principle that the person 
of the ambassador stood for the persona of the sovereign they represented 
when visiting another prince. An ambassador was invested further with 
political authority to speak on behalf of their sovereign at another court 
where the status of both sovereigns, in theory, was equal (Hampton, 
2009, p. 10). Diplomatic locations were important sites of action and 
agency where an ambassador, while an intruder, had the inviolable right 
‘to travel to and from his destination’ without being molested (Hampton, 
2009, p. 75). This space was extremely difficult for the ambassador who 
was situated outside the geographical and legal confines of their own 
country and was dependent on the goodwill of foreigners for safe passage. 
Their power was endowed by those whom they represented and their 
reception depended on their host’s recognition of the status of those who 
sent them. Both their behaviour and demeanour were important. Bodily 
appearance and actions, such as gestures, movements and dress, together 
with language were prescribed by protocols of reception and underpinned 
diplomatic engagements. Ultimately, an ambassador was judged by 
their hosts through the manner in which they presented themselves 
while representing another (Hampton, 2009, p. 9). The notion of the 
inviolability of the personage of an ambassador is a basic principle of 
Western diplomatic protocol. Their special status and that of their retinue 
renders the personnel of the embassy ‘untouchable’ and ‘sacred’ and 
serves to separate and isolate them from their host society. Individual 
perceptions and interpretations of the host society and culture made at 
the time of a diplomatic reception are governed by emotions formed 
under the pressures and outcomes of diplomatic encounters. The nature 
of Amherst’s reception at the Summer Palace of Yuanmingyuan, it will be 
seen, was instrumental in the British reappraising their ideas of the Qing 
court and China.
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The British East India Company14
A distinction needs to be made between British trade with China 
conducted by private merchants, known as the Country Trade, and the 
members of the Company. Private merchants from India exported large 
quantities of textiles and brought opium into China. Silver received from 
these sales was, in turn, exchanged for bank notes issued by the Company 
and drawn on banks in India and London. In the absence of a Chinese 
demand for British goods, tea could only be procured with payment in 
silver. The principal business of the Company was its highly profitable 
monopoly of the tea trade, which was reaffirmed in 1813 at the time of the 
British Parliament renewing the Company’s charter (Morse, 1926/1966, 
vol. 3, p. 204).15 Taxes from the sale of tea paid an estimated £4 million 
into the coffers of the British Government at the time of the Amherst 
Embassy (Staunton, 1822, p. 167).
The British East India Company was an amalgamation of two companies 
formed in 1708, namely, the joint-stock ‘Governor and Company of 
Merchants of London Trading to the East Indies’ formed in 1600 and 
the ‘The English Company Trading to the East Indies’ founded in 1698. 
Known as ‘The United Company of Merchants of England Trading 
into the East Indies’, it henceforth controlled all direct trade between 
England and Asia. The Company was governed by a 24-member Court 
of Directors, elected by stockholders. Decisions were made at East India 
House, located in Leadenhall Street, London.
The Regulating Act of 1783 and India Act of 1784 placed the affairs of 
the Company under a Board of Control of six members appointed 
by the British  Government in charge of overseeing the governance 
of India. The head of the board during discussion on the inception of 
the Amherst Embassy was Lord Buckinghamshire, who died of a heart 
attack two days before the mission departed Portsmouth for China.16 His 
place was taken by George Canning, one of Amherst’s closest friends. 
The Company’s management at Canton was conducted by a three-
14  Specific references on the British East India Company at Canton include Bowen (2006), 
Greenberg (1969), Keay (1991), Philips (1940), Van Dyke (2007) and Wakeman Jr (1978). For an 
in-depth study of the Company in India, see Dalrymple (2019).
15  Trade between England and India was opened to free traders at this time.
16  Buckinghamshire had been in ill health and had taken the waters at Bath in the week preceding 
his death. He died while riding in Hyde Park (Charles Grant to Amherst, 13 April 1816, in BL IOR 
MSS EUR F 140/38 (a)).
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member Select  Committee headed by the president of the committee. 
Extraordinary matters concerning Company ships or decisions on the 
dispatch of an embassy were managed by a small Secret Committee of 
three or four members sitting in London. Their instructions to the Select 
Committee at Canton were relayed via the ships of the season, which 
took six months to reach their destination. Therefore, the turnaround for 
responses and reporting on the latest developments was 12 months.
The British Factory at Canton housed 22 members in 1812.17 These 
included eight supercargoes and three writers. Supercargoes were 
responsible for the ‘Indiamen’ that anchored each trading season at the 
island of Whampoa, 12 miles downstream from Canton. In 1812, these 
numbered between 20 and 30 ships whose respective crews added up to 
thousands of British sailors who visited the European enclave of Canton 
on leave and were often involved in altercations with local people. The 
smooth operation of the trade was dependent on relationships ‘either 
direct or indirect, verbal or by letter’ between the members of the 
Company Select Committee and the provincial government (Staunton, 
1822, p. 196). Many of the earlier restrictions imposed by the Canton 
system had been relaxed by 1815, but serious altercations arising from the 
Anglo–French war played out in the waters of the Pearl River, inevitably 
arousing Chinese mistrust and suspicion of British actions and motives 
in this trade-rich maritime environment.
The Pearl River Setting
Western ships coming to trade at Canton stopped outside Macao where 
captains were issued with a permit and allocated a Chinese pilot who 
navigated the ship to its up-river anchorage at Whampoa. The island of 
Lingding was the first notable landmark seen after leaving Macao and was 
important as the designated mooring place for foreign warships, which 
were prohibited by Chinese law from proceeding any further into the 
Pearl River Delta.
17  Apart from the three members who made up the Select Committee, others were in charge of 
weighing teas, keeping the books and copying Consultation Books. Also included was an inspector 
of teas, Samuel Ball, and his assistant; a surgeon and his assistant; and the Reverend Doctor Robert 
Morrison, translator and teacher of Chinese (Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, pp. 176–177).
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Figure 3: Map of the Pearl River estuary showing the locations of 
Macao, the Bocca Tigris and Whampoa island where Western ships 
anchored and loaded cargoes.
Source: CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU.
The route to Canton commenced at the narrows of the Pearl River 
situated at the northern end of the estuary called the Bocca Tigris (‘Tiger’s 
Mouth’) or the ‘Bogue’, which was guarded by three Chinese forts 
at its entrance.18 The deterrent power of the forts for British warships 
was minimal. Commodore George Anson was suitably dismissive when 
visiting Canton during his voyage around the world in 1741–1742, and 
wrote of a ‘motley band’ from one of the forts who tried unsuccessfully to 
stop his illegal entry into the river (1790).
18  One fort was situated on two west-lying islands, while the other two sat at the foot of a larger 
island on the eastern side of the Bogue (Conner, 1997, p. 21).
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Navigation on the Pearl River was difficult due to numerous sandbars, 
tidal patterns and thousands of junks housing Tanka families and others 
engaged in the vast domestic coastal trade that crowded the river. Arrival 
at Whampoa revealed the sight of Western ships at anchor surrounded 
by sampans engaged in the unloading and loading of cargoes, especially 
tea. A British naval officer, James Johnson, who visited Canton in 1804, 
described the scene in terms coloured by national pride:
In viewing the various national flags flying on board their respective 
ships at Whampoa, it is highly gratifying to Englishmen’s feelings, 
to observe the British, superior in numbers to all others collectively; 
while each individual ship, like a colossal emblem of the British 
commerce, appears to look down with contempt on the pigmy 
representatives of other nations that surround her. (1806, p. 63)
Johnson approached Canton at night and marvelled at the lights of the 
city and the number of boats surrounding the foreshore, as well as:
The din of the Chinese language on every side; the clangour of 
their gongs, the shrill noise of their music, the glare of their fire 
works, all combine to form a scene so novel and striking, that 
the impression which it leaves on one’s memory, can hardly ever 
be erased afterwards. (p. 65)
His arrival at the wharf outside the British Factory at Canton evoked 
a greater reaction. Johnson used italics to describe a scene where 
‘the  inhabitants, language, manners, customs, even the houses, [and] 
manufactures’ were ‘so specifically different’ from what he had seen before 
that he ‘could almost fancy’ himself ‘transported into a new world’ (p. 65).
Political–Military Factors: The Macao 
Expeditions of 1802 and 1808
A fundamental historical difference between the Macartney Embassy 
and Amherst Embassy was that the latter took place at the conclusion 
of a period of total war. International conflict arising from British wars 
with France and her ally Spain resulted in tensions being played out in 
Chinese territorial waters. An expedition of French and Spanish warships 
threatened Company ships in 1799, resulting in the introduction of 
a convoy system conducted by the Royal Navy that escorted British ships 
to St Helena (Wood, 1940, p. 139). A treaty signed between France and 
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Portugal, which henceforth closed all Portuguese ports to British ships, 
prompted the governor-general of Bengal in 1802 to send six British 
warships carrying an expeditionary force of Indian Sepoys to occupy 
Macao to prevent the settlement falling into French hands, which would 
have had disastrous effects for Company trade (Wood, 1940, p. 139).19 
The  Portuguese authorities objected, fearing that Macao ‘would be 
lost forever’ if they accepted British assistance (Wang, 2014, p. 236).20 
British troops were denied permission to land and the Jiaqing emperor, 
understandably suspicious of British intentions, ordered the immediate 
departure of the troops from Chinese waters. The British refused, their 
ships remained anchored near Macao and trade was suspended. News of 
peace between Britain and France following the Treaty of Amiens (1802) 
reached Macao soon afterwards and the troops withdrew.21 British actions, 
however, had sent a clear message to the emperor of their willingness to 
act decisively and use military force, if necessary, to safeguard the Canton 
trade. The Jiaqing emperor had been alarmed but, according to Wang 
(2014), was reassured by reports from Macao that ‘no foreign countries, 
including Britain, could menace the dynasty’ (p. 237).22 The Portuguese 
at Macao also stepped up their campaign of spreading invidious 
reports of British intentions on the settlement at this time, alerting the 
Chinese Government to their ‘captious and deceitful’ intentions while 
masquerading as mere traders (Wood, 1940, p. 144).
A more serious dispute arose between the British and local Chinese 
authorities due to the British military occupation of Macao in 1808. 
Executed in response to a potential French threat as well as rampant local 
pirate activity in the Pearl River that threatened Company shipping and 
personnel, the governor-general of Bengal sent Admiral Drury with 300 
19  The British had learned as early as 1778 that France and Portugal had held negotiations for the 
cession of Macao to France. For a full account of problems at Macao due to British military action in 
1802 and 1808, see Wang (2014, pp. 236–244).
20  The Portuguese had been permitted to establish a trading base at Macao in 1557 and remained 
the only Europeans with a foothold in China until the Treaty of Nanking (1842) following the First 
Opium War ceded the island of Hong Kong to Britain.
21  Wood (1940) wrote that news of the treaty saved the Select Committee from making a ‘catastrophic’ 
decision as Wellesley, governor-general of Bengal, was about to send instructions to seize Macao by force. 
This would have placed the committee in an untenable position. Wood contended that Wellesley’s order 
would not have been obeyed, as to do so would have confirmed Chinese suspicions of British intentions 
and placed the English in ‘just as bad a light as the French’ (p. 143).
22  The Jiaqing emperor’s assessment is in stark contrast to his great grandfather, the Kangxi 
emperor, who stated with great foresight in 1716, ‘Certainly ships from Western countries may sail to 
China if they wish, though I suspect that the countries in the Western Ocean will become a threat 
to China in one hundred years’ (as quoted in Zhao, 2013, p. 153).
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troops to occupy Macao.23 Arriving on 11 September 1808 without prior 
notice to either the Chinese or Portuguese authorities, the troops were 
refused permission to land whereupon Drury took matters into his own 
hands and ordered their occupation of Macao on 21 September (Fu, 
1966, vol. 2, p. 603). Following a series of complicated negotiations 
between the Select Committee and local government, trade at Canton 
was stopped on 8 October (Wood, 1940, p. 148). Drury endeavoured to 
arrange a meeting with the viceroy of Canton to resolve matters and to 
explain the British position, but his overtures were rejected. In response, 
Drury illegally entered the Pearl River in three heavily armed vessels, 
endeavouring to intimidate the Chinese to lift their embargo on trade. 
When this failed, he set off for Canton in an effort to meet the viceroy 
(Wang, 2014, p. 242). Nearing Canton, Drury found his passage blocked 
by Chinese war junks holding thousands of troops who fired on him and 
his military escort. A British soldier was injured, but Drury’s order for his 
troops to return fire was not heard and he decided to withdraw at this 
time and retreated down river. He claimed later that he had held back 
deliberately, telling the president of the Select Committee: 
I never would consent to the slaughter of these defenceless 
multitudes [the people of Canton]; but if their commerce required 
to be supported by hostilities, and that if a single seaman of mine 
was killed, I would level Canton to the ground. (as quoted in 
Barrow, 1817b, p. 416)
Meanwhile, Chinese troops had massed around Canton and Macao with 
orders to set fire to British ships anchored at Whampoa and Macao. After 
further protracted negotiations, Drury decided to depart and withdrew 
his troops from Macao. Claiming a victory over the Royal Navy, the 
Chinese erected a pagoda to commemorate their success.
The Jiaqing emperor, angered by British actions, issued an edict 
condemning the occupation as an affront to Chinese sovereignty and 
dismissing British fears of a possible French invasion of Macao. Any 
aggressive French action, the emperor declared, would be met with 
Chinese military force where ‘we would immediately send our mighty 
army to suppress and annihilate them in order to maintain our maritime 
23  Wang (2014) wrote of the piracy threat, ‘By the end of 1808, the pirate confederation even 
threatened to attack Canton after destroying almost half of the Qing fleet in Guangdong’ (p. 240). 
Foreign merchants travelling between Macao and Canton were in constant danger of being attacked 
and had to be escorted by armed guards.
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defence’ (Imperial edict dated 14 November 1808 in Fu, 1966, vol. 1, 
p. 372). Regardless of the emperor’s grandiose claims, Chinese concerns 
about British strategic intentions towards China had firmly registered. 
This fear, according to the British historian Herbert Wood (1940, p. 139), 
was the reason for the Jiaqing emperor’s stand against Amherst.
British Nationalism and the Monarchy
The period between the Macartney and Amherst embassies (1793–1816) 
saw fundamental changes in Britain with the growth of nationalism 
centring on a veneration for the institution of the British monarchy. 
Historians have noted the construction of a patriotic identity that was 
inextricably connected with George III as the ‘father’ of the nation in 
which ‘affection for the monarch’ became a crucial test of British identity 
(Russell, 1995, p. 5). Explained largely as a response to the shock attack on 
the French monarchy during the French Revolution, Linda Colley (1984) 
wrote that celebrating the British monarch was ‘a way of celebrating 
the nation’s liberty as against the military despotism of France and the 
subservience of her satellite nations in Europe’ (p. 121).
British victory over France in 1814 and, ultimately, in 1815, promoted 
Britain to the rank of the world’s leading power. A shift in British values 
and concerns is reflected in the difference between the choice of personnel 
of the Macartney and Amherst embassies. The Macartney Embassy, 
which included scientists, mathematicians and other representatives of 
the sciences and technology, represented enlightenment concerns with the 
rational collating and measuring of cultural differences and artistic practices 
(Clingham, 2015). Eastberg (2009, pp. 39–46) argued that Staunton 
remained a man of the enlightenment due to his peculiar education in 
the classics and sciences. The other men of the Amherst Embassy, which 
included a large contingent of Company men from Canton, more closely 
reflected Regency values and were concerned primarily with pragmatic 
and material interests founded on commerce, signifying Britain’s 
ascendency in manufacturing and trade, as well as a commitment to duty 
and respect for the institution of the British monarchy. Amherst, it will 
be seen, was above all a courtier of St James’s; his paramount loyalty was 
to his sovereign whose honour had to be defended at all costs. Further, his 
time at St James’s and earlier posting at the Italian court of the Two Sicilies 
(1809–1811) had given him firsthand experience of European courtly 
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protocols and procedures. Amherst, unlike Macartney who had been 
governor of Madras, had no prior experience of eastern courts but came 
to the Qing court well versed in English and Continental court protocol, 
confident in the knowledge that he was the representative of the sovereign 
of the world’s greatest power and would be received with honour. The 
importance of rank and honour for governing British behaviour in early 
nineteenth century aristocratic and military culture has been pointed out 
by historians (e.g. Bell, 2008, p. 36). Amherst, it will be seen, was not 
disposed to be relegated by his Chinese hosts to the inferior status of 
a tributary envoy from a vassal state.
Insight into British thinking on the connection between diplomacy 
and commerce at the time of the Amherst Embassy is found in Robert 
Morrison’s (1820, p. 7) introductory remarks to his memoir of the 
Amherst Embassy. Morrison contended that improvement and progress 
for both individuals and independent nations was founded on an amiable 
intercourse with each other based on the principles of international law.24 
Governments who aspired to this goal while pursuing the good of their 
own country deserved the ‘thanks of Mankind’ (Morrison, 1820, p. 7). 
Commercial intercourse fostered the improvement of the ‘temporal 
condition’ of all, but only if it was conducted on the basis of equality 
and mutual reciprocity (Morrison, 1820, p. 8). Because the products of 
the earth were not evenly distributed between countries, it was the duty 
of governments to exert their influence on the leaders of other nations 
to alert them to the benefits of trade. Trade benefitted the farmers and 
manufacturers of all countries engaged in commerce, resulting in mutual 
improvement and progress.
Such beneficial results were possible only under conditions founded on 
equality and reciprocity, free of the control of slave owners or despotic 
lords: ‘The idea that one owes and yields homage to the other is likely 
to be prejudicial to the fair commercial intercourse between the two 
nations’ (Morrison, 1820, p. 8). The Chinese custom of the kowtow, 
if not mutually reciprocated, expressed in the strongest manner 
‘the  submission and the homage of one person or state to another’. 
Morrison concluded that it should be carried out only by those European 
nations who ‘consider themselves tributing and yielding homage to China’ 
24  Staunton (1821) wrote that because the Chinese were ‘surrounded by barbarous tribes, and in 
great measure protected from their incursions by natural boundaries, they have neither had occasion 
for, nor the opportunity of learning, any of the principles of that inter-national law’ (p. vi).
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(Morrison, 1820, p. 8). The British Government, however, acted as every 
civilised government should act when endeavouring to cultivate a good 
understanding and liberal intercourse with China, and would never yield 
homage to China (Morrison, 1820, p. 8). British identity in this period 
was based on a strong belief in liberty, the institution of Parliament and 
the perceived rationality of the British people. David Armitage (2000) 
described the ideology of the British people at this time as one founded 
on Protestant values, the idea of progress and the freedom of maritime 
commerce. Porter similarly demonstrated that the British held the ideal of 
a healthy and unobstructed commerce, protected and encouraged by the 
state, leading to progress and economic wellbeing (Porter, 2001, p. 201). 
These categories, representing the British paradigm of the time, were 
the antithesis of Chinese values and attitudes and inevitably formed the 
context in which the British judged Qing control of society, commerce 
and trade (Porter, 2001, p. 201). British views of Chinese indifference to 
foreign trade, and their confinement of the British to the port of Canton, 
described by Staunton (1822, p. 192) as ‘a frontier town, on the remotest 
verge of the Asiatic continent’ where they lived under ‘a highly jealous, 
despotic, and arbitrary’ government, inevitably created severe tensions 
and cultural clashes between the British and Chinese. The part these 
tensions played in giving rise to proposals for the dispatch of another 
British embassy to China is outlined in the following chapter.
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Origins of the Amherst 
Embassy: Canton and Sir 
George Thomas Staunton
Historians have traditionally assessed Sir George Thomas Staunton’s 
importance in the Amherst Embassy within the narrow context of his 
advice to Amherst to not kowtow before the Jiaqing emperor. While this 
advice was critical to the outcome of the embassy, Staunton’s very significant 
role in the 16-year period leading eventually to the decision to dispatch 
an embassy in 1816 has been largely overlooked. Reference to Staunton’s 
private letters written to his parents during his time as a servant of the 
Company at Canton from 1800 to 1817 provides a firsthand account of 
the specific conditions at Canton under which trade was conducted, as 
well as his role in the British decision to dispatch an embassy to the Qing 
court in 1816. Staunton, it will be seen, was a highly motivated individual 
who was determined to live up to the high expectations of his parents and 
mentors, namely, Lord Macartney and John Barrow. His shyness, social 
ineptness and intense dislike of the boisterous drinking culture of the 
British Factory, notable at the time of his early years at Canton, resulted 
in his taking refuge in the study of Chinese law, literature and Mandarin. 
Staunton’s importance for the Amherst Embassy is traced in this chapter 
on a number of levels, dating from the time of his arrival at Canton as 
a junior writer with the Company, until his final departure from Canton 
in January 1817 as president of the Select Committee following the 
conclusion of the Amherst Embassy.
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Figure 4: Portrait of Sir George Thomas Staunton at 52 years of age.
Note: Engraving after painting by Sir George Hayer in 1833 .
Source: LibraryThing (www .librarything .com/gallery/author/stauntonsirgeorge) .
First and significantly, Staunton exerted a strong influence on the views 
of his friend and mentor John Barrow, the second secretary to the Admiralty, 
who was the man most responsible in 1815 for advocating the need for an 
embassy to the Qing court. Staunton corresponded regularly with Barrow 
on the desirability of a follow-up to Macartney’s Embassy and provided 
him with both reports and assessments to support this view. Second, 
Barrow thought that Staunton’s unique knowledge of China, command 
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of the Chinese language and experience in dealing with local officials at 
Canton was the key to a successful mission to the Qing court where the 
Macartney Embassy had been lacking and consequently failed. Moreover, 
Staunton enjoyed a reputation as Britain’s leading sinologist with the 
publication in 1810 of his translation of the Chinese penal code under 
the title Ta Tsing Leu Lee. Third, Staunton exploited his unique position 
at Canton to acquire information on the Qing court that was denied to 
other Westerners. His systematic intelligence collection came from several 
sources including high-ranking mandarins, Hong merchants and Catholic 
missionaries based at Peking, as well as official Chinese publications 
originating in Peking. Taken together, these uniquely informed Staunton, 
who in turn informed Barrow of an embassy’s prospects at the Qing 
court and revealed the state of British knowledge of Chinese attitudes to 
foreigners in the period before the Amherst Embassy. Finally, Staunton’s 
great personal ambition, apart from making a substantial fortune at 
Canton, was to return to Peking in some capacity with a British embassy, 
preferably as its leader. To expedite his chances, Staunton drew up plans 
for another embassy, namely, in 1800–1801 and 1809–1810. Both plans 
were dismissed by the Court of Directors of the Company, for reasons 
that will be discussed in the first part of this chapter, who preferred to let 
matters rest with the status quo. The second part of the chapter focuses 
on the disputes at Canton in the immediate period of 1812–1814, where 
Staunton played a pivotal role and the Court of Directors finally became 
convinced of the need to finance an embassy to Peking.
George Thomas Staunton (1781–1859)
George Thomas Staunton was born at Salisbury on 26 May 1781. 
His father, Sir George Leonard Staunton, had left England in January of 
that year accompanying Lord Macartney on his posting as governor 
of Madras and did not see his son until his return to England in 1784.1 
The boy’s education and welfare, Staunton wrote later, became the ‘the 
master purpose of my father’s mind’ (1856, p. 3). Staunton was educated 
at home in the classics and sciences and spoke to his father only in Latin. 
1  Sir G. L. Staunton was appointed Macartney’s secretary in 1780, proceeded to India at the time 
of Macartney’s appointment as governor of Madras and, while there, negotiated a peace settlement 
with the Tipu Sultan of Mysore that ended the Second Anglo–Mysore War in India (see Cranmer-
Byng, 1962, p. 307; Eastberg, 2009, pp. 26–37).
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The Percy anecdotes (Vol. 3) referred in 1826 to the young Staunton at the 
time of the Macartney Embassy’s return voyage from China to England 
in 1794 where the boy:
was on the deck of the Lion with his father … who imagining 
that a French man of war was going to engage them, desired his 
son in Latin … to go down below deck. ‘Mi Pater, nunquam te 
desseram’. ‘My father, I will never forsake you’, was the spirited 
and affectionate reply. (p. 112)
One of Staunton’s tutors during the Macartney Embassy (1792–1794) 
was John Barrow, who had been appointed the comptroller in charge 
of the presents sent by George III to the Qianlong emperor, on the 
recommendation of Staunton’s father (Staunton, 1856, p. 9).
Participation in the Macartney Embassy defined the careers of not only 
Barrow, but also of Sir George and his son.2 Staunton senior had hoped to 
remain in Peking as the resident minister for England after the departure 
of the embassy, but had to return to England at the time of its premature 
dismissal from Peking. An opportunity to return to Peking as the minister 
plenipotentiary in a proposed embassy to China in 1796 following the 
Qianlong emperor’s invitation for another British mission to visit Peking 
was shelved after Staunton senior suffered a ‘paralytic seizure’ (Staunton, 
1856, p. 16). Similarly, as noted above, Staunton became a widely known 
celebrity as the boy who spoke to the Qianlong emperor in Mandarin and 
received a gift of a small golden silk purse from the emperor’s own hands 
(G. L. Staunton, 1797b, p. 348).
Young George Staunton entered Trinity College, Cambridge, at age 16 to 
read ‘Arts and Manufactures’ under Professor Farish. He lived off campus 
with his parents and mixed socially with senior academics, rather than 
with students of his own age.3 However, Staunton senior withdrew his son 
from the university after only two terms in protest when he was awarded 
with the second, and not the first prize, in the first-year examinations. 
The family, while moderately wealthy and possessing landed  estates in 
Ireland, did not have the financial resources for young Staunton to pursue 
an independent lifestyle befitting his station. His father, Staunton wrote, 
2  Sir G. L. Staunton’s (1797a) book was acknowledged as the official account of the embassy.
3  Staunton spent his summer holidays with his cousins, the children of the Reverend and Mrs 
Brodie, near Salisbury, just before he entered Cambridge. He wrote that this was a most enjoyable 
time and represented the only occasion where his father ‘allowed me of freely associating with young 
persons of about my own age’ (Staunton, 1856, p. 19).
37
3 . ORIGINS OF THE AMHERST EMBASSY
now thought that ‘an appointment in the service of the Company might 
still enable me to follow up my early introduction to Chinese diplomacy, 
and to acquire honour and distinction in that career’ (Staunton, 1856, 
p.  17). Staunton’s great ambition to lead another British embassy to 
China, doubtless influenced by his father’s ambitions for him, was formed 
at this time.
Staunton’s application to join the Company ranks was not a straightforward 
process. His appointment as a junior writer was secured only after some 
intense lobbying by both Macartney and Sir George promoting his 
cause as the only Englishman who knew Mandarin. The appointment 
was very unpopular within the Company and drew criticisms of ‘undue 
interference with private patronage’ as the lucrative post of writer was 
reserved traditionally for the sons and relatives of Company Directors 
(Staunton, 1856, p. 17). The position paid £2,000 a year (equivalent 
to approximately £200,000 in today’s values), yet Staunton found this 
barely enough to cover daily living expenses at Canton and Macao, and 
he sought extra funds from his parents to provide loans on high interest 
to Hong merchants.4
Staunton embarked on the Indiaman, Hindostan, for the six-month 
journey to China on 18 June 1799. His father wrote to him the next day:
I still believe that I have fallen upon the best, or at least the most 
likely, means of providing for your future happiness, but it is not 
the most happy for me to be thus separated from you … but you 
will finally return [from China] I hope, with a competent fortune. 
(Staunton, 1856, p. 23)
Staunton arrived in China in January 1800 and discovered that his fame 
as the 12-year-old English boy who had held a brief conversation with the 
Qianlong emperor at the time of the Macartney Embassy had gone before 
him. He was visited immediately on landing at Macao by Father Marchini, 
the chief cleric in charge of the Roman Catholic Mission.5 Marchini, 
recently returned from Peking, remembered speaking to Staunton in 
Mandarin in 1793 (Staunton Letters, Macao, 20 January 1800). Staunton 
4  Staunton wrote in his memoirs (1856) of a salary increase from £2,000 as a writer to £10,000 
on promotion to a supercargo in 1804 (pp. 32–33). See fn. 31 of this chapter for further information 
on Staunton’s loans to Hong merchants.
5  Staunton (1822, p. 81) recorded that John Baptist Marchini, was a ‘highly esteemed and 
venerated ecclesiastic’ whose ‘liberal conduct and conciliating manners have gained him the general 
esteem of the Europeans in China’.
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was also visited by two leading Hong merchants, Puankhequa and Chung 
Qua, on arrival at Canton.6 Such a visit to the most junior member of 
the British Factory was unprecedented but, as Staunton told his parents, 
they ‘knew of my speaking Chinese and one of them [Chung Qua] 
conversed with me in Chinese for half an hour’ (Staunton Letters, Canton, 
25 January 1800). Another mandarin of ‘considerable rank’, whose name 
is not known, also invited Staunton and the Company doctor to visit 
him using the pretext of attaining a consultation for an eye complaint. 
The mandarin, Staunton wrote, received them with:
great complacency and good nature and addressing himself to 
me in Chinese declared that he recollected very well to have seen 
me when the Embassy was at Pekin and eagerly asked in return 
whether I did not recollect him also, which from civility I could not 
absolutely deny though I did not retain any remembrance of him, 
or was it likely that I should. During dinner he enquired after the 
health of the first Embassador and of the Second Commissioner 
… and where they resided and what stations they now filled in 
their Native country. (Staunton Letters, Macao, 26 May 1800)
Staunton enjoyed few other social occasions at Canton. At just 19 he 
held not only the most junior position at the British Factory but was 
also the youngest member among his 13 compatriots. His singular 
upbringing and previous life in England ill-prepared him for the society 
of an all-male expatriate culture of heavy drinking sessions and boisterous 
behaviour and he recorded in his memoirs that his first two years at 
Canton were ‘the most gloomy period of my life’ (Staunton, 1856, p. 25). 
‘I was singularly unprepared’, he wrote, ‘for those collisions which must 
always tend a youth’s first initiation in mixed society’ (Staunton, 1856, 
p. 25). He told his parents at the time that ‘[I] felt the greatest stranger 
amongst them’ and was ‘pretty well guarded against the temptations of the 
Canton table’ (Staunton Letters, Macao, 12 May 1800). Fortunately for 
British sinology, Staunton devoted his leisure time at the British Factory 
to studying Mandarin and Chinese literature.
6  The former is likely to be, in Van Dyke’s (2011) romanisation, Poankeequa II (Pan Youdu). 
The latter, likely to be Conqua in Van Dyke’s (2011) romanisation, is more difficult to identify. For a 
discussion on possible people see Van Dyke (2011, pp. 325–362).
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Propitiously, Staunton had arrived at Canton at the time of a major legal 
dispute between the Select Committee and local government. Known as 
the Providence affair, it concerned a Chinese boatman who had drowned 
while attempting to cut the cable and steal the anchor of a British 
ship moored at Whampoa. The subsequent demand by the Chinese 
authorities for the handover of the British sailor who had fired under 
orders over the head of the would-be thieves, thus causing the victim 
to jump overboard and drown, was rejected by the Select Committee. 
Staunton was engaged by the Company to interpret at the ensuing trial 
held before the senior mandarins, Hong merchants and Company Select 
Committee. His  Mandarin skills, he modestly informed his parents, 
were ‘wholly unequal’ to the task. Nevertheless, the occasion provided 
an unprecedented opportunity for Staunton’s involvement in composing 
personal and written communications in Mandarin to the Chinese 
Government (Staunton Letters, Macao, 25 September 1800).
Staunton’s experience at the Providence trial revealed how a mastery in 
the language could gain access to high-ranking government officials. 
The viceroy, Staunton informed his parents, took the singular opportunity 
of visiting the British Factory without the Hong merchants, as ‘he was 
sufficiently familiar with my foreign pronunciation’ and did not need 
the aid of a Hong linguist (Staunton Letters, Macao, 27 March 1800). 
The president of the Select Committee, Richard Hall, informed Staunton 
that this was ‘the only instance of direct communication with the Chinese 
government without the interference of the merchants’ and, if continued, 
would prove ‘a considerable check’ on their behaviour, removing the need 
of ‘exclusively confiding … in native linguists, who might be corrupted or 
intimidated’ (Staunton Letters, Macao, 26 May 1800).7 His participation 
at the trial, however, had a significant downside. Staunton wrote that it:
in great measure indisposed the Hong Merchants towards me, 
who are sufficiently aware of the checks upon their conduct that 
my acquaintance with the language of the country, may hereafter 
become. (Staunton Letters, Canton, 27 March 1800)
7  The need for accurate communication between the Select Committee and Chinese authorities 
remained throughout this period. In 1805, the committee wrote on the matter of interpreting and 
translating communiques reliant on Chinese linguists who knew only ‘pidgin’ English: ‘The difficulty 
in obtaining a faithful interpretation of a letter by means of the Merchants is almost insurmountable, 
it being only by general expressions that we can at any time render ourselves intelligible’ (Morse, 
1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 7).
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Staunton was certainly motivated to pursue his studies in Mandarin 
following Hall’s praise, if only to enhance his Company career.8 His main 
aim, however, was to prepare himself in the event of another British 
embassy being sent to the Qing court. This remained his burning ambition 
until he finally abandoned the idea around 1812. He told his parents in 
1800 that ‘the principal advantage [of knowing Mandarin] which I look 
to is what you so frequently foretold, that of the event of another Embassy 
to this country’. This, he added, was ‘frequently in my thoughts’ (Staunton 
Letters, Canton, 15 November 1800). The praise he received following his 
participation in the Providence affair suggested to him that:
my acquaintance with the Chinese gives me some chance of being 
called upon to accompany such an expedition [and] I cannot help 
fancying some connection with it … I have been so fortunate as to 
have met with opportunities of giving proof of my acquaintance 
with the Chinese language, and that the Chief [Hall] has been so 
good as to record them … I do not give up the expectation that if 
an Embassy were appointed some mentions could be made of me 
in some shape or other. (Staunton Letters, Macao, 26 May 1800)
Staunton set out to collect information on the Qing court to prepare 
himself for future diplomatic service. He learned a vital piece of intelligence 
from Marchini, who informed him of a significant change in the imperial 
attitude towards Westerners: ‘The new [Jiaqing] Emperor’, Staunton was 
told, ‘is said to be more favourably inclined to the Europeans than his 
predecessor’ (Staunton Letters, Macao, 20 January 1800). This represented 
a promising change in the attitude of the Chinese Government exemplified 
locally at Canton by:
The kindness and humanity of the present Viceroy … frequently 
shown to foreigners, [which] makes it reasonable to express that he 
would in some degree co-operate in the wishes of an Embassador 
or at least not prove an obstacle to the success of his measures. 
(Staunton Letters, Macao, 26 May 1800)
Further consultations with ‘some intelligent Chinese’ confirmed Staunton’s 
growing belief that another British embassy to China ‘would be met with 
a favourable reception’ (Staunton Letters, Macao, 18 August 1800).
8  Staunton hoped Hall would advance his case for a further increase in his salary based on his 
proficiency in Mandarin, but the directors in London did not approve any compensation, much to 
his dismay (Staunton Letters, Canton, 9 January 1801).
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Staunton also sought to cultivate the views of foreign missionaries based 
in Peking. Commenting on a letter he had received from the Vincentian 
priest, Louis Lamiot, Staunton told his parents:
Lamiot seems to be a man of information and I shall cultivate his 
acquaintance by letter and newspapers which I hope to send to him 
by means of Portuguese Missionaries who are now at Canton and 
waiting for the Emperor’s orders for them to proceed to Peking. 
(Staunton Letters, Canton, 9 January 1801)9
Staunton’s intention was clear, namely, to ascertain ‘the present disposition 
of the Court towards foreigners and what alteration the death of the late 
Minister [Heshen] and the succession of the present Emperor had made 
in the Government’ (Staunton Letters, Canton, 26 February 1801).10 
He had high hopes that the Portuguese missionaries waiting at Macao 
for permission to travel to Peking would prove useful informants and 
sought to ingratiate himself by presenting them with newspapers and 
books recently received from India, to ‘incline them to make me that 
kind of return which circumstances may put in their power’ (Staunton 
Letters, Canton, 26 February 1801). A meeting with the missionaries 
proved disappointing. Staunton found they had neither ‘the talents or 
capacity’ to carry much weight at Peking and possessed little ability to 
‘exert any pressure’ on behalf of the British people at the Qing court 
(Staunton Letters, Canton, 5 March 1801).11 Father Lamiot, on the other 
hand, continued to write letters to Staunton and his views informed the 
assessments that were later passed to Amherst during his preparations for 
the embassy.
Staunton’s major source of intelligence on the Qing court was the weekly 
Chinese Government publication, referred to by the British as the Peking 
Gazette, which arrived at Canton every four or five days. The Gazette, 
9  Lamiot arrived in China at the end of 1793 and later served in the Secretariat at the Qing court 
as an interpreter, translating Chinese documents into Latin and sending them to Russia. He left 
Peking in 1819 and died at Macao (Fu, 1966, vol. 1, p. 327; 1966, vol. 2, p. 583).
10  The reference to Minister Heshen reflects the British view that he had played an important role 
in disposing the Qianlong emperor to refuse a dialogue with Macartney on British goals. Heshen was 
arrested by the Jiaqing emperor and his assets seized, acquired it was thought, through corruption and 
the favouritism of his father. Heshen was ‘given Imperial permission to commit suicide’ (Cranmer-
Byng, 1962, pp. 321, 322).
11  Fu (1966, vol. 2, p. 591, fn. 25–26) documented that three Western missionaries were granted 
permission to travel to Peking at this time; namely, a Portuguese Lazarist appointed to the Board of 
Astronomy in December in 1801 and who died in 1823; Joseph Nunez Ribeiro; and Gaetan Pires-
Pireira, who was sick and remained in Canton.
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written in the ‘court style’, contained ‘very curious information’ found 
in imperial edicts and petitions giving ‘insight into the policy of the 
Government’ (Staunton Letters, Macao, 5 August and 9 August 1801).12 
The Chinese press, Staunton complained, while free of government 
censorship, focused mainly on literary forms rather than current political 
issues (Staunton, 1810, p. xii). He wrote later that the Gazette’s prime 
function was to ‘influence and conciliate public opinion upon all state 
questions, which under a government theoretically so despotic, would 
hardly have been expected’ (Staunton, 1821, p. xxi).
The Select Committee, meanwhile, sent copies of Staunton’s translations 
of the Gazette to India following the request of the editor of the Bombay 
Courier. These, in turn, were passed directly to Governor-General Lord 
Wellesley. Staunton’s linguistic skills had made it possible to transmit 
hitherto unavailable intelligence on the Qing court to British recipients 
throughout the region.
A major consequence of Staunton’s involvement at the Providence trial 
was his discovery of the printed penal laws of China, which the Company 
proceeded to purchase on his behalf.13 Staunton began translating these 
into English in late 1800 to assist the Company’s understanding of Chinese 
law and its application. Their publication in 1810, under the title Ta Tsing 
Leu Lee, represented the first direct English translation of a Chinese text 
and firmly established Staunton as Britain’s leading sinologist.14
Staunton’s First Plan for Another British 
Embassy, 1800
Staunton drew up his first plan for another embassy to the Qing court in 
1800. He focused on the important role of royal letters in Qing diplomacy 
and advocated that George III send an annual letter with a British 
12  Staunton learned of the serious rebellions taking place in northern China in 1801, but was 
sceptical of government claims of victory after witnessing the number of troops mobilising on the 
river at Canton. This proved, he wrote, ‘how little effect these victories have had in the pacification of 
the Provinces’.
13  Copies of the Penal Code were provided by the viceroy. Staunton also acquired a 24-volume 
set and 144-volume set of the code between March and November 1800 (Staunton Letters, Canton, 
27 March and 8 November, 1800).
14  Staunton thought that while China’s penal laws were ‘not the most just and equitable’, they 
were ‘the most comprehensive, uniform, and suited to the genius of the people for whom [they were] 
designed, perhaps of any that ever existed’ (Staunton, 1810, p. xi).
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ambassador to the Jiaqing emperor with the first ships of the season, 
followed by the emperor’s reply carried by the last ships. He thought that, 
given the distance between Britain and China, there would be no objection 
to a ‘perpetual residence’ being established at Peking. Such a privilege, he 
was aware, was denied to all the ‘petty surrounding states who sent annual 
Ambassadors to the Court of Pekin from time immemorial’, and who 
were seen by the Chinese as ‘barbarians’, but he felt an exception would 
be made for the British based on the fact of:
The grandeur and respectability with which the former [Macartney] 
Embassy appeared at the Court of Pekin would prevent any future 
Ambassador from being degraded to the rank of messengers from 
tributary and subordinate states though he should annually attend 
with them at the Emperor’s court. (Staunton Letters, Canton, 
26 February 1801)
A similar assessment is found in Macartney’s account, which refers to 
the Jesuit Father Amiot’s view. While acknowledging that the Chinese 
had been alarmed on learning of news of war in Europe, Amiot assured 
Macartney that ‘[His] Embassy had been so brilliant, and ha[d] made 
such an impression in the country, as must in the end be productive 
of very happy consequences’. Further, Amiot advised that ‘the ground 
gained by sending an Embassy from the King to the Emperor should by 
no means be lost, but be followed up by an intercourse of letters between 
them’ (Cranmer-Byng, 1962, p. 151).
This view echoed those of Staunton senior, who wrote of the exceptional 
circumstances of Macartney’s reception at the Qing court:
The dignified and splendid manner in which the Embassy was 
received, influenced the minds of the Chinese, and induced them 
to believe that the government was about to make a change of 
measures favourable to the English. Embassadors were not 
usually received by the Emperor upon his throne; nor were their 
credentials delivered into his hands, but ordinarily into those of 
his ministers. (G. L. Staunton, 1797b, vol. 2, p. 347).
Macartney’s legacy, especially being permitted to hand his credentials and 
the king’s letters into the emperor’s own hands and performing the British 
ceremony of bowing on one knee rather than the kowtow, persisted as the 
major flaw in British assessments of their likely reception by the Jiaqing 
emperor and represented a fundamental misunderstanding of Qing court 
protocol that lies at the core of Amherst’s failure. Staunton’s unwavering 
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belief in the impact of the Macartney Embassy’s splendid appearance and 
civility of manners in contrast to those of China’s traditional vassal states 
is understandable if misplaced. His opinion, accepted unconditionally by 
Barrow, that the Qing court would make an exception for a British embassy 
and would receive it outside the framework of the traditional tribute 
system, was both a major factor in favour of sending a second embassy 
in 1816 and a key reason for its failure. Macartney’s dispensation of not 
having to perform the kowtow before the Qianlong emperor resulted in 
the Jiaqing emperor being resolute in insisting on its performance. It is 
ironic, therefore, that the prime legacy of the Macartney Embassy for the 
outcome of the Amherst mission was to make the emperor determined 
that Amherst comply fully with the court ceremony that lay at the core of 
the tribute system.
The Company Directors in London did not share Staunton’s enthusiasm 
for another embassy. No arrangements were made for a letter from 
George  III congratulating the Jiaqing emperor on his accession to the 
throne and a disappointed Staunton told his parents:
I am sorry to find how little disposed the Minds of the Directors 
and of others in power are to the idea of a second Embassy … one 
of the Directors thought it best to ‘Let the Government of China 
alone’. (Staunton Letters, Canton, 26 February 1801)
Nevertheless, Staunton persisted with the hope of returning to Peking 
and turned his attention to learning the ‘Mantokoo Tartar’ language 
spoken at the Qing court (Staunton Letters, Canton, 26 February 1801). 
Fluency in the Manchu language, Staunton thought, would be very useful 
at Peking as it would enable a direct dialogue with the emperor in his 
native tongue. His assumption that the Jiaqing emperor would be open 
to personal conversation and negotiation, most likely founded on his 
boyhood experience of conversing with the Qianlong emperor in 1793, 
may be read as understandable but misguided, as events later proved.
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Staunton Back in England, 1803–1804
Staunton was on leave in London during 1803–1804, having returned to 
England upon learning of his father’s death.15 He spent his time staying 
with Lord Macartney and his family, as well as with John Barrow who 
had recently been appointed second secretary to the Admiralty.16 Barrow, 
no doubt prompted by Staunton, raised the matter of another embassy to 
China with the Company Directors. Their response remained ‘cold and 
indifferent’, although they did agree to send a letter from George III and 
gifts valued at £2,176 to the Jiaqing emperor to placate him over British 
military actions at Macao in 1802 (Fu, 1966, vol. 2, p. 595, fn. 51).17
Staunton still harboured hopes of being involved in another embassy and 
appearances were important. He wrote to his mother from Portsmouth 
on the eve of sailing for China, ‘I have just complied with your wishes 
in having my hair cut … and henceforth shall leave off the powder’ 
(Staunton Letters, Portsmouth, 31 May 1804).18 His decision may be read 
as representing a historic change from the men of Georgian England, 
who, like the men of the Macartney Embassy, dressed in powdered wigs, 
tight silk britches and stockings. Dress for gentlemen at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century consisted of a more casual attire of tailored 
trousers, jackets and top hats.19 Staunton added:
15  Sir G. L. Staunton died on 14 January 1801. News of his death reached Staunton in late August 
1801 and was referred to as a ‘melancholy catastrophe’ (Staunton Letters, Macao, 28 August 1801). 
Staunton started planning his return to England with the first fleet to sail from China. Leave approval 
in London was secured through the efforts of Lord Macartney who convinced the Company Directors 
to allow Staunton to return. Staunton planned to take two Chinese Christian missionaries with him 
at his own expense for ‘the benefit of pursuing my Chinese studies’ on the passage to England to show 
the directors that he was not neglecting his duty to the Company (Staunton Letters, Macao, 3 October 
1801). Staunton inherited his father’s estate, apart from a small legacy left to his mother. He also 
succeeded to the Baronetcy.
16  Macartney pledged to take ‘the place’ of his father in promoting Staunton’s interests. He presented 
him at court before George III and Queen Charlotte in December 1802 and was instrumental in 
having him elected at the Literary Club as well as the Royal Society (Staunton, 1856, p. 31).
17  George III’s letter was dated 22 May 1804.
18  British attitudes to the use of hair powder by men had changed by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. Seen previously as a badge of gentlemanly respectability, hair powder was now perceived as 
effeminate and indicative of the corrupting effects of modern commercialism that had taken place 
in Britain in the eighteenth century. Its use, still prominent among French emigres, was considered 
representative of dandyism and ‘the irresponsible frivolity of the ancient regime’ (see Barrell, 2006).
19  The mode of dressing fashionable among the British supercargoes at Canton is revealed in the 
oil painting by a Chinese artist of the trial of the Neptune’s seamen in 1807 (reproduced in Conner, 
2009, pp. 68–69).
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As improbable things sometimes happen, Mr. Barrow’s expectations 
of an Embassy may one day be realised - upon such an event you 
must judge what clothes etc, etc, may be fit to send me out upon 
such an occasion. (Staunton Letters, Portsmouth, 31 May 1804)
Staunton sent his mother another letter on arrival at St Helena, illustrating 
his confidence in the opinions of his two patrons:
The etc, etc, which I expressed a desire might be sent me in the 
event of an Embassy, did not imply anything in particular, but 
I only wished that under such circumstances, anything really 
new, curious or useful, which might be suggested by my uncle 
[Macartney] or Mr. Barrow should not be rejected in order to save 
a little expense. (Staunton Letters, St Helena, 9 June 1804)
Curiously, the route to China went via Norfolk Island. Staunton told 
his mother:
We have taken an unusual and circuitous route. The name of the 
remote spot … will be familiar to you, from the circumstance of its 
having been the former residence of Governor and Mrs. King, who 
are still I believe at Port Jackson which is in the neighbourhood. 
(Staunton Letters, Staunton to his mother, written near Norfolk 
Island, 9 November 1804 but sent from Canton, 18 January 1805)
General letters for England were deposited at the time with two 
Botany  Bay ships on their way to England (Staunton Letters, Canton, 
24 February 1805).20
Staunton Returns to China, 1805
Staunton was promoted to the rank of supercargo on his return to 
the British Factory at Canton and enjoyed a substantial increase in 
salary from £2,000 to £10,000 per annum (Staunton, 1856, p. 32). 
Immediately upon his return, he was called on to attend the viceroy’s 
palace to witness the Company’s formal acceptance of a letter and presents 
from the emperor to George III, which had been sent in response to the 
king’s letter and presents received in 1805 (Fu, 1966, vol. 1, p. 349). 
The king had endeavoured to reassure the emperor that the presence of six 
British warships off Macao in 1802 did not constitute a military threat, 
20  The ships were the Experiment and Ocean.
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as rumoured by the Portuguese and French, but sought only to protect 
British trade. Similarly, an explanation was given also for the presence of 
other British warships in Chinese waters required to convoy the Indiamen 
to protect them from French attack.
Permission to enter the city of Canton and a formal call on the viceroy at 
this time represented a rare opportunity for the British. They made their 
‘bows in the viceroy’s palace’ and received presents for the king consisting 
of teas, silks and porcelains.21 Morse (1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 29) records:
It had been previously ascertained that the Mandarines were to 
deliver the Imperial Letter standing, and that on receiving it no 
more would be required from [the British] than an obeisance 
conformably to the usages of Europe.
The viceroy, however, informed the emperor that the British had kowtowed, 
which they read as an indication of his fear of incurring the emperor’s 
displeasure on learning the truth. The emperor’s letter confirmed that 
another British embassy would be received strictly within the context of 
the traditional tribute system. It contained language read by the British 
as condescending, which referred to them as ‘Strangers’ who being ‘awed 
by Our power, Nobly … bring their tributes from remote distances and 
throng to do homage to Our Empire’. Further:
Your kingdom is far distant and separated from Us by the seas, yet 
you respectfully observe the duties of a vassal state. From a remote 
region, you manifest your loyalty toward the Sun [the emperor]. 
(as quoted in Fu, 1966, vol. 1, p. 361)
George III was informed that if the British:
Continue to offer amity and friendship as an ally, if you can lead 
all your subjects to present tribute and serve Us as our vassals, 
then you will fulfil Our sublime principle of loving strangers 
and extending our benevolence to them. (as quoted in Fu, 1966, 
vol. 1, p. 361)
21  The presents consisted of ‘fourteen suitcases which contained six rolls of silk … four porcelain 
vases, four porcelain plates, eight porcelain bowls and eight porcelain dishes, four boxes of spring tea, 
and four rolls of the P’u-er tea’ (Fu, 1966, vol. 1, p. 367).
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Regardless of the compromise made at the time of Macartney over the 
kowtow, the Jiaqing emperor made it clear that a future British embassy 
would receive no such dispensation. Prospects for a successful negotiation 
of British goals remained as remote as ever.
Staunton’s hitherto favourable impression of the local government changed 
further with the arrival at Canton of a new viceroy who was ill-disposed 
and unfriendly to the British. He wrote contemptuously of ‘the many 
instances I have witnessed lately of the pride, weakness and corruption of 
the Chinese government’ (Staunton Letters, Canton, 5 November 1805). 
Dispirited, Staunton concluded in 1805 that the chances of a successful 
British mission to Peking ‘are fewer and those of failure more numerous 
than I had anticipated’. He added:
I am satisfied indeed that the success of any Mission to the Court 
of Pekin, must be very limited and precarious, but it is much 
easier now to satisfy the expectations of ministers and the Public 
[in England] than it was at the time of the former Embassy, 
since the flattering but groundless calculation of success which 
then existed are at present totally relinquished and the World is 
sufficiently acquainted with the Pride, meanness and ignorance 
which characterizes the Court of Pekin, which must obstruct 
the views of a Negotiator, publish the disgrace of his failure, and 
enhance the Men of [any] success. (Staunton Letters, Canton, 
30 December 1805)
Despite the belief that the Macartney Embassy had deeply impressed its 
hosts, Staunton suggests that the expectations of the British public were 
more realistic following the popularity of Barrow’s scathing account of 
China published in 1804. News of a failed Russian embassy sent to the 
Jiaqing emperor in 1805–1806, where the ambassador Count Golovkin 
was expelled from China for refusing to kowtow, reached Staunton late 
in 1806. His faith in a more positive reception for any future British 
ambassador was restored. Staunton asked his mother:
Please inform my good friend Mr. Barrow … [that] the Emperor 
of China has been more polite to his brother the King of England 
having written him a civil letter and transmitted some presents. 
(Staunton Letters, Canton, 16 December 1806)22
22  The significance of the Golovkin Embassy for the Amherst Embassy is discussed later in this study.
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Staunton’s Second Plan for a British 
Embassy to the Jiaqing Emperor, 1810
Staunton returned to England on leave in 1808 following a serious 
dispute at Canton where trade was stopped over a fracas between local 
Chinese and British sailors.23 He was absent also from China at the time 
of the second British occupation of Macao but, on learning the news in 
London, he joined with Barrow to lobby the Company Directors for an 
embassy to the Jiaqing emperor to repair relations (Morse, 1926/1966, 
vol. 3, pp. 79–99).24
The directors received Staunton’s plan for another British embassy on 
20 November 1809 (Staunton Letters, London, 20 November 1809).25 
Staunton again emphasised the importance of a formal letter sent from 
George III to the emperor informing him specifically of his strong 
desire for amicable and beneficial relations, and notifying him that the 
occupation of Macao by British troops was not authorised nor approved 
by the British Government. The inclusion of Mandarin translations of 
British Government documents would serve to convince the emperor 
of British integrity, thereby disposing him to encourage the viceroy at 
Canton to remove all trade restrictions imposed on the Company.
In a reference to himself and representing a new proposal, Staunton argued 
that the British now had a person ‘never as yet afforded of conversing 
unreservedly and without the aid of interpreters, with those who influence 
the emperor’s councils’ (Staunton Letters, London, 20 November 1809). 
This person, he continued, was familiar with ‘the modes of acting and 
thinking peculiar to the Chinese’ and would enable a British ambassador 
to ‘enter into confidential communications on subjects of mutual interests 
of both empires … it will not be too much to expect the most important 
and beneficial results from his negotiations’ (Staunton Letters, London, 
20 November 1809).
23  Known as the ‘Neptune Affair’. For a concise summary, see Conner (2009, pp. 69–70).
24  See Morse (1926/1966, vol. 3, pp. 76–99) and Wood (1940) for a detailed account of the British 
occupation of Macao.
25  This is a formal letter written by Staunton to Charles Grant, the chairman of the Secret 
Committee of the East India Company, sent from his mother’s house in Devonshire Street, London. 
The plan is written in a fine copperplate hand, suggesting that Staunton hired a professional scribe to 
offer the best presentation.
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Staunton’s expectations of beneficial ‘negotiations’ at the Qing court 
represented an obvious misjudgement, if not ignorance, of Qing 
diplomacy and indicates strongly his belief that any future British embassy 
would be received outside the tribute system. This assumption, it will be 
seen, was accepted unquestionably by Barrow in his call for an embassy 
in 1815, based on his confidence in Staunton’s ability to communicate 
directly in Mandarin to ensure success for British goals. Further, the Qing 
court, Staunton pointed out, favourably received foreign missions as 
‘Embassies bearing presents are not only gratifying to the personal vanity 
of the Sovereign, but [were] also useful politic exhibitions to the people’ 
(Staunton Letters, London, 20 November 1809).
Staunton was confident that his plan would be approved and waited for 
confirmation that he would be appointed the next British ambassador 
to the Jiaqing emperor. Barrow sent a letter marked ‘Most Secret’ dated 
10 November 1809, which read, ‘We have done the deed: and I most 
heartily congratulate you on the almost certain prospect of your going to 
Pekin as the King’s ambassador’ (Staunton, 1856, p. 43). The Company 
Directors, however, approved the plan in theory, but thought it ‘most 
advisable not to include any person who was actually in the service 
of the East India Company’ (Staunton, 1856, p. 44). The appearance of 
Company men would indicate that this was a mission sent primarily for 
commercial purposes and not as a compliment from the British sovereign. 
Staunton was devastated. He wrote later in his memoirs:
It is impossible to express the mortification and irritation of mind 
which I felt at this most unlooked for communication; and I must 
say that now, coolly reflecting upon it, after a lapse of six-and-
thirty years, I still think I was extremely ill used. (1856, p. 44)
Plans for a new embassy were shelved by the Company by the end of 1810 
and the idea was placed in abeyance.
Staunton’s Second Period at Canton, 
1811–1816
Staunton arrived back at Canton in January 1811 to resume his posting 
where he met the new viceroy, Sungyun, who was well known to the 
British, having escorted the Macartney Embassy from Peking to Canton 
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in 1793.26 Macartney had praised Sungyun both for his ‘strain of liberality 
scarcely to be expected in a Tartar or a Chinese’ and for his ‘most friendly 
and gentleman-like manner’ (Cranmer-Byng, 1962, p. 178). Sungyun, 
on learning of Staunton’s presence with the Company at Canton, 
‘Expressed himself surprised and much pleased that a person whom he 
well recollected with his Father in the British Embassy, happened to be at 
this time in China’. He also emphasised that he was ‘very much the friend’ 
of the British nation (Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 169).
Staunton was invited, in a private capacity, to the viceroy’s palace where 
conversation turned to Macartney. Staunton reminded the viceroy that 
it was time for another British embassy to the imperial court, but was 
quickly disabused of any such prospect. He was told in the firmest terms:
There is no occasion for you to send another Embassy to Pekin. 
The Emperor knows it is a long way, and does not wish you to 
trouble yourselves. Besides the Climate does not agree with you; 
you may catch infectious Distempers. No! Your Nation must not 
send an Embassy. I will not allow it. It is out of the Question and 
you must not think of it. (Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 173)
Crucially, it appears that Staunton’s letter to Barrow failed to pass on this 
critical piece of information but stressed instead the ‘civilities that had 
passed between the Chinese and the British’ and the gifts of silks, Chinaware 
and ‘other small articles, of no great value in themselves, but considered as 
tokens of friendship’ (Staunton Letters, Macao, 20 July 1811).
A further dinner at the viceroy’s palace was held a week later. Staunton 
was accompanied by John Roberts, the president of the Select Committee. 
Several high-ranking mandarins were present, referred to as ‘the Tsiangkun 
[Tartar-General] … and the Hoppo’ (Staunton Letters, Macao, 20 July 
1811).27 Their intense scrutiny of the viceroy inhibited informality. 
Rather, the British were addressed on the importance of conforming to 
the laws and customs of China and with correct protocol. Staunton wrote:
At the end of the first conversation the Viceroy said ‘As I have 
a great regard for you, you must allow me to shew you our Chinese 
customs, one of them is to bend the knee to great Mandarines, 
26  Referred to as Sun-yün by Fu (1966). Fu added that Sungyun was aware of the cost of the 
Macartney Embassy to the Chinese treasury and ‘the tension’ it had caused in China (1966, vol. 2, 
p. 607, fn. 141).
27  I have been unable to identify the Tartar-General concerned.
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pray let me see you perform that ceremony’. Though not a little 
surprised at such an address, I at first simply answered that I had 
the greatest respect for His Excellency, but was obliged to decline 
paying him the compliment he required, as our English customs 
forbab [sic] it. (Staunton as quoted in East India Records, BL IOR 
G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 171).
The British judged the viceroy’s manner as a need to distance himself from 
them in front of the mandarins. He threatened an end of his personal 
friendship and insinuated also that he would close Company trade.
Viceroy Sungyun’s emphasis on correct protocol offers some insight into 
the historical mystery associated with Macartney’s reception before the 
Qianlong emperor; namely, did Macartney perform the kowtow as the 
Chinese claimed, or did he perform the British ceremony of bending 
one knee described by Sungyun?28 Sungyun’s reference to ‘bending the 
knee’ suggests he witnessed Macartney performing this ceremony at the 
Qianlong court and was demanding a repeat performance by Staunton as 
a matter of form required on such occasions. Staunton remained firm and 
displayed the tenacity shown subsequently during the Amherst Embassy. 
He reassured Sungyun that his actions represented no disrespect towards 
him, but were governed rather by English custom stipulating that the 
requested ceremony was reserved only for the king or foreign sovereigns 
(Staunton as quoted in East India Records, BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) 
F 171). The British position on the ceremony was certainly clarified at this 
time and would have served to alert the Qing authorities that the kowtow 
would not be performed before the emperor. Whether such information 
was passed on to Peking resulting in forewarning the court is not known, 
but it certainly helps explain the mandarins’ immediate focus on the 
kowtow after the arrival of the Amherst Embassy in Tianjin in 1816.
Despite these events, Staunton’s unique and friendly relationship with 
Sungyun endured. Sungyun invited the British to nine conferences and 
entertainments during his tenure at Canton (Staunton, 1822, p. 135). 
Like the earlier visit of the viceroy to the British Factory in 1800, Sungyun 
made an unprecedented call on Staunton and the Select Committee 
at Macao and visited the British ships anchored at Whampoa where 
he was lavishly received by a 19-gun salute and enjoyed a ‘splendid 
28  For a full discussion on the kowtow question, see Pritchard (1943).
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entertainment’.29 His visit was read as ‘an extraordinary compliment’ to 
the British and one never seen before in China (Staunton Letters, Canton, 
15 November 1811). The Hoppo was also very accommodating at this 
time leading to British hopes of a ‘more favourable opening’ for improved 
relations between the Company and the Chinese. Staunton told Barrow:
These things are trifling in themselves, [but] are very unusual 
here, where the Mandarins are in general too proud and ignorant, 
to take any notice of foreigners except to give them trouble and 
inconvenience. (Staunton Letters, Macao, 20 July 1811)
Sungyun, unfortunately, was prematurely recalled by Peking after a period 
of only six months to take up a position as president of the Board of 
Civil Office (Eastberg, 2009, p. 164). Relations at Canton, Staunton 
commented disparagingly, ‘immediately fell back into the old channel’ 
(Staunton, 1856, p. 56). Staunton had received mixed messages regarding 
the propriety of sending another embassy. Sungyun’s long-lasting 
friendship, forged at the time of Macartney, had ensured a thaw in the 
normal chilly relations between the Select Committee and the Chinese 
Government. But Staunton was warned in explicit and unofficial terms 
that sending another embassy would not be welcomed.
Staunton received permission to return to England in 1812 after a period 
of ill health.30 His arrival coincided with debate on the renewal of the 
Company’s charter in the face of growing opposition to its monopoly of 
the tea trade from British free traders wishing to open trade with China. 
In consultations with the British Government, Staunton convinced Lord 
Buckinghamshire, President of the Board of Control, that a Company 
monopoly of the China tea trade was essential given the ‘special 
circumstances … arising out of the extraordinary system of the Chinese 
government’ (Buckinghamshire to Staunton, 2 September 1812, as 
quoted in Staunton, 1856, p. 58). The renewal of the Company’s charter 
in 1813 opened the India trade to private merchants, but the China tea 
monopoly, which henceforth became the Company’s most lucrative and 
important asset, remained and had to be protected at all costs.
29  The British gave the viceroy clocks and watches, which he did not accept, as well as foreign tobacco, 
wine, perfume, and clothes. The viceroy gave away the wine to the interpreters and other servants in the 
escort. The viceroy’s presents to the British were ‘double the value’ (Fu, 1966, vol. 1, p. 383).
30  Platt (2018, p. 156) mistakenly wrote that Staunton remained continuously in Canton from 
1810 until the arrival of Amherst in 1816.
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The Immediate Causes for the Calling 
of an Embassy to the Qing Court
Company relations at Canton with the Hoppo and the viceroy were 
especially strained in the period between and 1813 and 1814. The cause 
was the insolvency of several Hong merchants who had borrowed heavily 
on credit from American private traders. Bankruptcy was a serious 
offence  in China and the Company was concerned that the co-Hong 
merchants would seek to raise funds to pay debts resulting in impositions 
on foreign trade (Sargent, 1907, p. 21). Further, the emperor issued an 
edict proposing the co-Hong merchants be disbanded and all Western 
trade be placed under more rigorous conditions and in the charge of 
its two richest merchants (Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 194).31 The 
prospect of only two men controlling prices for exports and imports drew 
vehement opposition from the Select Committee who read the edict as 
an attempt to destroy all the privileges the Company had so far acquired. 
Charles Grant, the chairman of the Company Board of Directors, later 
reported to the House of Lords on the state of the China trade in 1821, 
‘Slender those privileges certainly are, but without them [the] trade would 
soon sink into absolute insignificance’ (Charles Grant, 5 March 1821 
as quoted in Report [relative to the trade with the East Indies and China] 
from the Select Committee of the House of Lords, 11 April 1821, p. 172). 
Staunton agreed. In his view, the placing of the trade in the hands of 
only one or two merchants was the equivalent of ‘shutting up the port’ 
(Staunton, 1822, p. 297). The Select Committee succeeded in having the 
proposal quashed.
Matters were not improved with the arrival of a new Hoppo in 1813 whose 
character towards the British was described as ‘boorish’ and ‘overbearing’ 
(Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 197). A stickler for correct procedure on 
31  These were Howqua (Wu Bingjian) and Kowqua (unidentified). Fu (1966, vol. 2, p. 605, fn. 126) 
commented that the British preferred to trade with the less prosperous merchants because they could 
lend money to them at a very high rate of interest. Staunton, in fact, proposed to his father very early in 
his career at Canton that money be sent out in order to lend it to Chinese Hong merchants at a high rate 
of interest, namely, 18 per cent. This, Staunton suggested, was a way to make ‘an honourable fortune’. 
He added that it was possible ‘to take advantage of these schemes when you are junior in the Company’. 
At a senior level, he continued, ‘you expose the merchant to suspicion of favouring support to the 
detriment of the Company’s interest’ (Staunton Letters, Macao, 20 April 1801). In September 1814, 
Staunton referenced that he remitted bills in 1813 ‘totalling £5087.10’, adding, ‘the Chinese merchants 
are paying off their debts at a good rate’. It is not clear if this statement refers to personal loans he may 
have made, or to the general state of affairs at Canton (Staunton Letters, Macao, 22 September 1814).
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all trade matters, the Hoppo prohibited direct communication with 
the Company and ordered that all reports be directed through the 
linguists (Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 197). The Select Committee was 
alarmed by his attitude and reported that ‘we must expect every possible 
annoyance and disruption which must necessarily arise from his rapacious 
Disposition’ (Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 197).
A most serious dispute at this time followed the actions of a British 
man-of-war, HMS Doris, during the 1814 trading season at the time 
of the Anglo–American War (1812–1814). The Doris had engaged 
‘in a very active blockade’ of American shipping in Chinese territorial 
waters and illegally brought a captured American ship into the Pearl 
River. The  viceroy  informed the President of Select Committee, John 
Elphinstone, that:
When two small countries [Great Britain and the United States] 
have petty quarrels overseas, the Celestial Empire is not concerned 
with them. However, when their ships enter territorial waters of 
the Interior [the Pearl River], they must obey and respect the 
prohibitions of the Celestial Empire … If [Elphinstone] dares to 
disobey us, then not only shall we destroy their warships, but we 
shall also suspend their trade. (Fu, 1966, vol. 1, p. 394)
The Select Committee was instructed by the viceroy to order the departure 
of the Doris from China. On being informed that the Company held no 
authority over a ship of the Royal Navy, the viceroy threatened not only 
to use force against the Doris, but also proceeded to implement a series of 
raids on the British Factory. John Francis Davis wrote later:
The Chinese … entered upon a course of aggressive measures not 
against the frigate, but against the Factory, which soon became 
intolerable. The local government first prohibited the employment 
of native servants; they then sent persons to enter the Factory, 
and seize upon such Chinese as they found there. The boats of 
the Indiamen were molested while peacefully proceeding on their 
business on the river; and every attempt was made to prevent 
communication with our men-of-war. (1836/1851, vol. 1, p. 72)32
32  John Francis Davis was the eldest son of Samuel Davis, a director of the Company. Following 
precedence given to the sons of notable members of the Company, Davis arrived at Canton in 1813 
as a junior writer with the Company. He was appointed governor of Hong Kong from 1844 to 1848.
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A Chinese linguist, Ayew (Li Huaiyuan), based at the Factory was arrested 
at this time and sent to ‘Tartary’ (Xinjiang) in retaliation for the actions 
of the Doris.33 His treatment at the hands of the Chinese authorities as 
well as the unauthorised entry of the Chinese in the British Factory were 
the immediate catalysts for the decision to send the Amherst Embassy. 
Staunton wrote:
It may be observed that intrusion [into the Factory] is a very light 
term for the entry without notice or cause assigned of a police 
officer with his retinue, into a residence immediately distinguished 
by the national flag, and hitherto considered by foreigners as an 
inviolable sanctuary. If the inviolability of the British Factory were 
not maintained—what would become of the security of other 
foreign residences of less distinction and pretensions? (Staunton, 
1822, p. 298)
The consequences of a Chinese attempt to place further restrictions on 
the activities of the Select Committee, the actions of the Doris, the raid 
on the British Factory and the arrest of Ayew had serious repercussions 
for Anglo–Chinese relations. Staunton, who was returning to China from 
England, had little idea of the turmoil he would confront. He wrote to his 
mother from the Anjere Roads in the Sunda Straits:
My thoughts are now chiefly directed towards China, where I am 
in some degree, at home, and shall not be long to arrive. I understand 
everything was quiet there when the last accounts came away, and 
that Mr. Elphinstone’s management of the Company’s affairs 
continue to give great satisfaction. (Staunton Letters, Anjere Roads, 
Straits of Sunda, 14 August 1814, italics in original)
His last term in China, however, proved to be ‘by far the most active and 
anxious I passed in that country’ (Staunton, 1856, p. 61).
33  Chinese treatment of Ayew, a Factory linguist, was a specific concern of the Select Committee. 
Ayew had been assigned with the task of carrying a letter and presents to Sungyun sent by the 
president of the Board of Control and the directors of the Company in 1812 to thank him for his 
assistance during the Macartney Embassy and more recently at Canton, but he was arrested at Peking 
and charged with illegally bringing gifts from Westerners to Chinese officials. He was allowed to 
return to Canton and resume work at the British Factory. An article on this question was published in 
2014 in Chinese in The Journal of Chinese Studies by Lawrence Wang-chi Wong under the translated 
title ‘The 1814 “Ayew incident”: Linguists in Sino-British relations in the nineteenth century’.
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Staunton was called on immediately after his arrival at Macao in 1814 
as the committee’s sole negotiator with the Chinese authorities in the 
Doris dispute.34 He briefed Barrow in a private letter and informed his 
mother that he was ‘up to his head and ears in Discussions with the 
Chinese government’ (Staunton Letters, Macao, 14 October 1814). While 
welcoming the opportunity to renew his acquaintance with ‘the language 
and customs of this people’, he refused absolutely to submit to the 
viceroy’s demands (Staunton Letters, Canton, 14 December 1814). After 
an anxious month of fruitless and tedious negotiations with ‘Mandarins 
of rank at the Factory’ over the actions of British warships in Chinese 
territorial waters, Staunton took the initiative. Declaring the Select 
Committee had no control over the actions of the Royal Navy, Staunton 
took the unprecedented and tough decision to suspend trade and ordered 
all British subjects and ships to leave Canton (Fu, 1966, vol. 2, p. 612). 
Staunton wrote:
I was compelled to break off the negotiation, to strike the British 
flag, and to retire with the whole body of British subjects from 
Canton; and that it was only when our ships [those already at 
Whampoa] were upon the point of sailing through the Bocca 
Tigris, and thus finally quitting the port, that I was overtaken by 
such a conciliatory overture from the Viceroy as warranted me in 
returning to Canton and renewing the negotiation. (1856, p. 63)
His strategy worked. The viceroy backed down, the ships were loaded 
and trade resumed. Staunton’s firm stand against Qing officialdom set 
a precedent for Amherst’s actions during the Amherst Embassy’s future 
negotiations with the mandarins. ‘[My] only weapon[s]’, Staunton (1856) 
recalled, ‘were those of argument and an appeal to the universal principles 
of justice, forcibly addressed to the Chinese in their native language, 
though in a spirit of British independence’ (p. 64), which had won the day.
Staunton’s actions, significantly, brought an immediate rebuke from the 
Jiaqing emperor who issued an edict dated 8 January 1815:
There is an English barbarian, Ssu-tang-tung [Staunton], who 
previously came to the Imperial capital at the time his country 
presented tribute, was young and crafty, and throughout his return 
journey drew maps of all strategic spots of the mountains and rivers 
… he passed through. After he arrived at Canton he did not return 
34  He was assisted at this time by Morrison and Davis.
BRITAIN’S SECOND EMBASSY TO CHINA
58
to his native country, but has lived in Macao for twenty years. 
He understands Chinese … Barbarians who come to Kwang-tung 
[Canton] ask his advice and follow his suggestions. Probably in the 
long run he will make trouble. (Fu, 1966, vol. 1, p. 394).35
A further edict concerning the actions of British warships was issued a 
couple of days later:
Recently, the escorting warships of England, disobeying the 
established regulations that foreign ships must anchor outside 
our territorial sea, sailed into the Boque Fortress. Such deceit 
is unimaginable … Hereafter, the escorting warships of various 
nations should continue to obey the established regulations 
against entering our territorial waters … If they dare to enter our 
defensive zone, we should consider firing our cannon to scare 
them away so that they may clearly understand that they will have 
to deal with us. (Fu, 1966, vol. 1, p. 395)
Staunton was not the only Englishman to come under imperial suspicion 
at this time. In 1807, the Reverend Doctor Robert Morrison of the 
London Missionary Society arrived at Canton.36 Destined to be the senior 
interpreter for the Amherst Embassy, his proficiency in Mandarin ensured 
his appointment in the same capacity with the Company. Morrison 
also engaged in the illegal activities of teaching Mandarin to Company 
personal at the British Factory and compiling a Chinese–English 
dictionary sponsored by the Company.37 His major pursuit involved the 
translation of Christian texts into Chinese, which he printed illegally at 
Macao. This was in defiance of the Jiaqing emperor’s imperial edict of 
1805 that specifically prohibited books printed in the ‘Chinese and Tartar 
35  The edict reveals the Qing court’s misinformation about Staunton that had repercussions later 
during negotiations between the British and Chinese at the time of the Amherst Embassy.
36  Morrison was the first Protestant missionary to arrive in China. He landed at Canton in 1807 
on an American ship (as Company ships were forbidden to carry missionaries) and hoped to spread 
the gospel in China. Morrison first stayed in two small rooms at the American Factory where he went 
‘native’, ‘adopting the habits and … dress of the natives’ and eating Chinese food (see Morrison, 1839, 
pp. 187–188). Staunton had received a letter of introduction about Morrison from Sir Joseph Banks 
and became his ‘friend and advocate’ at Canton (Staunton, 1856, p. 36). Staunton recommended 
Morrison to John Roberts, the president of the Select Committee, and he was hired as a translator 
with the Company in 1809 with a salary of £200. He set out to work on a Chinese translation 
of A grammar of the Chinese language (1815), A dictionary of the Chinese language (1815) and the 
Scriptures (Morrison, 1839, pp. 239–240).
37  Morrison’s skill in Chinese was acknowledged by Staunton who wrote, ‘I was certainly several 
years prior to him in [studying Mandarin] but I cultivated the Chinese language altogether for 
different purposes, and much less exclusively and assiduously than he did [and] I … with pleasure, 
acknowledge that he attained ultimately to a much greater degree of proficiency’ (1856, p. 37).
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languages’ as these were viewed as attempts to ‘facilitate the propagation 
of [European] tenets’ (Barrow, 1810, fn. 304). His actions brought him to 
the notice of the Chinese authorities who, in 1815, conducted a raid on 
his office, destroying his printing press and arresting a Chinese employee 
(Staunton, 1856, p. 37). Morrison acknowledged, ‘The present state of 
China is such as renders printing, and several other labours very difficult; 
and even personal residence uncertain’ (Morrison, 1839, p. 385). Thus, 
Morrison and Staunton, both men destined to play a major role in the 
Amherst Embassy, had aroused Chinese Government suspicion on the 
eve of the embassy’s arrival.38 Informing British assessments of the Jiaqing 
emperor was his recent escape from an assassination attempt in 1813 
which, in Morrison’s view, contributed to the emperor’s suspicion of 
Staunton. Morrison informed Staunton in 1815 that the emperor was:
Immured in his palace, distrustful of all around him; a large 
number of persons denounced as rebel leaders not yet taken; he 
supposes that plans against his life and throne are carrying on, 
and may burst forth suddenly, as the last convulsion did. In this 
state of mind some designing villain brings your name before 
him, says that you took maps of the country twenty years ago; 
that the encroachments of the English bringing ships of war, 
bringing troops, entering the river, and attacking the people of 
other countries, &c., were acts all committed by your instigation! 
What then must His Majesty have thought with his fears already 
so much excited? (Morrison to Staunton, 10 January 1815, in 
Morrison, 1839, p. 425)
The loss of mutual trust between the British and Peking also extended 
to the Select Committee and the Chinese Government at Canton. 
The British blamed this, in part, on the obstreperous behaviour of the 
viceroy. Davis, writing in 1836, explained:
The conduct and disposition of the Chinese government for some 
time past had been such, as to prove that the commercial interests 
of [Great Britain] in China were exposed to the utmost hazard 
from the chance of perpetual interruption at the will of a capricious 
and despotic set of delegates, who kept the court of Peking in 
profound ignorance of their own oppressive and arbitrary conduct 
towards the Company’s trade. (1836/1851, vol. 1, p. 73)
38  Morrison informed the Select Committee of the ‘personal hazard’ and ‘feeling an apprehension 
that writing or translating a Letter to His Majesty the Emperor of China, which will of course contain 
an impeachment of the local Government of this Province, will subject me to personal suffering from 
the Chinese even long after the present difference shall be arranged’ (Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 211).
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He added:
To these circumstances are to be attributed the Embassy of Lord 
Amherst in 1816 … which object was to secure, if possible, the 
commerce of Great Britain upon a solid and equitable footing 
under the cognizance of the emperor, and with the advantage of 
a ready appeal to him in case of need. (1836/1851, vol. 1, p. 73)
The Jiaqing emperor, the British assumed, was kept in ignorance of the 
true state of affairs of trade at Canton. His intervention, it was thought, 
would follow a direct official approach on behalf of the British sovereign 
and would serve to place trade on a secure and stable basis. But the fact 
that Staunton and Morrison, both men destined to play a vital role in 
Lord Amherst’s Embassy, were regarded with the utmost suspicion by the 
Chinese authorities, did not augur well for their reception at the Qing 
court. Further, British military intervention at Macao in 1808 as well 
as the ‘agitated’ state of affairs in Shandong province, where a rebellion 
had resulted in the death of 20 court eunuchs on orders of the emperor, 
hardly disposed the imperial court to welcome meddlesome foreigners 
(Morrison’s journal entry, 7 November 1813, as quoted in Morrison, 
1839, p. 373). Historians, principally Wengsheng Wang, note a hardening 
of the Qing attitude towards the British who were now regarded as the 
most troublesome ‘of all Westerners’ with a voracious appetite for trade 
(Wang, 2014, p. 248). This change, in Wang’s view, partly explains the 
‘emperor’s rejection of the Amherst Embassy in 1816’ (2014, p. 248). 
Further, rumours circulating at Macao of the British occupation of 
Washington in 1814 during the Anglo–American War heightened local 
suspicion of the British. Staunton commented on a ‘ridiculous report’ 
that ‘the British who had recently landed in America, and destroyed the 
city of Washington, were destined ultimately for the coast of China, upon 
some similar service’ (1822, p. 138). He added:
There is great reason to believe that [the act of the Doris], together 
with the frequent cruizing of our ships of war on their coasts, 
was considered by the Chinese, not merely as a national affront, 
but as actually connected with some ulterior schemes for a hostile 
invasion of their territory. (p. 138)
Staunton first learned that an embassy was being contemplated in 
a personal letter from Barrow, dated 10 April 1815, which he received 
in September 1815. His reaction was far from enthusiastic. Another 
embassy, in his personal view:
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Is … a measure about which I have for some time ceased to be at 
all anxious and am so much aware of the risk of bad management, 
that I rather wish upon the whole that it might be abandoned. 
If however it is otherwise determined, it will of course command 
my best exertions and services. Whenever anything is settled, 
I trust due notice will be given us here, that we may be prepared 
accordingly. (Staunton Letters, Macao, 21 September 1815)
He hoped that an embassy would not damage Britain’s reputation or cause 
it to:
Recede from that high and honourable position which our 
commercial representatives had taken at Canton, as well as our 
former diplomatic representative, Lord Macartney, had taken at 
Pekin. (Staunton, 1856, p. 66)
The possibility of another embassy to the Qing court and the prospect 
of playing a leading role in such a major diplomatic initiative in Anglo–
Chinese relations had long sustained Staunton’s ambitions for recognition 
and fame beyond the accumulation of wealth as a Company servant in 
Canton. It is ironic that, at a time when Staunton’s enthusiasm for such 
an enterprise had largely evaporated, his friend and mentor in London, 
John Barrow, would seize the opportunity presented by events at Canton, 
based largely on Staunton’s earlier reporting, to argue successfully for an 
embassy as the best means to address the parlous state of the Company’s 
relations with the local authorities in China.
Barrow’s strong advocacy of an embassy took place entirely in London 
without further reference to Company representatives in Canton. Focus 
falls next on the events in Whitehall and Company headquarters in 
Leadenhall Street in connection with the decision to dispatch a special 




The View from London: 
John Barrow and Lord 
William Pitt Amherst
William Pitt Amherst (1773–1857), like his embassy, has received little 
attention from historians who have focused either on Sir George Thomas 
Staunton and his role in advising Amherst against kowtowing, or on 
John Francis Davis’s literary accounts of the British reaction to China.1 
This study seeks to redress the imbalance and argues that Amherst was 
conscientious in discharging his duties and ably led the mission in 
difficult circumstances. His conduct reflected his upbringing conditioned 
by deeply imbued aristocratic values of allegiance to the British Crown 
and, by extension, the nation. A recognition of Amherst’s previous 
experience and career as well as his personal response to his appointment 
is important in gauging his suitability for the position of ambassador to 
the Chinese Empire and for establishing his frame of mind on the eve 
of departure for China. The reactions of Amherst’s family and friends 
to his appointment, found in personal letters, reveal the views held of 
China by the cosmopolitan and educated elite of British society at the 
time and are examined later in this chapter. This chapter commences with 
an examination of British opinions and observations in response to the 
proposal for a second embassy to China.
1  Tuck’s (2000) analysis of the embassy, it has been noted, concentrated on Staunton (pp. vii–xlii). 
Kitson focused largely on Davis’s writings in his Forging romantic China (2013) and ‘The dark gift’ 
(2016).
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The plan for an embassy to the Qing court in 1816 originated at Whitehall, 
rather than with the directors of the Company or the Select Committee 
at Canton.2 Regardless of Staunton’s previous lobbying on the subject, 
the call for another embassy to China in 1815 was exclusively Barrow’s 
initiative. His position as second secretary to the Admiralty represented 
one of the most important and influential civil service offices in the British 
Government and gave him direct access to Cabinet ministers, politicians 
and members of government boards.3 His reputation as the foremost 
British-based expert on China ensured his views carried weight at the 
highest levels of the government. The intelligence on which he based his 
argument for another embassy in 1815, however, was either outdated or 
had been overtaken by events. The disputes at Canton prompting the call 
for an embassy had been settled by the time Amherst arrived in China 
in June 1816. Even Staunton, it has been seen, had lost his enthusiasm 
for an embassy, but his more recent views were overlooked by Barrow 
who proceeded to promote the project with Lord Buckinghamshire, 
the president of the Board of Control.4
Barrow Calls for an Embassy
Napoleon’s abdication in April 1814 and the restoration of Louis XVIII 
to the French throne ushered in a new world order with Britain as its 
greatest power. Both the Royal Navy and the British merchant navy 
reigned supreme. Britain’s traditional trading rivals—the French, Spanish, 
Portuguese and Dutch—had been defeated and the China trade was 
firmly in British hands, leaving only the United States as Britain’s main 
2  Gao (2016, p. 598) is wrong in his assertion that ‘the EIC’s Court of Directors in London 
pleaded with the British government for [sic] sending a royal ambassador to the Qing court’.
3  Christopher Lloyd (1970, p. 75) described the Board of Admiralty. It was headed by the First 
Lord (Lord Melville 1812–1828) who was also a Cabinet minister. Seven members, mostly politicians, 
comprised the board. Two secretaries assisted the board. The first secretary dealt with the political 
aspects of naval affairs. The second secretary was ‘responsible for running the Admiralty office and 
supervising the very extensive correspondence with naval officers all over the world, as well as with 
agents of other Boards’. Barrow was paid a salary of £2,000 in wartime and £1,000 in peacetime.
4  Lord Buckinghamshire, previously Lord Hobart, was governor of Madras from 1794 to 1798. 
He was reputed as being headstrong and quarrelsome (Philips, 1940, p. 183). George Canning, on 
the other hand, described Lord Hobart to Amherst in 1794 as possessing ‘every quality in him, that 
can make him useful and respectable in the high situation, that he is to fill’ (BL IOR MSS EUR F 
140/13). Buckinghamshire had several meetings with Staunton at the time of the renewal of the 
Company’s charter in 1812–1813; Staunton urged him to support the continuing monopoly of the 
China trade (Philips, 1940, p. 186).
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competitor.5 Barrow was concerned that world peace posed a potential 
threat to British trade with China and informed Buckinghamshire in a 
letter dated 14 February 1815 that these countries may be ‘expected to 
endeavour to renew their trade in China’ (Barrow to Buckinghamshire, 
14 February 1815, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 2–6). The French 
were especially threatening. Barrow believed they would get ‘a start’ on 
the British due to the mischievous French missionaries at Peking who 
were in ‘full activity; [and who] have got the ear of the present Emperor’ 
(Barrow to Buckinghamshire, 14 February 1815, in BL IOR G/12/196 
(Reel 1) F 2–6). Buckinghamshire was warned that the British ‘need 
not be surprised [that within the year] a communication will be made 
personally from the Court of France to [the Court] of Pekin’ (Barrow 
to Buckinghamshire, 14 February 1815, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) 
F 2–6). Again Barrow’s judgement on this occasion was based on obsolete 
intelligence. The only French missionary at the Qing court was Father 
Lamiot who, it was noted earlier, had been in regular correspondence with 
Staunton. Rather, Barrow’s scare campaign was based on a specific hatred 
of the French, understandable given a century of intermittent wars with 
France and his own experience at the time of the Macartney Embassy. ‘The 
French Jesuits’, Barrow wrote, were ‘the enemies of Protestant England … 
[and had] contributed to blast the hopes … for the success of the British 
Embassy’. He continued:
That Embassy, in the general estimation of the board, failed in 
its object: it was indeed too soon discovered that it could not do 
otherwise; Demands were made, which had the Chinese character 
been duly appreciated, could not have been preferred. Those very 
demands were an admirable instrument in the hands of our Enemies 
who adroitly turned against us—We were … most completely in 
the hands of those enemies … Our interpreters too, were Chinese 
Catholics … discovered by their countrymen [arriving in China] 
to be … unworthy beings who had deserted the Tombs and the 
Religion of their Fathers, they had not the courage … to advance 
5  American trade increased substantially in the first decade of the nineteenth century due to the 
demand for tea and manufactured silk. American private traders were also exporting tea and other 
products from Canton into Europe. In 1815–1816, the Americans exported 4.5 million pounds of 
tea for American consumption and almost three million pounds of tea for European consumption, 
amounting to over US$5 million. The value of Company imports and exports between Britain and 
China was valued at £4,285,799, with the value of exports and imports between India and China in 
the hands of private English traders valued at £2,379,064 (Report [relative to the trade with the East 
Indies and China] from the Select Committee of the House of Lords, 11 April 1821, p. 162).
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the cause of the Heretics more especially when under the eye of 
their Catholic Brothers. (Barrow to Buckinghamshire, 14 February 
1815, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 2–6)
But prospects for the success of a new British embassy were at hand. 
Referring to Staunton, Barrow wrote, ‘We [can] now appear at the Chinese 
court with an advantage which we never before possessed’. He explained:
The EIC have in their employ a Gentleman who can both speak 
to the Chinese and write to them in their own language, without 
the usual recourse to the medium of any Interpreter; an advantage 
which can only be duly appreciated by those who have had the 
mortification of experiencing the intrigues and chicanery … when 
communications are to be held with this jealous and corrupt 
government through the interventions of Catholic missionaries. 
(Barrow to Buckinghamshire, 14 February 1815, in BL IOR 
G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 2–6, emphasis in original)
Barrow, in his praise for Staunton, ignored the other English Mandarin 
speakers at Canton, namely, Morrison, Davis, Toone and Thomas 
Manning.6 News of the Jiaqing emperor’s opinion of Staunton as ‘the 
young and crafty Englishman’ had yet to reach him. Staunton, in 
Barrow’s view, was the only candidate qualified to lead an embassy to the 
Qing court:
It is almost needless to add that Sir George Staunton, who is now 
on the spot, is the gentleman to whom I allude. From a long and 
intimate acquaintance with him, I cannot have the smallest doubt 
… that his knowledge of the [Chinese] people and their language, 
his zeal and integrity, joined to the solid good sense which he 
possesses, would at least ensure [an honourable result for the 
British nation]. (Barrow to Buckinghamshire, 14 February 1815, 
in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 2–6)
Opening up the Chinese domestic market for British manufacturers was 
also a powerful argument. Buckinghamshire was reminded of the gains 
to the manufacturers of Sheffield and Birmingham if ‘a single Penknife 
6  Thomas Manning also joined the embassy suite as a Chinese interpreter and proceeded to 
Peking, thus achieving his ambition of visiting the Chinese capital after earlier failed attempts to enter 
China through Tibet. While in Lhasa, Manning kowtowed before Tibetan mandarins and the grand 
lama (Markham, 1876, pp. 259, 265). A cache of Manning’s papers was discovered in 2014 that have 
since been archived at the Royal Asiatic Society, London. A quick review of the papers in 2016 (due 
to time restraints) unfortunately revealed little of specific relevance to the Amherst Embassy. For a 
more detailed examination of Manning, see Platt (2018, pp. 140–151).
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or a pair of scissors, [produced by] the manufacturers of England, could 
be introduced into every family in China’ (Barrow to Buckinghamshire, 
14  February 1815, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 2–6).
Regardless of ulterior British motives, the Chinese were to be informed 
that the mission was being sent in a spirit of courtly civility from the 
British monarch to the emperor, congratulating him specifically on his 
escape from the assassination attempt in 1813. The Qing court was to 
be notified further of the British desire for peaceful relations between the 
Select Committee at Canton and the provincial government.
The Company’s Secret Court of Directors met in London on 3 March 
1815 and agreed that an embassy could result in potential benefits 
provided it was ‘judiciously arranged and ably executed’ (Chairman 
and Deputy Chairman to Buckinghamshire, 3 March 1815, in BL IOR 
G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 7). A commission of three members was proposed. 
The first commissioner, or ambassador, would be nominated by the Prince 
Regent and would be in charge of his letter to the Jiaqing emperor. The 
other two commissioners were to be chosen from the Select Committee at 
Canton. This was to ensure that trust was not placed in a single individual. 
The inclusion of a gentleman nominated by the Prince Regent signified 
the official status of the embassy, serving to inform the Qing court of its 
special authority above one constituted only by men of the Company.
The choice of ambassador was an early concern. Recent British military 
activity in Nepal, a Chinese tributary, required a man ‘best adapted to 
the feeling and taste of the Chinese’.7 Such a candidate should be a ‘Man 
of high Rank, and of Military character, and also of a pre-possessing 
appearance’ (Chairs to Buckinghamshire, 3 March 1815, in BL IOR 
G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 9). Any hope Staunton may have had of returning 
to Peking as the leader of a British embassy was extinguished immediately 
by these criteria.
7  British military action in Nepal was thought to be of ‘no small importance’ for British interests 
in China. Lord Moira wrote to the Select Committee in November 1814 of a considerable Chinese 
force assembled in Tibet in response to Nepalese soldiers gathering on the frontier. The British had no 
designs on Tibet, but nonetheless, there was a ‘threat of Chinese invasion of Nepaul for the purpose 
of imposing on that kingdom the delegations of feudal or tributary dependence, or perhaps of actually 
reducing it to subjection’ (Letters from Lord Moira, November 1814, and Edward Gardner, British 
Resident, Catmandhu, in BL MSS EUR F 140/46). For a discussion on Anglo–Chinese relations 
concerning Tibet, Nepal and British India at this time, see Mosca (2013).
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Buckinghamshire and the Company’s chairman and deputy chairman 
visited Prime Minister Lord Liverpool. His response to an embassy was, at 
best, lukewarm. Doubt was expressed whether he could justify the idea of 
another embassy to the British public after Macartney’s failure. Liverpool 
added, however, that he would not be deterred from the pressure of 
public opinion if adequate reasons were put forward and would do his 
duty (Secret Court of Directors held Tuesday 2 May 1815, in BL IOR 
G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 11). The Company chairs decided to postpone any 
decision until news of the latest developments was received from Canton.
News from Canton dated 16 January 1815 arrived at the beginning of 
July. The Secret Court of Directors responded in a dispatch dated 7 July 
1815. Conditions at Canton and the conduct of the ‘local government of 
Canton to our representatives in 1814’ had revealed:
The hazard to property and commerce of the Company [which 
has] been exposed by the violence, injustice and despotism of 
the Government - and the very precarious situation in which our 
affairs and the British interests operating under the unprincipled 
rules of those Chinese authorities—we cannot avoid seeing that it 
maybe our duty … to engage the interposition and influence of 
H.M. government with the Court of Pekin. (Secret Commercial 
Letter to China, 7 July 1815, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 12)
Buckinghamshire responded to this intelligence in a letter dated 26 July 
1815. Details received lately from China had convinced him that the 
security of both Company personnel and trade at Canton ‘can only be 
expected by the appointment of a Mission from the Prince Regent to the 
Emperor of China’ (Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East India 
Company to Buckinghamshire, 28 July 1815 and forwarded to Amherst 
at the time of his appointment, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). The 
Company chairs sent a detailed letter to Buckinghamshire’s office two days 
later setting out the altercations that had taken place at Canton in 1813 and 
1814. Focus fell on two main concerns. The Cantonese authorities, they 
reported, aimed to place the British Factory under their direct control. It 
was evident these authorities had little sense of public or personal honour 
and acted solely within their own interests, evidenced by their insistence 
that all communication with the Select Committee be in English, thus 
leaving scope for distorted and incorrect Mandarin translations to be 
passed to the Chinese Government. This strategy proved their motives 
of ‘conceal[ing] the truth from the Emperor’ and their fear of the Court 
of Peking (Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East India Company 
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to Buckinghamshire, 28 July 1815 and forwarded to Amherst at the time 
of his appointment, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). An open channel 
for official communication with the supreme Government of China at 
Peking was vital to correctly address British grievances at the highest level. 
Perceptions of British exceptionalism governing its affairs with the Qing 
court remained. Britain was ‘a country whose people and whose greatness 
[the Chinese] are unwillingly obliged to respect’, and an embassy sent in 
the name of the British sovereign would serve ‘To place the Chinese trade 
on a basis of steady and fixed principles which will guard it against the fatal 
effects of an arbitrary, capricious, or unjust exercise of power’ (Chairman 
and Deputy Chairman of the East India Company to Buckinghamshire, 
28 July 1815 and forwarded to Amherst at the time of his appointment, 
in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36).
No new demands, concessions, or privileges were to be insisted on by the 
ambassador as this would serve to ‘excite jealousy and resistance’; rather, 
his aim was to ‘secure the enjoyment of privileges long conceded by the 
Emperor, and protection against the vexatious insults and impositions of 
the local authorities’ (Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East India 
Company to Buckinghamshire, 28 July 1815 and forwarded to Amherst 
at the time of his appointment, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). British 
intentions to observe the prescribed laws and regulations of China were to 
be made clear and negotiation was to centre on the following goals:
1. For the privileges of the Company to be more accurately defined 
and detailed.
2. To ensure trade security against sudden and capricious interruptions.
3. Freedom from the interference of Chinese Government officers in 
the Factory. The freedom to hire Chinese servants and an exemption 
from abusive, contemptuous, or insolent treatment from Chinese 
functionaries.
4. To open a channel of communication between members of the 
Factory and some public tribunal at Peking, either a British resident 
or by written representations in the Chinese language. And the right 
to use the Chinese language in all addresses and representations to the 
local government.
5. To give an explanation of the ‘Affair of the Doris’ or any other subject 
of a political nature on which it may be expedient to touch.
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Success in any of these was of the highest importance and the Company 
chairs thought it was ‘worth the cost of the attempt, if that were not 
otherwise a matter of duty’ to proceed. It was important, however, not 
to incur any unnecessary splendour or expense (Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman of the East India Company to Buckinghamshire, 28 July 1815 
and forwarded to Amherst at the time of his appointment, in BL IOR 
MSS EUR F 140/36).
Official Approval of an Embassy
Lord Liverpool informed the Company chairs of government approval for 
an embassy to the Qing court on 10 August 1815. A commission made 
up of three commissioners was to be appointed. The second and third 
commissioners were named as the president of the Select Committee at 
Canton, John Elphinstone, and Sir George Staunton. Their contribution 
to the embassy would be considerable due to their local experience and 
knowledge of Mandarin, but it must be understood:
That the person selected by his Royal Highness the Prince Regent 
to be placed at the head of the Commission, and to be the bearer 
of the letter addressed by HRH the Prince Regent to the Emperor 
of China, should, as in the Government of India, be authorized 
to act upon his own responsibility upon any points of difference 
between him and the other Commissioners. (Buckinghamshire to 
Chairman and Deputy Chairman, EIC, 10 August 1815, in BL 
IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 30)
Buckinghamshire’s next task was finding a suitable person of rank to 
fill the position of ambassador on such a delicate and difficult mission. 
The successful candidate, as noted earlier, would be a military man as this 
profession, in the view of the Company Directors, was held in the highest 
honour by the Chinese and a man of that description ‘would prove 
acceptable’ to them as the principal member (Chairs to Buckinghamshire, 
28 July 1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). The ambassador would 
receive the same allowance as Macartney, namely, £20,000 for the mission 
(equivalent to approximately £2 million in today’s values). The Select 
Committee at Canton was to be notified officially that an embassy to the 
Qing court was being planned.8
8  Barrow had raised the matter unofficially with Staunton in his private letters, as noted earlier in 
this study.
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Choice of a British Ambassador
Buckinghamshire’s first choice to fill the position of first commissioner 
or ambassador in the proposed embassy was his brother-in-law and close 
friend, the Rt Hon. John Sullivan, who was appointed as one of the paid 
assistant commissioners and had served under him when he was governor 
of Madras (Philips, 1940, p. 202). Sullivan had made a considerable 
fortune from sugar plantations in Trinidad, was a member of the Board of 
Control and was also a servant of the Company (Philips, 1940, p. 202).9 
He was keen to take the appointment and had received Lord Liverpool’s 
approval, but his nomination was declined by the Company Court of 
Directors who thought his rank and position in the Company did not 
qualify him for the role. Sullivan wrote to Buckinghamshire in a letter 
dated 26 August 1815:
Though I have a strong sense of the difficulties I should have had 
to encounter, with a Government so constituted as that of China 
… I should not have despaired of overcoming them, if I could 
have carried with me a full conviction that the Court of Directors 
has ceased to consider it essential to the success of the Mission that 
it should be placed in the hands of a Peer, or of a distinguished 
Military character. But knowing as I now do that they continue to 
attach great importance to that point, I should ill deserve the good 
opinion of Lord Liverpool and yourself … I decline the honour. 
(John Sullivan to Buckinghamshire, 26 August 1815, in BL IOR 
G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 36–37)
Buckinghamshire now approached Lord William Pitt Amherst and 
sent a letter marked ‘Private and Confidential’ inviting Amherst to dine 
with him at the Fitzroy Room to ‘entertain a subject I have to mention’. 
He continued:
It is intended to send a Commission of Embassy to China. 
The business is to be conducted upon a liberal scale, but not as 
extravagant as in the case of Lord Macartney.
In the event of you embarking in this undertaking, I conceive you 
must look to an absence of two years and might expect to put 
twenty thousand pounds in your pocket.
9  Sullivan had resided in Madras where he ‘took a keen interest in Indian affairs, personally 
conducting useful research at the Board into the civil and political government of India’.
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The consent of the Court of Directors is necessary. I write in 
Lord Liverpool’s name as well as my own. (Buckinghamshire to 
Amherst, marked ‘Private and Confidential’, 29 August 1815, in 
BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35)
Amherst declined the offer and Buckinghamshire approached Lord 
Binning.10 Binning took a couple of weeks to make up his mind. Amherst, 
in the meantime, had reconsidered the appointment and informed 
Buckinghamshire that he would accept the nomination of ambassador to 
China if Binning turned it down. He informed Buckinghamshire, ‘I have 
made up my mind to a separation of two years from my family for the 
sake of procuring for my children a provision of £20,000’ (Amherst to 
Buckinghamshire, 8 September 1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35).
A series of secret correspondences between Amherst and Buckinghamshire 
followed where Buckinghamshire forwarded in ‘strict confidence 
some extracts of my letters to Binning’ (Buckinghamshire to Amherst, 
9  September 1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35). Amherst was 
informed on 9 September by Buckinghamshire that he was expecting 
Binning’s answer and that ‘if in the affirmative you must be aware that he 
must have the appointment’ (Buckinghamshire to Amherst, 9 September 
1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35). Binning’s answer arrived on 
15 September. He had declined the appointment. Amherst was requested 
to meet with Buckinghamshire ‘without delay’ (Buckinghamshire to 
Amherst, 15 September 1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35).
Amherst’s Appointment
Amherst’s appointment was announced to the British public on 
27  September 1815. The Company’s Secret Court of Directors wrote 
to the president of the Select Committee at Canton on the same day 
announcing that the Company was going ahead with an embassy to China 
to address the arbitrary and injurious proceedings of the local authorities 
towards Company representatives and interests at Canton (Draft Letter in 
the Secret Commercial Department to the President and Select Committee 
of Supra Cargoes at Canton, reference made to letters of 7 July, n.d., in 
10  Thomas Hamilton, Lord Binning (1780–1858). Binning, like Amherst, was a close friend of 
George Canning and later served under him on the Board of Control from 1816. He was a MP for 
Rochester from 1818–1832. A friend described Binning as ‘a thin under jawed fellow’ and ‘one of the 
pleasantest men I ever met’ (see The History of Parliament, www.historyofparliamentonline.org).
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BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/43 (a)). The embassy was to consist of a person 
of high rank, namely, Lord Amherst, as first commissioner. The two 
most senior members of the Select Committee, John Elphinstone and Sir 
George Staunton, were nominated as the second commissioner and third 
commissioner, respectively, but their rank and inclusion was to be decided 
by Amherst on arrival in China (Staunton, 1824, p. 4).
Henry Ellis, the illegitimate son of Lord Buckinghamshire, was 
appointed secretary of the embassy with dormant credentials of minister 
plenipotentiary in the event of the death or absence of the ambassador 
(Castlereagh to Lord Amherst, 1 January 1816, in Morse, 1926/1966, 
vol. 3, p. 283).11 Ellis had returned recently from an important diplomatic 
mission to Persia where, acting as the deputy minister plenipotentiary at 
Tehran in the absence of the minister, James Morier, he had successfully 
engaged in negotiations with the Shah of Persia and acquired a ratification 
of the Anglo–Persian Definitive Treaty signed in 1814 (Sir Gore Ouseley, 
James Morier, Henry Ellis, in Public Records Office [PRO], Kew, UK, FO 
60/9).12 His diplomatic skill was noted by Morier, who praised his efforts in 
achieving success during ‘negotiations of considerable difficulty at Tehran’ 
(James Morier, 21 August 1814, in PRO FO 60/9). Ellis, Morier wrote, 
was ‘fully acquainted with the peculiar nature of the public service in 
Persia’ (James Morier, 21 August 1814, in PRO FO 60/9). His experience 
of eastern diplomacy, it may be assumed, was seen as providing Amherst 
with valuable insight and assistance during forthcoming negotiations with 
the Qing court.
Lord Buckinghamshire’s letter addressed to the viceroy of Canton informing 
him officially that an embassy was being dispatched was left unsealed so 
that the Select Committee could read its contents and present it together 
with the original and a copy of a Chinese translation. The timing of the 
letter’s delivery at Canton was considered critical. An immediate delivery 
might lead the local government, acting ‘from suspicion or hostility’, to 
turn the emperor’s ministers against the embassy with a danger of their 
11  A secretary’s task in a diplomatic mission is assisting the ambassador in drafting papers, 
examining documents and giving legal advice and providing the ambassador with the fruits of their 
professional experience (Mattingly, 1955/2010, p. 103).
12  An earlier treaty had been signed in 1812 by Ouseley. The Anglo–Persian Definitive Treaty 
(signed in 1814) guaranteed British military assistance in the event of European powers hostile to 
England entering Persian territory. Company interests in India were concerned about potential 
French incursions in Persia and sought to contain Russian threats that had resulted in their victory 
over Persia in the period 1805–1813. British embassies had pressured Persia to comply with Russian 
terms given that Russia was a British ally against Napoleon.
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refusing its reception. News of the embassy’s impending arrival was to 
be kept secret and was to be announced by the presentation of the letter 
when the ships-of-war conveying Amherst and the embassy arrived off 
the coast of China. Such a strategy would leave little time for Peking to 
be notified and for orders to arrive at Canton forbidding the progress of 
the embassy (Secret Commercial Letter to China, 27 September 1815, 
in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 39–40). Short notice of the embassy’s 
arrival, on the other hand, ran the risk of offending the Chinese as well as 
leaving insufficient time for the Qing court to prepare for the embassy’s 
arrival. Accordingly, the Select Committee was instructed by the directors 
to use their own discretion for timing the delivery of Buckinghamshire’s 
letter and to take the most expedient course of action ‘according to the 
circumstances in which you find yourselves placed’ (Secret Commercial 
Letter to China, 27 September 1815, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 41).
The issues to be raised with the Chinese Government were also left to the 
discretion of the Select Committee. The Chinese were to be informed that 
Elphinstone and Staunton’s inclusion in the embassy was on the orders 
of the Prince Regent and not the Company and the presence of several 
Mandarin speakers from the British Factory was necessary to relieve 
Staunton from translation duties. These were Robert Morrison, who had 
‘given so many proofs of his skill in translation from either of the two 
languages into the other’, Robert Toone and John Francis Davis (Secret 
Commercial Letter to China, 27 September 1815, in BL IOR G/12/196 
(Reel 1) F 41).
Amherst was scheduled to arrive in Chinese waters on 1 May 1816, 
at which time he was to be presented with a full report on the latest 
intelligence of Company affairs. The directors reminded the Select 
Committee that the dispatch of an embassy represented a potential hazard 
to British interests where trade could be stopped and it was acknowledged 
that this was ‘a perilous expedition’ (Secret Commercial Letter to China, 
27 September 1815, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 43).
75
4 . THE VIEW FROM LONDON
Lord William Pitt Amherst (1773–1857)
William Pitt Amherst, referred to as ‘Pitt’ by his family and close 
friends, was born at Bath on 14 January 1773.13 Named in honour of 
the statesman William Pitt the Elder, Amherst was the first of three 
children of Lieutenant-General William Amherst, aide-de-camp to the 
king, governor of Newfoundland and adjutant-general of the army, and 
his wife, Elizabeth Patterson.14 On the death of their parents in 1781, 
Amherst and his younger sister, Elizabeth, went to live with their uncle, 
Jeffrey Amherst, first Baron Amherst and commander in chief of the 
British Army, on his estate at Sevenoaks in Kent.15 Named ‘Montreal’ 
after his celebrated victory over the French during the Seven Years War in 
1760, the estate offered rolling hills, horses and an ideal country life for 
children. Elizabeth wrote to her brother in 1800, ‘Surely no two people 
were ever more fortunate after losing their parents, to find themselves in 
a better situation than if they had lived’ (Hall & Shelton, 2002, p. 49).16
Amherst was educated at Westminster School where he ‘profited by the 
mould and conscientious rule of Dr Samuel Smith’ and, at the age of 16, 
went to Christ Church Oxford to study for a Bachelor of Arts during 
the ‘Saturnian reign’ of Doctor Cyril Jackson from where he graduated 
in 1792 (‘A commemoration speech on Amherst’s life’, read at the Christ 
Church Gaudy, 21 June 1876, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/221). 
Historians have concluded that young men of Amherst’s aristocratic class 
led a sheltered existence:
13  Viscount Mersey (1949, p. 47) described the Amherst family as ‘old legal gentry’. The family 
motto was ‘Victoria Concordia Crescit’ (‘Victory springs from Concord’) (Debrett’s New Peerage for 
1822, 1822).
14  Amherst’s father, Lieutenant-General William Amherst, was born in 1732 and died in 1781. His 
mother, Elizabeth Patterson, died in 1777. The family lived on the Isle of Wight, on land inherited 
by Elizabeth, in a house described as a ‘seven bay’ Palladian style overlooking the sea (Peers, n.d.).
15  Field Marshal Jeffrey Amherst (1717–1797), 1st Baron Amherst, was instrumental in British 
victories against the French in Canada during the Seven Years War, including the capture of Montreal 
in September 1760 which ended French rule in North America. He was appointed governor-general 
of British North America or Canada, a position he held until 1763. Made a baron in 1776, Amherst 
was promoted to commander in chief of the British Army in 1778 (Peers, n.d.).
16  Amherst’s youngest sister died soon after birth in 1775. Elizabeth Frances (Amherst) Hale 
was born at Walcott, England, in 1774 and moved to Canada in 1799 where she died at Quebec 
City, Quebec, in 1826. She had married John Hale and had 12 children. John Hale was the deputy 
paymaster British Forces in Quebec in 1798, and later became a member of Legislative Council for 
Lower Canada in 1808 (Hall & Shelton, 2002, pp. 448–450).
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By their social intercourse, their classical studies, their mingling in 
the affairs of county society, and their travels, they could be said 
to have had an extensive knowledge of three things above all else, 
namely, ancient Rome, modern (non-industrial) England south 
of the Trent, and those foreign parts which customarily featured 
on the itinerary of the Grand Tour. (R. J. White as quoted in 
Plowright, 2002, p. 23)
Amherst was a quiet and inoffensive student whose ‘academic performance 
was unexceptional’ (Peers, n.d.). Nevertheless, his high birth, good looks 
and fine character ensured his popularity with a group of very close 
friends made at school and university, many of whom were destined to 
become the leading politicians of their generation.17 His friends included 
George Canning, future foreign secretary (1807–1809, 1822–1827) and 
prime minister (1827); John Parker, 1st Earl of Morley, a prominent 
Whig politician and a member of the House of Lords; Lord Sidmouth, 
Prime Minister (1801–1804) and Home Secretary (1812–1822); 
Charles Abbot,  Speaker of the House of Commons (1802–1817); and 
Charles Wynn, a future president of the Board of Control (1822–1828). 
Archives housed in the British Library contain several letters written to 
Amherst over the course of his life that provide insight into his character, 
career and the importance of connections and patronage in Georgian and 
Regency high society.
In 1794, at the age of 21, Amherst travelled to Austria at the start of 
a  grand tour of Europe. Lady Elizabeth Holland, the English socialite, 
met Amherst and recorded in her journal that he was ‘a quiet, sedate 
young man, full of proprieties and all sorts of good things’ (Holland, 
1909, p. 129).18 She continued, ‘Mr. A. fell in love with me and Mrs. W 
[Mrs. Wyndham]; he was most in love with the one he last saw. We went 
to balls and were very gay’ (Holland, 1909, p. 129). Lady Holland’s group 
of friends reached Italy two years later where they met Lord Macartney, 
recently returned from the court of the Qianlong emperor and currently 
on a ‘confidential mission to Louis XVIII at Verona’ (Holland, 1909, 
17  Jennifer Hall-Witt (2007, p. 17) stated the importance of ‘one’s dress, manners, wit, and 
attractiveness, as well as one’s network of friends and acquaintances, which could influence one’s 
entrance into elite social circles’. Amherst’s sister referred to his good looks in the context of a newly 
arrived portrait of Amherst hanging ‘over the chimney-piece’ in 1806, adding that ‘all the young 
ladies have fallen in love with you’ (Hall & Shelton, 2002, p. 207). Curiously, Platt (2018, p. 159) 
belittles Amherst as ‘neither brilliant nor particularly handsome’.
18  Mrs Wyndham was the wife of the British Minister at Florence.
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p.  136).19 Lady Sarah Plymouth, married to Lord Plymouth and the 
mother of three children, joined Lady Holland’s group in Naples.20 She 
and Amherst were immediately attracted to each other. Lady Holland 
related, ‘I went with Lady Plymouth and Amherst to Tivoli; we stayed 
a couple of days. Lord Macartney came, and … I saw a good deal of him’ 
(Holland, 1909, p. 142). Lord Macartney’s ‘remarkable [and] retentive 
memory’ and love of ‘playing tricks’ made him good company (Holland, 
1909, p. 229). Whether or not Amherst and Macartney discussed China 
at this time is not known, but it is reasonable to suggest that the subject 
of Macartney’s reception at the Qianlong court was raised at some point 
in light of his unique appointment as the first British ambassador to arrive 
in China and his disappointment at the failure of his mission.21 If so, such 
a conversation would likely have left a negative perception of China in 
Amherst’s mind.
Amherst returned to Oxford in 1797 where he received a Master of Arts. 
Later that year, he succeeded to the title of Baron on the death of his 
uncle and was handed ‘Montreal’ by his aunt, the Dowager Amherst. 
A reference to the estate appears in an 1879 publication:
The father of the first Lord Amherst had acquired a small estate near 
Seven Oaks; the son extended its boundaries by the purchase of 
the third part of Otford and other lands. He also pulled down the 
old house and built himself a mansion, which he called Montreal, 
in commemoration of his chief victory. (Evans, 1879, p. 162)22
Meanwhile, Amherst’s and Lady Sarah Plymouth’s relationship developed 
into a romantic affair that impacted not only on his private life but also on 
his career. The fact that Amherst was concerned to keep the relationship 
a  secret from both his sister Elizabeth and the Dowager Amherst 
is indicated in a letter to Elizabeth written at the end of 1799, where 
19  Barrow (1807, p. 356) wrote, ‘in June 1795, [Macartney] was again called upon to undertake 
an important mission to Italy of a delicate and confidential nature, the particulars of which there are 
many reasons for not disclosing at present’.
20  Lady Sarah Plymouth was born Sarah Archer in 1762. She married the 5th Earl of Plymouth in 
1778 when she was only 16. She had a son and two daughters by this marriage.
21  Macartney wrote, ‘I cannot help feeling the disappointment most severely’ (Cranmer-Byng, 
1962, p. 152).
22  The Palladian style house built by Lord Jeffrey Amherst in 1769–1770 at Sevenoaks was sold in 
1926 to a local businessman where after it fell into disrepair. The house was demolished in 1936. The 
original estate comprised 2,500 acres of which 60 acres were subdivided into a housing estate between 
1952 and 1963 and named ‘Montreal Park’. The remaining land is presently a nature reserve managed 
by the Kent Wildlife Trust (www.montrealpark.org.uk/history/history.htm).
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Amherst informed her that he had turned down the position of governor 
of Jamaica due to some ‘most weighty reasons of a private nature’ (BL IOR 
MSS EUR F 140/7). She replied in a letter dated 1 February 1800:
You say your objections to accepting the place offered you are 
insuperable, but do not mention them; whatever they may be 
I have not the least doubt of their being founded in good sense 
& am very glad you are not going to what I fear is a bad climate. 
(as quoted in Hall & Shelton, 2002, p. 28)
His sister turned her attention to Amherst’s maiden speech before the 
House of Lords in late 1799:
All my friends write good accounts of your Lordship’s speech … 
so I hope as you have begun so prosperously you will continue 
to exert your abilities on behalf of your Country. I am certain it 
only requires a little exertion for you to become a good Speaker, as 
you are certainly amply provided with good sense, judgment and 
information … I only wish to give you a little hint to speak loud 
enough … your voice naturally is not a very loud one. (as quoted 
in Hall & Shelton, 2002, p. 31, emphasis in original)
Lord Plymouth, described as ‘a fine Fat round English Lord’, died in 1800 
(Figgis & Rowney, 2001, p. 140). His death, Lady Holland wrote, was 
‘a great release to his wife, who will be rewarded by marrying Amherst 
within the year. His constancy is unparalleled’ (Holland, 1909, p. 264, 
emphasis in original). Amherst and Sarah were married on 24 July 1800. 
Their marriage was a very strong and loving union that bore three sons 
and a daughter.23 Amherst’s sister Elizabeth was not pleased about the 
marriage, citing the age difference—Amherst was 27 and Sarah was 38—
and the fact that Sarah had three children from her previous marriage. 
Advantages were noted, however, and her response provides clues to the 
nature of Amherst’s lifestyle and occupation at this time:
Your circumstances will be extremely comfortable … Lady 
Amherst having so generously given up Montreal to you is 
a very great advantage and the farm around will be an additional 
employment and amusement for you.24
23  Jeffrey was born on 29 August 1802 at ‘Montreal’, Seven Oaks, and died on 2 August 1826 
at Barrackpore, India. Jeffrey had been aide-de-camp to his father in India (BL IOL MSS EUR F 
140/168). His brother, William, was born on 3 September 1805 and succeeded as the 2nd Earl on 
the death of Amherst in 1857.
24  Prior to his marriage, Amherst lived at 41 Duke Street, St James’s (Hall & Shelton, 2002, p. 67).
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‘Montreal’ remained his family home until after Sarah’s death in 1838.25 
Fond references to the estate appear in several letters from friends over the 
years and portray an ideal country life with social gatherings spent around 
the fireplace in the grand house. Amherst was also fortunate in acquiring 
a fine London residence at 66 Grosvenor Street, Mayfair, inherited by his 
wife on the death of her father, whose contents were described as consisting 
of ‘uncommonly elegant furniture’ (Hall & Shelton, 2002, p. 48).
Amherst showed little interest in domestic politics and hated public 
speaking (Hall & Shelton, 2002, p. 47). His main interests were foreign 
affairs and coin collecting, and he was very fond of children (Hall & 
Shelton, 2002, pp. 49–51). Amherst’s chief occupation at this time was 
the management of ‘Montreal’ as well as activities and responsibilities 
connected with the very fashionable St James’s Volunteers, which he 
joined on 31 May 1798 with the gazetted rank of colonel.26 This position 
entitled him to wear a splendid uniform of:
Scarlet jacket, dark blue or black facings and collar with gilt 
edging, gold epaulettes, gilt gorget and buttons, gilt sword-hilt, 
dark blue or black trousers, black helmet with plume white out 
of red, pink sash, silver spurs on high black boots. (Walker, 1985, 
Item no. 1546)27
Amherst enjoyed military service, which was hardly surprising given his 
family background and upbringing. He wrote to his wife from Dover in 
1806 at the time of British fears of a French invasion:
I am very glad you are in town, and shall rejoice if it [an invasion] 
has the effect of giving me a little more military duty … If the war 
continues we may be treated with a military spectacle all along the 
25  Amherst’s first wife, Lady Sarah, died in 1838. Amherst married Lady Mary Sackville, the 
daughter of the 6th Earl of Plymouth and the widow of Amherst’s stepson, on 25 May 1839 at the 
age of 66. The couple lived at ‘Knole House’, Sevenoaks, one of England’s grandest houses.
26  The volunteer movement was formed for the purpose of defending Britain against a French 
invasion. Gillian Russell (1995, pp. 13–15) has pointed out its important role in galvanising domestic 
support for king and country among groups that might otherwise have gravitated towards radicalism. 
The Volunteers were disbanded in 1802 after the Peace of Amiens, but reformed in June 1803 as the 
St James’s Westminster Volunteers with Amherst as colonel. Amherst’s sister refers to an incident in 
1804 reported in a newspaper where the ‘timely arrival’ of Lord Amherst at the head of the Grenadier 
Company of the St James’s Volunteers put down a ‘rowdy mob’ of demonstrators in Tenterden Street, 
off Hanover Square (Hall & Shelton, 2002, p. 180).
27  This is a description of a portrait of Amherst in full Volunteer uniform painted in 1803 by 
Arthur William Devis. The portrait remained in the Amherst family until it was lent to the War 
Office in 1926. It was sold at Sotheby’s (Amherst Sale) on 29 January 1964 and again at Christie’s on 
23 November 1973.
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coast, as camps succeed each other the whole way to Eastbourne 
without any great intervals. (Amherst to Lady Amherst, 1806, in 
Letters from the Yale Collection of American Literature)
Amherst and the British Court
Undoubtedly, the highlight of Amherst’s early career was his appointment 
as a Lord of the Bedchamber to George III, a position he first held from 
1802 to 1804.28 The appointment represented a mark of royal favour 
and also carried an annual salary of £1,000 (equivalent to approximately 
£100,000 in today’s values). Amherst’s sister agreed that this was an 
opportunity that her brother could not possibly refuse, although she 
told him, ‘it is not quite the line [of occupation] we could have wished. 
However, I conclude it is no bar to your taking some more active situation 
in future’ (Elizabeth Hale to Amherst, 12 August 1802, in Hall & Shelton, 
2002, p. 117). The opportunity to serve the king as one of his courtiers in 
the inner sanctum of the Court of St James’s served to familiarise Amherst 
with the daily intricacies of court life marked by the decorous sociability 
of morality and taste (Brewer, 1997, p. 38). Further, the experience served 
to establish the subsequent context for his judgement of the manners and 
conduct of the Qing court, perceived as heavily ceremonial and prescribed 
in contrast to Regency England. The historian John Ashton wrote:
The only etiquette observed on the Terrace is, that when the King 
passes, the ladies and gentlemen withdraw on either side, the latter 
merely uncovering the head; bows and curtsies being dispensed 
with on the occasion [when the king stops to converse] … this is 
done with the greatest urbanity. (1890, p. 8)
The fact that Amherst felt some sense of underachievement in light of the 
careers of his more illustrious political friends was reflected in his need to 
assure them that his appointment to the king’s bedchamber was achieved 
without ‘any solicitation on my part in any Quarter’ (Amherst to George 
Canning, 28 April 1802, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/13). Canning replied 
that he never ‘entertained a doubt of [Amherst] having obtained it [but] in 
the most honorable manner’ (Canning to Amherst, 3 May 1802, in BL 
IOR MSS EUR F 140/13). Amherst’s position was suspended momentarily 
28  Amherst had three other terms as Lord of the Bedchamber: 1804–1813, 1815–1823 and 1829–
1833 (Hall & Shelton, 2002, p. 450).
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in early 1804 due to new arrangements in the royal household, but his 
quick reinstatement, brought about by Canning’s recommendation, was 
met with an effusive response showing his high personal regard for the 
British monarch. Amherst wrote, ‘I bow, with the utmost submission to 
His Majesty’s demands’ (Amherst to Earl of Winchilsea, 18 May 1804, in 
BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/11).29
While Amherst displayed a personal disdain for the behaviour of the 
Prince Regent, his respect, if not reverence, for the institution of the British 
monarchy remained steadfast.30 For men of Amherst’s class and station in 
life, commitment to the British Crown still embodied and symbolised 
the highest virtues of patriotic duty and national honour at a time when 
British politics were increasingly becoming accountable to Parliament, the 
press and public opinion (Dickinson, 1999, pp. 35–42). Webster wrote 
in his Introduction to The letters of George IV of the importance of royal 
patronage for personal advancement among the closed circle of the British 
aristocratic elite (1938, p. lxiv). Amherst’s steadfastness in  upholding 
vigorously the sanctity of the office of the British sovereign in the face of 
extreme pressure from the mandarins of the Qing court during discussions 
with the Chinese Government is explained by such allegiance.
Amherst’s owed his first diplomatic appointment in 1808 as ambassador 
extraordinary to the Court of the Two Sicilies to the recommendation 
of George Canning.31 His fluency in Italian and love of Italian culture 
eminently qualified him for this position, in marked contrast to his later 
appointment as an ambassador to China. His sister enquired of the decor 
at ‘Montreal’, ‘You intended ornamenting some room with the largest 
general view of Rome at a distance; have you yet done so?’ (Elizabeth Hale 
to Amherst, Quebec, 9 December 1800, in Hall & Shelton, 2002, p. 68).
29  Canning wrote to Amherst that the Prince Regent said to him following his recommendation, 
‘You wish Lord Amherst restored—I shall have the greatest pleasure in restoring him’ (Canning to 
Amherst, 6 August 1804, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/13).
30  Amherst referred to the ‘absurd and scandalous behaviour of the Prince’, which made him 
ashamed to visit the Prince Regent in the drawing room at Carlton House. He commented: ‘and 
yet what can an individual do!’ (Amherst to Lady Amherst, 31 May 1814, in Letters from the Yale 
Collection of American Literature).
31  Amherst wrote that the appointment had received the full approval of the king. He added that his 
interview with Canning was ‘very short as he was in a hurry to prepare for the Levee, where indeed I shall 
have an opportunity of again seeing him. Eighteen months is the time agreed upon, but he expressed 
a wish that I shall not publickly [sic] name this stipulation, in order to save him the application which 
would already be made for the reversion. I must now dress for His Majesty’ (Amherst to Lady Amherst, 
14 December 1808, in Letters from the Yale Collection of American Literature).
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Amherst’s two-year term at the Sicilian court, however, was described as:
Fruitless as [Amherst] tried, without sufficient support from 
London, to patch over the rift between Sicilian constitutionalists 
and nationalists and the island’s nominal rulers, the exiled 
Bourbon king of Naples and his wife, Maria Carolina, who fought 
tenaciously to defend their authority. (Peers, n.d.)32
On his return to England in 1811, Amherst spent his time commuting 
between ‘Montreal’ and his town house in Grosvenor Street. His letters 
reflect a busy and carefree social life of engagements in the highest circles 
of aristocratic and court society. Their nature is discerned in a reference to 
a recital at the London residence of Lady Salisbury where a performance of 
‘Spanish airs’ sung by a Monsieur and Madame La Font, appearing on the 
recommendation of the Prince Regent, was on the program.33 Amherst, 
whose taste in the arts was rather pedestrian, enjoyed the occasion.34 He 
wrote to Lady Sarah, ‘The harmony between [Monsieur Lamont] and his 
wife is quite edifying. They say they are French, but I can hardly believe 
it, they sing with so much taste’ (Amherst to Lady Amherst, 1815, in BL 
MSS EUR B 363).
Amherst attended another social function a couple of nights later. 
His sense of humour is revealed in a letter to Lady Sarah:
I found a diamond earring … and went about looking for an 
unadorned ear. I presently discovered the lady, Mrs. Harbord, and 
restored her trim before she was aware she was lop-sided. (Amherst 
to Lady Amherst, 13 June 1815, in BL MSS EUR B 363, emphasis 
in original)35
32  The Bourbons ruled in Sicily under the protection of the British navy.
33  Lady Salisbury invited the singers on the recommendation of the Prince Regent who had heard 
them at a recital at Carlton House a few nights prior.
34  Amherst’s correspondence shows little appreciation of the arts. In 1822, he attended the Hay 
Market Theatre with his son Jeff to see ‘a laughable play called Matchmaking, and my old delight 
Peeping Tom [of Coventry]. I suppose I am grown grave, for Liston did not make me laugh as 
Edwin used to do. Amongst other songs is “Your Lordship is welcoming among us”’ (Amherst to 
Lady Amherst, 1 August 1822, in Letters from the Yale Collection of American Literature). ‘Liston’ 
and ‘Edwin’ were two famous comic actors of the time. John Liston is referred to as a ‘caricaturist’ 
and Edwin played character roles depicting the lower orders of society and died in 1805 (Davis, 
2015, pp. 61, 136). Robert Morrison (2019, p. 67) described Liston as relying on ‘hilarious facial 
contortions’ and making fun of conceited Cockneys and affected provincialists.
35  Mr Harbord was an MP.
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Amherst also described dinners held in Hanover Square with General 
Bligh.36 He spent a ‘very merry night’ with Bligh and a small group of 
friends at the Freemason’s Tavern where a walk home after the festivities 
‘prevented my having a very bad headache’ (Amherst to Lady Amherst, 
1815, in BL MSS EUR B 363, emphasis in original). The subject of most 
of his letters at this time concerned his love and affection for his wife and 
children. Recalling 20 years of marriage, Amherst wrote to Sarah:
What a delightful retrospect it is! And what an Angel in woman’s 
shape art thou, my dearest. How I dwell upon all your amiable and 
excellent qualities, and how has possession, instead of producing 
satiety, only sharpened and increased my love for you. (Amherst to 
Lady Amherst, 12 June 1815, in BL MSS EUR B 363)
And, finally, in a letter to Sarah, who was spending time in Dublin: 
‘I wonder what would induce me to consent to pass another five weeks 
away from you … From my breast you must never more depart’ (Amherst 
to Lady Amherst, 7 July 1815, in BL MSS EUR B 363).
Amherst’s Personal Reaction to the 
Appointment of Ambassador
From the earlier account of the selection process surrounding the 
position of ambassador to the Qing court, it is not difficult to appreciate 
that Binning’s indecision and Buckinghamshire’s concern to keep the 
appointment process a secret caused Amherst and his wife great anxiety. 
Hugh Hammersley, a prominent banker, MP and close friend of Amherst, 
wrote to him on 8 September 1815:37
I am anxious for an explanation of that to which you allude as a 
painful struggle. I conclude it is some public employ which may 
interrupt the fire-side happiness so dear to you. (Hammersley to 
Amherst, 8 September 1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35)
36  Bligh (1769–1840) was a general in the 33rd Regiment of Foot, an MP in the Irish House 
of Commons (1800–1801) and a leading cricketer of the day.
37  Hugh Hammersley’s father was the banker to the Prince of Wales. Hammersley (1767–1840) 
was MP for Helston. Known as a ‘Cannonite’, Hammersley, like Amherst, had been a captain in the 
St James’s Westminster Volunteers: ‘In 1826 he irritated Canning by pressing the claims of his friend 
Lord Amherst for an earldom’ (Thorne, 1986).
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Binning’s eventual rejection of the position and Amherst’s decision to 
accept the appointment was governed principally, as noted earlier, by the 
inducement of earning £20,000 for his sons’ inheritance (Amherst to 
Canning, 25 September 1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35). A further 
incentive, and an indication of the importance of rank in English aristocratic 
circles, was his expectation that the completion of a successful mission 
might be ‘a step to the earldom’ to which ‘My attention has been more alive 
since Lady Amherst by marrying me descended from the rank of Countess 
to that which she at present holds’ (Amherst to Canning, 25 September 
1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35).
Amherst’s reduced financial circumstances at the time were well known 
in London high society. Charles Bagot, who was shortly appointed as the 
British ambassador to the United States, wrote to Binning on his decision 
not to accept the appointment of ambassador to the Qing court:
[You had] no choice I think but very civily to say no to it … 
Amherst did right to take it. His private circumstances are very 
bad, without any prospect of mending it by his own exertions. 
(as quoted in Bagot, 1909, pp. 10–11)
Knowledge and gossip about the affairs of one’s friends and acquaintances 
reflected in Bagot’s letter are read by historians as typical of the nature of 
Regency high society where the exclusive circle of friends and acquaintances 
making up the aristocracy ensured that everyone knew all about each 
other’s domestic situation and financial position (Webster, 1938, p. xiv). 
Webster wrote in his Introduction to The letters of King George IV:
Everyone knew about the incomes and the domestic circumstances 
of the rest—marriage difficulties, less respectful alliances, pressures 
of debts and the possibilities of inheritances daily canvassed in 
frank and familiar conversations and letters. (1938, p. xiv)
Sarah’s initial reaction to Buckinghamshire’s proposal was ambiguous. 
She informed Amherst that she had rushed to the local library, presumably 
at Sevenoaks, to get ‘a copy of Macartney’ to immerse herself in the account 
of his embassy (Correspondence between Amherst’s appointment and 
departure, Sarah Amherst to Amherst, n.d., in BL IOR MSS EUR F 
140/35). Remaining behind at ‘Montreal’ while Amherst went to London 
to hold discussions with Lord Buckinghamshire, she worked through her 
emotions while on an energetic ride with Jeffrey, their 13-year-old son. 
She wrote to Amherst on her return:
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My mind as you may suppose has been intent on nothing but 
the business of this morning—the time being only two years 
makes the undertaking a less one—but it is a very great sacrifice 
and ought to have a large temptation—If the voyage and every 
expense is paid by Government, so that we could be enabled to 
lay up our own Income it would greatly enhance the temptation. 
(Lady Amherst to Amherst, n.d., in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35, 
emphasis in original)
Sarah, it appeared, had hoped to accompany her husband to China, for 
she wrote ‘if I am permitted to be with you, it matters little to me where 
I am’ (Lady Amherst to Amherst, n.d., in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35). 
An embassy to China, in her view, was not a desirable undertaking and she 
expected to learn that Amherst had refused the appointment:
If not, I dare say you might merely make your own terms, for 
few, very few of your Rank, to say nothing of Abilities … would 
consent to go and I dare say [the] Government [will] have 
difficulties in getting any one to accept such a Mission (Lady 
Amherst to Amherst, n.d., in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35, 
emphasis in original).
Sarah listed her concerns, namely, ‘the climate is a matter to enquire into’ 
(emphasis in original) as well as the length of time her husband would be 
away from his family. She ended her letter with a note of resignation that 
deferred to her husband’s wisdom:
My head is not as good as yours, & can devise nothing we have not 
talk’d over already … God bless you My dearest Love - who can 
tell what is to happen to [us] between sun rise and sun set. (Lady 
Amherst to Amherst, n.d., in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35)
Amherst informed Canning that he was due to sail before the end of 
November. He added:
I am told … I am to be joined, I believe at Canton, by the Chief 
of the Factory there and by Sir George Staunton (the boy in 
Lord Macartney’s Voyage) who are to be united with me in the 
Commission. My absence from England will be short of two years. 
I conclude I may consider my appointment as decided tho’ it is 
yet to be approved by the Regent and the Court of Directors … 
I have had no judgment but my own to direct me in the decision 
which I have taken. (Amherst to Canning, 25 September 1815, in 
BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35)
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The Reaction of Amherst’s Friends
Amherst’s appointment was approved formally by the Prince Regent on 
2 October 1815. His family and friends were astonished at the news. 
The Dowager Amherst wrote that she was stunned and added:
I hope in God that the Embassy to Pekin may contribute … much 
to your Happiness and Advantage as every other event in your life 
has hitherto done; but this is a severe trial of your good Fortune. 
(Dowager Amherst to Amherst, 27 September 1815, in BL IOR 
MSS EUR F 140/35)
Hugh Hammersley was initially quite startled when he heard the news, 
but thought Amherst had ‘done right to make a sacrifice of two years to 
the future advantage’ of his family, adding:
It is an undertaking of a very serious kind to be shut up for so 
many months on board a Ship, and in all probability to be allowed 
to satisfy your curiosity in a very confined degree at the end of 
your Sail … The shake by the hand you gave me in the Vestry on 
Tuesday is not to be repeated for more than two years. I thank 
you much for not disclosing the Secret that day, for you would 
have lessened my joy and happiness most seriously. We have only 
to hope that if you do the E. India Company a real benefit by the 
Sacrifice, they will act liberally in their turn, & the reward will 
be worth having. (Hugh Hammersley to Amherst, 23 September 
1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35)
Lord Boringdon agreed with Hammersley of the benefits of adding 
£20,000 to the family fortune but warned Amherst:38
To take care and have a most complete understanding as to the 
powers and situations of the two gentlemen appointed with you; 
so that they should not be able in case of success to reap all the 
credit and in the event of failure to impose the blame upon you. 
(Lord Boringdon to Amherst, 28 September 1815, in  BL IOR 
MSS EUR F 140/35)
38  Lord Boringdon was Lord Morley, created in 1815 for John Parker, 2nd Baron Boringdon 
(Debrett’s New Peerage for 1822, 1822, p. 379).
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Boringdon recommended strongly that Amherst should take his son, 
Jeffrey Amherst, to China. Not only was the boy of an age and character 
to benefit from the expedition, but also his presence would provide a 
source of great comfort to his father. Canning congratulated Amherst on 
his appointment:
I hope you continue to be well pleased with the nature of your 
Embassy and as hopeful of the result of it as you describe yourself 
at present. With every good will for your success, and your 
safe return, my dear Amherst. (George Canning to Amherst, 
20 October 1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/13)
The prospect of a visit to China did not excite much envy among Amherst’s 
friends. Lord Camden, who had read Macartney, wrote to Amherst, 
‘The country you are about to visit is rather curious than interesting but 
I  hope you will be able to see more of it than your Predecessors have 
done’ (Lord Camden to Amherst, 28 September 1815, in BL IOR MSS 
EUR F 140/35). A letter received from Doctor D. Jackson, the retired 
dean of Amherst’s alma mater Christ Church College, Oxford, reflected 
a wider reading of European diplomatic overtures to China. His opinion 
of Amherst’s coming encounter with China and its court, however, was 
hardly enthusiastic. He wrote:
There is a monotony in every thing belonging to China, which 
always tired me even when I have been reading about it … 
As for the negotiations in which you are to be engaged, there is a 
monotony in these also. I have read I believe all the accounts of 
… negotiations with the Court of Pekin that have been published, 
but the history of one is the history of all … one knows I think 
how every negotiation was or will be begun, carried on, and 
[ended]—or I should rather say broken off. (Dr D. Jackson to 
Amherst, 2 October 1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35)
Amherst complained later that the implementation of his embassy was 
marked by great haste.39 The circumstances were hardly propitious. Lord 
Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, warned Amherst on 28 September 
1815 that the proposed departure of the embassy on 1 December left no 
time to spare for making the necessary naval preparations (Lord Melville 
to Amherst, 28 September 1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35). 
Henry Ellis, newly appointed secretary of the embassy, acted quickly 
39  Amherst complained in his letter to George Canning in 1817 of his embassy being marked by 
‘hurry and confusion’ (Amherst to Canning, 8 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 285).
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and informed Amherst four days later of his ‘intention, to proceed to 
London on Sunday, that I may be in readiness to receive Your Lordship’s 
commands, and attend to any business that may arise connected with the 
Embassy’ (Henry Ellis to Amherst, 27 September 1815, in BL IOR MSS 
EUR F 140/35).
Amherst’s Response to the Embassy
Amherst’s appointment as the ambassador-elect to China saw him 
diligently research all available information on China and his choice of 
dinner guests at his Mayfair residence reflected the need to entertain 
people connected with the forthcoming embassy. Thus, on Sunday 
15 October 1815, Amherst’s guests were Miss Temple and her brother, 
Lord Palmerston, then 31 years of age and the secretary of war; Mr and 
Mrs Sullivan, presumably the Rt Hon. John Sullivan, who it has been seen 
was the initial choice to lead an embassy to China; John Barrow; Hugh 
Hammersley; and Captain Murray Maxwell of the HMS Alceste, the man-
of-war delegated to carry the embassy to China (Lord Amherst’s ‘Dinner 
Book’ in Kent History and Library Centre, Amherst Manuscripts: Family 
Papers, U1350-E16). Captain Maxwell was a close friend of Amherst 
and is referred to in a letter he wrote to Sarah from Dover as early as 
1806 (Amherst to Lady Amherst, Dover, 1806, in Letters from the Yale 
Collection of American Literature). Amherst also held a working dinner 
in late November where the absence of ladies presumably ensured an 
appropriate occasion for a discussion on the logistics of the embassy. 
Guests on this occasion were the Earl of Buckinghamshire; Chairman and 
Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Company, Charles 
Grant and Thomas Reid; Henry Ellis, Secretary of the embassy; John 
Barrow; Captain Maxwell and Captain Basil Hall, commander of the ten-
gun brig HMS Lyra commissioned to accompany the Alceste to China; 
and Henry Hayne, Private Secretary to Amherst.40 Other guests were 
Hugh Hammersley and Home Secretary Henry Addington, later Lord 
Sidmouth (Lord Amherst’s ‘Dinner Book’ in Kent History and Library 
Centre, Amherst Manuscripts: Family Papers, U1350-E16).
40  Henry Hayne had accompanied Amherst on his posting to the Two Sicilies in 1809 on the 
recommendation of Lord Boringdon (Hayne, n.d.).
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The Composition of the Amherst Embassy
Apart from Amherst and Ellis, other personnel assigned to the embassy 
included a chaplain, the Reverend Mr Griffith; two surgeons, namely, 
Clarke Abel who was to be paid an annual salary of £500 and Doctor 
Lynn who proceeded without salary.41 The embassy draftsman was 
William Havell, while Lieutenant Cooke was in command of the Marine 
Contingent. A band of 10 musicians was included who were provided 
with a ‘packet of music’ sent by the Duke of Kent, which he hoped would 
be ‘a source of some little amusement during the voyage’ (Duke of Kent to 
Amherst, Kensington Palace, 28 December 1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR 
F 140/36).42
Amherst took a personal interest in the various occupations represented 
in the embassy. Sir Joseph Banks called on him and requested that an 
intelligent Kew gardener be included to collect seeds and plants under the 
charge of Clarke Abel who, while attending the embassy in the capacity 
of a medical man, had a considerable knowledge of natural history.43 
Amherst also thought a shoe maker would be a useful addition to the 
embassy but the Company Directors replied that this was unnecessary as 
it was planned to provide a sufficient supply of ‘Shoes and Boots’.
On 15 October 1815, Buckinghamshire formally asked Lord Melville for 
a ship-of-war to be held in readiness to transport the embassy to the north 
of China. Amherst had written to his old friend Captain Murray Maxwell 
with the request that his ship HMS Alceste be commissioned to take him 
to China (Henderson III, 1970, p. 168).44 Maxwell responded:
Your letter has filled me with pride and happiness … the obtaining 
what I so anxiously desired … and excites such a tumult of 
pleasurable sensations that I am really My Lord unable to say 
more. (Captain Murray Maxwell to Amherst, 10 October 1815, 
in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35)
41  Clarke Abel was appointed the naturalist to the embassy at the suggestion of Sir Joseph Banks. 
He later accompanied Amherst in the position of physician when Amherst was governor-general 
of Bengal. He died at Cawnpore India on 14 November 1826. See Appendix A for a full list of the 
Amherst Embassy personnel sent from England.
42  The Duke stressed that he had already held a performance of the music to ‘prove it was faultless’ and 
pointed out that the score was specially calculated for the number of instruments in the band (Duke of 
Kent to Amherst, Kensington Palace, 28 December 1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35).
43  See Fan (2004, pp. 18–19) for British instructions to naturalists in China to gather information 
and collect seeds.
44  Henderson (1970) writes that Amherst asked ‘for the frigate, Alceste, commanded by his friend 
Capt. Murray Maxwell’ (p. 168).
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Captain Maxwell was described by one historian as the ideal captain in 
charge of a happy ship whose crew hero-worshipped him, admired him 
for his seamanship and were loath to displease him (Henderson III, 1970, 
p. 169). The unique opportunity to sail to the north of China under 
the charge of Captain Maxwell attracted a request from Speaker of the 
House of Commons Charles Abbot for the inclusion of his 17-year-old 
son as a midshipman on the voyage.45 Abbot told Amherst that his son 
Charles had always wished to go to China:
He [has] set his heart upon it, I do not well know why, except 
from the desire of visiting those Seas which do not come within 
the ordinary chances of his Profession … [Please] persuade the 
Captain to take him for one of his midshipmen … he will [derive 
enviable advantages] in the company of so many persons of 
science. (Charles Abbot to Amherst, 11 December 1815, in BL 
IOR MSS EUR F 140/35)
Abbot’s request was granted. He and his son paid an early call on 
Amherst at his Grosvenor Street residence to pay their respects before his 
arrival on ‘the Quarter Deck of the Alceste’ (Charles Abbot to Amherst, 
19 December 1815, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35).
China was viewed by Amherst’s friends and relatives, representatives of 
the privileged upper class of British society, as a curious country on the 
far side of the world. Most of their comment was cautious, muted and 
dwelt heavily on the negatives: time, distance, climate and separation 
from family made tolerable only by the handsome financial reward 
attached to it. None viewed China with any enthusiasm as a destination, 
nor thought about its importance to Britain. Earlier reports from the 
Macartney Embassy portrayed China as a difficult and monotonous 
destination, in contrast to the exciting or exotic cultures and countries 
visited traditionally during the grand tour of Europe by young people 
of Amherst’s rank. Nevertheless, Amherst approached his assignment 
with application and energy. How he researched China and the strategies 
he formed for his forthcoming coming reception at the Qing court are 
the subject of the next chapter.
45  Maxwell was an officer of high repute. Henderson (1970) wrote that the action of the HMS 
Alceste under Captain Maxwell in the wars in the Adriatic ‘may have changed history’ when the 
Alceste and two other ships intercepted a French squadron carrying 200 guns bound for Trieste on 
28 November 1811. Napoleon heard the news and abandoned plans to attack Constantinople and 





An examination of Amherst’s notes (Amherst, ‘Notes on policy to be 
pursued by the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 
140/36) prepared at the time of his appointment as ambassador to the 
Qing court is important for a number of reasons. First, it reveals the body 
of knowledge on Chinese diplomacy available to the British at the time. 
This appears meagre when compared to information accessible to modern 
scholars, yet it represented a significant increase on what was at hand 
for Macartney 23 years earlier. Second, while historians have focused on 
the issue of Amherst’s struggle to resolve the question of whether or not 
to perform the kowtow after his arrival in China, they have provided 
no insight into what informed his decision beyond the role played by 
Staunton (Tuck, 2000; Gao, 2016). His notes reveal his thinking, as well 
as offering insights into the strategies adopted by Macartney during his 
embassy, which, in turn, strongly influenced Amherst. Finally, Amherst’s 
research shows that he approached his assignment in a diligent and 
conscientious manner in an endeavour to learn in advance as much as he 
could about Chinese diplomatic practice in order to achieve a successful 
outcome. While he did not have the cultural knowledge or in-country 
experience of Staunton, he may be judged as initially having an open 
mind and as having considered practical strategies and approaches from 
a systematic review of the limited information available to him. This 
attitude was to equip him well when he was faced with weighing up the 
advice he received from his two commissioners, Staunton and Ellis.
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Amherst drew on three main sources of information in his research. 
The  first consisted of the published accounts of previous Western 
embassies to the Qing court. Amherst’s chief reference in preparing 
for his mission was Macartney’s journal, provided to him by Foreign 
Minister Lord Castlereagh, as well as other extracts published in the 
second volume of Barrow’s (1807) biography of Macartney (Castlereagh 
to Amherst, 1 January 1816, in BL MSS EUR F 140/43 (a)). Barrow was 
also consulted for his views, presumably at an official level in his office, 
as well as unofficially during working dinners held at Amherst’s Mayfair 
townhouse (Lord Amherst’s ‘Dinner Book’ in Kent History and Library 
Centre, Amherst Manuscripts: Family Papers, U1350-E16).
A major source was the accounts of the reception of two Russian embassies 
sent to the Qing court, namely, the Ismailof Embassy of 1721 and the 
Golovkin Embassy that arrived at the Chinese border in 1806.1 Historians 
have overlooked their significance in shaping Amherst’s thinking, but 
their influence is readily apparent in the official dispatches he wrote to 
George Canning, President of the Board of Control, dated 12 February 
1817, 8 April 1817 and 21 April 1817.
Amherst’s second resource consisted of the letters and reports written 
by foreign missionaries at Peking containing their views on the failure 
of  Macartney’s mission and providing their advice on what might 
be required for a successful mission.
Amherst’s third and final source of information were reports containing 
intelligence from Canton whose significance had been overtaken by 
events by the time they reached London.2 Castlereagh sent Amherst two 
dispatches dated 1 January 1816 together with instructions for discharging 
his duties at the Qing court that were based on events that had occurred at 
Canton in late 1814. The state of Company trade at Canton featured in 
several pages of Amherst’s notes and are evidence that he was aware of all 
the main British grievances responsible for precipitating this embassy to 
the Qing court. His mastery of the issues represents a substantial increase 
in his knowledge of China when compared with his first pencilled jottings 
1  Amherst had access to John Bell’s (1763) A Journey from St. Petersburg in Russia to Pekin in 
China, but the reference he used for the Golovkin Embassy is not recorded. Staunton (1821, p. xvii) 
wrote regarding this embassy, ‘No official accounts of its proceedings have been published, or at least 
have reached [England]’.
2  The latest intelligence received in July 1815 referred to events that took place in Canton at the 
end of 1814.
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written on a scrappy piece of paper where two queries are noted, namely, 
‘What European nations have residents at the Court of Peking?’ and 
‘What was the name of the island [Taiwan] in the Yellow Sea in which the 
English had formerly an established hub from whence they were expelled 
(within the memory of man) for improper conduct?’ (Amherst, ‘Notes on 
policy to be pursued by the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS 
EUR F 140/36).
Historical Background: Earlier Embassies
The British may have been late comers to the Qing court, but they 
nevertheless had considerable experience engaging with the Mughal courts 
of India where their diplomats were confronted with similar protocol 
issues as faced by Macartney in China, in particular, the ceremony of the 
kowtow. Sir Thomas Roe, the first English ambassador to the Jahangir 
emperor in 1615, ‘refus[ed] the demand of touching the ground with his 
head’ before the prince in contrast to the Persian ambassador ‘who came 
to court splendidly attired, and prostrated himself many times, knocking 
his head against the ground’ (as quoted in Murray, 1820, vol. 2, p. 148).3 
Roe’s firm and resolute refusal to compromise English honour in the face 
of the degrading ceremonial demands made of him at this time may be 
seen as setting a precedent for the behaviour of British ambassadors at 
other eastern courts (Sir William Foster’s comment on Roe in Roe, 1899, 
p. xxiii).
Barrow had read an account of the Dutch embassy sent by the Dutch East 
India Company (VOC) to the Shunzhi Emperor (r. 1644–1661) in 1655 
and his views on this and other diplomatic events were no doubt discussed 
with Amherst (Nieuhof, 1669; Wilkinson, 2000, p. 759).4 Received as 
vassals before the Shunzhi emperor, the Dutch were also confronted with 
troublesome Jesuit missionaries who ‘searched after all means possible to 
hinder the Hollanders access to the Court’ (Kops, 2002, p. 554). Although 
the Dutch ambassador performed the kowtow and the Dutch were granted 
permission to return to China every eight years to pay tribute, they were 
not permitted any other trade (p. 565). Evidence of other unsatisfactory 
outcomes and dismissals of European embassies from the Qing court were 
3  See also Roe (1899, p. 295).
4  The reference to the great popularity of Nieuhof ’s (1669) book is quoted in Kops (2002, p. 545).
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available to the British. The first Russian ambassador, Iskowitz Baikov, 
sent in 1656, refused to kowtow and was dismissed without an audience 
(see Baikov, 1732), as was a second Dutch embassy sent in 1667 for the 
same reason (see Wills, 2009, pp. 41–86).5 The Kangxi court, however, 
showed its pragmatic side when it signed a formal treaty with the Russian 
Government in 1689. The Treaty of Nerchinsk secured Russian and 
Chinese borders and established set trade routes between the two countries 
that were further ratified with the Treaty of Kyakhta in 1727. ‘This was 
the first time in modern history’, the historian Harry Gelber pointed out, 
‘that there were serious negotiations between China and a major foreign 
power’ (2007, p. 140). The precedent of Western-style treaties negotiated 
by the Qing court with the Russians, although a special case resulting 
from a common border, was read by Europeans as representing a formal 
recognition of mutual obligation and national sovereignty based on 
equal status, and was noted by Amherst, indicating at least an example of 
negotiation if mutual interests were involved (Amherst, ‘Notes on policy 
to be pursued by the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 
140/36).
As indicated above, Amherst’s focus was drawn in historical sequence to 
three earlier embassies: the Russian Ismailof Embassy of 1719–1722, the 
Macartney Embassy of 1792–1794 and the Golovkin Embassy of 1805–
1806. Amherst drew points from each embassy that were instrumental in 
shaping his strategies for approaching the Qing court in 1816.
An Important Precedent: The Russian 
Ismailof Embassy of 1719–1722
Amherst’s notes reveal his interest in the Scotsman John Bell’s (1763) 
account of the Ismailof Embassy sent by Peter the Great to the Kangxi court 
in 1720. Ismailof ’s goals were similar to those of Macartney, namely, to 
negotiate trade concessions and open diplomatic representation at Peking. 
Ismailof initially refused to kowtow and insisted on delivering the Tsar’s 
letter directly into the hands of the emperor. Seven days of negotiation 
took place before a compromise was reached. Amherst noted:
5  This was the embassy led by Pieter van Hoorn. Wills (2009, p. 41) wrote that ‘despite their very 
substantial investment in this Embassy, the people who sent it did not have very high hopes for it. 
And they were right’.
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The Russian embassador Ismailoff endeavours to avoid the 
ceremony of prostration, but at last conforms to it under 
a stipulation that any Chinese Embassador* who may be sent to 
St. Petersburg shall conform to all the ceremonies of that court. 
(Amherst, ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the British Embassy 
to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36)6
Amherst’s asterisk placed next to the words ‘Chinese Embassador’ in this 
passage is a rare suggestion in the literature of Western embassies to China 
of a potential Chinese envoy embarking on a mission to a European 
court. Macartney adopted a reversed variation of this idea when he 
advocated that any future Chinese ambassador at the Court of St James’s 
kowtow before the British sovereign, which in turn was advocated by 
Amherst during his mission. Amherst was clearly attracted to Ismailof ’s 
compromise at this stage of his research. The Russian ambassador, Amherst 
noted, was subsequently ‘well and honestly treated’ and invited to a ‘great 
entertainment on new year’s day [and] when the Chinese prostrated 
themselves, the Russians were allowed to salute the Emperor after their 
own fashion’ (Amherst, ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the British 
Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). Amherst noted 
further that Ismailof met the Kangxi emperor on 10 or 12 occasions and 
was permitted to remain in Peking for three months, which exceeded the 
usual period of 40 days allotted to a foreign embassy.7 Such impressive 
access to the emperor enjoyed by Ismailof resulting from the performance 
of a solitary kowtow was in stark contrast to Macartney who only had 
two formal audiences with the Qianlong emperor.8 Intelligence received 
by the British that the Jiaqing emperor was better disposed to Westerners 
than his father would have suggested to Amherst that he could expect 
a favourable reception if he followed Ismailof ’s precedent of making an 
initial kowtow, followed thereafter by performing the British ceremony of 
kneeling on one knee and bowing before the Jiaqing emperor.
6  Naquin and Rawski (1987, pp. 30–31) pointed out that the Qing court’s relations with Russia 
were quite different from that of other Western countries by noting that a Qing ambassador was 
prepared to perform the kowtow before the Tsar in Moscow in 1731 and St Petersburg in 1732. 
Nevertheless, Amherst classified the Russians as ‘Westerners’ for the purposes of his research.
7  His first meeting with the emperor was on 28 November 1720 and his last on 23 February 1721 
(Amherst, ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 
140/36).
8  Macartney also met the Qianlong emperor at an ‘entertainment’ but no business took place despite 
Macartney’s efforts to ‘lead him towards the subject of my Embassy’ (Cranmer-Byng, 1962, p. 137).
BRITAIN’S SECOND EMBASSY TO CHINA
96
The Impact of Macartney’s Journal on 
Amherst: The Importance of Rank
Amherst turned his attention to Macartney’s journal. Barrow thought 
the inclusion of several extracts from Macartney in his second volume of 
Macartney’s biography ‘may not … be wholly uninteresting to those who 
shall be concerned in any future mission to the court of Pekin’ (Barrow, 
1807, vol. 1, p. 348). Amherst noted these and also took copious notes 
from Macartney’s journal handed to him by Castlereagh.
Amherst quotes Macartney’s remarks on his escorts in his notes: 
‘Van [Wang] and Chou [were] family names. Taqin annexed to their Rank 
& signifies great man. Blue button inferior red, white to blue’ (in Cranmer-
Byng, 1962, p. 71).9 Cheng, the ‘Tartar legate’ who met Macartney at 
Tianjin, Amherst noted, was unfriendly and exhibited a ‘settled prejudice 
against the Embassy’ arising out of a dispute over the delivery of the British 
presents to Jehol.10 Amherst highlighted Macartney’s passage, ‘I have taken 
great pains to conciliate him; but I suspect he is not of a conciliable [sic] 
nature’ (Amherst quoting Macartney’s journal, pp. 201–202 in ‘Notes 
on policy to be pursued by the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR 
MSS EUR F 140/36). The mandarins Wang and Chou, despite their high 
rank, were portrayed as men with ‘no great regard to Truth’ for they had 
no scruples in asking ‘for a present saying the Emperor’s allowance was 
not sufficient’ (Amherst quoting Macartney’s journal, p. 220 in ‘Notes on 
policy to be pursued by the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS 
EUR F 140/36). Amherst made a special note that his embassy would 
be subject to constant surveillance where its ‘appearance, deportment 
and conversation’ and ‘Every thing they say & do [is] minutely reported 
& remembered’ and brought to the attention of the emperor (Amherst 
quoting Macartney’s journal, p. 233 in ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by 
the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36).
9  Amherst also noted the various Chinese ‘Courts’ or Boards of Government, and listed 
government titles including the ‘Keun-Min-Too–Magistrate resident near Macao; Foo-yuen or 
Sun-foo 2nd in authority to Viceroy: Fsong-too—The Viceroy: Quang-tchoo-foo—Governor of City 
of Canton: another interpretation calls him the Magistrate of the district of Macao’ (See Amherst, 
‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36).
10  In contrast to the Amherst Embassy, where early discussion with the mandarins arose over the 
performance of the kowtow, initial talks at the time of Macartney Embassy concerned his insistence 
that the delicate and bulky presents of the planetarium, the globes, the great lustres, clocks and other 
articles remain in Peking and not travel to Jehol for fear of damage (Barrow, 1807, vol. 2, p. 191).
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Amherst’s readings of Macartney’s journal contributed to his awareness of 
the importance of ceremony in Qing diplomatic encounters and special 
note was made of Macartney’s conclusion:
[Ceremonial] is a very serious matter with [the Chinese] … they 
pressed me most seriously to comply with it; said [the prostration] 
was a mere trifle, kneld down on the floor and practised it of their 
own accord to shew me the manner of it, and begged me to try 
whether I could perform it. (Barrow, 1807, vol. 2, p. 209, referred 
to by Amherst in his ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the British 
Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36)
Amherst also possessed a dispatch written by Macartney after he had 
left the Qianlong court that emphasised the Qing mandarins’ insistence 
that a foreign ambassador practice in their presence ‘the adorations as 
the Chinese term expresses, or prostrations, which are constantly made 
before the throne by subjects and vassals of this Empire’ (Amherst quoting 
Macartney’s journal in ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the British 
Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). 
[Macartney] was well aware of the tenaciousness of this Court to 
a ceremony of which the humiliation on the one part contributed 
perhaps to render most Embassies so grateful to the other. 
(Amherst quoting Macartney’s journal in ‘Notes on policy to be 
pursued by the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR 
F 140/36)
But Macartney admitted that he was unaware of the true meaning 
of the characters on the flags adorning the embassy boats that read 
‘The Embassador bearing Tribute from the Kingdom of England’. Even if 
he had known, he would not have made a formal complaint in case this 
caused ‘an abrupt as well as [an] unsuccessful termination to my Mission’ 
(Amherst quoting Macartney’s journal in ‘Notes on policy to be pursued 
by the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36).
Amherst noted Macartney’s views on the mandarins, which were far from 
complimentary. The ‘Tartar Chiefs’ were suspicious of British designs ‘as if 
we came to pry into the situation of the country’ and intended under the 
‘specious and innocent pretext to trade, to insinuate ourselves gradually into 
some share with them of the domination over China’ (Amherst quoting 
Macartney’s journal in ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the British Embassy 
to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). He emphasised the difference 
in a proposed compromise in which he would kowtow if a mandarin of 
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equal rank performed the same ceremony before a portrait of George III. 
The emperor agreed to this proposal only if the mandarin performed the 
ceremony ‘in a private room, without parade, and would scarcely be known 
or mentioned in the Empire’ (Amherst quoting Macartney’s journal in 
‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR 
MSS EUR F 140/36). Macartney, on the other hand, would be performing 
the ceremony in public on the occasion of a festival ‘before all the tributary 
Princes, and great subjects of State, and would be described in the Gazette’ 
(Amherst quoting Macartney’s journal in ‘Notes on policy to be pursued 
by the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). He 
refused not only on these grounds but also because of the risk that the 
news of a humiliating public kowtow was ‘likely even to find their way 
to Europe’ due to the presence of Western Jesuits at the Qianlong court 
(Amherst quoting Macartney’s journal in ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by 
the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). Macartney 
concluded his dispatch in the strongest terms that to kowtow was to ‘give 
stronger testimonies of homage to a foreign Prince, however respectable and 
great, than to my own sovereign, who was not less so’ (Amherst quoting 
Macartney’s journal in ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the British Embassy 
to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). A compromise was at length 
agreed on when the Qianlong emperor agreed to Macartney performing 
the British ceremony of bending one knee to him ‘with the profoundest 
reverence’. The emperor, Macartney concluded, was ‘much less eager in 
his pretensions, than his Courtiers for him’ (Amherst quoting Macartney’s 
journal in ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the British Embassy to China’ 
in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). Macartney’s successful compromise 
no doubt assured Amherst that a precedent had been established where a 
British ambassador was no longer required to perform the kowtow.
Missionary Views on Macartney’s Failure
The inclusion of China experts in the Amherst Embassy was thought to 
ensure its success where Macartney had failed. Jesuit interpreters at the 
Qing court would not be required and it is noteworthy that Amherst makes 
no reference to the ‘mischievous’ activities of the Jesuits blamed by Barrow 
(1807) for Macartney’s failure. His indifference is explained by the fact, of 
course, that there were only five foreign missionaries still at the Qing court, 
namely, Father Lamiot and four Portuguese missionaries. The Company’s 
Secret Court of Directors, no doubt reflecting the views of Staunton, 
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described Lamiot as ‘a respectable French missionary attached to the 
English by a long course of kindness from our Supra-Cargoes at Canton’ 
(Secret Commercial Committee to Lord Amherst, 17 January 1816, in 
BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 86).
Amherst had in his possession a letter dated 1794 written by a French Jesuit, 
Father Louis de Poirot, with his views on the Macartney Embassy (A Jesuit 
at Peking to Mr Raper enclosing a letter written by the Missionary Louis 
de Poirot dated 18 May 1794 on the Ceremony at Macartney’s Reception, 
in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). De Poirot stressed that the missionaries 
at the Qianlong court had been disposed to do all in their power to assist 
the Macartney Embassy but that their intentions were thwarted by the 
Qing Government’s sudden prohibition on all communication with the 
British (A Jesuit at Peking to Mr Raper enclosing a letter written by the 
Missionary Louis de Poirot dated  18  May 1794 on the Ceremony at 
Macartney’s Reception, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). Nevertheless, 
he now presented his ‘friendly remarks’ on the outcome of Macartney’s 
Embassy. He attributed the failure of the embassy to the British reliance 
on a young and inexperienced Chinese interpreter and their refusal to ‘pay 
the customary obedience’ to the court. Macartney’s failure to consult the 
Jesuits was a mistake as he would have been informed that the kowtow 
represented a ‘Homage [that] was only a mere ceremony’ (A Jesuit at 
Peking to Mr Raper enclosing a letter written by the Missionary Louis de 
Poirot dated 18 May 1794 on the Ceremony at Macartney’s Reception, 
in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). He added, revealing a fundamental 
ignorance of the British, that Portuguese and Papal ambassadors had been 
only too happy to perform the prostration ceremony. Referring to the 
Ismailof Embassy, de Poirot continued:
[It was] true that a Muscovite Embassador was proud and would 
not submit to it … [but] Kanghi [showed] him that it was not 
meant as a submission from one Sovereign to another, [and] 
ordered one of his Nobles to make the same submission before 
the signet of the Czar of Muscovy. (A Jesuit at Peking to Mr Raper 
enclosing a letter written by the Missionary Louis de Poirot dated 
18 May 1794 on the Ceremony at Macartney’s Reception, in BL 
IOR MSS EUR F 140/36)
This was a confusing reference implying that the Kangxi emperor ordered 
a mandarin to kowtow before a representation of the Tsar instead of 
committing to the practices of the Russian court as suggested in Bell’s 
(1763) account noted earlier. The British, de Poirot continued, ‘might 
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have performed this ceremony’ on these terms. Significantly, given 
Amherst’s future thoughts on the kowtow at the time of his mission, 
Ismailof ’s precedent of 1721 was once more invoked as representing an 
expedient course of action at the Qing court.
De Poirot also stressed that the British choice of presents, consisting 
of ‘expensive pieces of mechanism’, were not suitable and a missionary 
should have been consulted over their selection. The ‘plainness of dress’ of 
the members of the Macartney Embassy drew specific criticism because 
it left a bad impression of the British. ‘Plain clothes’, while acceptable in 
Europe, were considered by the Chinese as a ‘mark either of poverty or 
disrespect’. Heavily embroidered clothes, on the other hand, commanded 
respect and gave the Chinese a ‘greater idea of the Europeans’. De Poirot 
advised that future European ambassadors to the Qing court must wear 
clothes richly laced with gold to impress and ‘dazzle the Eye’ (A Jesuit at 
Peking to Mr Raper enclosing a letter written by the Missionary Louis de 
Poirot dated 18 May 1794 on the Ceremony at Macartney’s Reception, in 
BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36).
The Importance of the Golovkin Embassy 
of 1805–1806
The precedents of two other embassies to the Qing court after Macartney 
would have served to confuse Amherst. The Dutch mission to the 
Qianlong court in 1795 resulted only in humiliation and a failure to 
accomplish any of its goals despite the performance of an estimated 
30 kowtows during its stay in China. Amherst makes no reference to this 
embassy in his notes, but Van Braam’s (1798) account received substantial 
coverage in the British media and was well known to the British public.11 
Barrow showed particular interest in the embassy in his autobiography, 
stating that many of the details of its reception were ‘too disgusting to 
repeat’. He adds, ‘Van Braam, a jolly fat fellow, who, from the luxurious 
11  Estimates of the number of kowtows performed vary, but a general figure places it at between 30 
and 50. The Dutch travelled in miserable conditions, were lodged in dilapidated buildings and Van 
Braam, the second secretary in the embassy, was humiliated when his hat fell off while kowtowing 
to the Qianlong Emperor. The Dutch were even required to kowtow before a gift of a sturgeon sent 
from the palace. Rockhill (1905, p. 32) wrote, ‘the envoys received the gift in the courtyard, kneeling 
and knocking their heads on the ground’. It needs to be noted that the Dutch mission was sent by the 
Dutch East India Company at Batavia, and not on behalf of the Netherlands Government, which, 
in any event, was a republic whose head of state was not a monarch.
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life of Batavia, underwent a state of starvation in China, writes to his 
friend that he had returned as thin as a shotten herring’ (Barrow, 1847, 
p. 98).12 Certainly Staunton and Henry Ellis, the third commissioner in 
the Amherst Embassy, were well aware of this ill-fated embassy and both 
referred to it in later correspondence in connection with the kowtow.
The Russian embassy led by Count Golovkin in 1805–1806, as noted 
earlier, was important as the only European embassy sent to the court 
of the Jiaqing emperor, and was of great interest to Amherst who made 
several pages of mainly descriptive notes on its progress (Amherst, ‘Notes 
on the Golovkin Embassy, 1805-06’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). 
The Golovkin Embassy was a grand and elaborate delegation consisting of 
over 300 people including Cossacks, dragoons, several young noblemen, 
scientists and an interpreter fluent in Mandarin. Presents for the emperor 
included furs of the highest quality and the finest products of Russian 
decorative arts. Arriving at the small village of Kiahta on the Chinese 
border, Golovkin, Amherst noted, set himself up in ‘great magnificence’ 
and commenced negotiations with the mandarins regarding his entrance 
into China (Amherst, ‘Notes on the Golovkin Embassy, 1805-06’ in BL 
IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). Inevitably, the question of the ‘ko-teu’ arose 
(Amherst, ‘Notes on the Golovkin Embassy, 1805-06’ in BL IOR MSS 
EUR F 140/36). Golovkin informed the mandarins that he intended 
to follow the precedent of former Russian ambassadors and would not 
be performing the ceremony. The embassy proceeded to enter Chinese 
territory while news of Golovkin’s refusal was being transmitted to Peking. 
On arriving at Urga, 140 miles from the capital, Golovkin was met by the 
senior Qing commander, referred to as ‘the Wan’ by the Russians, who 
was also the Jiaqing emperor’s brother-in-law. Delays were caused at Urga 
due to some confusion over the wording of the Tsar’s letter to the emperor. 
While waiting for confirmation from Peking to proceed, Golovkin was 
invited to a ‘solemn breakfast’ where he noticed a table covered with 
yellow silk (Amherst, ‘Notes on the Golovkin Embassy, 1805-06’ in BL 
IOR MSS EUR F 140/36).13 Informed that the table represented the 
presence of the emperor, Golovkin was instructed to kowtow before it. 
He refused. He insisted that previous Russian ambassadors had never 
performed the ceremony at the border but had been allowed to proceed 
directly to Peking where due respect was paid to the emperor. Further, 
12  The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘shotten’ as ‘In herring, applied to a person who is 
exhausted by sickness or destitute of strength or resources’.
13  The term ‘solemn breakfast’ is used by Amherst in his notes.
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Golovkin informed ‘the Wan’ that Macartney had not kowtowed and 
the Russians would not perform a ceremony from which the British had 
been excused. ‘The Wan’ was astonished on learning this and called it a 
‘misrepresentation’ (Amherst, ‘Notes on the Golovkin Embassy, 1805–06’ 
in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36).
Golovkin was expelled immediately by the Jiaqing emperor on learning of 
his refusal to kowtow. Presents were returned and Golovkin and his grand 
retinue departed on the long and arduous return journey to St Petersburg. 
Amherst noted the role played by the mandarins. Golovkin, he wrote, 
‘seems to throw a great deal of the blame on the Wan’, thus heralding 
the need, in Amherst’s mind, to placate obstreperous mandarins acting 
in their capacity as gatekeepers to the emperor (Amherst, ‘Notes on the 
Golovkin Embassy, 1805–06’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36).
Lamiot’s Letters
Amherst now had examples of two other failed European embassies to 
the Qing court: the Dutch embassy of 1795, which was dismissed with 
no reward after the ambassador performed numerous kowtows; and the 
Golovkin Embassy, expelled for refusing a single kowtow. Any confusion, 
however, was clarified with the receipt of informed comment in a letter 
written by the French Vincentian priest resident at the Qing court, Father 
Lamiot, which came to the attention of the British at Canton. The letter, 
dated 1 October 1807, was addressed to a ‘Spanish agent’ at Manila and 
commented on the failure of both Macartney and Golovkin.
The refusal of both ambassadors to kowtow before the respective emperors, 
Lamiot thought, was the fundamental cause for their failure, but he also 
blamed the actions of the mandarins who had blocked access to the emperor. 
This judgement, in the light of what Amherst had just read about the 
Golovkin Embassy, no doubt made perfect sense. The mandarins, Lamiot 
explained, were united against any foreign embassy and ‘will readily use 
every means of intrigue, deception, and bribery to circumvent’ them 
(Amherst, ‘Notes on a letter written by Lamiot, dated 1 October 1807’ 
in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). Their actions were dictated specifically 
by concerns that any interference in dealings with foreigners would result 
in their having to pay compensation, leaving them open to accusations 
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‘of plunderings which have brought no advantage to the government’ 
(Amherst, ‘Notes on a letter written by Lamiot, dated 1 October 1807’ in 
BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36).
Lamiot, understandably, shifted the blame for the failure of the Macartney 
Embassy away from the Jesuits, identified by Barrow as the primary cause 
for the failure of the embassy, to the devious and self-centred actions 
of the mandarins or gatekeepers. Their behaviour, Lamiot pointed out, 
was ruled by a fear and dread of incurring the emperor’s displeasure. 
Accordingly, the emperor, who had absolute power to demote, punish or 
fine his officials, was never told the truth, but the mandarins dared not 
initiate any independent actions or shape agreements in their own right.14 
Amherst, it will be seen, was confronted with frustrating and inconclusive 
negotiations on his way to Peking, due to the mandarins’ inability to 
make decisions independent of the emperor.
Lamiot recommended further that embassies be sent in the name of the 
sovereign and to proceed secretly and directly to the northern port of 
Tianjin. Amherst wrote next to this passage:
This appears to me to be hardly possible, as notice must be given 
to the Government of its arrival not only to obtain permission 
to proceed but to make all the necessary preparations and 
arrangements. (Amherst, ‘Notes on a letter written by Lamiot, 
dated 1 October 1807’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36)
Lamiot also included his thoughts on the Jiaqing emperor in a letter dated 
10 October 1808. Amherst noted that Lamiot ‘speaks of [the Jiaqing 
emperor] as anxious only to govern well, [as] indifferent to rare and 
curious objects and is an enemy to luxury and fetes’ (Amherst, ‘Notes on 
a letter written by Lamiot, dated 1 October 1807’ in BL IOR MSS EUR 
F 140/36). This assessment of the Jiaqing emperor reminded Amherst of 
earlier Western impressions of the Kangxi court, described by Bell as one 
of ‘order and decency, rather than grandeur and magnificence’ (Bell, 1763, 
vol. 2, p. 12).
14  The fact that the mandarins were not permitted to take any decisions without the emperor’s 
permission is noted in Staunton’s (1821) translation of the Narrative of the Chinese embassy to the 
Khan of the Tourgouth Tartars. In this account, the Chinese ambassador informed a Russian officer 
during his travels through Russia, ‘In our empire of China, none of the great officers of state are 
empowered to transact state affairs upon their own authority … They must, on all occasions, be 
regularly submitted to his Majesty’ (p. 102).
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The prospect of dealing with a responsible and pragmatic emperor 
encouraged British expectations of a fruitful diplomatic encounter at 
the Qing court where direct communication would result in negotiation 
and mediation. While Lamiot had reported that the Jiaqing emperor was 
adverse to ostentatious displays, it was thought that a splendid audience 
before the emperor displaying the civility and courtly demeanour of 
a  British diplomatic mission would secure the Jiaqing emperor’s ‘good 
graces’ and sanction the commencement of negotiations with Qing court 
officials.15 Amherst was fully aware of the minefield of conventions that 
governed the site of diplomatic dialogue with the Qing court where 
misunderstandings had the power to disrupt or even sever negotiation. 
His main concern centred on the fact that once a written submission had 
been delivered to the Chinese authorities, it effectively closed off further 
opportunities for mediation. He made a note that ‘there is no longer any 
opportunity to negotiate … the determination is taken, and the business 
cannot be again reverted to’ (Amherst, ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by 
the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). Lamiot 
had given the same advice and Amherst wrote elsewhere:
Follow M. Lamiot’s advice in delaying as long as possible to give in 
to demands in writing (which would be speedily and conclusively 
answered) and take every possible means to ensure their success 
before they are definitely proposed. (Amherst, pencil notes on 
‘The objects of the Embassy’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36)
Amherst, no doubt drawing on his own diplomatic experience at the 
Court  of Palermo, wrote the following, which although logical in 
British terms, displayed a naiveté about Chinese diplomacy and reveals 
that he thought his embassy would be received outside the traditional 
tribute system:
Negotiation should be conducted in the spirit of cordiality and with 
the feeling of equality. No offence taken at trifles nor intentional 
indignity overlooked. Act first and apologise afterwards. Firmness, 
dignity, and patience essential requisites. Resist any attempt of 
persons interested to terminate abruptly the Embassy. Any such 
attempt on the part of the Government to be represented as unjust 
and unfriendly. (Amherst, pencil notes on ‘The objects of the 
Embassy’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36)
15  Hampton (2009, p. 19) noted that Ermolao Barbaro wrote in the 1490s that the importance 
of an ambassador was to attain ‘the good graces of those to whom he is sent’.
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While such strategies might appear reasonable to pursue in a European 
diplomatic encounter, they were not realistic in the context of the Qing 
court. The emphasis on reasonableness revealed a major misunderstanding 
and lack of awareness of the practicalities of dealing with the Qing court 
where there was no scope for dialogue of any kind and no channel for 
diplomatic communication, and certainly not with one imbued with 
the feeling of equality. Further, while Macartney’s visit happened to 
coincide with the unique event of the Qianlong emperor’s 80th birthday 
celebrations, Amherst was visiting the Qing court uninvited and at 
a less auspicious time. The historian John Wills has pointed out that 
the emperor considered tribute audiences a routine formality in which 
ambassadors from tributary states were able to relax and engaged in cordial 
relations with the court once the ceremonial formalities had taken place 
(2009, p. 28). The British, on the other hand, saw an embassy to China as 
a singular opportunity to engage, persuade and exert diplomatic pressure 
on the Qing court where the real business of diplomacy was entered into 
after the ceremonials had concluded. Indeed, Amherst had gone as far as 
to prepare for a meeting with Qing officials along specific lines. He wrote, 
‘Would it be possible to announce to the Chinese rather than to ask from 
them, [for] the appointment of a Minister at Pekin, or at least a Consul 
at Canton?’ (emphasis in original). Amherst acknowledged that such 
diplomatic negotiations would be delicate:
By a precipitate enforcement of our demands the Embassy may 
be abruptly terminated. By a protraction of them, it may come to 
a conclusion before they are brought forward. It will be difficult 
to steer between these two courses. (Amherst, ‘Notes on policy to 
be pursued by the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS 
EUR F 140/36)
His aim, however, was ‘to be cautious’ and ‘not to make demands 
which [might] rather produce new misunderstandings than remove 
old grievances’ (Amherst, ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the British 
Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). Amherst understood 
that the Qing mandarins had no power to negotiate on their own 
initiative. At the end of the day, Amherst noted optimistically, ‘all these 
obstacles are perhaps not insurmountable as the success depends upon the 
will of one Man’ (Amherst quoting Letter by Lamiot, 1 October 1807, 
‘Notes on a letter written by Lamiot, dated 1 October 1807’ in BL IOR 
MSS EUR F 140/36). But the will of the emperor was contingent on his 
willingness to compromise and recognise British exceptionalism. Amherst 
BRITAIN’S SECOND EMBASSY TO CHINA
106
hoped that a splendid display by a new British embassy—following in 
the footsteps of the earlier impressive Macartney Embassy that had done 
so much to instil a favourable notion of the British nation in China in 
contrast to the barbaric appearance of traditional vassal missions—would 
ensure an honourable reception at the Qing court.
Amherst was fully aware that his was a difficult mission requiring tact and 
caution (Amherst, ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the British Embassy 
to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). Nevertheless, he remained 
hopeful, especially as the Jesuits were no longer a problem and the 
inclusion of Mandarin speakers would assist him in a successful outcome 
where Macartney had failed. The British ability to now communicate 
directly with the mandarins would ensure access to the court and succeed 
in overcoming obstacles initially put in place by the gatekeepers. The 
ability to engage in direct communication, as well as Amherst’s personal 
charm and past diplomatic experience, would succeed in impressing the 
emperor who would hopefully initiate a series of negotiations on the state 
of trade at Canton and open an official channel for direct communication 
between the court at Peking and the Company at Canton. Macartney’s 
firm actions had dispensed with the need to kowtow and the embassy had 
left a favourable impression at the Qing court. Barrow’s words summed 
up Macartney’s legacy:
By this Embassy the British character became better known to the 
Chinese, and protection and respect were obtained for the British 
subjects resident at Canton. At the request of Lord Macartney 
they have since been permitted to address their complaints 
personally or by letter to the viceroy … It opened an amicable 
correspondence between His Majesty and the Emperor of China. 
(1807, vol. 2, p. 354)
Amherst was reassured further by a letter from the Company’s Secret 
Commercial Committee, dated 17 January 1816, on the expected 
outcome of the embassy. Citing the examples of Ismailof and Macartney, 
the letter stated:
It has been said that the Chinese government expects nothing 
more from an Embassy than some complementary proceedings, 
accompanied with presents; but it seems plain in the cases of more 
than one Russian Ambassador, and of Lord Macartney himself, that 
the Chinese Ministers did not decline all negotiations. And if that 
Government were given seriously to understand, that an attempt 
to avoid taking due cognizance of an affair so important to our 
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National interest and honour, would be viewed as a denial of justice 
and of a most unfriendly character, they would perhaps not persist 
in it. (Secret Commercial Committee to Lord Amherst, 17 January 
1816, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 86)
Amherst’s Conclusions
Amherst concluded that concern with ceremony was a very serious matter 
at the Qing court. He earmarked a passage in Macartney’s journal on 
the ‘First mention of mode of presentation to the Emperor’ (Amherst 
quoting Macartney’s journal, p. 200 in ‘Notes on policy to be pursued 
by the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). This 
was the occasion where Macartney was first informed by the mandarins 
that the  ceremony of kneeling down on ‘both knees and making nine 
prostrations or inclinations of the head to the ground … had never been 
and never could be dispensed with’ (Amherst quoting Macartney’s journal, 
p. 200 in ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the British Embassy to China’ 
in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). Macartney, following Westphalian 
principles, reiterated that his first duty was to perform the ceremony that 
was agreeable to his king.
Amherst’s notes on ‘Ceremonial’ referred specifically to Barrow’s views 
presented in his first volume of Macartney’s biography (1807) and reveal 
that he was greatly influenced by them. Barrow emphasised Macartney’s 
successful negotiation as the first European ambassador to appear before 
a Chinese emperor without performing the humiliating kowtow, thereby 
saving both personal and national honour.16 Barrow, buoyed by Macartney’s 
success, advocated specific instructions to future British ambassadors to 
China. These should be ambiguous and left open, leaving an ambassador 
free to make appropriate decisions based on the conditions found at the 
time. Ambassadors were further advised not to enter into discussions with 
the mandarins on the subject as it was important ‘to keep the agents of 
the court in good humour’ (Amherst, ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by 
the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36).
16  This was not strictly accurate. An earlier Portuguese embassy and a Papal embassy had been 
admitted to the Qianlong emperor and the envoys did not kowtow. However, an important distinction 
is that these embassies did not come with requests for trade. Rather, they concerned religious matters 
and, therefore, arrived and were received in China outside of the tributary system (Peyrefitte, 1992, 
p. xxiv). Reference is made to the Papal envoy, the Cardinal of Tournon who arrived at the Qing court 
80 years before Macartney and did not kowtow.
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Amherst’s notes reveal that he was not convinced by this advice. 
He marked a passage in Barrow’s (1804) book, Travels in China, on the 
reactions at Peking to the news that Macartney had not kowtowed before 
the Qianlong emperor:
Nobody would speak to me [Barrow] … I asked [our friend 
Deodato a Neapolitan missionary] what was the matter? His 
answer was, We are all lost, ruined, and undone! … Macartney 
had refused to comply with the ceremony of prostrating himself, 
like the Embassadors of tributary princes … [and had performed] 
the same ceremony of respect to the Emperor as to his own 
sovereign. That although little was thought of this affair at Gehol, 
the great officers of state [in the] department of ceremonies 
in Peking were mortified, and perplexed, and alarmed; and that 
… it was impossible to say what might be the consequence of an 
event unprecedented in the annals of the empire. (p. 117)
Such ‘embarrassment may be avoided’, Amherst wrote, ‘if the King 
makes a specific reference in the ambassador’s instructions to approach 
the throne of China with the same ceremonial respect as appears before 
himself ’ (Amherst, ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the British Embassy 
to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). Amherst still persisted in 
viewing his upcoming mission within the terms of Westphalian diplomatic 
principles of equality between nations.
The Importance of Appearances
Amherst’s need to present himself in the most prestigious light befitting 
his status as a British ambassador claiming his authority from the Prince 
Regent, and as a member of the British aristocratic elite, is reflected 
in a  letter he wrote to Lord Buckinghamshire concerning both the 
appearance of his table while in China as well as his official wardrobe. 
Submitting a  bill for expenses incurred in ordering extra silverware, 
Amherst reminded Buckinghamshire that only the finest silver, crystal 
and linens were appropriate for ambassadorial appearances. Such were:
Absolutely necessary for the Table, which I shall have to keep 
for the Embassy when on show, and which, as the Chinese will 
probably be spectators of it, I have ordered more becoming to 
my station by a large addition of my own [silver] Plate, which 
will amount to about a thousand pounds. The cost of my state 
wardrobe and various incidental expenses … which arise from the 
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circumstances of my appointment (I do not mean my outfit only) 
will amount to at least as much more: Thus leaving me charged at 
the very outset with an expense of upwards of £2000. (Amherst 
to Buckinghamshire, 28 December 1815, in BL IOR G/12/196 
(Reel 1) F 66)
Amherst’s early expectations of the manner in which he would be received 
by the Qing court and the opportunities this provided for a display of 
British taste and refinement are revealed in this letter. His reference to his 
dinner table being ‘on show’ suggests that he also anticipated playing the 
gracious host entertaining the mandarins in a formal European manner 
complete with silver and fine tableware, multiple courses and the best 
wines, served to create an atmosphere conducive to amiable conversation 
followed by frank and productive discussion. An impressive display of 
silver was essential as a visual representation of both Amherst’s rank 
and Great Britain’s prosperity.17 The importance of appearances was not 
confined to the ambassador alone but was also a concern for at least one 
member of the British public who, knowing of the Chinese preference for 
etiquette, enquired if it:
might be judicious with reference to the success of the Embassy, 
that the King’s ship, carrying Lord Amherst, should wear a Broad 
Pendant (like [Macartney’s ship] the Lion). Is this compatible with 
the rules of the Admiralty? (Chairman and Deputy Chairman, 
EIC, to Viscount Melville, 1 February 1816, in BL IOR G/12/196 
(Reel 1) F 127–128)
The writer was informed that the HMS Lion had not flown a pendant 
and in fact:
It is not probable at any rate that the Government or people of 
China would be sufficiently conversant in the details of the various 
degrees of rank in the British Navy to render it a matter of any 
consequence. (Chairman and Deputy Chairman, EIC, to Viscount 
Melville, 1 February 1816, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 128)
17  ‘Nothing can be more superb than the silversmith’s shops’ reflecting the richness of the nation’ 
(Brewer, 1997, p. 29).
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Choice of Presents for the 
Jiaqing Emperor
Barrow (1807, vol. 1, p. 348) commented that the British knew little of 
the customs and manners of the Qing court at the time of the Macartney 
Embassy and had been dependent on the ‘voluminous writings of the 
French missionaries’ for guidance in the choice of presents for the Qianlong 
emperor. The Qing court, according to these sources, was interested 
primarily in ‘the sciences’, specifically ‘astronomy and experimental 
philosophy’ (Pritchard, 1943, p. 163). Scientific gifts including 
a planetarium, glass lenses and air pumps were chosen to showcase British 
scientific progress to ‘excite at Peking a taste for many articles of English 
workmanship’ in the hope of generating markets for British goods.18 These 
gifts, however, were famously dismissed by the Qianlong emperor who 
told George III that China did not ‘value ingenious articles, nor do we 
have the slightest need of your country’s manufactures’ (‘Edict from the 
Emperor Qianlong to King George the Third of England’, 23 September 
1793, as quoted in Cranmer-Byng, 1962, p. 340).19 Barrow (1807, vol. 1, 
pp. 348–349) complained that the scientific gifts were ‘all lost and thrown 
away by the ignorant Chinese’ and that if Chinese interest in the sciences 
had ever existed this was ‘now completely worn out’. The previous British 
perception of the Qing court as a site of scientific interest and progress 
had changed, following Macartney, to one of ignorance and stagnation 
whose members were adverse to ‘the introduction of all novelties’ and 
were ruled by ceremonial and ‘idolatrous worship’ (Barrow, 1807, vol. 1, 
p. 349).
Barrow believed he had learned from the Macartney experience and 
was confident that he understood that the nature of Chinese taste was 
founded on objects of ‘intrinsic value’ (Minute of a Conference between 
the Chairs and Mr Barrow Respecting the Presents for the Emperor, in BL 
IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 45). This judgement appears to have been based 
18  Macartney’s prime objective was to secure a treaty of trade with the Chinese Government. 
His embassy was primarily ‘a trade mission to popularize British inventions and manufacturers’ 
(Cranmer-Byng & Levere, 1981, p. 505).
19  A similar declaration is found in Staunton’s (1821) translation of Narrative of the Chinese embassy 
to the Khan of the Tourgouth Tartars. The Kangxi emperor instructed the Chinese ambassador that 
in the event of the ‘vain and ostentatious’ Russians displaying unusual items, he was not to ‘express 
admiration nor contempt; and [is] merely to say, “whether our country possesses or not such things 
as these, it is quite out of our province to determine”’ (p. 17).
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on Macartney’s discovery of 40 or 50 garden pavilions situated among 
the imperial gardens at Jehol that were furnished ‘in the richest manner’ 
of the best of European taste, including fine paintings, European sing-
songs and toys, and Chinese porcelains and enamel ware (Cranmer-Byng, 
1962, pp. 125–126). Macartney was astonished at the sight of objects ‘of 
such exquisite workmanship, and in such profusion’ and thought that 
the British presents ‘must shrink from the comparison and hide their 
diminished heads’ (Cranmer-Byng, 1962, p. 125). A major consideration 
in the choice of presents was that they not offend Chinese pride (Barrow, 
1807, vol. 1, p. 350). Barrow cautioned that Chinese sensibilities had 
to be considered. Gifts of a high standard representative of ‘the talent 
and ingenuity of foreigners’ were likely to draw ‘jealous comparisons’ 
with their own manufacturers and Lamiot had stressed that the Jiaqing 
emperor was averse to luxury and curious objects.
Presents chosen by the Amherst Embassy for the emperor included gold 
items such as a cup with a cover and a salver of beautiful workmanship; 
several silver vessels; a 24-piece china dessert service decorated with 
a white and gold scroll border with paintings of British landscapes; 
several large floral decorated china vases; glassware, bottles and liqueurs 
including brandy and dried fruits valued at £400; engravings of the coast 
of England and Wales; a painting of the Doncaster races; and portraits of 
the Prince Regent and Princess Caroline. Other gifts included two superb, 
elegantly finished and richly ornamented sedan chairs; super fine furs; 
perfumes; two ornamental clocks for the Hall of Audience; and a selection 
of superfine cloths of soft Spanish wool. It was hoped that their inclusion 
would attract Chinese attention and open a market among the superior 
mandarins and the principal officers of the Chinese Government (Secret 
Court of Directors to Amherst, 26 January 1816, in BL IOR G/12/196 
(Reel 1) F 116).
De Poirot had thought that the Macartney Embassy’s omission of presents 
for the mandarins at the Qianlong court had contributed to the embassy’s 
failure. Accordingly, the Amherst Embassy carried an extra range of gifts 
including crystal chandeliers and glassware, porcelains, fine linens, clocks 
and watches, perfumes and snuffs. A selection of paintings, ‘chiefly of 
Buildings, Flowers and Animals’, as well as a map of London and prints 
showcasing prominent buildings and landmarks, such as St Paul’s, the 
Greenwich Hospital and views of the Thames, were also chosen, as well 
as maps of the British Isles, a Chart of Navigation from Europe to China, 
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hand telescopes, a model of a ship-of-war, a fire engine, and pocket books 
containing razors, scissors and pen knives. The total cost of all the presents 
was £22,005.13.7 (equivalent to over £2 million in today’s values).20
Barrow also drew up a list of presents that were unsuitable to send to the 
Qing court including a barouche or carriage. The splendid gilded carriage 
sent with Macartney had been found subsequently by the Dutch in 1795, 
evidently never used, and Barrow commented that it was impossible 
‘to make them to suit Chinese taste’, referring to the fact that the driver 
sat in an elevated position to the emperor (Minute of Conference between 
the Chairs, & Mr Barrow respecting Presents for China, in BL IOR 
G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 47). Presents of a military character were also not 
appropriate.21 Six small brass cannons brought by Macartney that fired 
several times a minute had ‘excited the darkest suspicion in the mind of the 
legate’ who observed them (Minute of Conference between the Chairs, & 
Mr Barrow respecting Presents for China, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) 
F 47). Maps of China and India were thought to also incite ‘jealousy’ in 
China, given Britain’s presence in India, while botanical drawings were 
excluded as it was thought that the Chinese excelled British skill in that 
branch of drawing.
‘Kia-King’s’ Tea Pot
Historians have documented that British manufacturers were approached 
at the time of the Macartney Embassy for their suggestions and assistance 
in the selection of presents for the Qianlong emperor (see Berg, 2006). 
It appears that Barrow also wrote to selected British manufacturers in the 
context of the Amherst Embassy for their thoughts on how the mission 
might assist their businesses. One who replied was L. W. Dillwyn, 
Esq., of the Cambrian Company, porcelain manufacturers of Swansea, 
Wales. Dillwyn thanked Barrow for his letter and informed him that 
the intended embassy could certainly ‘assist my endeavours to rival the 
Chinese Porcelain’ (L. W. Dillwyn to John Barrow, 7 January 1816, in 
BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/38(a)). Complaining that his knowledge of the 
20  A full list of the presents and their cost is provided in Appendix B.
21  The Kangxi emperor’s instructions to the ambassador to the Tourgouth Tartars declared that 
all firearms and ‘similar goods’ were ‘prohibited goods; their exportation beyond the frontier is 
never permitted’. Accordingly, these were not appropriate gifts to be carried by diplomatic envoys 
(Staunton, 1821, p. 17).
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manufacture of Chinese porcelain was based solely on the Jesuit account 
found in Du Halde (1741) and from examples of the ‘very inferior wares 
of Canton’, he continued:
It is said that all the articles of the very finest quality are appropriated 
for the Emperor’s Court, and of these I should greatly like to 
procure a piece. Any broken Article would answer my purpose 
as well as a perfect one; for my object would be to subject it to 
a course of experiments. (L. W. Dillwyn to John Barrow, 7 January 
1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/38(a))22
Barrow, displaying a rare sense of humour, forwarded Dillwyn’s letter 
to Amherst with the accompanying note:
My Dear Lord,
If you should happen to break one of Kia King’s old Teapots 
or saucers, perhaps Your Lordship would have the goodness to 
recollect the wish of the ingenious writer of the enclosed and 
preserve the fragments. (Barrow to Amherst, n.d., in BL MSS 
EUR F 140/38 (a))
Dillwyn’s expert admission that British china had yet to reach the technical 
perfection of imperial porcelain was dismissed by Barrow who appears to 
have assumed that a piece of Wedgwood china would suitably impress the 
Jiaqing emperor and be judged favourably next to the imperial wares that 
graced his table. The list of British presents reveals that their choice was 
decided on the basis of cultural assumptions reflecting and epitomising 
the values of aesthetic taste held by the British aristocracy and court 
society. Good taste, it was assumed, transcended cultural borders and the 
luxury goods prized and valued at St James’s would similarly appeal to 
the high-ranking mandarins at the Qing court. The choice of tableware 
for the emperor’s table appears incongruous given the cultural protocols 
of Chinese cuisine and serve to suggest that Barrow, despite his brief 
residence at the Qianlong court in his capacity as the comptroller of 
Macartney’s presents, never witnessed the Chinese at table in the palace 
at Peking.
22  Dillwyn’s reference to the Jesuit account of porcelain manufacture refers to d’Éntrecolles’s letters 
from the kilns of Jingdezhen in Du Halde’s Encyclopaedia of China first published in Paris in 1735, 
which revealed the secrets of Chinese porcelain manufacturing techniques to the West.
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Preparations of the HMS Alceste
Reference to the nature of the provisions and stores brought on board 
the Alceste for the long voyage to China indicate the lifestyle of privileged 
guests on board an early nineteenth-century British man-of-war. Included 
among the wine and spirits were 120 dozen bottles of first growth 
Chateau Margaux Claret at a cost of £444, 132 dozen Chateau Lafitte 
at a cost of £488 and 126 dozen bottles of Chateau Latour at a cost of 
£466. Aperitifs and liqueurs consisted of 240 dozen bottles of Superior 
Port at a cost of £528, 240 dozen bottles of East India Madeira and 108 
dozen bottles of Superior Sherry. White wines included 78 dozen bottles 
of Old Hock, 30 dozen bottles of Sparkling Champagne and other white 
wines. The wine bill alone cost the Company £5,163.17.00. Other stores 
included ‘120 Packages’ of cognac, Jamaica rum, brandy, Scotch whisky, 
cider and ‘Taunton Ale’ adding up to £5,710.6.8. Jams, jellies, preserved 
fruits, brandy fruits, raspberry vinegar and sundry confectionaries totalled 
£340.12.00. Dried fruits, chocolates, ‘Jordan’ almonds and 66 lbs of the 
‘finest Louchong and Hyson Teas’ were included as well as ‘12 Canisters 
of Oatmeal, Groats & Pease’ (BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). Spices and 
herbs were also loaded on board, as well as oils, sugar, vinegars, anchovies, 
caviar, pickles, cheeses, hams, pickled tongues, ‘truffles and morsels’ and 
crates of beef (BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36).
Extra funds deposited in two chests amounting to £20,000 (equivalent 
to approximately £2 million in today’s values) were added to the Alceste’s 
inventory in case extra supplies had to be purchased at ports of call during 
the voyage, although the Company Directors did question whether there 
was a need to stop at Madeira to purchase more wine.23 A major expense 
was the refitting of an apartment on board the Alceste commensurate with 
Amherst’s status as ambassador, as well as extra furniture required during 
his stay in China. An inventory of the furnishings included ‘4 Trafalga 
chairs, carv’d and cane seats’ costing £10; two large lounging chairs; two 
large handsome indulgent sofas at a cost of £74.10.00; two large knee 
hole wash stands and one handsome Grecian couch; one very large sofa 
table; one superb British carpet made up to fit the cabin, five allover cases 
23  The directors pointed out that the expenses of the embassy already exceeded that of the 
Macartney Embassy. Over 1,665 dozen bottles of spirits, cider, beer and wines had been provided. 
The question, therefore, was asked, ‘So is it really necessary to stop at Madeira for more wine?’
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of Crimson Calico for sofas, couches and elbow chairs; an ornamented 
bronze inkstand; and ‘28 yards of the best Print, Lace, and calicoes’ 
(BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36).24
The Embassy on the Eve of its Departure 
for China
Amherst had in his possession a letter dated 6 January 1816 from 
a  member of the public that displayed an interest in the need for the 
British to acquire an understanding of China because a knowledge of 
Chinese ‘desires, wants, likes, dislikes, prejudices etc.’ was essential if the 
British were to learn ‘how to manage them’. The author added:
I hope my Lord, you will be able to prevail upon the Emperor 
to permit 12 of the most competent Englishmen, who are well 
acquainted with the Chinese language, to travel over the whole 
Empire—and I hope you will prevail upon the Emperor to 
send 12 of his most competent Mandarins to England, so they 
might learn our language as they came over; who would bring 
the Emperor an account of our Real-State. (Anonymous letter in 
Amherst’s possession, postmark 6 January 1816, in BL IOR MSS 
EUR F 140/35)
This letter reflects Porter’s (2001, p. 205) insight of the British belief 
in the value of ‘voyages of reciprocal discovery’ where scientific and 
cultural knowledge was appreciated and transmitted between nations. 
The author’s confidence in the ability of the embassy to ‘increase wisdom 
and knowledge and understanding’ between East and the West reflects an 
optimistic expectation of a fruitful outcome for the embassy that mirrored 
Amherst’s faith. China and the mentality of its people, it was hoped, 
would be accessible to British investigation.
24  It would appear that the colour yellow featured prominently in Amherst’s furnishings. Reference 
is made to the colour during the salvaging of furniture from the wreck of the Alceste in February 1817. 
This was hardly a judicious choice considering the colour yellow was reserved in China for the sole use 
of the emperor.
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George Rose, a diplomat and leading Treasury bureaucrat, had a more 
realistic assessment of the chances of the embassy.25 He wrote to Charles 
Abbot, Speaker of the House of Commons, congratulating him on 
securing a passage for his son as a midshipman on the Alceste:
The voyage to China in the way it is made by an ambassador is 
beyond all comparison more interesting than to any other part of 
the world … your mentioning his accompanying Lord Amherst 
leads me to mention a circumstance I should not otherwise have 
done. (Colchester, 1861, vol. 2, p. 562)26
Rose continued that he had met John Sullivan, Buckinghamshire’s first 
choice as ambassador, who informed him that Amherst was ‘instructed to 
act precisely as Lord Macartney’ (Colchester, 1861, vol. 2, p. 562). Rose 
added that this ‘led me to say his Lordship had then better stay at home’. 
Amherst’s only chance for a successful mission, in Rose’s opinion, was 
to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the Jiaqing emperor than 
Macartney had shown to the Qianlong emperor where his:
infinite ill-humour … excited by [his] temper and unbending 
disposition … certainly did not give fair play to the chance of 
effecting the objects of his mission; and I am quite clear that an 
opposite course should be adopted now. (Colchester, 1861, vol. 2, 
p. 563)
On 30 December 1815, Amherst was sworn in as a privy counsellor.27 
Lord Sidmouth congratulated him on his appointment and apologised for 
not attending the ceremony. He referred to the upcoming embassy and 
assured Amherst that he had no doubt of its success due to ‘the judgment, 
temper and address of the Person, in whose hands this important entity is 
fortunately placed’ (Lord Sidmouth to Amherst, 31 December 1815, in 
BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35). Amherst thanked Sidmouth for his ‘kind 
and flattering attention’ and for:
25  Sir George Henry Rose (1771–1855), First Secretary, British Embassy, the Hague (1792–1793); 
Charge d’Affairs Berlin (1793); envoy extraordinary to the United States (1807–1808); British 
Minister in Munich (1813–1815) and Berlin (1815).
26  Charles Abbot, 1st Baron Colchester, was the speaker in the House of Commons (1802–1817) 
and a close personal friend of Amherst.
27  The Privy Council consisted of a board of high-ranking dignitaries who advised the British 
monarch on state affairs. Staunton was very bitter that he was never awarded the honour, especially 
after Ellis was appointed to the council in the 1830s. Staunton thought this was because he had no 
‘personal friend’ in the Cabinet to further his cause. He added that such Royal favour would have 
been particularly pleasing had it been conferred on him after the Amherst Embassy while his mother 
was still alive and where he was still ‘young enough to form and hope to realise fresh projects of 
ambition’ (Staunton, 1856, pp. 176–183).
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the good wishes which you do me the honour and favour to express 
for the successful termination of my Embassy and for my safe return 
to my family … The best mode of repaying your Lordship’s kindness 
will be to exert every faculty I possess in the honourable and faithful 
discharge of the duties entrusted to me; and my chief reward will 
be the approbation of those who, like your Lordship, deserve and 
acquire the applause and esteem of their Country. (Amherst to 
Sidmouth, n.d., in Devon Heritage Centre (South West Heritage 
Trust), 152M/C1816/OF1)
Rose, meanwhile, kept up his attack on the conduct of Macartney at the 
time of his embassy and told Lord Colchester:
I feel quite confident, if the ambassador is to act as Lord Macartney 
did (whose steps Mr. Sullivan told me he [Amherst] is to follow 
exactly), he will not have even a chance of obtaining anything; and 
much is to be obtained if the Chinese Ministers will open their 
eyes to the true interests of their country. I was present at long 
and repeated conversations between Mr. Pitt and Lord Macartney, 
after the return of the latter, and Mr. Pitt was entirely convinced 
that the unbending conduct of his Lordship rendered his success 
hopeless. (Colchester, 1861, vol. 2, p. 566)
Final Instructions on the Performance 
of the Kowtow
Amherst received two ‘enclosures’ of instructions ‘for your guidance in the 
discharge of Duties’ at the Court of Peking from the Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Castlereagh, dated 1 January 1816. Amherst was reminded that there was 
a danger of commerce at Canton failing ‘altogether’ and that his mission 
was ‘the only remedy that was likely to be effectual in order to place the 
[trade and] intercourse upon a satisfactory and stable footing’ (Castlereagh 
to Amherst, Foreign Office, 1  January 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 
140/43 (a); also cited in Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 279). His objects 
were to negotiate assurances of protection of the Company members 
at Canton from the violence and injustice of the local government; to 
more accurately define and detail their privileges; to guarantee freedom 
from intrusion of the Chinese provincial government at Canton into the 
British Factory; and to secure an open channel of communication, in the 
Chinese language, in all addresses and representations to the Chinese 
Government. A copy of the proceedings of the Macartney Embassy was 
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also enclosed from which ‘a careful perusal of the correspondence of his 
Lordships, you will receive the most valuable suggestions’ (Castlereagh 
to Amherst, Foreign Office, 1 January 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 
140/43 (a)). Amherst was instructed:
In the pursuit of these objects, you will regulate your conduct, 
by such information as you may receive from the Company 
Supercargoes, on the habits and customs of the Chinese 
government and people; and I am persuaded that in the knowledge 
and experience of the Supercargoes you will find the means, under 
the exercise of your own judgment and discretion, of adapting 
a  course, the best calculated to affect the essential purposes of 
your Embassy. (Castlereagh to Amherst, Foreign Office, 1 January 
1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/43 (a))
Castlereagh issued two important instructions. The first was identical to 
that given to Macartney revealing a lack of any further thought on the 
part of the Foreign Ministry. Thus, Amherst was informed to follow 
the  ‘punctilio’ or procedures of ceremony at the emperor’s court and 
conform ‘to all the ceremonies of that Court, which may not commit the 
honour of your Sovereign or lessen your own dignity, so as to endanger 
the success of your mission’ (Castlereagh to Amherst, Foreign Office, 1 
January 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/43 (a)). The historian Tuck 
(2000, p. xx) has pointed out the ‘vagueness and ambiguity’ of such 
instructions. Further ‘ambiguity’ followed with Castlereagh instructing 
Amherst to ‘take the earliest opportunity to declare … [that] the Prince 
Regent had entirely approved of the ceremonials performed by the 
Earl Macartney to the August Father of the present Emperor’ and had 
especially commanded him to ‘adopt that precedent upon’ his mission 
‘to His Illustrious Son’ (Castlereagh to Amherst, 1 January 1816, in 
BL MSS EUR F 140/43(a)). Castlereagh’s second instruction regarded 
Amherst’s rank in the embassy where he was to ‘consider yourself at liberty 
to act upon your own responsibility, in case of any difference of Opinion 
between you and the other Commissioners’ (Castlereagh to Amherst, 1 
January 1816, in BL MSS EUR F 140/43(a)). The Secret Commercial 
Committee of the Company similarly stressed that the first commissioner, 
namely, Amherst, ‘was to possess an extraordinary power of acting on 
his own responsibility in opposition to the sentiments of his Colleagues’ 
(Secret Commercial Committee to Amherst, 17 January 1816, in Morse, 
1926/1966, vol.  3, p.  294). These  instructions endowed Amherst with 
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the flexibility to override Company interests if he deemed it expedient to 
do so. Ultimately, Amherst answered only to the Prince Regent who had 
appointed him.
Amherst’s notes reveal his continued confusion over these instructions, 
especially regarding the performance of the kowtow. He  wrote 
to Buckinghamshire for clarification on its performance, but 
Buckinghamshire’s reply was not particularly helpful (Buckinghamshire 
to Amherst on the Ceremonies of Lord Macartney, 12 January 1816, in 
BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35). After some deep thought on the issue, he 
had decided that:
due to the absurd prejudices and customs of the Chinese … I can’t 
define which ceremonial would be considered as committing the 
honour of the sovereign or lessening the dignity of the emperor. 
(Buckinghamshire to Amherst on the Ceremonies of Lord 
Macartney, 12 January 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35)
Amherst was informed that because it was impossible to anticipate the 
‘circumstances you [will] find yourself in’ it was necessary that he ‘exercise 
your own discretion’ (Buckinghamshire to Amherst on the Ceremonies 
of Lord Macartney, 12 January 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35). 
Buckinghamshire was convinced, however, that it was unwise to include 
any official reference to Macartney’s ceremonials in the Prince Regent’s 
letter to the Jiaqing emperor as this would serve ‘to embarrass [rather] 
than facilitate’ (Buckinghamshire to Amherst on the Ceremonies of Lord 
Macartney, 12 January 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35). He added, 
reassuringly, that Macartney acted ‘with full confidence in the support 
of his government’ (Buckinghamshire to Amherst on the Ceremonies of 
Lord Macartney, 12 January 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35). 
Amherst thanked Buckinghamshire for his advice and ‘for clearing up 
some doubts relative to the latitude afforded me under my … instruction 
relating to the ceremonial of my presentation to the emperor of China’ 
(Amherst to Buckinghamshire, 19 January 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR 
F 140/35).
Buckinghamshire had sent Amherst a private letter two weeks earlier from 
Bath, writing:
My most anxious wishes for the success of your Mission, not only 
on account of the Public, but because I feel deeply interested on 
your account. I certainly am sanguine in my expecting, and not 
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the less so, from a conviction that by placing the business in your 
hands we take the best security against failure. (Buckinghamshire 
to Amherst, 5 January 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/43 (a))
On 4 February 1816, Buckinghamshire suffered a fatal stroke while 
riding in Hyde Park. He had informed Amherst five days earlier of a ‘most 
serious attack, but hope I am doing well’ (Buckinghamshire to Amherst, 
30 January 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/35). Expectations of a 
successful mission were muted with little overt optimism, but Amherst 
had done all he could by way of background research and preparation 
to ensure that he had a flexible strategy in place should the opportunity 
present itself.
Amherst’s Notes: ‘The Course Which I 
Shall Have to Pursue Will Be as Follows’
Amherst read his brief in the following terms. His ‘great objective’ was to 
‘open a direct communication with Pekin’. He wrote in his notes, ‘I must 
not lose sight of this’ (Amherst, ‘Notes on policy to be pursued by the 
British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36). He noted 
further that although the Qianlong emperor had:
absolutely refused to permit an English Resident at his Court, I see 
nothing in the transactions of the former Embassy which would 
render hopeless an application for permission to open a direct 
communication between the members of the Factory and one of 
the tribunals or public departments at Pekin. No such demand 
appears to have been made by Lord Macartney & consequently 
there are no traces of any objection on the part of the Chinese 
government to such a measure. (Amherst, ‘Notes on objects of the 
Embassy’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36)
Amherst listed the course he was to pursue:
1. announce to the emperor that he was appointed by the Prince Regent 
and explain his desire to renew the amicable relations that existed 
between the respective fathers and that the Prince Regent had chosen 
this time to send an ambassador due to the restoration of tranquillity 
in Europe
2. ‘solicit the emperor’s protection to the subjects and commerce 
of England’
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3. ‘bring forward propositions for the future regulation of trade, and 
therein the prevention of former evils’. Amherst added in a pencilled 
note, ‘(introducing the subject perhaps by the disavowing of the 
proceedings of the Doris)’.
He added that to accomplish his last objective he would propose:
1. a British resident at Peking
2. open communication in the Chinese language between the Factory 
and a Tribunal at Peking or a Chinese minister in England
3. a consul at Canton.
Success in one or the other, Amherst continued, would be the best means 
of obtaining:
1. protection from violence or injustice and a more accurate definition 
of Company privileges
2. security for trade against the sudden and capricious interruptions 
and the privilege of dealing with such merchants as the Factory may 
think fit
3. free communication with a resident at Peking or by written 
representations in the Chinese language, and the right to use that 
language in all addresses to the local government.
Amherst’s greatest wish, only to be promoted in the event of the above 
being  achieved, was the opening of a ‘port to the north-wards of 
Canton and  a  Resident Minister at Pekin and a Chinese Minister to 
England in return’, reflecting a British belief in the value of mutual self-
interest  in  achieving British aims. A secret report prepared at Canton 
by Samuel Ball, Inspector of Teas, was prepared on this subject and 
handed to Amherst on arrival in China.28 A further objective was the 
‘extension of British manufactures’ into China. Above all else, Amherst 
reminded himself, was the need to ‘avoid the language of complaint’ 
in his negotiations with the Qing court (Amherst, ‘Notes on policy to 
be pursued by the British Embassy to China’ in BL IOR MSS EUR F 
140/36). While the general objective of his embassy was stated in his 
instructions, Amherst’s actions were to be left largely to his own discretion 
and judgement to be decided at the time.
28  This report is reproduced in Appendix D.
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As the time of departure for China drew near, Amherst became more 
and more concerned at the delays caused by the refitting and loading of 
the ships. Instead of leaving England by 1 December 1815 as initially 
planned, the date was pushed back to early February 1816, which left 
little time for the embassy to arrive in northern China before the onset 
of the typhoon season. Amherst told the Company chairs five days 
before sailing:
I do not recollect any former period of my life to have looked 
with so much anxiety to any event, as I now feel for our arrival 
at a proper season in the Bay of Pe-tchee-lee … [as] we need to 
arrive at the mouth of the White River before the change of the 
Monsoon. (Amherst to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, 
3 February 1816, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 131)
Refitting of the Alceste was completed on 3 February 1816 and Amherst 
and his suite came on board the following day (Journal of Sir William 
Fanshawe Martin, 1817, pp. 1–2, in BL ADD MSS 41346-41475). 
The embassy sailed on 8 February 1816. On the day of departure, Captain 
Maxwell sent a letter to the Company chairs pledging his utmost ‘zeal 
and energy’ to the task of providing for the comfort of Amherst and 
his entourage. He further reassured them that he would ‘endeavour to 
conform to that liberal motto of old English hospitality [of ] “spare not, 
waste not” which you requested should be my guide’ (Maxwell to the 
Chairs, 8 February 1816, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 135). Amherst 
wrote to his wife on the same day from Portsmouth:
My dearest love, Our bitterest parting is over. Let us support 
ourselves till we meet again by the consciousness of having done 
a duty now, which will sweeten the rest of our lives … The sun was 
setting gloriously one side of me and the Moon rising in almost 
equal splendour on the other. I thought they seemed to shed 
a  favourable influence of the journey I am undertaking, and in 
that belief I will bid you goodnight. (Amherst to Sarah Amherst, 
in BL Box 130 946c Ref 5562)
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The Voyage from Portsmouth 
to ‘Hong Kong’
The three ships carrying the British embassy to China set out from 
Portsmouth on 8 February 1816 on the five-month voyage that sailed 
via Madeira, Rio de Janeiro, Cape Town and Batavia. Lord Amherst; his 
14-year-old son Jeffrey; Henry Ellis, Secretary to the Ambassador; Clarke 
Abel, Surgeon and Naturalist; and Henry Hayne, Private Secretary to the 
Ambassador, travelled on the man-of-war HMS Alceste.1 Also on board, 
it has been noted, was the wife of the boatswain, whose presence was 
described by one of the Alceste’s crew as ‘the Dammablest thing a man 
can be troubled with but she stood it like a Brittan’.2 Charles Abbot, 
the son of the speaker, as well as Captain Maxwell’s son were among the 
midshipmen. The Alceste was joined at Spithead by the naval brig HMS 
Lyra under the command of Captain Basil Hall. One of her midshipmen, 
William Hutcheon Hall (no relation), later commanded HMS Nemesis 
at the time of the First Opium War.3 The Company ship General Hewitt, 
commanded by Captain Walter Campbell, carried the presents sent by the 
Prince Regent to the Jiaqing emperor.
1  Henry Hayne (n.d., vol. 1, p. 3) listed the other members of the embassy on board the Alceste: 
Mr Griffith, Chaplain and Jeff’s tutor; Doctor Lynn; and Havell, the embassy’s draughtsman.
2  This was quoted in a 13-page manuscript written by the carpenter on board the Alceste to his 
father that was auctioned at Christies on 26–27 September 2007 (see Christie’s Sale 7470: Exploration 
and Travel 26-27 September 2007, www.christies.com/lotfinder/Lot/china-lord-amhersts-embassy-to-
china-4966662-details.aspx).
3  The HMS Nemesis was the world’s first ironclad steam-powered warship. On 7 January 1841, the 
Nemesis engaged in action against Chinese forces in the Pearl River with other British warships and 
routed the Chinese war junks sent against them. The Nemesis’s shallow draught showed the utility of 
such vessels in shallow waters and ‘demonstrated conclusively the enormous gap’ between Chinese 
and British military might (Marshall, 2016, p. 89).
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Life on board the Alceste on the outward voyage helped build an esprit 
de corps forging the members of the embassy into a close-knit group 
united in their mission. The spirit of camaraderie was enhanced further by 
the arrival of the men from the British Factory at Canton who joined the 
embassy when the ships arrived at the islands off Macao on 13 June 1816. 
Such high spirits were mostly due to Amherst’s leadership derived from 
his civility, reasonableness and sense of humour. In modern management 
parlance, Amherst would be regarded as an inclusive leader and a team 
player who extensively consulted his commissioners and other members 
of his retinue to make decisions based on the fullest possible range of 
information and views.
Ellis and Clarke recognised the challenges of a long voyage to the other 
side of the world and the uncertainty of their reception once they reached 
China. Their views, no doubt, reflected those of the others in the mission. 
Ellis (1817) wrote:
The voyage must in fact occupy so many months, that the most 
sanguine cannot yet dwell upon the scene awaiting them at its 
termination with any degree of interest; and those who have 
perused the accounts of the former Embassy, commenced too as 
it was under better prospects, can scarcely anticipate either public 
success or private gratification from any events likely to occur 
during our progress through China. (p. 1)
Clarke Abel, the surgeon and naturalist, later lamented:
In passing the shores of the Isle of Wight, my imagination dwelt 
painfully on the white cliffs and verdant slopes, which but three 
days before I had visited with friends who gave the best value to 
my existence, and from whom I was separating, perhaps for ever. 
(1818, p. 1)
Amherst’s initial thoughts concerned his personal wellbeing. His dislike 
of sea travel was revealed in a letter to his wife written at Dover in 1806:
Many people go from hence over to the French Coast, but you 
know I am no admirer of a sea voyage and shall content myself 
with seeing them from Terra firma. (Amherst to Sarah Amherst, 
1806, in Letters from the Yale Collection of American Literature)
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Suffering dreadfully from sea sickness during the first days of his voyage 
to China, Amherst complained of the ‘rolling’ of the ship making writing 
impossible and forcing him to retire to his ‘cot for 5 days and … sit out 
two dinners’:
both my head and stomach are … exceedingly confused … [the] 
noise of the bulk heads … [the] creaking of the wood is such as 
to intercept all conversation across the table … [one has to] exert 
your lungs to the utmost to be heard by your next neighbour. 
(Amherst to Sarah Amherst, 16 February 1816, in BL Box 130 
946c Ref 5562)4
Abel also suffered chronic sea sickness, but William Havell, the artist 
for the embassy, soon recovered and, after the first day, ‘was the life and 
soul of the party’ (Hayne, n.d., vol. 1, p. 4).5 Despite his indisposition, 
Amherst remained positive and wrote, ‘Nothing can exceed the harmony 
and good humour that prevails amongst us’ (Amherst to Sarah Amherst, 
16 February 1816, in BL Box 130 946c Ref. 5562). Jeffrey’s presence, 
as predicted by Lord Boringdon, was a great comfort to his father:
Without him I should have been a very wretch … From nine 
o’clock till three I do not see a human being in the ship except 
Jeff who comes from his French lesson and Captain Maxwell 
who brings the Chart to show me where we were at 12 o’clock. 
(Amherst to Sarah Amherst, 22 February 1816, in BL Box 130 
946c Ref. 5562)
Amherst and Jeffrey spent a lot of time walking up and down the quarter 
deck looking out for the Lyra and the General Hewitt. Amherst wrote on 
16 February, ‘the Indiaman sailed along side us … for 2 or 3 hours, near 
enough to nod to each other, but the weather was too rough to admit to 
conversation’ (Amherst to Sarah Amherst, 17 February 1816, in BL Box 
130 946c Ref 5562). Amherst’s optimism about his mission improved 
steadily after gaining his sea legs. He told Sarah:
4  Hayne (n.d., vol. 1, p. 4) noted that Amherst appeared on deck for the first time on the afternoon 
of 14 February.
5  William Havell, born in 1782, worked in his family’s London-based engraving firm and was 
an established artist. He left the embassy at Manila on its return voyage in February 1817 after 
an altercation with one of Alceste’s officers and travelled separately to India where he remained for 
eight years earning a living as a portrait artist. He returned to England in 1825, living in reduced 
circumstances and died in December 1857 (Owen, 1981).
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I am so convinced that what we have done is right, and so 
confident, humbly confident, that we shall be rewarded for it, that 
hope was  never so buoyant with me before. (Amherst to Sarah 
Amherst, 17 February 1816, in BL Box 130 946c Ref 5562)
He also felt well enough to inform her of some choice gossip regarding 
the details of Lord Buckinghamshire’s will. Informed by Ellis that 
Buckinghamshire had ‘not left a single shilling to the present lord’ and 
only a ‘small legacy to Mr Ellis and his elder brother’, he added that 
‘Lady Buckinghamshire has a handsome provision [but] I dare say you 
have heard all this from Lady Macartney’ (Amherst to Sarah Amherst, 
17 February 1816, in BL Box 130 946c Ref 5562).
Madeira
The ships reached Madeira on 18 February 1816 where they found 
two British men-of-war, recently arrived from Portsmouth, waiting in 
the Funchal Roads. On board the HMS Niger was Sir Charles Bagot, 
newly appointed British Ambassador to the United States on his way to 
Washington. Bagot knew Amherst and had commented earlier on his dire 
financial circumstances.6 Sir Hudson Lowe, on board the HMS Phaeton, 
was on his way to St Helena to take up the post of governor in charge of 
Napoleon’s exile.7 Amherst, anxious to set sail and get underway, declined 
their invitations to visit Madeira as nothing ‘shall interfere with the main 
object of our voyage’ of a speedy passage to China (Amherst to Sarah 
Amherst, 18 February 1816, in BL Box 130 946c Ref. 5562). Jeffrey 
recorded in his journal that the town of Funchal appeared ‘very clean 
and large’ from a distance, but learned from others that the reverse was 
true: ‘like most Portuguese towns, it is excessively filthy’ (Journal of Jeffrey 
Amherst, son of Lord Amherst, on his father’s mission to China, n.d., n.p. 
in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/37, hereafter referred to as ‘Jeffrey Amherst, 
n.d., n.p.’). Regardless of Amherst’s immediate concerns and those of the 
Company Directors, time was found to load a store of Madeira wine on 
board the Alceste before sailing that evening for Rio de Janeiro.
6  Charles Bagot was later to enjoy a pension of £4,000, in contrast to Amherst who received 
a hereditary pension of £3,000 (Wade, 1835, pp. 510, 507).
7  Napoleon was taken to St Helena on board the HMS Northumberland under the command of 
Sir George Cockburn who was entrusted with his safe custody until the arrival of Sir Hudson Lowe. 
Lowe arrived at St Helena in April 1816 (Seaton, 1898, p. 37).
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Sailing into fine weather, the squadron made good time. Dinner was 
heralded by the sound of a horn and the band playing the ‘Roast Beef 
of Old England’ (Hayne, n.d., vol. 1, p. 6). Embassy personnel were 
joined by two or three officers of the watch and evenings were spent 
playing backgammon (Hayne, n.d., vol. 1, p. 5). A festive mood was felt 
throughout the ship (Amherst to Sarah Amherst, 25 March 1816, in BL 
Box 130 946c Ref. 5562). Amherst wrote:
For the last two evenings there has been dancing upon the deck 
from about 6 to 8, the gentlemen and officers on the quarter 
deck and the sailors on the gang-way and forecastle. I don’t know 
which party enjoy it most, but the sailors are a little puzzled with 
the French country dance tune. One fellow last night amused 
himself with dancing upon his head. (Amherst to Sarah Amherst, 
22 February 1816, in BL Box 130 946c Ref. 5562)
‘Much mirth and humour’ accompanied the crossing-the-line ceremony 
on 4 March (Amherst to Sarah Amherst, 22 February 1816, in BL Box 
130 946c Ref. 5562). Sounds symbolic of British power swept the waves 
as the embassy band played ‘God Save the King’ and ‘Rule Britannia’ 
when King Neptune came on board (Hayne, n.d., vol. 1, p. 17). Novices 
dressed up in women’s clothes lent by Mrs Low (Hayne, n.d., vol. 1, p. 17) 
and were ordered to be smeared with an oatmeal paste that was shaved off 
‘with a rusty iron hoop, full of notches’ followed by a  ducking match 
(Hayne, n.d., vol. 1, p. 19). Amherst’s exemption from the ceremony was 
bought at a cost of ‘a double allowance of grog to the sailors for two days’, 
much to the delight of the crew (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). The Lyra 
and General Hewitt left the Alceste soon after on 10 March and followed a 
course directly to the Cape of Good Hope, while the Alceste headed west to 
Brazil in order for Amherst to pay a courtesy call on the Portuguese royal 
family who were living in exile at Rio de Janeiro under British protection. 
Such a detour, it was felt, would not jeopardise the mission as the Alceste’s 
speed and favourable southeast trade winds would ensure ample time for a 
rendezvous with the rest of the squadron at Cape Town (Ellis, 1817, p. 2).
The New World: Rio de Janeiro
British reactions to Rio de Janeiro, their first port of call in the New 
World, provides a useful touchstone against which to compare their later 
views on China. British responses to their alien environments need to be 
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placed within the framework of Regency values and assumptions. Visual 
reactions to scenery were important for classifying interest or otherwise 
in a country. Other sensory sensations, especially unpleasant odours, 
immediately indicated an uncivilised and coarse society deprived of 
order and civility. Appearances were especially important for determining 
people as respectable or otherwise. Henry Hayne, Amherst’s private 
secretary, wrote of Rio de Janeiro, ‘nothing reminded me more of the 
uncivilised country where I was than their appearance’ (Hayne, n.d., 
vol. 1, p. 57). He added that the American minister met at Rio looked 
more ‘like an English barber than a minister … [of ] the Corps Diplomatic’ 
(Hayne, n.d., vol. 1, p. 55).
British reactions to the new environments they encountered, revealed 
especially in their later responses to and perceptions of China, were shaped 
also by other more pressing concerns. Amherst, for example, did not respond 
to the sights of Brazil in the same way as others in his mission due to his 
anxiety about reaching northern China before the onset of the typhoon 
season and his preoccupation with immediate official duties connected with 
meeting the exiled Portuguese royal family in Rio de Janeiro.
Rio de Janeiro’s physical appearance, in particular the Sugar Loaf, was 
described by Ellis as ‘indescribably sublime and beautiful’: ‘The eye 
wandered in rapturous observation over an endless variety of picturesque 
combinations, presenting a totality of wondrous scenery … [which defied] 
pictorial and verbal description’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 3). Hayne (n.d., vol. 1) 
referred to Barrow’s experience when visiting Rio and, like him, was ‘lost 
in admiration of the magnificent scenery’ (p. 35). Hayne and Ellis were 
enchanted when they came across the wife of the Russian Consul reading 
a book with a small child in a jungle clearing. Ellis described:
On approaching the stream … we observed an European lady, with 
her nurse and child, in a recess of the rock; her dress, appearance, 
and occupation (that of reading), presented, from their civilized 
combination, a most striking contrast to the uncultivated grandeur 
of the scene which surrounded us. (Ellis, 1817, p. 6)8
Ellis’s response to the New World seen in this passage reveals early 
nineteenth-century British cultural predispositions for interpreting new 
sights that were later applied to China. Struck by the incongruous and 
contradictory sensory and Romantic image of an unexpected scene 
8  The lady was Mrs Langsdorf, wife of the Russian Consul.
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of a  European mother and child reading in the wild Brazilian jungle, 
Ellis reverted to notions of civilisation, progress and sentimentality. 
For him, the European lady’s presence imposed a sense of order on the 
uncultivated and wild landscape. The external appearance of fine dress 
and the refined occupation of reading further engaged Ellis’s sensibilities, 
while the presence of the child suggested the finest values of familial love 
and affection.
While the Lyra did not visit Brazil (proceeding directly from Madeira 
to Cape Town), her captain, Basil Hall, clearly recognised the cultural 
insularity of the common British sailor when exposed to a foreign culture. 
He wrote as a general observation:
It is Jack’s custom, wherever he goes, to call every one he encounters 
abroad a mere outlandish-man, forgetting that it is himself alone 
who is so … Should the people he meets with happen to understand 
a word or two of English, he is satisfied, and they are set down for 
sensible people; otherwise he pities their ignorance, and laughs at 
the folly of their designating common things by names strange to 
their ears. I remember once overhearing the conversation of two 
of my sailors in the streets of Valparaiso, who had only been a few 
days in the country; one said to the other, ‘What do you think 
of these people?’—‘Why’, replied his companion, with a look of 
thorough contempt, ‘will you believe it—the infernal fools call 
a hat Sombrero!’ (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 10)
Amherst had little time to contemplate Brazil’s novelties. Cannon fire 
heard by those on board the Alceste as she approached the harbour was 
revealed as a salute announcing the death of the Queen of Portugal. The 
town of Rio de Janeiro was clouded in a ‘character of noisy and luminous 
melancholy’ as ships in the harbour fired their guns every five minutes as 
a mark of respect (Abel, 1818, p. 10). Amherst prepared himself for the 
Queen’s funeral but was also taken by the British consul on a sightseeing 
tour of the area where he noted the splendour of the botanic gardens 
and made reference to a few ‘Chinese gardeners’ who were cultivating the 
‘Tea-plant’ with great success (Abel, 1818, p. 18).
British reactions to Rio were affected specifically by the presence 
of numerous slave markets where vast numbers of slaves generated 
considerable moral outrage. The Alceste’s physician, John M’Leod, thought 
slavery was contrary to ‘reason and natural light’. He complained further 
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of Brazil’s despotic government and the ‘swarms’ of Catholic priests who 
hung about the streets in clusters (M’Leod, 1818/1820, p. 8). The filth 
of Portuguese towns was also confirmed by Abel (1818):
The strongest efforts of the imagination cannot picture any thing 
so heavenly as the country, or so disgusting as the town … I almost 
lamented that I had an organ of smell. [I can] give no idea of 
the stench which exhales from the accumulated odure [sic] of its 
streets. (p. 23)
Cape Town
The Alceste reached Table Bay, South Africa, in record time, arriving on 
30 April 1816 (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Cape Town’s character as a 
‘completely European’ settlement evoked little interest for Ellis (1817, 
p.  18). Amherst was entertained by Lord Charles Somerset, Governor 
of the Cape, and two sailors jumped ship from the General Hewitt. After 
the squadron left the Cape bound for Java on 11 May 1816, Amherst’s 
anxiety grew as the Alceste drew closer to China. He wrote to Sarah:
I get exceedingly nervous as we approach the Straits of Sunda and 
advance towards Canton. I cannot feel confident that we shall be 
allowed to go up the Gulf of Pechelee. If we are required to land 
at Canton I know it was the opinion in England that it would be 
fatal to the success of the Embassy. (Amherst to Sarah Amherst, 
11 May 1816, in BL Box 130 946c Ref. 5562)
Batavia
The Dutch East Indies were reached on 10 June 1816 and the ships 
anchored in the Anjere Roads. Amherst and some of his suite travelled 
overland to Batavia and were fascinated by scenes of rice fields, sugar 
and bamboo plantations and wild jungles. Arriving at Batavia, Amherst 
noted the port’s Chinese ‘middling classes’, described by Ellis (1817, 
p. 25) as the descendants of ‘Fo-kien province’ who ‘surpass[ed] the rest 
of the [Chinese] nation in enterprise’ due to their willingness to travel 
and establish themselves in foreign countries. The children were of ‘mixed 
race’, as there were no Chinese women in Batavia, and were sent to China 
for their education (p. 26).
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Despite Batavia’s numerous novelties, the British were impressed primarily 
with the effect of good British governance on the Javanese population 
following their occupation of the East Indies between 1811 and 1816.9 
Dutch rule was condemned for its mismanagement and exploitation of 
the native population and natural resources and for its indifference to the 
rights and happiness of their subjects (Ellis, 1817, p. 34). Ellis thought 
that the imminent departure of Sir Stamford Raffles and the British 
administration from the islands was a ‘matter of mutual regret’ because 
Raffles was ‘idolised’ by the Javanese who thought of the British not as 
their masters, but as their benefactors (p. 36).
Amherst’s attention now focused on the arrangements for the secret 
rendezvous with the embassy’s Canton-based contingent off the coast of 
Macao. He addressed a letter dated 9 June to the president of the Select 
Committee informing him of the impending arrival of the embassy. This 
was handed to the captain of an American ship bound for China. The 
Lyra was sent on ahead to meet up with the Indiaman Orlando in Chinese 
waters to confirm arrangements for rendezvousing with the two Company 
ships, the Discovery and Investigator, scheduled to join the embassy. The 
Alceste and the General Hewitt departed Java 10 days later bound for 
China.
Reaction to the Embassy at Canton
Early rumours of another embassy reached Canton in January 1816. 
Barrow had alerted Staunton that an embassy was ‘still in contemplation’ 
and it appears he suggested that Staunton would be its leader (Staunton 
Letters, Macao, 18 January 1816). Staunton had just been promoted 
to president of the Select Committee after Elphinstone’s departure 
for England in early 1816. His new position, Staunton informed his 
mother, was one ‘I never either coveted or expected’, while his new 
responsibilities made it very difficult ‘to leave this spot … to form an 
Embassy’ (Staunton Letters, Canton, 21 February 1816). British relations 
with the Cantonese authorities were currently very cordial in part due 
to the arrival of the son of Staunton’s old friend Sungyun, the former 
governor-general at Canton, who in 1811 had bestowed extra favours on 
9  Amherst had brought a duplicate set of dispatches ordering the evacuation of British troops 
from Java.
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the British. Sungyun’s son, whose rank was higher than the viceroy, was 
on a special assignment as the Imperial commissioner sent to try appeals 
against some provincial officials. He sent Staunton some small presents 
and invited him to visit his pleasure boat which Staunton refused on the 
grounds that this was ‘unbecoming’ to his status (Staunton Letters, Macao, 
18 March 1816).
Official news that an embassy was on its way was received at Canton 
on 25 May 1816, only 45 days before Amherst arrived at the islands off 
Macao.10 The Select Committee, fearful of unofficial news of the embassy’s 
imminent arrival coming to the notice of the Chinese authorities through 
Indian newspaper accounts arriving at Macao, immediately sprang 
into action.11 The governor of Guangdong, called the ‘acting viceroy’ 
or ‘Foo-yuen’ by the British, was notified officially of the approach of 
the embassy.12 It was assumed another British embassy was acceptable 
to the Chinese Government following the Qianlong emperor’s edict of 
1796 signifying his approval of such a mission. The embassy’s aim was 
to inform the Jiaqing emperor of ‘the happy restoration of peace among 
the nations of the West’.13 The Indiaman Thomas Grenville arrived from 
Bengal with Buckinghamshire’s official letter to the viceroy two days 
later (Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 258). Staunton, along with the other 
Factory members scheduled to join the embassy, travelled immediately to 
Macao to wait for Amherst’s arrival.
Metcalfe’s Meeting with the Fuyuan 
or Governor of Guangdong
Thomas Metcalfe, the second member of the Select Committee, arranged 
a meeting with the Fuyuan for the official handover of Buckinghamshire’s 
letter. The Fuyuan was to be reminded of the superior status of the British 
10  This news was brought by HIC Orlando. Amherst arrived at the Lemma Islands off Macao on 
10 July 1816.
11  Newspapers from India with the news of the embassy arrived on 2 June 1816.
12  The Fuyuan is typically referred to as governor of Guangdong. It is unclear here whether the 
British made a mistake or whether this governor was acting as governor-general of the Liangguang at 
this time.
13  The Select Committee informed the ‘Foo-yuen’ of the Qianlong emperor’s invitation, dated the 
6th day of the 11th moon of the 58th year (December, 1793), where it was signified to Macartney 
that the court was agreeable to receiving another British ambassador (see Ellis, 1817, pp. 493–494, 
Note No. 1).
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nation in contrast to the ‘lesser respectability’ of the traditional vassal 
states who regularly sent embassies to the imperial court (Metcalfe to 
the Select Committee, Canton, 4 June 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 
140/45). Metcalfe, accompanied by Morrison as interpreter, was met at 
the Canton city gates by the Hong merchants who, aware that this was 
the first time the Englishmen had entered the city, allowed extra time 
for sightseeing before proceeding to the governor’s palace (Metcalfe to 
the Select Committee, Canton, 4 June 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 
140/45). The meeting with the Fuyuan was short, lasting only 20 minutes. 
The British were not offered chairs and remained standing while the five 
senior mandarins remained seated. After making a specific point of taking 
off their hats and bowing before replacing their hats, Metcalfe opened 
the box carrying Buckinghamshire’s letter and delivered it to the Fuyuan 
who looked at it briefly before passing it to the Hoppo who passed it to 
another senior mandarin. Metcalfe recorded that the Fuyuan ‘mentioned 
with seeming satisfaction the former Embassy’ (Metcalfe to the Select 
Committee, Canton, 4 June 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/45). 
After handing over a Chinese translation the British retired. Metcalfe was 
anxious to leave the palace as quickly as possible to dodge being questioned 
further about the embassy’s purpose and to avoid giving the Chinese the 
impression that this was a Company initiative rather than one sent on 
behalf of the British Crown (Metcalfe to the Select Committee, Canton, 
4 June 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/45).14
The Hong merchants Howqua and Puankhequa visited Metcalfe the 
following day with a list of questions regarding the embassy including 
some about the nature of the presents for the emperor and whether the 
ships planned to follow Macartney’s itinerary by stopping at Zhoushan. 
Questions were then asked about the ‘real object’ of the mission (Metcalfe 
Report of Meeting with Howqua and Puankhequa, in BL IOR MSS 
EUR F 140/45). Metcalfe stuck to the party line and reiterated that its 
objective was to announce the peace in Europe and the Prince Regent’s 
desire to preserve the bonds of friendship between Great Britain and 
China (Metcalfe Report of Meeting with Howqua and Puankhequa, in 
BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/45). Other private conversations between 
Metcalfe and the Hong merchants held later in the week, however, 
focused on Staunton’s inclusion in the embassy. Metcalfe was informed 
14  Morrison (1820) wrote that Metcalfe asked for questions to be sent to the Factory to ‘afford 
more time to give suitable answers’ (p. 11).
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that the emperor did not approve of Staunton visiting Peking after his role 
in the recent altercations at Canton, but Metcalfe replied that Staunton’s 
inclusion in the embassy was ordered by the British sovereign and could 
not be disobeyed (Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 259). Metcalfe informed 
Amherst in a private letter that Chinese displeasure regarding Staunton’s 
participation in the embassy originated with the Hong merchants and not 
from the government due to the ‘merchants who have always a wish to 
lower the Company’s Servants in the Eyes of the Mandarins’ (Metcalfe to 
Amherst, 10 July 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/38 (a)).
Staunton was also visited by some senior Hong merchants at Macao who 
questioned the embassy’s plan of travelling directly to Tianjin rather than 
calling first at Canton. They were informed that this was necessary due to 
the nature of the presents whose bulk and delicate nature required they 
travel by sea as they would be damaged if they proceeded overland. They 
were also informed that Buckinghamshire’s letter ordered a direct route to 
Tianjin and could not be disobeyed.
Meanwhile, rumours at Macao began circulating while the Select 
Committee waited for official approval from Peking, which was expected 
around 15 July. Howqua became increasingly anxious over the inclusion 
of both Staunton and Morrison in the embassy and warned this could 
result in ‘evil consequences’ with ‘something unpleasant’ occurring as the 
emperor would not be pleased at learning that Staunton, in particular, was 
travelling to Peking (Metcalfe Report of Meeting with Howqua, 13 June 
1816, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 275). Staunton, however, read his 
concern as indicative of the desire of the merchants to protect themselves 
in the face of imperial displeasure.
Staunton’s withdrawal from the embassy, the British thought, would only 
confirm Chinese suspicions and would be tantamount to labelling him 
as a traitor when in fact he was only doing his duty and following his 
sovereign’s orders. The Hong merchants’ attitude was interpreted as yet 
another example of Chinese interference in the internal affairs of the 
British Factory. Such ‘low cunning and intrigues’, the Select Committee 
felt, had to be defeated at all costs. It was imperative that ‘Sir G. Staunton 
and suite should embark and proceed to some rendezvous to join the 
Embassador; apprising the Mandarins of the circumstance, but to move 
out of reach of any reply’ (Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 260).
135
6 . THE VOYAGE FROM PORTSMOUTH TO ‘HONG KONG’
Staunton sent the Fuyuan an official letter informing him that he was 
proceeding immediately to join the embassy ships that were sailing 
directly to Tianjin. Their exact location was kept secret from the Chinese 
Government, which had taken the precautionary measure of sending 
Chinese troops to military posts in the area following rumours spread 
by the Portuguese at Macao of suspicious British intentions (Ellis, 1817, 
p. 55).15
Staunton’s immediate reaction on learning that he was not to lead the 
embassy is not known. He informed his mother in a brief note dated 
6  June 1816, ‘I am at this moment full of business preparing for the 
expected Embassy—and likewise being chief of the Factory … but [I am] 
in good health’ (Staunton Letters, Macao, 6 June 1816). His next letter is 
dated 6 July. The gap in correspondence is uncharacteristic, especially given 
the importance of such a mission for the Staunton family. Nevertheless, 
he was delighted to receive a private letter from Amherst, delivered by 
the American ship sent from the Straits of Sunda, that reached him on 
24 June, informing him that Amherst had visited his mother in London 
before departing on the mission: ‘[I am] well pleased at this mark of 
politeness and attention’ (Staunton Letters, Macao, 6 July 1816). The 
embassy was due to arrive at any moment and it was important he ‘should 
lose no time in this neighbourhood. I am going to embark tomorrow on 
board one of the Company’s cruising ships stationed here, in order to 
proceed with his Lordship to his destination’ (Staunton Letters, Macao, 
6 July 1816). Staunton’s earlier doubts about the prospects of the embassy 
had not changed, but his naiveté remained:
I do not flatter myself that much is to be gained at present by 
an Embassy, but I have little doubt of the Chinese receiving us 
handsomely—and with the proper attention due from one great 
nation to another. (Staunton Letters, Macao, 6 July 1816)
15  Dutch and Portuguese ‘jealousy’ at Macao was also detected at the time of the Macartney 
Embassy. Macartney commented on the Portuguese that ‘we had to expect from them every ill office 
and counteraction in their power’ (Cranmer-Byng, 1962, p. 64).
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Staunton’s position in the embassy had still to be determined. His role had 
not been approved by the Company due to fears of Chinese displeasure 
after the part he played in the recent altercations at Canton and Macao. 
Accordingly, it was left to Amherst to decide Staunton’s position.16
Amherst Overnights in Coastal Waters 
off Hong Kong
Amherst’s arrival in the South China Sea was shrouded in secrecy. The 
Alceste met up with the Lyra and General Hewitt and the two Company 
ships, the Discovery and Investigator, with the members of the British 
Factory on board at a prearranged location on 10 July 1816.17 The ships 
moved that evening to a small rocky island known as ‘Hong Kong’ for 
the purpose of watering. Staunton was due to visit Amherst on board 
the Alceste the following morning, but in the meantime Basil Hall wrote 
in a private capacity to his friend, Lord Sidmouth, on the prospects of 
the embassy based, no doubt, on information from the members of the 
Canton contingent who had joined the Lyra that day.18 He informed 
Sidmouth:
It would give me pleasure could I furnish your Lordship with any 
accurate information as to the probable success of our mission; 
but it is difficult to get this free from prejudiced views. Along 
with Sir George [Staunton], there have come several men of great 
acuteness, & local knowledge. I can readily observe that they have 
not any expectation of our succeeding. They seem to think it 
quite hopeless our even finding this government treating us on an 
equal footing with themselves; under a show of cordiality & good 
faith, they disguise the worst possible opinion of us, & all sorts 
of treachery; therefore, without some motive to induce them to 
16  Only Toone and Davis had been officially instructed to attend the mission (Staunton, 1824, 
p. 8). Morse (1926/1966) stated that Buckinghamshire appointed Elphinstone second commissioner 
and Staunton third commissioner. On the departure of Elphinstone to England, the vacancy was to 
be filled by Ellis, originally secretary to the ambassador.
17  The Macartney Embassy arrived in Chinese waters on 20 June 1793 and anchored off Macao. 
In contrast to the secrecy surrounding the Amherst mission, the Qianlong court had ample warning 
of its arrival. Three members of the mission, including Sir G. L. Staunton, went ashore immediately 
and returned the following day with news that the Qianlong court planned to give it a most hospitable 
and honourable reception (Cranmer-Byng, 1962, p. 63).
18  Henry Addington, 1st Viscount Lord Sidmouth, had served as prime minister from 1801 to 
1804, and was the home secretary at the time of the Amherst Embassy. He was a close friend of both 
Amherst and Basil Hall. Hall’s letter was sent in a private capacity.
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behave better, we perhaps lose ground by these acknowledgments 
of their right to treat us as inferior. The Portuguese of Macao appear 
to be guided by the wildest jealousy imaginable—their accounts 
of the object of this Embassy have produced strong apprehensions 
that it is merely the precursor of an invasion. (Hall to Sidmouth, 
HMS Lyra off Macao, 9 July 1816, in Devon Heritage Centre 
(South West Heritage Trust), 152M/C1816/OF2)
This letter is important as it represents the only document reflecting the 
up-to-date and private views of the Englishmen based at Canton that were 
no doubt also relayed to Amherst. Amherst’s task ahead in dealing with an 
arrogant and suspicious imperial court was considered daunting in spite of 
the inclusion of Britain’s foremost sinologists and contradicts Staunton’s 
view of an expected cordial, if fruitless, reception. Chinese suspicions 
of British motives were reinforced by the Select Committee’s tactics of 
secrecy and evasion that provided no specific information on either the 
movements of embassy personnel or the ships transporting them. Further, 
the role of Portuguese propaganda and the presence of unusual British 
shipping activity in the waters of the Lemma islands near Hong Kong had 
alerted local authorities. The Alceste, Lyra and General Hewitt, as well as 
the Company ships Discovery and Investigator, were joined for a brief time 
by the Company ship Thomas Grenville, which was on its way to Europe. 
Jeffrey recorded in his journal, ‘Such an assemblage of English ships had 
I  suppose never before met together at Hong Kong’ (Jeffrey Amherst, 
n.d., n.p.).
Staunton learned of Ellis’s position as the second commissioner in the 
embassy upon the arrival of the Alceste on 10 July 1816. His disappointment, 
as well as his delay in visiting the Alceste and meeting Amherst until the 
following morning, has been interpreted by Platt (2018, p. 161) as a sign 
of great petulance where ‘he initially refused even to speak’ to Amherst. 
However, there is no evidence to support this assertion. Staunton (1824, 
p. 7) gives a more plausible and practical reason for his delayed arrival on 
board the Alceste. First, Amherst had just received reports and intelligence 
from Canton on 10 July and needed time to study these, especially 
regarding the expediency of including Staunton in the embassy. Second, 
Captain Maxwell was anxious for all the ships of the squadron to proceed 
as quickly as possible to ‘Hong Kong’ to re-water. Once on board the 
Alceste, Staunton proceeded to spend ‘a considerable time in consultation 
with Lord Amherst and Mr. Ellis, relative to the future arrangements and 
constitution of the Embassy’ (Staunton, 1824, p. 7). At issue was his rank 
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and position in the embassy. Staunton argued that the subordinate position 
of third commissioner would lower his status in the eyes of the Cantonese 
Government and he was especially concerned that Ellis was nominated with 
dormant credentials of minister plenipotentiary, meaning that he would be 
the ambassador in the event of Amherst’s death. Fortunately, both Amherst 
and Ellis agreed readily with Staunton’s wishes. He was delighted and told 
his mother in a letter, also quoted by Platt (2018, p. 161) who omitted 
the following three lines, thus changing the emphasis of Staunton’s positive 
remarks about his first meeting with Amherst and Ellis:
The conduct of both these Gentlemen is everything I could 
properly wish—nothing could be more obliging and kind than 
Lord Amherst’s reception—or more conciliatory than Mr. Ellis … 
You will perceive that I am established the Second, and First of the 
Embassy—Lord Amherst also said verbally—‘You are in a higher 
situation than your father was because you are actually … in the 
Commissioners of Embassy … whereas he was only Secretary of 
Legation’. (Staunton Letters, On board Discovery, 12 July 1816)
Staunton’s emphasis on the importance of rank and his pride at surpassing 
the status of his father in the Macartney Embassy is made clear in this letter. 
He concluded by persisting in his belief that, while he was not sanguine 
about the embassy’s prospects, he nevertheless remained confident that it 
would be ‘received as well at least as the former Embassy’ (Staunton Letters, 
On board Discovery, 12 July 1816). While Amherst’s decision to appoint 
Staunton as his number two, in Tuck’s (2000) view, may have ‘doomed the 
Embassy from the start’ (p. xxi), it needs to be noted that, contrary to the 
views of historians such as Platt (2018) and Gao (2016), the camaraderie 
that existed on the outward voyage continued to characterise the relations 
within the embassy suite, which would remain positive and professional 
throughout the remainder of their time in China.
However, Amherst had his doubts regarding the inclusion of Thomas 
Manning in the embassy. He was instructed to take only Toone and Davis 
on the mission and was concerned with Manning’s ‘peculiar costume 
and appearance’ of a long beard and Chinese dress (Staunton, 1824, 
p. 9). Staunton reassured him that, although some Hong merchants had 
previously objected to Manning’s appearance, the Chinese Government 
had taken no notice of him, either at Canton or during his time in Tibet. 
His knowledge of Mandarin, Staunton thought, would be a valuable asset 
in future dealings with the Chinese. Manning, however, acknowledged 
his ‘insufficiencies’ and referred to Morrison as the person possessing the 
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‘most able of all’ skills. He praised Morrison’s fluency in Mandarin, as well 
as his ‘peculiar attention’ paid to the habits of the Chinese people and 
practical experience of current affairs at Canton (Manning to Staunton, 
Accepting the Offer, Macao, 25 May 1816, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) 
F 229). Nevertheless, the embassy’s importance required the inclusion of 
all available talent if it were to fulfil its mission and Manning was hired 
at a fee of $2,000 (Manning to Staunton, Accepting the Offer, Macao, 
25 May 1816, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 229).
Watering in a ‘Sheltered’ Bay: Hong Kong, 
11–13 July 1816
Hong Kong was the first Chinese territory seen by those who had come 
directly from England. Inhabited by only a few scattered fishing villages, the 
harbour impressed the British naval officers who thought that it afforded 
an ‘admirable shelter for ships of any burden’. Its geographical topography 
of being ‘land-locked on every side by lofty islands’ was acknowledged as 
an ideal haunt for pirates (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 6). Reference to ‘Hong 
Kong’ at this time, as noted earlier, was its first citation in published 
English literature.19
Abel, in keeping with his earlier impressions of Rio de Janeiro, was 
impressed with the ‘high conical mountains, rising in the centre, and … 
a beautiful cascade [of water] which rolled over a fine blue rock into the sea’ 
(1818, p. 60). The Chinese fishing boats that gathered around the British 
ships caught Jeffrey’s attention; he described their curious shape and the 
large painted eye on their bows. Revealing British amusement at the use 
of pidgin English at Canton and the perceived superstitious mentality of 
the Chinese he wrote: ‘When asking them the reason [for the eye] they 
answered in broken English, “How can see the rocks when no have got 
Eye?”’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.).
Several embassy members took the opportunity to go ashore while 
the crews were collecting fresh water from the waterfall. Abel gathered 
rock samples and plant specimens, including a variety of fern that gave 
a distant impression of a green and fertile island. Closer inspection, 
19  Morse (1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 260) identified the spot where the ships of the Amherst Embassy 
moored as ‘Malihoy Bay abreast the Waterfall at Hongkong in the Channel between Hongkong and 
the North end of Lemma Island’.
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however, revealed a ‘remarkabl[y] barren’ place (Abel, 1818, p. 60). The 
heat and humidity were overwhelmingly oppressive and Abel recorded 
a temperature of 120 °F (48.8 °C) during a hike on the mountain. Hong 
Kong, on closer inspection, had none of the tropical wonders of Brazil or 
Java and, apart from the waterfall, had no other picturesque features.
Abel’s first contact with native Chinese was also an anticlimax. The only 
inhabitants were ‘some poor and weather-beaten fishermen, spreading 
their nets, and drying the produce of their toils on the rocks which 
supported their miserable mud-huts’ (Abel, 1818, p. 62). Davis noted the 
good manners of the locals, which he thought were far more acceptable 
than those of the impertinent Cantonese. Their ‘quiet and civil’ behaviour, 
Davis (1841, p. 7) thought, was due to the island’s isolation where 
a European visitor was a ‘novel’ occurrence.
Havell, meanwhile, had his sketchbook and tried to draw the local people 
who had gathered around him ‘in all eagerness and insatiable curiosity’ 
(Davis, 1841, p. 7). His task, according to Davis, proved difficult, as the 
subject being drawn immediately ‘wheel[ed] round to the rear to look 
over the artist’s shoulder and observe progress’ (p. 7). Havell, described as 
‘not the most patient of his profession’, became frustrated and the whole 
scene ‘became rather ridiculous’ (p. 7).
Wet and unsettled weather greeted the British the next morning. 
Imperial permission to proceed to the north of China had yet to arrive and 
the British were growing increasingly anxious that their location would 
be discovered by Cantonese authorities who would halt the embassy and 
divert it to Macao. Hall was concerned that the ‘well-known practice of 
the Chinese, whose constant study it had been to render access to the court 
as difficult as possible’ made their next move a total gamble. He added:
It was finally resolved, after much discussion, to put the most 
favourable construction on the matter; to take it for granted … 
that the ambassador was to be favourably received, and to push 
on without delay for the Pei Ho river, the nearest to Pekin of any 
part of the sea-coast of China. It was contested, that once fairly on 
the threshold of the celestial empire, we should be less exposed to 
the operation of those multifarious intrigues, through which … 
everything must pass, if discussed at Canton. (Hall, 1840/1865, 
p. 6)
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The British, concerned at the lateness of the season, decided to take their 
chances and set sail for the north of China despite having not received 
official permission to do so. The ships were about to depart when a fast 
sailing boat, sent by the British at Macao, approached them with news that 
the emperor’s edict had been received granting permission for the embassy 
to proceed. Metcalfe’s accompanying letter was optimistic. The Chinese 
at Canton, Amherst was informed, thought the emperor’s response to 
the embassy was extremely favourable (Staunton, 1824, p. 10). Staunton 
read the emperor’s edict before passing it to Morrison for translation and 
concluded it was expressed in the ‘usual strain of arrogance and affected 
superiority’ representative of all such correspondence. Dated 24 June 
1816 the edict stated:
As the English nation offers presents, and tenders its sincere good 
will with feelings, and in language respectful and complaisant, it 
is doubtless proper to allow the Embassy and presents to enter 
China, and the ship bearing them to proceed to Teen-sing, that 
the ambassador and suite may disembark. (Abel, 1818, p. 380, 
Appendix C)
The British, understandably, were ecstatic and greatly relieved. Amherst 
wrote to Sarah:
In the midst of my anxiety what should burst upon me but 
a dispatch beginning Huzzu! Huzzu! [Hurrah! Hurrah!] with the 
intelligence that the Imperial answer … had arrived at Canton 
on the 9th and expressed the Emperor’s high gratification at the 
honor intended him by the Embassy - that three Mandarins were 
dispatched to the province of Pe-che-tee and particularly one to 
Tien-sing [Tianjin] on the White River to wait our arrival and 
to conduct the Embassador with due honor to Pekin. (Amherst to 
Sarah Amherst, ‘At Anchor off the Island of Hong-Kong’, 12 July 
1816, in BL Box 130 946c Ref. 5562)20
The squadron departed Hong Kong for the north of China on 13 July 
1816 in rain and unsettled weather. Staunton and Morrison had since 
joined Amherst and Ellis on board the Alceste where discussion soon 
turned to the strategies to be employed on the mission, in particular, the 
crucial issue of the kowtow.
20  It would appear that this letter was placed with Captain Maxwell for dispatch with the first ship 




Up the Coast of China 
and Arrival at Tianjin
On 13 July 1816, five British ships left Hong Kong Island and set 
a course for the Gulf of Bei Zhili in northern China.1 The initial British 
encounter with China after the embassy arrived in the north and before 
it was embroiled in the kowtow controversy was largely informal and 
cordial. Ensuing stressful confrontations with Chinese officialdom, 
however, simply reinforced British stereotypes of the Chinese. Perceptions 
of China soon came to duplicate Barrow’s views portrayed in his book 
Travels in China (1804). This account functioned as a primer assisting 
British understanding of the novel environment in which they now found 
themselves, and was referred to constantly by members of the Amherst 
Embassy during their journey.
The intrusion of British ships into China’s northern seas represented 
a physical demonstration of British technical and military superiority seen 
only once before at the time of Macartney in 1793.2 While the ships were 
following Macartney’s route, there were still considerable dangers for such 
large vessels in little-charted waters. Captain Basil Hall complained that 
the best charts were ‘nearly useless … we frequently stumbled upon large 
groups of islands, headlands, and bays, of which no mention had ever 
1  Bei Zhili literally means ‘northern directly ruled’ province. There was a Nan Zhili or ‘southern 
directly ruled’ province around Nanjing.
2  Earlier British naval expeditions to the north Asian region included Captain Cook who had 
sailed down the eastern coast of Japan on his way to Macao during his third voyage in 1776–1780, 
and Captain William Broughton who stopped at Macao in 1796–1797 during his exploration of the 
Japanese islands.
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been made’ (1840/1865, p. 7). Assisting navigation was ‘Massey’s patent 
sounding machine’, the latest British scientific tool used for measuring 
sea depths (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 7). Hiring Chinese pilots had been 
canvassed briefly in London, but was soon dismissed on grounds of the 
need for keeping the mission a secret from Chinese authorities, as well 
as doubts over their competency to navigate large ships in waters north 
of Guangdong province.3 Trust was placed instead in British seamanship 
and technology to steer the embassy safely to the Yellow Sea.
Fast progress was made through the Straits of Formosa, passing along 
the coasts of Guangdong and Fujian provinces until the ships entered the 
Donghai or Eastern Sea (M’Leod, 1818/1820, p. 21). Jeffrey wrote in his 
journal that the Alceste and General Hewitt often towed the Discovery and 
Investigator ‘by which means we got on rather faster’ (Jeffrey Amherst, 
n.d., n.p.). The British were in a buoyant mood due to fine weather and 
the prospect of encountering new and ‘stirring scenes’ of China (Davis, 
1841, p. 10). Chinese fishing boats periodically approached the Alceste, 
but, according to Jeffrey, British attempts to bargain with them failed as 
‘they did not like to have any dealings with us’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.).
The ships cleared the Formosa Straits on 17 July and passed the Zhoushan 
Islands the following day. Swift progress continued. Several geographical 
landmarks named by Captain Erasmus Gower of the HMS Lion during 
the Macartney Embassy were noted. These included Staunton’s Island, 
Cape Gower and Cape Macartney. Captain Maxwell followed Gower’s 
example and named a cape situated at the point of the promontory of the 
Shandong peninsula ‘Cape Amherst’. The naming of the China coast after 
British officials appears incongruous given the cultural antiquity of the sea 
route, but little shipping was seen apart from fishing boats, which gave an 
erroneous impression that the coast was deserted. A vigorous local coastal 
trade, pointed out by Samuel Ball in his secret report,4 was taking place 
much closer to shore out of sight of the British ships.
3  The Macartney Embassy sought to procure Chinese pilots at Zhoushan to conduct the mission 
to Tianjin. They had little nautical skill, however, and the British had to rely on their own resources 
(Cranmer-Byng, 1962, pp. 65–66).
4  This report, as noted above, is reproduced in Appendix D.
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Figure 5: Route taken by the British ships to the Gulf of Bei Zhili 
in northern China.
Note: After depositing Amherst and his embassy at ‘Tagu’, the HMS Alceste and HMS Lyra 
proceeded to chart the coast of Korea and the Ryukyu Islands before travelling onto the 
Canton port of Whampoa to collect the embassy .
Source: CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU. Based on map in M’Leod 
(1818/1820, p . 28) .
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The Yellow Sea
The British reached the Yellow Sea in only 12 days. Little of China had 
been seen apart from a thin ribbon of land that came in and out of view 
as the ships passed. Davis wrote later on the occasion of sailing past the 
Fujian coast:
We cast a wistful eye from our ships at the China coast, a few miles 
off, and with the help of a glass could discover a few scattered 
villages, apparently fishermen’s houses. The shore was generally 
low, with barren hills a little way inland. (1841, p. 12)
Of more immediate concern was the severe discomfort from extreme 
humidity endured by the English. Abel wrote:
I can … give no better notion of the excessive moisture of the 
atmosphere in the China seas during the S.W. monsoon, than 
by stating the Leslie’s hygrometer is not graduated to a sufficient 
extent to mark its degree, that our clothes were as wet as if they 
had been exposed to a smart shower of rain. (1818, p. 64)
The squadron finally came to a halt in the Gulf of Bei Zhili, called 
‘Pe-che-lee’ by the British, on 26 July 1816. Amherst took the opportunity 
of following Macartney’s precedent and called on all the ‘gentlemen, 
servants, musicians, and guard of the Embassy to be assembled on the 
quarter deck’ where he addressed them on ‘the importance, and indeed 
the absolute necessity of conducting themselves with sobriety and 
decorum during their residence in the Chinese dominions’ (Ellis, 1817, 
p. 63).5 Further, trade with the Chinese was strictly prohibited as it was 
imperative to remove any suspicion that the prime aim of the embassy 
involved commercial interests.
5  Macartney ordered that a similar proclamation be communicated to the crew of the Lion and 
Hindostan on 16 July 1793 (Cranmer-Byng, 1962, p. 66).
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First Contact with the Chinese: 
Fishermen and Mandarins
The Lyra, meanwhile, had been sent on ahead to announce the approach 
of the embassy and anchored in three fathoms of water, six miles from 
shore. The rest of the fleet anchored in five fathoms of water, 15 miles 
from the mouth of the Baihe River (Ellis, 1817, p. 63).6
Captain Hall and Francis Toone, the interpreter on board the Lyra, were 
instructed to make contact with the local mandarins to inform them of 
the embassy’s arrival by way of an official letter written by Amherst and 
placed in Toone’s care. The letter, following Chinese protocol, contained 
the names of the embassy’s officials and included a list of the presents. 
Amherst referred to the Macartney Embassy and requested that a similar 
number of boats be made available for the transport of his embassy to 
Peking (Ellis, 1817, p. 63). Toone, however, was instructed not to visit 
the shore to avoid the prospect of some questions of an ‘insidious and 
embarrassing character’ on the motives of the embassy (Ellis, 1817, p. 63). 
The pair set off in a rowboat from the Lyra for the distant mouth of the 
Baihe River, hoping to find some way of notifying the local authorities 
of the embassy’s arrival.
28 July 1816
Hall and Toone decided to approach a Chinese fishing junk lying at 
anchor near the Lyra. Chinese reactions at noticing some Europeans 
rowing towards them can only be imagined. British sensibilities, on 
the other hand, were shocked at the discovery that the fishermen were 
as ‘naked as savages’ wearing only a jacket over their shoulders but 
‘no  clothing for the lower part of the body’ (Morrison, 1820, p. 16). 
The moral assessments are Morrison’s as Hall neglected to mention this 
point in his account, perhaps out of sensitivity to the possible response 
of his readers. The fishermen received the Englishmen most cordially and 
invited them on board where they were offered a seat on a bench placed 
on the quarterdeck. Communication at first was difficult as Toone did not 
understand their dialect, but matters resolved themselves when he reverted 
6  The Baihe or White River is now known as the Haihe or Ocean River.
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to the use of Chinese characters where ‘every man in the boat understood 
him’ (Hall,  1840/1865, p. 7). While Toone was busy communicating 
with the head fisherman, Hall described ‘falling into the hands’ of the 
crew whose curious attention focused on his dress. Particular interest was 
shown towards his shoes, which Hall removed for examination while his 
epaulettes were unbuttoned and drew the ‘greatest wonder’. Hall’s pocket 
compass was also discovered and its purpose comprehended immediately 
by the fishermen: ‘three or four of them carried it off to compare with 
their own needle’ (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 7, emphasis in original). The 
fishermen’s delight on recognising the function of the compass was 
commented on by Hall who acknowledged the important role of common 
understanding and awareness serving to break down cultural barriers. The 
fishermen returned the compass to Hall ‘with much complacency’ (Hall, 
1840/1865, p. 7).
A sudden downpour forced Hall and Toone to take shelter inside the 
junk’s cabin, which represented one of the few occasions during the travels 
of the embassy in China where the English were privileged to see inside 
any local abode. The cabin was ‘a neat little apartment, round which were 
spread a few fur skins, and very comfortable pillows in small pigeon-holes, 
or sleeping berths’ (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 7). Threads of copper coins were 
noticed on a table and numerous Chinese books were scattered around 
the room. Hall was fascinated with the Chinese hairstyle described as the 
‘well-known long tuft or tail, reaching from the back of the head nearly to 
the ground; all the rest of the head being shaved’ (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 8). 
Chinese reaction to the British, on the other hand, centred on the absence 
of ‘tails’. Hall wrote perceptively:
Such is the effect of custom, that nothing in our dress or manners 
excited so much surprise in these people, or appeared more 
preposterous in their eyes, than our contriving to exist without 
long tails. (1840/1865, p. 8)
The cordial meeting came to an end when the fishermen refused to 
accept Amherst’s letter or take it to the local authorities. Hall and Toone 
offered some silver dollars as thanks for their hospitality but the coins 
were not recognised and the fishermen tried to hand the money back. 
‘The fishermen’, Hall wrote, ‘finding us determined not to take back the 
money, very unceremoniously pitched it into the boat as we rowed away’ 
(1840/1865, p. 8). M’Leod, the physician accompanying the Alceste, noted 
that the universal currency of Spanish silver dollars held no meaning for 
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the Chinese; rather, these coins were ‘melted down, the moment [they 
fell] into the hands of a Chinese at Canton’ (M’Leod, 1818/1820, p. 34). 
The British, meanwhile, decided to send a boat to the river entrance on 
the following day in an attempt to make contact with local officials.
29 July 1816: The Mandarins Come 
On Board
Two large junks approached the Lyra the following morning and Hall 
described ‘two Chinese officers, middle-aged, portly, comfortable-looking 
… with very dark mahogany-coloured faces’ who came on board. Their 
names were Chang-wei and Yin. Chang-wei was Chinese and a  civil 
officer who wore a blue button, while Yin was a Manchu military 
officer who wore a red button.7 Their appearance, Hall related, caused 
a sensation among the British crew because this was the first time they had 
seen ‘Chinese dress … except on teacups and saucers’ (1840/1865, p. 7). 
His perceptive comment reflects that British images of ‘China’ and its 
people for the majority of Englishmen were formed exclusively from their 
representations on the export wares from Canton that flooded the British 
market during the eighteenth century.8 British astonishment expressed on 
board the embassy ships can also be read as signifying the difference noted 
in Chinese identity between the mandarins or ‘gentlemen’ who came 
on board the British ships at this time, with those Chinese seamen seen 
previously at Batavia or on the local fishing boats.
The first social encounter between the British and the mandarins was 
an enjoyable occasion due largely to the personality of Chang-wei, the 
younger official, who ‘made himself at home in a moment. He laughed, 
7  Tuck (2000) noted that Staunton and Ellis grew to like both mandarins whose junior rank 
spared them any repercussions from the emperor at the time of the eventual dismissal of the embassy. 
Tuck further noted that Chang-wei was promoted to a judicial commissionership in Shantung soon 
after the embassy’s departure and left the embassy on 12 September 1816. Yin left the embassy on 
17 September 1816. ‘Their task seemed to be to see to the daily wants of the Embassy … and to keep 
the Embassy in touch with the two great officials conducting the mission to Peking’ (p. xxvii).
8  William Alexander (1767–1816), the draughtsman with the Macartney Embassy, produced over 
2,000 sketches of images and scenes depicting China and Chinese life that were first published in Sir 
G. L. Staunton’s (1797a) Authentic Account and subsequently in 1805 and 1814. Access to these was, 
of course, restricted to the most privileged classes of British society. Alexander’s artwork can be found 
in Legouix (1980).
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joked, and skipped about, examining everything more like a child than 
a grave public functionary’ (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 7). Chang-wei enjoyed 
himself especially in Hall’s cabin. Here he:
placed himself unceremoniously, but not rudely, at the head 
of the table, and reaching his arm out, drew a book from the 
library, opened it, and, with great affected formality, turned 
the leaves backwards and forwards till he lighted upon the title 
page. He then held it up before him, examined it with his eyes 
nearly closed,—turned it upside down, sideways and in every 
direction,—twisting his face into all sorts of ridiculous forms, 
expressive of his amusement and surprise at the strangeness of 
what he saw;—then jumping on his feet, displayed the book to his 
wondering attendants, who had taken possession of the skylight, 
and were thrusting their heads down to see what was going on. 
(Hall, 1840/1865, p. 7)
Harmonious and jovial relations between the mandarins and the British 
were improved further with the arrival of a couple of bottles of cherry 
brandy. The mandarins, Hall related, ‘no sooner drank, than they filled 
their glasses again, and were not contented till all their attendants had 
followed so good an example’ (1840/1865, p. 7). Eventually, Hall added, it 
was high time to come to business. Predictably, after all the cherry brandy, 
the mandarins declared their willingness to take charge of Amherst’s letter 
and return with it to Dagu to place it in the hands of the senior legate. 
Communication with the mandarins was difficult and Toone once more 
reverted to the use of Chinese characters to get messages understood, 
much to the mandarin’s surprise and amusement (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., 
n.p.).9 The practice was taken up by Chang-wei, who finding himself 
misunderstood and seeing no ink or paper, improvised by ‘dip[ping] his 
finger, without apology, into his neighbour’s glass [of cherry brandy]—for 
the contents of his own had long disappeared—and painted the symbols 
on the table’ (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 8).
The Chinese guests were not easy to get rid of. Hall wrote that while the 
mandarins were:
9  Jeffrey wrote that the mandarins were ‘much surprised and amused at seeing Mr. Toone talk and 
write in the Chinese language’.
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pledging the emperor in cherry brandy, the boatmen were taken 
in charge by the sailors who, in like manner, were initiating 
them, with great success, into the mysteries of grog and salt-beef. 
(1840/1865, p. 8)
The mandarins, armed with Amherst’s letter to the local governor, finally 
departed. The Lyra weighed anchor and set out to rejoin the rest of the 
squadron anchored 10 miles out at sea.
Captain Hall came on board the Alceste the following morning with news of 
the mandarins’ visit to the Lyra. Amherst was informed that the governor-
general of Bei Zhili had signified his readiness to receive the embassy at the 
mouth of the Baihe River. Bad weather, however, prohibited any further 
communication from shore and the British had a couple of anxious days 
waiting for news. Time was spent observing the great number of junks 
and boats that passed by them on their way to Tianjin. The Chinese 
were initially shy in approaching the British squadron, ‘alarmed perhaps 
by the novel appearance of our ships’, but gradually became bolder and 
approached near enough for close mutual inspection (Jeffrey Amherst, 
n.d., n.p.). Jeffrey, no doubt parroting the sentiments of his father, was 
pleased that the cooler weather allowed them to ‘dress something like 
Englishmen—before we need[ed] to go without our coats and waistcoats’ 
(Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). He also joked about the happy disposition 
of Hall’s mandarin visitors who were ‘always laughing and cherry [sic]’ 
(Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.).
31 July 1816: The Embassy Conductors 
Come On Board
On the morning of 31 July, a small junk with streamers and flags portraying 
‘a dark coloured dragon’ approached the Alceste. On board were four 
mandarins, including Chang-wei and Yin (Ellis, 1817, p. 65). This visit 
represented Amherst’s first direct contact with the Chinese authorities. 
The mandarins were kept waiting in Captain Maxwell’s cabin where ‘they 
were regaled with wines’ and engaged in conversation with Morrison 
while  Amherst prepared himself for their reception (Jeffrey Amherst, 
n.d., n.p.). Amherst wore his Parliamentary robes while the other civilian 
members of his suite wore their Windsor uniforms. The mandarins were 
subsequently conducted by Morrison, who acted as the interpreter at 
the meeting, ‘through a passage formed by the other gentlemen of the 
BRITAIN’S SECOND EMBASSY TO CHINA
152
Ambassador’s suite’ to Amherst’s cabin where Amherst, Staunton and Ellis 
were waiting to receive them (Abel, 1818, p. 69). Amherst, according 
to Jeffrey, was seated on the sofa with Staunton on his left, the place of 
honour in China. Ellis sat on Amherst’s right while Jeffrey ‘stood behind 
the sofa ready to carry [his] father’s train’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). 
The mandarins made a very low bow on entering the cabin and seated 
themselves where they were served cherry brandy as the British had no 
means of serving tea in the Chinese fashion. The choice of beverage 
was ‘by no means to the[ir] dissatisfaction’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 67). Jeffrey, 
meanwhile, was a focus of attention. He wrote that Morrison had taught 
him ‘the Chinese for 14 which was my age … and … it turned out, [that] 
one of the mandarins asked me my age as soon as I was presented to him 
and was not a little amused at my answering him in his own language’ 
(Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.).
The British believed the purpose of the meeting was largely complimentary 
as its chief objective was to enquire about the number of people in the 
embassy and the nature of the presents (Ellis, 1817, p. 66). Such an 
enquiry in Chinese terms formed part of a body of fundamental protocols 
governing the reception of any prospective embassy at the Qing court. 
The  British were informed that the superintendent of salt duties at 
Tianjin, a mandarin appointed by special commission to the embassy, 
was  waiting to receive Amherst on shore. His name was Guanghui, 
referred to as ‘Kuang’ or the ‘legate’ by the British, who was destined 
to escort the embassy to Peking and back to Canton.10 Immediate 
arrangements were made for Morrison and Cooke to return to shore 
with the mandarins to meet with Guanghui to make arrangements for 
the disembarkation of the embassy. Two other pieces of information were 
relayed at the meeting. The first was the disturbing intelligence that the 
current governor-general of Bei Zhili had been removed and was due to 
be replaced by a man named Sulenge, called ‘Soo’ by the British, who 
had been the recent viceroy at Canton and whose disposition towards 
the British was particularly hostile. Ellis thought this change would be 
most unfortunate as the viceroy ‘will probably be disposed to connect the 
present embassy with the late discussions at Canton in which he was so 
10  Tuck (2000, p. xxviii) pointed out that Guanghui was referred to as ‘Kwang’ by Ellis, as ‘Quang 
Ta-zin’ by Staunton and as ‘Quong’ by Amherst. He was a Manchu and a bond servant of the imperial 
household.
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actively engaged’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 66).11 The second piece of intelligence 
was that the Jiaqing emperor was due to depart for his summer retreat at 
Jehol on 9 September, leaving little time for embassy business at Peking.
Evidence that the Chinese had studied ‘the minute circumstances relating 
to the former Embassy’ was shown when one of the mandarins asked if 
there was a portrait of the emperor on board. A print of the Qianlong 
emperor from the time of the Macartney Embassy was produced at which 
time the mandarins became very anxious and ‘displayed the greatest 
embarrassment’ (Davis, 1841, p. 32). Davis recalled that they rose from 
their seats and begged that it be put away or otherwise it would be 
necessary for them to ‘perform the prostration’ before it (1841, p. 32). 
The mandarins also spent time looking around the cabin where their gaze 
fell on some fine pieces of English bone china. They were astonished to 
learn that these were made in England and not at Canton; even greater 
disbelief was expressed by the mandarins when being told that finer 
specimens of china were available in England.
Ellis was disappointed with his first encounter with Chinese officials:
Their dresses were common; and certainly, their general appearance 
was neither respectable nor elegant: comparing them with persons 
of correspondent rank in Persia, Arabia, or Turkey, I should say 
they were inferior in outward respectability. The most remarkable 
part of their dress is the straw conical bonnet, with hair dyed red, 
hanging over it. Their complexions were dark and their features 
coarse. (1817, p. 66)
The mandarins, according to Jeffrey, were ‘pretty fresh’ by the time they 
departed the Alceste but were still capable of ‘measuring the length and 
breadth of the Alceste and in counting the number of guns she carried’ 
(Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.).
11  The British later discovered that ‘Soo’, or Sulenge, had not been a governor at Canton but 
rather the Hoppo who had received Macartney at Canton at the completion of his embassy. He was 
currently a most senior mandarin holding the position of president of the Board of Public Works.
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31 July 1816: Morrison and Cooke Visit 
the Mainland
Morrison and Cooke travelled to Dagu in a boat from the Discovery manned 
by Lascars under the command of Captain Crawford. Arriving at the port, 
described by Morrison (1820, p. 16) ‘as a poor village’, the accompanying 
mandarin displayed ‘the most civil behaviour’ in attempting to shelter 
the Englishmen from the heavy rain. After an uncomfortable journey in 
Chinese carts along wet and muddy roads, Morrison and Cooke reached 
the temple where Guanghui and the other mandarins delegated to escort 
the embassy, including Chang-wei and Yin who had earlier visited the 
Lyra, were waiting.
Guanghui, or the legate, described by Morrison (1820, p. 18) as a Tartar and 
‘a little man, about 58 years of age; pleasant and conversable … but artful 
and fraudulent’ opened proceedings.12 Morrison was asked ‘in a cheerful 
tone’ a number of questions customarily addressed in Qing diplomacy: 
How far had the embassy come? Had the embassy stopped at Macao? 
Had the embassy met the ships that he had sent and how many British 
ships and how many people were in the embassy’s entourage (Morrison, 
1820, p. 18)?13 On learning that the embassy had 75 members, Guanghui 
requested that the number be reduced to 50 by dispensing with the guard 
and the band, to which Morrison replied that an extra 25 people could be 
of little consequence to so great an empire, leaving the legate with little 
choice but to agree (Morrison, 1820, p. 18). The meeting closed with 
an announcement that Chang-wei and Yin would pay a call on Amherst 
the next day. Morrison thought the meeting was an ‘intended haughty 
reception’. He and Cooke retired and had dinner in the ‘Chinese manner’ 
(Morrison, 1820, p. 18).
The Englishmen climbed the stairs to the upper storey of the temple after 
dinner to admire the view where Morrison met a minor Chinese mandarin 
who was an excellent source of unofficial intelligence. He  learned on 
this occasion that the embassy would not be staying long at Peking and, 
12  Platt (2018, p. 168) referred to Guanghui as ‘Zhang’ and the ‘handler’ of the embassy. ‘Zhang’ 
is the only mandarin referred to by Platt, apart from the high ranking Heshitai, known as ‘the Duke’ 
who encountered the British for the first time at Tongzhou on 20 August 1816.
13  Morrison noted that no Chinese ships had been sent.
155
7 . UP THE COAST OF CHINA AND ARRIVAL AT TIANJIN
unlike the Macartney Embassy, would not be travelling to Jehol. Rather, 
it was the Qing court’s intention to receive and dismiss the embassy as 
quickly as possible.
Following a very uncomfortable night spent at the temple with only 
a bench to sleep on and no blankets or pillows, Morrison and Cooke 
travelled back to the river in ‘the wretched carts of the country’ before 
enduring a very rough sea passage back to the British ships (Morrison, 
1820, p. 19). Morrison was so fatigued from his trip ashore that he had 
to rest for the next couple of days. He later received an apology from the 
Chinese for their impolite hospitality towards him and Cooke.
4 August 1816: The Mandarins 
Visit Amherst
Final arrangements for the embassy’s disembarkation were delayed by 
the ‘blowy weather’ preventing the mandarins from travelling out to the 
Alceste (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Calm weather returned on 4 August 
and several large junks, bearing red flags announcing the presence of 
Chang-wei and Yin, finally approached the Alceste. Yin had brought his 
11-year-old son.14 British protocol was broken on this occasion with 
the seven-gun salute being fired as the mandarins approached the ship, 
rather than when they came on board, in order to not ‘needlessly shaken 
[their] tender nerves’ (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 9). The Alceste’s quarter deck 
was lined with two columns of British marines. The band played while 
the mandarins scrambled up its sides with great difficulty ‘owing to the 
load of state-robes with which they had encumbered themselves for 
the occasion’ (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 9). Captain Maxwell, resplendent in 
his full uniform, greeted the mandarins who showed much ‘involuntary 
surprise’ when inspecting the marines and witnessing the presentation of 
arms. The full military reception impressed Abel who drew a comparison 
between British splendour and the mandarins’ appearance:
They gave me no very exalted notions of Chinese magnificence 
… plainly dressed, and attended by a train of very shabby looking 
fellows … the appearance of the whole party was strikingly 
14  Yin was later described by Abel (1818, p. 144) as ‘an old soldier, with ruddy complexion and 
laughing eyes, [who] cared very little about the arts or sciences of his own or any other country. 
The only produce of Europe that seemed to interest his attention was port-wine or cherry-brandy’.
BRITAIN’S SECOND EMBASSY TO CHINA
156
contrasted with the very tasteful and imposing splendour which 
surrounded them on board the Alceste. Her clear and ample decks, 
her well arranged rigging, her formidable artillery, her men prompt 
and orderly, and her officers in full uniform, formed a picture of 
propriety and order, of magnificence and power. (1818, p. 70)
Staunton and Ellis conducted the mandarins to Amherst’s cabin and 
Amherst greeted them wearing his ceremonial robes. Guanghui had 
sent his apologies, explaining that his exalted rank freed him from the 
obligation of travelling ‘eight or ten miles on the open sea to pay a visit of 
ceremony’ (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 9).
The mandarins were seated in the place of honour on Amherst’s left 
following Chinese protocols, while Staunton and Ellis sat in a row of 
chairs situated on the right-hand side. Morrison overheard Chang-wei 
tell his servant that he would have far rather preferred to have been 
placed in line with the ambassador, indicating the problems implicit in 
protocols of seating arrangements that continued to be a major concern 
in future official meetings between the British and Chinese (Morrison, 
1820, p. 20). The diplomatic encounter soon turned into a farce due to 
interruptions by Chang-wei and Yin’s numerous attendants, who, curious 
to catch a glimpse of the ambassador, kept trying to enter the cabin where 
they were resisted by the British. British sensibilities at this time were also 
offended by the ‘disagreeable odours’ emitted by the Chinese, both of 
‘garlic and asafoetida’, as well as the ‘repulsive atmosphere’ that surrounded 
them resulting from ‘a want of cleanliness’ (Abel, 1818, p. 70).
Curiosity over dress was not confined to Chinese fishermen. 
The  mandarins’ appearance of long beards and ‘two enormous claws 
on the left hand’, described by Morrison as rendering ‘the limb useless to 
them’, was particularly disconcerting to the British (M’Leod, 1818/1820, 
p. 24). M’Leod (1818/1820) thought they ‘resembled bulky old women 
with their clumsy boots’ (p. 24). The mandarins, in Morrison’s (1820) 
opinion, were embarrassed by the ‘novelty of their situation’ because 
they had never seen Englishmen before (p. 20). He picked up also on the 
nuances of meaning in the discussions held among the Chinese as they 
worked out their answers. He wrote that ‘An old servant, in a loud tone, 
stood prompting and explaining for Yin’. Morrison checked him by saying 
‘he understood the master better than the servant’ (p. 20).
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Chang-wei asserted that his government’s lack of preparations was due 
to the premature arrival of the embassy in northern China. Nevertheless, 
Amherst was informed that a highly ranked minister of state was waiting 
at Tianjin to receive him, and confirmed Morrison’s earlier intelligence 
that the embassy’s imperial audience was scheduled for Peking rather than 
Jehol. After receiving a list of embassy personnel and presents, Chang-
wei asked the British about the objective of the embassy. Its purpose, 
the British affirmed, was to confirm and strengthen the friendship and 
alliance of the two courts. A formal letter with a detailed explanation 
of British goals was being prepared and would be presented to the 
minister at Tianjin along with a translation of the Prince Regent’s letter 
to the emperor. The next question concerned the proposed manner for 
the embassy’s return. Amherst replied that it was intended to follow 
Macartney’s precedent and travel overland to Canton. The mandarins, on 
learning this information, ‘made no reply’ (Amherst to Canning, 8 August 
1816, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 193).
Chang-wei and Yin next raised the unwelcome issue of the ceremony. 
Amherst wrote later in his official report:
Next came a question which altho’ prepared for its early discussion 
I hardly expected would have been put to me so soon. I was asked 
as to my knowledge of the Ceremony to be performed at the time 
of my presentation to the Emperor, and was expected to be ready 
for its performance. I said that I should be prepared to approach 
the Emperor in the most respectful manner possible, and being 
anxious to avoid entering at that time into further particulars an 
endeavour was made to turn the conversation to other subjects. 
(Amherst to Canning, 8 August 1816, in BL IOR G/12/196 
(Reel 1) F 193)
The mandarins were diplomatic. They told Amherst:
That England was an important Country, and that the attention 
which the emperor was about to shew us were not bestowed on 
embassadors from every nation. Lest however this compliment 
should be treated too high something was said as if the long and 
fatiguing voyage we had made was to be considered as our special 
title to His Imperial Majesty’s favour and attention. (Amherst to 
Canning, 8 August 1816, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 194)
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Staunton, ironically given his fame as the 12-year-old at the Qianlong 
court, failed to mention Yin’s son in his account of the embassy. The 
boy knelt before Amherst on one knee ‘with much grace and modesty’ 
suggesting that he had been instructed in the British custom of respect 
and had been told by his father to honour it (Ellis, 1817, p. 74). Jeffrey, in 
return, was presented to the two mandarins who ‘seemed highly pleased 
with him’ (Davis, 1841, p. 37). The two boys ‘made acquaintance with 
each other’ and Hall commented on the effect of children breaking down 
the ‘ice of ceremony’ among cautious and distrustful people (1840/1865, 
p. 9). Jeffrey’s presence served to delay the mandarins’ departure while they 
engaged in cheerful conversation with the British relieving them of ‘much 
needless formality’ (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 9). The mandarins promised a 
delivery of provisions and left the Alceste. Ellis complained once more of 
the oppressive stench emitting from the departing Chinese that reminded 
him of ‘the repose of petrifying garlic on a much used blanket’. He agreed 
with Barrow’s assessment that the Chinese were ‘a frowzy people’ (Ellis, 
1817, p. 74).
Hall, who had the ‘leisure to watch what was going on’, observed the 
return of the mandarins to their boats (1840/1865, p. 9). Yin, Hall wrote, 
had no sooner returned to his junk than he:
flung off his robes, his crape petticoat, his great unwieldy velvet 
boots with soles an inch thick, and his fantastical cap, and issuing 
forth with his pipe hanging out of one side of his mouth, and 
a pair of slippers on his feet, appeared on the deck of his vessel 
without one trace of grandee left. So anxious indeed was he to 
remove from our minds the idea of his being naturally the grave 
and austere personage we had seen before, that he immediately 
set about monkey tricks, as they are called at sea, and diverted 
himself with throwing peaches to the young midshipmen, who, in 
a correspondent taste, had climbed into the rigging, and were not 
slow to better this instruction. (p. 9)
A procession of eight large junks with red swallow-tailed flags and one 
bearing the ensign of the imperial dragon approached the British ships soon 
afterwards bearing a present from the emperor that included 10 bullocks, 
20 sheep, 20 hogs, 100 ducks and fowls, a great store of vegetables and 
many boxes of tea (p. 9). The Chinese carriers who came on board with 
the produce were warmly received by the British sailors who:
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paid them the most obsequious attention, escorting them around 
the decks like ladies, smoothing down their long tails, joking and 
talking with them … not caring whether John Chinaman … 
understood them or not. (p. 9)
The Chinese visitors were invited to sit down in the midshipmen quarters 
but when they attempted to rise from their seats they ‘found themselves 
like Gulliver, for their wicked entertainers had tied each by his long tail 
to the back of his chair’ (p. 9). Initially angry at such abuse, the Chinese 
soon saw the humour of the occasion and all parties ‘joined in the laugh’ 
(p. 9). The British trick, according to Hall, hereafter became well known 
among the Chinese who, on subsequent visits to British ships, took the 
precaution of ‘coiling their tufts around their heads, out of the reach 
of practical jokes’ (p. 10).
Some of the bullocks sent by the emperor had drowned on the outward 
passage. The British waited until the Chinese had departed before 
throwing  the carcasses overboard and were astonished when people 
on passing junks scooped them up and proceeded to prepare them for 
cooking. M’Leod thought the practice disgusting and although he had yet 
to set foot in China had already judged that the Chinese ‘eat in a putrid 
state, dogs, cats, rats, and in fact, all manner of carrion and vermin’ 
(1818/1820, p. 27). He added that the British much preferred to live 
‘on our own salt beef ’ (p. 27).
The junks that brought the mandarins, as well as those that had brought 
the  supplies, remained moored beside the British ships. The larger 
junks, the British learned, were scheduled to offload their luggage and the 
emperor’s presents the following day. The Chinese carriers were astonished 
at the amount of luggage and furniture required by the British on their 
mission, leading Davis (1841) to comment on their ‘self-denying and 
frugal habits’ compared with their British counterparts:
A mat to spread out as a bed, and a hard, hollow pillow of woven 
rattans, together with the smallest possible box for garments, is all 
that they generally want for themselves. (p. 39)
Amherst invited the mandarins to dine on board the Alceste but this was 
declined due to Chang-wei’s dread of ‘passing from one vessel to another’ 
in the choppy seas (Morrison, 1820, p. 21). Chang-wei’s language, 
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according to Morrison, was more civil than Yin’s coarse and boisterous 
military manner (Ellis, 1817, p. 75). The mandarins sailed for shore 
that evening.
Hall was invited to breakfast on board a junk anchored close to the Lyra 
the following morning. Initially deterred by stories of Chinese eating 
‘bow-wow pies’ and ‘ragouts of cats’, he bravely ‘put on a good face’ and 
accepted the invitation. He was very pleasantly surprised to find the deck 
spread with a grass mat on which was placed five or six bowls of finely 
boiled rice ‘as white as snow’ accompanied by a ‘variety of savoury hashes 
and stews’ (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 10). In the middle of the dishes was 
a  large smoking platter containing ‘what looked very like an omelette’. 
Shamsu wine was served in diminutive teacups and Hall thoroughly 
enjoyed himself, recording,
I had intended merely to go through the ceremony of tasting 
a morsel of rice to please these kind people, but ended by making a 
hearty meal, to the unspeakable delight of the Chinese boatmen. 
(1840/1865, p. 10)
Davis and Lieutenant Cooke went ashore a couple of days later to 
supervise the boats transporting the embassy and the presents to Tianjin. 
They were met by a civil mandarin wearing a light blue button and 
greeted with a three-gun salute fired by a company of Chinese soldiers. 
Vast crowds hoping to catch a glimpse of the English had gathered on 
the riverbank. Refreshments of tea and sweetmeats were served. Twenty-
two boats were ready for the transportation of the embassy to Peking, 
including  the baggage and presents for the emperor. A ‘dinner-boat’, 
suitable for the embassy suite to dine together, was promised at Tianjin 
(Davis, 1841, pp. 41–42).
Davis was not surprised to notice that the flags on the boats bore the 
Chinese characters for ‘Koong-she’ (gong shi) or ‘Tribute Emissaries’ 
but, being unauthorised to speak on the subject, made no comment 
(Ellis,  1817,  p. 75). The emperor, he was informed, wished to meet 
Amherst without delay and Minister Sulenge was waiting at Tianjin to 
receive the embassy (Ellis, 1817, p. 75). Davis and Cooke were presented 
with gifts of apples, pears and peaches and returned to their ships in 
a journey that took five hours (Davis, 1841, p. 43).
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The unloading of the presents and the embassy’s baggage onto the junks 
took a couple of days. The cheerful attitude of the Chinese workers and the 
orderly manner in which they carried out their task impressed the British 
and Ellis wrote that ‘the lower orders, though curious, are by no means 
intrusive or impertinent’ (1817, p. 77). Chinese insolence shown towards 
Europeans was obviously confined to the Cantonese: ‘here, the men in the 
boats, and others of the same class, appear aware of the conduct required 
to persons of superior station’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 77). Pressure was placed on 
the embassy to speed up its arrangements for leaving the ships due to the 
emperor’s wish to meet them as soon as possible before leaving for Jehol. 
Amherst was informed that the emperor was especially looking forward 
to meeting Jeffrey and was planning a play and other amusements for 
him at Peking. He also enquired if Jeffrey ‘had read any Chinese books’, 
indicating that Staunton’s impact at the Qianlong court had not been 
forgotten (Amherst to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, sent from 
the ‘Gulf of Pe-Che-le’, 8 August 1816, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) 
F 196).
Discussion on the ‘Kowtow Question’
Their imminent departure from the British ships provided the last 
opportunity for Amherst and his commissioners to discuss strategies in 
a free and unrestrained environment. Hints dropped by Chang-wei and 
Yin convinced Staunton that the Chinese expectation of the English 
performing the kowtow had changed from a probability into a certainty:
A great deal of anxious conversation [took] place between Lord 
Amherst, Mr. Ellis, and myself on the subject to the mission … in 
all its bearings, and to contemplate all the possible contingencies 
by which its success may be either retarded or promoted … so as 
to provide against being taken by surprise or off our guard; at least 
with respect to all the probable points of discussion—Among these, 
from the first, there was none which appeared more important, 
or more likely to be brought into early and serious discussion, 
than the question of compliance with the Chinese ceremony of 
prostration. (Staunton, 1824, p. 29)
Amherst’s ambiguous instructions regarding the kowtow were noted 
where Barrow and Castlereagh instructed him to follow Macartney’s 
precedent of bowing on one knee as ordered by the Prince Regent, while 
Buckinghamshire said he was free to perform the kowtow if expedient 
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to do so for the attainment of his mission’s objectives (Staunton, 1824, 
p. 30). As acknowledged earlier, Castlereagh’s orders muddied the waters 
even further by stating that Amherst conform to the ceremonies of the 
Qing court ‘which may not commit the honour of your Sovereign or lessen 
your own dignity’ (Castlereagh to Amherst including two enclosures: 
Instructions, No. 1, 1 January 1816, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/43 (a)).
Staunton’s presence in the embassy brought a new perspective to the 
issue as his local experience and deep reflection on the subject claimed 
authority over the views of the other embassy members. Following 
Amherst’s request for his opinion, Staunton delivered a letter on 8 August 
with his view on complying with the Chinese ceremony of prostration. 
His prime concern was:
The effect it may have on the British character and interests at 
Canton, I beg to state that I feel strongly impressed with the idea 
that a compliance … will be unadvisable, even though the refusal 
should be attended with the hazard of the total rejection of the 
embassy. I am fully sensible of the importance of the objects of 
the present mission; but I cannot bring myself to believe that 
their attainment would in the smallest degree be promoted by the 
compliance in question: and the mere reception (it could hardly 
be termed honourable reception) of the Embassy, would I think be 
too dearly purchased by such a sacrifice.
Staunton (1824) added:
There are some expedients by which the chief objections against 
the ceremony would be removed, but I am persuaded that the 
Chinese government is more likely to waive the ceremony, than to 
accede to any arrangement of that nature, that could be accepted 
as satisfactory. (p. 24)
Staunton’s continuing belief that British exceptionalism would result 
in a possible dispensation from the strict protocols of Qing tributary 
ceremonial is evident in his statement. He argued strongly, however, that:
To recede at present from the precedent of Lord Macartney’s 
Embassy, by a compliance unaccompanied by any condition 
similar to that for which Lord Macartney had stipulated, would 
be a sacrifice of national credit and character; and as such would 
operate injuriously to the trade and interests of the East-India 
Company at Canton; that such compliance (judging from my 
general knowledge and experience of the Chinese character, and 
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more especially from the result of the Dutch Embassy in 1795) 
would not be likely to promote the attainment of any one of the 
objects we have in view, or in any way to benefit our national and 
commercial interests. (1824, p. 32)
Ellis, who thought it expedient for Amherst to perform the kowtow if this 
gained access to the emperor, followed up with his views on the issue in 
a letter dated 11 August. He thought the performance of the ceremony 
rested on ‘matters of expediency’ and that it was important to arrive at 
a consensus in order ‘to clear the question of all personal feelings, which 
might lead us into a course of proceeding not quite in unison with the 
sentiments of the authorities at home’ (1817, pp. 84–85). He concluded:
I have, however, such perfect reliance on Sir George Staunton’s 
judgment and local experience, that I shall not hesitate in giving 
way on every point connected with Chinese usages and feelings, 
where my individual opinion might lead to a different conclusion. 
(pp. 84–85)
Staunton’s and the Company’s view, on the other hand, recognised 
that notions of British sovereignty were at stake. Metcalfe, the acting 
president of the Select Committee at Canton in Staunton’s absence, 
succinctly summed up the Company’s position: kowtowing before the 
Chinese emperor functioned as an acknowledgement of his rank as the 
‘Sovereign of the Universe’, implicitly degrading the British sovereign 
and British envoys to the rank of tributary vassals (Metcalfe as quoted 
in Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 263). Performing the kowtow would 
result in demoting British status, thereby allowing the Hong merchants at 
Canton the upper hand in acting roughshod over Company merchants. 
Discussion on the kowtow continued with Amherst deciding eventually:
That we should take the subject of compliance with ceremony into 
our consideration, unshackled by any reference to the instructions 
in question; and view it as a mere question of expediency, with 
regard to its influence more especially on the commercial interests 
of the East-India Company at Canton. (Staunton, 1824, p. 31)
The kowtow question remained open. Amherst, it was agreed, was free to 
perform the kowtow if the success of the mission was thought to depend 
on it (Staunton, 1824, p. 30). Relationships among Amherst and the 
commissioners were exceedingly close. Staunton wrote to his mother 
from the Alceste on 7 August 1816 that all the ‘preliminary arrangements’ 
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of  the embassy had been settled in ‘a manner quite agreeable to my 
wishes’. Showing no signs of jealousy or resentment that Amherst had 
been appointed ambassador over him, Staunton continued:
I have found Lord Amherst everything I could possibly wish—
He has not only been exceedingly kind and attentive to me 
personally, but appears disposed to pay every consideration to 
the suggestions and representations that I have occasion to make 
him. His Lordship’s conduct and manner throughout is extremely 
conciliating … yet without any sacrifice of dignity—and I therefore 
really think that our Government has been very fortunate in its 
selection. (Staunton Letters, HMS Alceste, on anchor in the Gulf of 
Pechelee, 7 August 1816)
Staunton also praised Ellis:
Mr Ellis is also [a] very pleasant, and intelligent young man, and 
I  have little doubt of our continuing to act together with the 
greatest cordiality. The rest of the Gentlemen are likewise pleasant 
and respectable men, and form, with those who have accompanied 
me from Canton, a society of 20 persons—the whole party—
Servants, Soldiers and Musicians being 75. (Staunton Letters, 
HMS Alceste, on anchor in the Gulf of Pechelee, 7 August 1816)
Amherst, meanwhile, was uneasy about his forthcoming reception at 
Tianjin. Sulenge’s exceptionally high rank raised concerns about the 
future of the embassy. Amherst wrote:
I am a little apprehensive that [Sulenge’s appointment] … is not 
to be considered altogether as a compliment, but rather as a design 
to introduce matters of ceremony or others such as was done in 
the case of the Russian Embassy in 1805 before our arrival at the 
Capital and possible to prevent our ever reaching the Capital 
at all. (Amherst: First Dispatch, to the Chairman and Deputy 
Chairman, sent from the ‘Gulf of Pe-Che-le’, 8 August 1816, 
in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 197)
Ellis also sensed that the presence of a high-ranking minister at Tianjin 
suggested ‘that some propositions of importance, more especially touching 
the ceremony, were to be made there’. Fearful that the agenda at Tianjin 
left little time for negotiations, he predicted, ‘The tempest is gathering, 
and it is difficult to say whether we should carry through it, or strike our 
masts and make everything snug’ (1817, p. 73).
165
7 . UP THE COAST OF CHINA AND ARRIVAL AT TIANJIN
Regardless of the diplomatic outcome of the embassy, the British were 
determined to travel back to Canton on the overland route followed by 
Macartney. Accordingly, plans had been made at the Admiralty in London 
to circumvent any Chinese attempt to force the embassy to return by sea 
by arranging for the early departure of the British ships. The Alceste and 
Discovery were to head north to explore the Manchurian and Korean coasts, 
while the Lyra and Investigator were to head south towards the Yellow Sea. 
It was then proposed that the ships would rendezvous at a point along the 
coastline of Shandong Province where they would separate. The ships of 
the Royal Navy, namely, the Alceste and Lyra, would head east towards the 
Ryukyu Islands, while the Indiamen sailed south to Macao, in the wake of 
the General Hewitt, which was tasked with sailing directly to Whampoa to 
collect tea (Tuck, 2000, p. xli, fn. 70).15
The members of the embassy enjoyed a fine dinner on board the Alceste 
and disembarked onto the boats carrying them to the port of Dagu on 
the morning of 9 August 1816 where they were ‘to commit themselves, 
for a period of about six months, to Chinese hospitality’ (Davis, 1841, 
p. 43). Amherst had made it his duty to ‘make the situation of everybody 
in the Embassy as comfortable as possible’ and reminded all who were 
travelling with him that the good conduct of the last embassy had ‘excited 
the admiration’ of the Chinese (Journal of Sir William Fanshawe Martin, 
1817, p. 23, in BL ADD MSS 41346-41475).
The embassy ships had been fully stocked with supplies arranged between 
the quartermaster of the Alceste, Mr Hickman, and the Chinese authorities. 
Maxwell told Amherst that Hickman had negotiated with a  ‘very civil 
mandarin’. He added:
How they came to understand what they said, I do not exactly 
know, but Hickman seems positive beef, mutton, greens and 
fruit were amongst the … good things intended to be sent us 
by His  Imperial Majesty. (Maxwell to Amherst, the Yellow Sea, 
Saturday, noon, 10 August 1816, in BL MSS EUR F 140/38 (a))
Maxwell requested, with a wink and a nudge, that Morrison give 
a mandarin ‘a hint’ that the sooner ‘the supplies came the better’:
15  Captain Murray Maxwell’s obituary in 1831 noted the contribution made to British hydrography 
by these voyages. For example, the ‘mainland of Corea was found more than a hundred miles to the 
eastward of the spot on [former] charts’ (Gentleman’s Magazine, September 1831, vol. 101, pt. 2, 
p. 273).
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As we are very anxious to move away from this very dangerous 
anchorage, (where betwixt your Lordship and myself, I would 
venture to ride, at any time a whole summer without the smallest 
apprehension) all the ships are getting very short of water. We shall 
therefore be on our way out of the Yellow Sea endeavouring to 
procure some … The Pekin government may despair of catching 
us at Chusan [Zhoushan] above a very few days, but should your 
Lordship have any commands for me, a letter directed there might 
reach me. (Maxwell to Amherst, the Yellow Sea, Saturday, noon, 
10 August 1816, in BL MSS EUR F 140/38 (a))
The embassy ships, soon after disembarking Amherst and his suite, 
‘slipped anchor, evaded the maritime authorities and made for the open 
sea’ (Tuck, 2000, p. xxviii).16
9 August 1816: The Embassy Lands 
in China and Early Negotiations on 
the Kowtow
Seventy-five Englishmen left the British ships on the morning of 9 August 
1816, bound for Dagu.17 Twenty gentlemen made up the ambassadorial 
suite while the remainder of the party comprised 17 servants, 12 musicians, 
23 marines and three mechanics (Staunton, 1824, pp. 36–37). The group 
was joined on its first night ashore in China by some men from the ships, 
including captains Maxwell, Hall and Campbell, who accompanied it to 
Dagu before returning to their ships the next day to prepare for weighing 
anchor and setting off on their respective missions on 11 August 1816.
Amherst’s departure for the Chinese mainland was marked with an 
elaborate display of British pomp and ceremony. The British ships fired 
a 19-gun salute while cheering crews lined the decks. Amherst and the 
two commissioners were seated in the Alceste’s barge bearing the English 
standard at the fore and the Company’s ensign at the mizzen. They led a 
procession of two lines of boats carrying the rest of the embassy personnel, 
the marine guard and the band playing martial songs. Davis noted later, 
‘The Embassy never again made so respectable an appearance until the 
16  The ships left on 11 August 1816 and rendezvoused on 29 August 1816 in the waters off the 
southern coast of Shandong Province.
17  This number was 20 less than Macartney’s entourage which included five German musicians and 
53 military personnel.
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same boats met it on its return, in the river near Canton, and conducted 
it to the British Factory’ (1841, p. 44). Nearing Dagu, the embassy suite 
transferred to Chinese junks for the final stage of their journey to the 
Chinese mainland.
Four to five hundred Chinese troops with their colours flying and music 
playing were lined up at the entrance of the river to Dagu where a three-
gun salute from a Chinese shore battery greeted the arrival of the British 
(Staunton, 1824, p. 33). The Chinese soldiers, in Ellis’s view, appeared 
‘respectable’ from a distance but Jeffrey noticed they were armed only with 
bows and arrows. Closer inspection, he reported, revealed they were not of:
A warlike appearance; first of all from their dress, and secondly 
from the slovenly way in which they stand; some with their toes 
turned in, others from their hands in their pockets and so on. 
(Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.)
Abel was dismissive also of their ‘gaudy appearance’ and observed that 
the troops were constantly moved up to the next point of the river once the 
embassy had passed (1818, p. 74).
Amherst was met at Dagu by a great number of mandarins who directed 
the British onto the Chinese barges carrying them to Tianjin. Flags 
bearing characters denoting ‘Tribute Bearers’ flew from the mastheads but 
the British decided not to comment (Abel, 1818, p. 73). Guanghui, the 
legate in charge of the embassy, visited Amherst and announced his regret 
that ‘an ignorance of each other’s language, prevented a more intimate 
and familiar conversation’ and was disappointed on discovering that 
Jeffrey could not speak Chinese (Staunton, 1824, p. 34). ‘The emperor’, 
Jeffrey wrote, ‘fully expected I could, because Sir George Staunton when 
he accompanied the last Embassy was about my age and could speak the 
language’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Guanghui was affable and well-
mannered and stressed that his early visit was purely complimentary, but 
hinted that an imperial banquet was scheduled at Tianjin.
Amherst repaid the visit that evening where he met the high-ranking 
mandarin, Sulenge, for the first time. No formal discussion took place 
and Sulenge departed for Tianjin soon after. Jeffrey wrote:
Su entered his palanquin carried by four bearers and accompanied 
by an escort of horse archers, and set off on the eighty mile 
journey to Tien sing in order to receive the Embassy there. (Jeffrey 
Amherst, n.d., n.p.)
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The boats assigned for the embassy were a mixture of large, roomy vessels 
for Amherst and the commissioners, while the others were small and 
indifferent (Staunton, 1824, p. 35). Morrison (1820) described them:
They were divided into rooms: first was a kind of anti-chamber 
for servants; next a room in which to receive visitors; and farther 
back a bed-room. Some had four apartments, beside a place at the 
stern occupied by the boatmen, and used as a cooking-room. The 
Embassador’s and Commissioner’s boats were large and handsome, 
with streamers in the Chinese manner. Most of the others were too 
small for two persons, which was the general arrangement. (p. 25)
The first evening in China presented an immediate challenge to British 
culinary sensibilities on the presentation of a gift of cooked dishes for the 
evening meal chosen by Guanghui. Notable for the absence of cats and 
dogs, these nevertheless included trays of stewed shark fins, stag sinews, 
bird’s nests and sea slugs (Abel, 1818, p. 74). Abel (1818) wrote, ‘as it 
was the first time of partaking of Chinese fare, curiosity induced us to 
taste the made dishes, but their flavour did not tempt us to do more’ 
(p. 74). Other unappetising offerings consisted of ‘varnished’ sheep, pigs 
and fowls (p. 74).
Regardless of the novelty of the food, the dining experience was 
unsatisfactory and chaotic for other reasons. The crates with Amherst’s 
cutlery, crockery and table linen had been sent on to Tianjin. Jeffrey 
wrote, ‘Many of our party were obliged to eat with the Chinese chopsticks 
[and] made pretty work of it’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). There were no 
chairs or dining tables and Chinese tables had to be pushed together and 
stools were used as chairs. Beds and bedding had also been sent to Tianjin 
along with many boxes holding personal belongings. Servants rummaged 
through boxes and bags searching for their master’s possessions, which 
left things in a considerable mess. The British spent their first night in 
China sleeping on bare boards in cold conditions with no blankets or 
pillows and plagued by hordes of mosquitoes. An added blow to British 
comfort was being prohibited by Chinese soldiers from taking a walk 
after dinner. Abel commented, ‘We had little cause to look forward with 
much pleasurable anticipation to the liberty which we were likely to enjoy 
during our passage through China’ (1818, p. 75).
First impressions of the Chinese countryside were disappointing, 
especially when compared with the picturesque scenery of Rio de Janeiro. 
Abel thought Dagu was ‘destitute of interest’ with flat, barren shores and 
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mud houses. Crowds of silent people lined the riverbank and thousands of 
junks covered the waterway, impeding the progress of the embassy (Hall, 
1840/1865, p. 10). Ellis, on the other hand, noted improvements as the 
embassy barges approached Tianjin. Not only did the countryside appear 
well cultivated, but also some ‘small inclosures in places remind[ed] us of 
England’ (1817, p. 82). Ellis’s tone even implied some warmth towards 
Chinese children noted in his observation that ‘Chinese children must 
have a peculiar satisfaction in being dirty, as we observe them every where 
either sliding down the bank, or rolling themselves in mud’ (p.  83). 
On  the whole, Ellis’s assessment of the Chinese at this early stage was 
positive and he wrote that ‘My good opinion of the ordinary habits of the 
Chinese increases: they are orderly and good humoured to each other, and 
to strangers; not a single dispute has yet occurred’ (p. 83). His perceptions 
had been softened by an earlier acquaintance with India and he was not 
as shocked as his compatriots with the appearance of the boat trackers 
described by Abel (1818) as ‘miserable objects of wretched and naked 
men, tracking our boats and toiling often through a deep mire under 
a burning sun’ (p. 76). Morrison (1820) painted an even bleaker picture 
of the boats propelled by human effort where groups of 20 or 30 ‘poor 
miserable-looking men’ passed cords across their shoulders and walking 
forward in a leaning posture pulled the cords tied to the masthead of 
the vessel (p. 25). Jeffrey referred to seeing a body floating in the river 
that drew no reaction from the Chinese and thought it was the custom 
for poor Chinese to dispose of their dead in this fashion, accounting for 
‘the many dead bodies which we passed in our progress through China’ 
(Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.).
12 August 1816: Arrival at Tianjin
The barges came to a halt at Tianjin at half past four in the afternoon 
of 12 August 1816, three days after leaving Dagu. Midshipman Martin 
wrote of British annoyance at the ‘number of pleasure boats which flocked 
round our junks with parties in them who amused themselves by passing 
their remarks on us and criticizing our dress’ (as quoted in Morrison, 1820, 
p. 29). A party of mandarins dressed in their ceremonial robes was waiting 
to greet the embassy, catching Amherst unprepared and in his dressing 
gown. Embarrassed, Amherst hastily retired to dress, leaving Morrison to 
explain British etiquette where the reception of visitors occurred sometime 
after a first arrival at a destination. Toone, Davis and Morrison were sent 
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to meet Guanghui and Sulenge. Sulenge was described as a stooped old 
man of 70 who wore a red button. His complexion was marked with ‘the 
small pox’ and he was in the habit of deferring to Guanghui (Morrison, 
1820, p. 27).
The British were received with a pleasing formality and were honoured 
with chairs situated to the left of Sulenge. The emperor, Guanghui 
informed them, regarded the British highly and favoured those who had 
travelled from such a great distance to pay their respects to him but, he 
supposed, they must be in a great hurry to return to England (Morrison, 
1820, p. 27). Morrison replied that an extra month or so was of no matter 
considering the distance the embassy had come and that Amherst would 
be insulted if he was forced to leave Peking before the customary 40 days 
allotted traditionally to foreign embassies. Guanghui next raised the 
subject of the king’s letter to the emperor and pointed out that Macartney 
had already delivered his letter by this time during his embassy. Morrison 
corrected him. Macartney’s journal stated clearly that the king’s letter 
was delivered into the hands of the ministers at Jehol some weeks after 
the embassy had first arrived in northern China. Declining to comment, 
Guanghui’s final questions concerned the rank of Jeffrey Amherst, as well 
as that of other members of the ambassadorial suite. These questions 
were later interpreted by the British as an attempt to confirm Staunton’s 
presence and status within the embassy.
Morrison, Toone and Davis returned to the boats to inform Amherst 
that Sulenge and Guanghui were about to make a call. The legates were 
received by the British with ‘great ceremony’. Amherst was informed of 
the emperor’s intention to receive him and his embassy with even greater 
honours than those offered to Macartney at the Qianlong court. Focus 
at the meeting fell again on the presentation of the Prince Regent’s letter 
to the emperor. The legates, Amherst was informed, were authorised to 
receive the letter at Tianjin rather than waiting to hand it to the ministers, 
as Macartney had done, at Jehol. Amherst, who had always planned to 
use the occasion of handing the letter personally to the first minister at 
Peking as the opportunity to raise the subject of the embassy’s objectives, 
specifically those concerning trade, said he intended to wait until he met 
the minister. This, Sulenge informed him, was impossible. All business 
was to be conducted through him and Guanghui and there would be 
no dealings between the embassy and government ministers (Morrison, 
1820, p. 27). Amherst, on being informed of this, agreed to deliver a copy 
of the Prince Regent’s letter to them on the following day. Sulenge then 
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enquired after the identity of a young boy called Thomas Staunton that 
he remembered at the time of the Macartney mission and enquired if 
Staunton was he. Morrison, who was interpreting, hesitated to answer 
at which point Staunton came forward ‘to introduce himself ’ (Staunton, 
1824, p. 43). Staunton explained that he had been reluctant to speak 
until this time as his facility in the Chinese language had suffered due to 
long stays in England. Guanghui proceeded to compliment Staunton and 
told him that he had heard a great deal about him from his good friend, 
Sungyun, the late viceroy of Canton (Staunton, 1824, p. 43). Sulenge, 
Davis (1841) wrote, ‘feigned surprise’ at discovering Staunton’s identity 
‘though there was every reason to suppose that the accounts from Canton 
must have long since put him in possession of this piece of information’ 
(p. 64). Revealing his identity, however, was a great relief for Staunton, 
as every interview with the Chinese had been ‘awkward and equivocal’ 
(Staunton, 1824, p. 44). ‘Whether or not’, Staunton wrote, this was 
a preconceived plan of the legates to ‘ascertain whether I meant to avow 
or conceal my identity with the youth in question, it is difficult to say’ 
(1824, p. 44).
Staunton, meanwhile, had picked up some of the nuances in the legates’ 
conversation regarding their invitation to the whole embassy to attend 
a banquet feast arranged for the next morning. He informed Amherst that 
the words ‘tse-yen’ (ciyan) or a ‘repast conferred’ meant that the banquet 
was more than an ordinary event. Indeed, Staunton added ominously, it 
forced British attention on ‘the description of the imperial breakfast’ that 
had proved so fatal to the Russian embassy in early 1806, after which 
Golovkin and his embassy were expelled immediately from China for 
refusing to kowtow (Staunton, 1824, p. 44). On the legates’ departure, 
Amherst and the commissioners once more discussed the strategy to be 
pursued at the imperial banquet the next day. While the kowtow before 
the emperor remained an open question, unanimous agreement was 
reached that performing the ceremony before an imaginary presence of 
the emperor represented by a yellow curtain was totally inadmissible 




The Imperial Banquet 
of 13 August 1816 and 
Progress to Tongzhou
Amherst’s arrival at Tianjin marked the start of official negotiations with 
the Chinese Government on the occasion of an imperial banquet that 
Macartney had managed to avoid at the time of his embassy.1 Historians 
have ignored the critical role and significance of the banquet that served 
as a site of generic diplomatic conflict and a carefully planned diplomatic 
ambush for the British from which the embassy never fully regained its 
forward momentum.2 Chinese tactics at the time confirmed British views 
that they were dealing with a devious and inflexible ‘Tartar court’ that 
was determined to ensure that access to the emperor conformed to the 
protocols of the tribute system. These assessments were reinforced for the 
British as the embassy proceeded to Tongzhou, situated 12 miles from the 
emperor’s Summer Palace of Yuanmingyuan.
1  Macartney was invited to a banquet at Dagu on 5 August but pleaded illness. He wrote, 
‘The Mandarins, Wang and Chou … now came to visit us, and pressed us much to accept their invitation 
to a banquet … which had been prepared for us, but being a good deal fatigued I declined it’ (Cranmer-
Byng, 1962, p. 73). Serious discussion of the ceremony to be performed before the Qianlong emperor 
did not take place until 8 September at Jehol (pp. 118–119). In contrast, Amherst was confronted about 
the kowtow within three days of arriving in China. Barrow commented later in the Quarterly Review 
that ‘Lord Macartney … was more fortunate than Lord Amherst in escaping the yellow screen and the 
five clawed dragon of Tien-sing, where all the misfortunes of the latter originated’ (1817, p. 479).
2  For example, Eastberg (2009) made no specific reference to the banquet while Gao, in his 
article ‘Inner kowtow controversy’ (2016), devoted only a paragraph to it but correctly concluded 
that Amherst ‘paid some reverential bows without indicating he would perform kowtow before the 
emperor himself ’ (p. 601).
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Figure 6: Amherst’s official visiting card (front and back views) with an 
explanation of the Chinese rendering of his name.
Source: British Library .
13 August 1816: The Imperial Banquet
The imperial banquet hosted by the legates Guanghui and Sulenge at Tianjin 
on 13 August 1816, held only three days after the embassy disembarked at 
Dagu, represented the first of only two formal receptions granted to the 
Amherst Embassy in China and was the only one held in northern China.3 
Amherst and Staunton recognised that it was no ordinary civil reception; 
rather, it was a test on their readiness to comply with the kowtow ceremony 
(Staunton, 1824, p. 44; Amherst to Canning, 12 February 1817, in BL 
IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 218). The day was also very hot, with Hayne 
(n.d., vol. 2, p. 20) recording an afternoon temperature of 93ºF (33.8ºC). 
For the British, the occasion presented an opportunity to make a suitable 
display befitting the embassy’s first public appearance in China. Leading the 
parade on horseback were lieutenants Cooke and Somerset, in full uniform 
and bearing the Colours of England. The marine guard marching two by 
two followed, accompanied by the band. Amherst, the commissioners 
3  The second reception was at Canton on 7 January 1817 after Amherst’s return from Peking.
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and Jeffrey were borne by Chinese palanquins. Amherst wore his ‘peeral’ 
robes over his Windsor uniform; Staunton was in the gown and cap of 
the Fellow Commoner of Cambridge; and Ellis wore his Windsor uniform 
without a sword. The rest of the suite were resplendent in the blue and 
scarlet embroidered uniform of the embassy, with gold lace coats, round 
hats, pantaloons and boots (Hayne, n.d., vol. 2, p. 20). Chinese soldiers 
cleared a path through the immense though silent crowd that had gathered 
as the procession made its way through the narrow streets of Tianjin.
The reception took place in a makeshift building of bamboo and plaited 
matting purposely built for the banquet. This venue represented a stark 
contrast to the grand stone buildings of Europe normally associated with 
diplomatic receptions. A hushed crowd at the entrance watched as the 
British alighted and entered an outer court lined with Chinese bowmen. 
Several mandarins dressed in their ceremonial robes stepped forward to 
meet the British and conducted them to a large hall.4 Staunton’s earlier 
suspicions were confirmed. Amherst wrote:
The first thing that caught my eye on entering the room was 
a  table covered with yellow silk evidently intended as a symbol 
of the Imperial Presence. Having read in a journal of the Russian 
Embassy in 1805 that the Russian ambassador soon after passing 
the frontier had been invited to a banquet, and then had been 
required to perform the Ko-tow … I concluded it was intended to 
put me to the same test, and having made up my mind, whatever 
ceremony I might afterwards submit to in the presence of the 
Emperor himself, to refuse prostration to any mere representation 
of the Imperial Person, I anticipated a similar fate to that of the 
Russian Embassy and was prepared to find, at Tien-sing, a final 
termination to our progress. (Amherst to Canning, 12 February 
1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 219)
Amherst, Staunton, Ellis, Morrison and Jeffrey were conducted into an 
inner apartment where the two legates Sulenge and Guanghui and four 
other mandarins were waiting. The Chinese sat on the left side of the 
room and gave the British seats on the less honourable right-hand side. 
The British, Guanghui emphasised, were being honoured by an imperial 
banquet expressly commanded and given by the emperor and it was to be 
assumed that the emperor himself was present. Accordingly, the kowtow 
was to be performed in return for the emperor’s benevolence.
4  State banquets and the food served were managed by the Court of Banqueting, an agency of the 
Board of Rites (see Rawski, 1998, p. 43).
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Amherst replied that his orders came directly from the King of England 
and he was unable to comply with the Chinese request to kowtow. Rather, 
he intended to show the same respect to the emperor as he would to his 
own sovereign and would follow Macartney’s precedent as commanded 
by the king. In the presence of the emperor he would kneel on one knee, 
bow his head and kiss the emperor’s hand as a mark of affection.5 But 
on the present occasion, where the physical presence of the emperor was 
absent, he would perform the same ceremony paid by the Lords before the 
vacant throne of the British sovereign in the House of Lords, a low bow. 
As a conciliatory gesture to the mandarins, Amherst agreed to bow nine 
times in unison with the number of ‘kneelings’ performed by them 
(Morrison, 1820, p. 29).
Kissing the emperor’s hand, the mandarins replied, was unacceptable 
and asserted, with what Jeffrey described as the ‘the most obstinate 
perverseness’, that Macartney had kowtowed, not only in the presence of 
the emperor but at other times as well, whenever the occasion demanded 
(Staunton, 1824, p. 46; Ellis, 1817, p. 92). Sulenge recalled that he 
remembered Macartney performing the kowtow at Canton and appealed 
to Staunton, who had been present on that occasion, to vouch that this 
was the case (Staunton, 1824, p. 47). Staunton was evasive. The embassy 
was so long ago, and he had been so young, that he could not remember 
which ceremony had been performed, but he was certain that it was not 
the kowtow (Staunton, 1824, p. 47).6 He reaffirmed Amherst’s position 
5  The tradition of a ceremonial kissing of the hand in European diplomacy was an act of submission 
performed by the great lords of the realm (see Ruiz, 1985, p. 125).
6  Historical controversy surrounds the question of whether Macartney kowtowed before the 
Qianlong emperor in 1793. An entry in Staunton’s boyhood diary, dated 14 September 1793, describes 
the British standing by the side of the road as the emperor passed where, he wrote, ‘we went on one 
knee and bowed our heads down to the ground’; ‘down to the ground’ is crossed out. Later that day, 
at a  reception before the emperor, Staunton referred to ‘making the proper ceremony’, assumed by 
some to suggest the Chinese ceremony of the kowtow. But, on 30 September, Staunton referred to 
performing ‘the usual ceremony of Bending one knee’. Back in Canton, the mandarins made nine 
bows and three genuflections before a throne representing the emperor where the British, according to 
Staunton, ‘followed their example’ (Sir George Thomas Staunton, Diary 1792–1793: Journey to China, 
1792–1793, London, England: Adam Matthew Microform Publications (China Trade, Politics & 
Culture, 1793–1980 database). Retrieved from www.china.amdigital.co.uk). These descriptions have 
led some historians, including Rockhill (1897, 1905) and Pritchard (1943), to conclude that Macartney 
kowtowed. Rockhill (1905, p. 31) based his claims on a report by a Russian interpreter, Vladykin (based 
in Peking at the time), that claimed Macartney had performed ‘the detested prostrations’. Pritchard 
(1943, p. 166) referred to a French savant, M. Pierre Abel-Ramusat, who, following Russian sources, 
also reported that Macartney had kowtowed. A more realistic assessment is made by Peyrefitte (1992, 
pp. 224–225) who correctly points out the physical impossibility of Macartney—53 years of age, 
overweight, gout ridden and wearing tight silk trousers—kowtowing. Further, it is almost impossible 
for the average person to touch the ground with their head while kneeling on one knee!
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that the British would follow Macartney’s precedent, recorded in his 
official report, which was the most authentic authority on the subject. 
‘However mortifying to his feelings’, Amherst said, he had no choice but 
to decline the honour of the emperor’s invitation and would forego the 
banquet altogether (Ellis, 1817, p. 93). This, Staunton wrote later, would 
‘get rid of the difficulty for the present’, but, by doing so, the mandarins 
had argued, he would be treating the emperor’s kindness with contempt 
(1824, p. 47).
Discussions on the subject dragged on for two hours, made especially 
tedious, it would seem, by the logistics of interpreting and the very hot 
weather. The mandarins appealed to Amherst’s paternal feelings, suggesting 
it would be a great shame if Jeffrey was deprived of the opportunity 
of seeing the emperor (Ellis, 1817, p. 94). Macartney had kowtowed, 
the mandarins argued, and it was necessary for Amherst to practise the 
ceremony. Amherst ‘strenuously denied’ such claims and diplomatically 
pointed out that the obeisance Macartney paid to the Qianlong emperor 
should be acceptable to his son. The mandarins refused to accept Amherst’s 
argument and pointed out, significantly, that the Jiaqing emperor had 
been present on the occasion of Macartney’s audience with his father 
and would vouch that Macartney had kowtowed.
Amherst next proposed that he would prepare a letter stating his reasons 
for not kowtowing and would present it to the emperor at Peking, but this 
was not acceptable. The Qianlong emperor, Amherst was informed, was 
most unhappy with Macartney’s European homage and had been adamant 
that it should not become a precedent for future occasions. ‘The Emperor’, 
Guanghui added, ‘would be angry with the King of England’, which 
so offended Morrison that he dared not translate it (Morrison, 1820, 
p. 30). Amherst, however, read the admission of the Qianlong emperor’s 
disapproval as proof that the mandarins had lied in their assertions that 
Macartney had kowtowed. A compromise was suggested. He would 
bow before the altar table the same number of times as the mandarins 
kowtowed, thereby showing his respect to the emperor, but he would not 
transgress his sovereign’s orders. The emperor, he was confident, would 
understand his position. His embassy, he pointed out, had been in China 
for only three days after a six-month voyage—surely the emperor would 
not be so unreasonable to expel the embassy. This proposal was eventually 
accepted ‘with good grace’. It was agreed that Amherst would make nine 
bows before the imaginary presence of the emperor (Amherst to Canning, 
12 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 227).
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The party adjourned for lunch and returned to the banquet hall. 
Guanghui told Amherst that he was very unhappy with his decision not 
to kowtow and cautioned that it would be wise for him to ‘reconsider 
the consequences that might result’ from a refusal to perform the correct 
ceremony (as quoted in Ellis, 1817, p. 96). Morrison (1820) quoted the 
legate as saying:
Return thanks in your own way, and whatever it be, we shall report 
it to the court … you will give offence if you do not conform; we 
warn you of the consequences; do not reflect on us hereafter. (p. 30)
Morrison described Sulenge as ‘screwing up his arch mouth’, and saying 
in a serious tone, ‘Do conform! Imitate us! If you do not, it will not be 
well!’ (p. 31). Negotiation on the subject had reached a crisis point. It was 
clear, Staunton thought, that there was no chance for any ‘reconsideration 
or consultation, as we had no option’ (Staunton, 1824, p. 96). Jeffrey 
thought his father’s refusal to perform the kowtow was likely to result 
in the embassy being ‘sent back without seeing his Imperial Majesty’ 
(Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.).
With the prospect of the ceremony taking place beside the altar, Amherst 
informed the others of his suite that they were to follow his example, 
‘by  bowing in the same respectful manner we should do to our own 
Sovereign’ (Hayne, n.d., vol. 2, p. 25).
The British were confronted with an altar table covered in a yellow silk 
cloth embroidered with gold dragons. A lighted censer that spewed smoke 
sat on top of the table. Placed behind the table was a carved screen ‘of 
curious workmanship, representing a vine in full fruit’ and made up of 
glass gems of different colours (Abel, 1818, p. 81). Abel (1818) noted that 
this represented the ‘symbolic presence of His Chinese Majesty’ (p. 81). 
Situated on the floor in front of the table were several small, red-coloured 
rugs, placed to accommodate the ‘faithful votaries’ (p. 81). Two Chinese, 
standing beside the table, commenced the ceremony with a ‘slow chant’ 
(Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). The six mandarins situated themselves on the 
right-hand side of the table. Amherst stood on the left-hand side while 
Staunton, Ellis and Morrison stood behind him. Abel wrote:
At a signal given by an officer, who uttered a few words in an 
exalted and singing tone, the Mandarins fell on their knees, and 
inclining their heads, knocked them three times against the ground, 
and then arose. A second and a third time the signal was repeated, 
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and a second and a third time they knelt and knocked their heads 
thrice against the earth. The Commissioners and the gentlemen 
of the suite bowed respectfully nine times. (1818, p. 83)
At the conclusion of the ceremony, the parties adjourned for the meal, 
which was described by Ellis (1817, p. 96) as ‘handsome’ and served in 
the Chinese style. Amherst, Jeffrey and the commissioners were invited to 
the upper part of the hall where they sat on cushions, six or eight inches 
from the ground before very low tables barely 12 inches high, facing 
the mandarins seated opposite them on the left-hand side (Morrison, 
1820, p. 32; Hayne, n.d., vol. 2, p. 27). They had their own separate 
table where they dined alone with no opportunity to converse with their 
fellow diners, representing an inversion of Western dining protocol. The 
rest of the embassy suite sat on the ground on which a red felt cloth was 
placed. Sitting on the floor for the British dressed in their heavy robes was 
exceedingly difficult and even painful. Morrison wrote:
We were compelled by this arrangement to sit cross-legged. Some 
of our party, incapable of this, stretched their legs under the tables 
… from the awkward posture in which we sat, it was a most 
uncomfortable meal. (1820, p. 32)
Figure 7: The frontispiece of an anonymous critique of the Amherst 
embassy, Sketches of China (1820), depicting Amherst kneeling before 
the altar table while the mandarins kowtow.
Source: British Library .
BRITAIN’S SECOND EMBASSY TO CHINA
180
Martin added that they were ‘forced to sit … Tartar fashion cross-legged 
like our English taylors’ (Journal of Sir William Fanshawe Martin, 
1817, p. 32, in BL ADD MSS 41346-41475). Sennett’s (1994, p. 340) 
observation that comfort for Europeans in the late eighteenth century 
meant freedom of movement, even when sitting, illustrates the practical 
difficulties confronting the British on this occasion. The meal lasted about 
an hour. ‘Strings of trays were brought and fitted in the square tables 
before us, each one for 2 persons with a dozen basons or small dishes each’ 
(Hayne, 1820, vol. 2, p. 27). The food, according to Staunton (1824), was 
‘exceedingly well dressed’. He added:
Those of our party, who had no prejudice against Chinese cookery 
… and were enabled to use the chop-sticks in the absence of the 
knife and fork, partook of the feast very heartily. (p. 50)
Ellis did not enjoy the food, although he found the first course of preserved 
fruits and custard ‘very palatable’. The shark fin was not to his taste and 
he thought the ‘bird-nest soup … too gelatinous and insipid’; it even 
remained bland even after the addition of ‘shrimps, eggs, &c’ (Ellis, 1817, 
p. 102). Hayne, on the other hand, found the food ‘remarkably good … 
especially the birds nest and shark’s fin’ (Hayne, n.d., vol. 2, p. 27). Other 
dishes served included a soup made of mare’s milk and blood, heart sinews 
‘and other viands used by the Chinese for their supposed aphrodisial 
virtues’ (Abel, 1818, p. 84). Ellis and Staunton enjoyed the warm Chinese 
wine and the mandarins ‘were very attentive in pledging the Ambassador 
and commissioners every time the cups were presented’ (Staunton, 1824, 
p. 50). Martin described their Chinese hosts ‘encouraging us to drink by 
showing us the bottom of their cups’ (Journal of Sir William Fanshawe 
Martin, 1817, p. 32, in BL ADD MSS 41346-41475).
The guests were entertained by a Chinese orchestra and a play whose 
plot was indecipherable to the British, although the well-presented 
stage sets and colourful costumes were admired. These, Abel thought, 
resembled the clothes of the Chinese before the Tartar conquest (1818, 
p. 84). The  music, consisting of a ‘hubbub of noises proceeding from 
gongs, drums, cymbals, and everything else calculated to deafen the ears’ 
offended British sensibilities (Davis, 1841, p. 70). Ellis was reminded of 
bagpipes and thought it ‘might have been tolerated by Scotsmen, [but] 
to others [the music] was detestable. Of the same description was the 
singing’ (1817, p. 102). The Chinese tumblers, on the other hand, were 
greatly admired for their strength and agility (p. 102).
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At the meal’s conclusion, Amherst, Jeffrey and the commissioners were 
invited once again into the inner apartment to resume discussion on 
the kowtow ceremony. ‘The test of the yellow curtain’, Staunton wrote, 
‘had failed to produce the desired effect’ (1824, p. 50). The legates ‘now 
pressed for a verbal pledge’ of the ceremony the English proposed to 
perform in the actual presence of the emperor (p. 50). Repeating that he 
planned to follow Macartney’s precedent and bend one knee as he would 
before his sovereign, Amherst was requested to give a demonstration of 
the British ceremony before the mandarins to enable them to make an 
accurate report to the emperor. Amherst replied that this was not possible. 
An impasse was averted when:
Sir George Staunton … happily suggested, that Lord Amherst’s son 
should perform the proposed ceremony before his father. Chinese 
usage was so completely in accordance with this manifestation of 
respect from a son to his father, that every difficulty or objection 
to any previous practice by Lord Amherst was removed, and the 
proposition was instantly admitted. (Ellis, 1817, p. 97)
A carpet was produced and Jeffrey performed the ceremony. The mandarins, 
in Jeffrey’s opinion, were ‘still very dissatisfied, and complained that we 
did not shew the Emperor proper respect’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). 
Amherst was asked to clarify if he proposed to repeat the ceremony 
nine times. Amherst agreed to do so but pointed out that this was more 
than he would perform before any European monarch. The mandarins 
asked if Jeffrey could repeat his earlier bow but perform it nine times. 
Amherst refused, telling the mandarins that he had no wish to ‘trifle 
with a ceremony’ that he considered a serious one (Amherst to Canning, 
12 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 231). The mandarins 
insinuated that a refusal to kowtow could have serious consequences for 
the wellbeing of British trade at Canton. Amherst ignored such threats. 
Staunton had assured him earlier that a performance of the kowtow would 
be much more damaging to Company interests than non-compliance. 
Amherst’s refusal to change his mind brought discussion on the ceremony 
to a close. The legates were handed a copy of the Prince Regent’s letter to 
the emperor and the conference concluded.
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An Analysis of the Banquet
Scholarly reference to the Amherst Embassy has been confined to the 
context of the ‘kowtow question’, but little attention has been given 
to its initial reception at the banquet just described. The occasion of 
the banquet represented an important site where knowledge about 
each other was produced for both the British and Chinese and where each 
other’s intent was weighed and gauged (Hampton, 2009, p. 4). Each side 
scrutinised the other through performance and both were highly sensitive 
to this intense scrutiny. The British arrived with a splendid display of 
pomp and pageantry but, on entering a Chinese space, found themselves 
forced to respond to Qing pressure over the kowtow. Jonathan Spence 
(1998, p.  43) refers to the official banquet as one of the most central 
and solemn moments of ritual in Chinese diplomatic intercourse. The 
banquet’s importance for the Amherst Embassy was a critical test and 
served to dispel British notions that it was possible to negotiate as equals 
with the Qing court.
The British, it was seen, travelled to the banquet hall within the reassuring 
space of a formal European cortege insulated from the Chinese crowds. 
Abel (1818) described his efforts to scan the crowd for glimpses of women 
and was surprised that many of the ‘well-dressed and interesting children 
[had] so little of the Chinese character in their faces, that they would 
scarcely have attracted attention in an English crowd’ (p. 80). ‘The men’, 
Abel thought, were ‘generally well made and frequently tall [and I] did 
not observe in them that uniformity of countenance which I had been 
led to look for in the Chinese’ (p. 80). Hayne was of the same opinion:
I had here a better opportunity of contemplating innumerable 
faces, & I must do them the justice to say that they were by no 
means an ill-looking race one with the other, nor so dark as those 
in the country we had passed. I think any unprejudiced person 
would come to the same conclusion after making allowances for 
the shaved head, [and] ugly dresses both of which we have been 
unaccustomed to see. (n.d., vol. 2, p. 22)
Hayne and Abel were reassured with the sight of physically attractive 
people. The sociologist Erving Goffman’s insight referring to peoples’ 
reaction to being among crowds is relevant to the British frame of mind 
at this time:
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By scanning one’s surroundings through an image repertoire, 
subjecting the environment to simple categories of representation, 
comparing likeness to difference, a person diminishes the complexity 
of [alien] experience. (as quoted in Sennett, 1994, p. 366)
On arrival at their banquet destination, the British left behind the secure 
confines of a British space, represented by the military order of the marine 
guard and procession, and entered into the Chinese-controlled space of the 
banquet hall. The visual and olfactory markers, such as cooking smells and 
incense smoke, were especially confronting to the British and exacerbated 
preconceived cultural images and meanings of China. The visual impact 
of the hall’s interior was commented on by Abel:
It is difficult to describe the glittering and tawdry magnificence 
which now suddenly opened upon us. An immense number 
of painted lamps, pictures, and other ornaments, in all colours 
of the rainbow, hung about us on every side; whilst a crowd of 
Mandarins, in their dresses of ceremony, rendered the animated 
part of the scene no less striking. (1818, p. 80)
Hayne and Abel, as well as others in the British party, were free to wander 
around the hall and courtyard while Amherst and the commissioners were 
engaged in negotiations in the conference room. British attempts were 
made to come to terms with Chinese culture where little of worth was 
seen apart from some beautiful painted lanterns and a picturesque display 
of presents for the embassy consisting of rolls of coloured silks ‘prettily 
arranged in trays’ on a table (Hayne, n.d., vol. 2, p. 23). The low square 
dining tables neatly arranged for the forthcoming meal caught Hayne’s 
attention, while Abel (1818) described the ‘pots of flowers and dwarf trees 
… distributed over the room, [which] were often mingled with pieces of 
limestone’ (p. 81). Appearances for the British were important, especially 
for classifying Chinese dignitaries. The historian James Epstein (1989, 
p. 77) has written of the importance for the British of ‘flags and banners, 
hats and caps, ribbons and medals’ during the early nineteenth century 
for defining state and civil power brokers. Accordingly, members of the 
embassy sought clues to the rank of the various mandarins by a close 
scrutiny of their dress. Hayne (n.d., vol. 2, p. 24) referred to badges of rank 
consisting of ‘a tiger or Dragon for the orders of the Military and a bird 
for that of the civil’. Abel (1818, p. 82) also described the mandarins’ 
finely embroidered silk petticoats ‘beautifully interwoven with gold and 
silk, in the forms of dragons and flowers. Their boots were of satin, and 
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served them for pockets’. The mandarins’ hats, described as ‘small and 
conical, covered with long red hair, and surmounted with a globe, whose 
colour indicated their rank’ (p. 82), were of specific interest.
The different coloured hat buttons worn by the mandarins were similarly 
important signifiers for British recognition of rank and status of the 
officials they encountered, and reference was made often to the ‘Red Book’ 
that explained the colours.7 While Hayne was correct in his assertion that 
dragons and tigers indicated military men, he was not sufficiently educated 
on Chinese culture to recognise their symbolic meaning or gradations of 
rank (Forge, 1973, p. xiv).8 Patricia Bjaaland Welch’s (2008) work on 
symbolic meanings in Chinese art explains that high-ranking officials of 
‘one to three were allowed the use of the five-clawed lóng dragon, while 
the lower ranks (four down) were only allowed the use of the four-clawed 
măng dragon. These dragons are virtually identical in terms of majesty and 
composition, the main difference being the number of claws’ (p. 125). 
Similarly, the tiger represented ‘strength, power, and courage, and, in 
particular, military prowess. The tiger is therefore regarded as a protector 
and guardian’ (p. 145). While the British made a  connection with the 
presence of dragons at the banquet with the emperor, the symbolism 
found on the mandarins’ robes was read only in British terms as attractive 
and effeminate pieces of embroidery. Also noted were the girdles worn 
around the waists of the military mandarins from which hung ‘fans, pipes, 
and chop-sticks’ (Abel, 1818, p. 82). The contrast with the bearing of 
the British officers, which the British regarded as manly and military, 
marked a clear distinction with their Chinese counterparts on show at 
the banquet.
The banquet’s political function, namely, to secure British compliance 
with the ritual performance of the kowtow, was recognised immediately 
by Amherst and Staunton. As explained previously, Amherst’s public 
performance of the kowtow would have affirmed the demotion of the 
British sovereign to the status of a tributary vassal of the Chinese emperor. 
Sulenge admitted this fact in his memorial to the Imperial Government 
7  The ‘Pekin Red Book’ was referred to by the British for information on Chinese ranks and family 
background. Ellis noted their research on Guanghui: ‘On reference to the Pekin Red Book, it was 
found that the Chin-chae [Guanghui] is connected with the imperial family; his rank as a Mandarin 
is low’ (1817, p. 69).
8  Forge, an anthropologist, writes in the context of art appreciation: ‘Most anthropologists would 
suggest that it is impossible for a member of culture A to know with any meaning of a work produced 
in culture B unless he has had considerable experience of that culture’ (1973, p. xiv).
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following the banquet. He stated he had informed Morrison, ‘if the envoy 
knew the true meaning of reverence, he should follow us in performing 
the same ritual; it was only then, we said, that he could properly be 
regarded as having assumed an inferior status’ (‘Su Leng-eh and Kuang-
Hui: The Kowtow Controversy’, a memorial submitted to the Imperial 
Government on 13 August 1816 in Li, 1969, pp. 46–47).
Amherst was ill at ease on entering the banquet hall. He had moved 
from a secure British space into one where his personal status as a British 
ambassador was in danger of being undermined as he was pressured to 
undergo a rite of incorporation into the Chinese politico-cultural realm 
(Gluckman, 1966, p. 3). The sight of the altar table draped in yellow 
silk alerted Amherst immediately to Golovkin’s expulsion in 1806 and he 
braced himself for difficult negotiations with the mandarins. The censer 
spewing smoke on the altar table served further to remind the Protestant 
British of the abomination of Catholic and pagan practice. ‘Kneeling’ 
also evoked in them images of Islam or cowardice (Rawski, 1998, p. 22).9 
Kneeling thus symbolised subjugation and touching the ground with 
one’s head held connotations of uncleanliness and insult equating human 
behaviour with that of savage barbarians (Hevia, 1995, p. 234).10 Sennett 
(1994, p. 82) has pointed out that some forms of ritual function to give 
bodily performance precedence over the spoken word. Diplomacy for the 
British was not established by the oppression of the prostrate body, but 
on a belief in equality based on the strength of negotiation and rational 
argument where participants were held responsible for their spoken words, 
which were recorded and documented.
Regardless of bodily positions and connotations of pagan ritual, the 
fundamental question concerning the performance of the kowtow, from 
the British point of view, was the fact that it was not reciprocal and 
signified subjugation of the British monarch to the Chinese emperor. This 
had been shown during the Macartney Embassy when the suggestion that 
a Chinese minister of equal rank to Macartney kowtow before a portrait 
of George III was refused. The kowtow, the British asserted:
9  Rawski (1998) referred to ‘the ritual of submission before the emperor [being] inspired by 
Muslim pilgrimage traditions and thus bore religious connotations’ (p. 22). It will be seen that 
Captain Maxwell, at the time of firing at the Bocca Tigris forts, commented on the cowardly Chinese 
falling on their knees in a stage of fright ‘like Persians at sunrise’ (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 71).
10  Hevia (2009) also quoted Stallybrass and White who argued that the kowtow represented the 
‘the feminization of servitude in the figure of the kneeling chambermaid’ (p. 222).
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If … not reciprocally performed … express[ed] in the strongest 
manner, the submission and homage of one person or state to 
another and [it is] in this light the Tartar Family now on the 
throne of China considers the ceremony call’d San-Kwei-Kew-
Kow - thrice kneeling and nine times beating the head against 
the ground. (Anonymous, Handwritten background notes on the 
Amherst Embassy, n.p., in PRO FO 97/95)
The Amherst Embassy’s fate was sealed at this early time. The legates 
next made a fundamental mistake in permitting the embassy to proceed 
towards Tongzhou before receiving official approval from the Jiaqing 
emperor, and before receiving confirmation of Amherst’s intentions on 
the performance of the kowtow in the physical presence of the emperor. 
Amherst had kept his options open, which ensured that future diplomatic 
discussion would focus only on this question until a mutual agreement 
was reached. British objectives for the embassy were now destined to be 
neglected and overlooked, although they still believed that an audience 
before the emperor would open the door for negotiation. The banquet 
of 13 August had resulted in setting the diplomatic agenda where the 
Amherst Embassy from now on found itself on the back foot in its dealings 
with Qing officialdom.
Aftermath of the Banquet
Amherst, nonetheless, was very pleased with the outcome of the conference 
at the banquet. He had escaped Golovkin’s fate and had not been expelled 
from China for refusing to kowtow. Importantly, he was to proceed to 
Peking, ‘conceiving that every day of progress toward the Capital added 
some probability of our ultimate reception’ (Amherst to Canning, 
12 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 219). His reception 
had been civil and ‘there was no mixture of rudeness or acrimony or any 
indication of ill-will, such as Lord Macartney had reason to complain’ 
(Amherst to Canning, 12 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) 
F 232). Ellis (1817) recalled the fate of the Dutch embassy of 1795 
where compliance with the kowtow ceremony had resulted only in the 
most degrading of circumstances, whereas Amherst had ‘sufficiently 
establish[ed] the expediency of resistance’ (p. 99). Hayne was impressed 
with Amherst’s efforts to brief the rest of the embassy:
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[Of ] everything that might interest them, & even to gratify any 
reasonable curiosity or something to this effect which of course gave 
universal satisfaction & raised him still higher in the estimation of 
everyone. The contest was severe indeed on the disputed point, 
which made us glory more in our victory. (n.d., vol. 2, p. 31)
Hayne’s assessment of Chinese actions reflected wider British opinion 
where lying and low cunning was:
characteristic of the Nation, who from beginning to end think no 
more of a lie than we do of eating our breakfast, which of course 
has done away with every thing like mutual confidence. (p. 32)
Ellis read Sulenge’s assertion that Macartney had kowtowed as a deliberate 
attempt by the mandarins to trap Staunton into contradicting himself. 
To have done so, Ellis added, would have had the effect of attributing 
British resistance to the ceremony to his suggestions, thus undermining 
Amherst (Hayne, n.d., vol. 2, p. 32). The legates’ acceptance of a copy of 
the Prince Regent’s letter to the emperor signified that the embassy was 
still on track to proceed to Peking. But there was no guarantee that the 
emperor would accept the proposed British ceremony of respect.
The embassy travelled 19 miles up-river towards Tongzhou the following 
day and the British were astonished by the large number of junks loaded 
with grain destined for the Peking granaries (Ellis, 1817, p. 105). Sulenge 
and Guanghui informed Amherst during an evening visit that  the 
emperor was unlikely to agree to his terms over the performance of 
the kowtow. Sulenge’s appointment to the embassy, it was pointed out, 
was an unprecedented honour and indicated the emperor’s high regard 
for Amherst because his rank was superior to any official appointed to 
the Macartney Embassy. Amherst, in reply, stressed that the nine bows 
he proposed to perform before the Jiaqing emperor represented a greater 
honour than the single bow traditionally paid by a British ambassador to 
the Russian sovereign. This gave the mandarins the opportunity to inform 
Amherst that the Russian embassy was expelled from China without an 
audience over the very question of the kowtow. Morrison wrote:
Old Soo threw out, in a rather gruff tone, that the Russians had been 
rejected for their non-compliance, and their commerce interrupted; 
and hinted that it would be the same with us. (1820, p. 35)
Guanghui added that as there was only one Sun in the universe so there 
was only one Sovereign in the world; this Sovereign was the Emperor of 
China to which all other sovereigns owed homage and submission (p. 35). 
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While this statement resulted in an ‘excited murmur’ among the Chinese 
present, the British thought this proposition was ‘too ridiculous to be 
seriously opposed’ (p. 35). Guanghui and Sulenge remained steadfast 
and informed the British that ‘they did not think there was more of a 
chance in ten thousand’ that the emperor would receive the embassy on 
the terms currently proposed (Amherst to Canning, 12 February 1817, in 
BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 235). The copy of the Prince Regent’s letter 
was returned as his address to the emperor headed ‘Sir, My Brother’ was 
inappropriate and had to be changed (Staunton, 1824, p. 53). The British 
agreed to delete the term.
The legates next requested to see the box containing the Prince Regent’s 
letter. The gold box, valued at £1,500 (equivalent to approximately 
£150,000 in today’s values) and described as ‘a magnificent thing of its 
kind’ failed to attract attention whereas the appearance of the little gold 
silk purse given to Staunton by the Qianlong emperor evoked ‘extreme 
veneration’ and interest (Davis, 1841, p. 86).
Ellis (1817) wrote on the conclusion of the meeting that he was becoming 
increasingly concerned that the true objectives of the embassy were being 
ignored. The emphasis on ceremony and the kowtow indicated that the 
chances of negotiations on these were highly unlikely.
15 August 1816
The boats proceeded up-river towards Tongzhou for the second day. 
The question of the kowtow was raised again when Chang-wei and Yin 
visited Amherst on his barge during a stopover. Macartney, they admitted, 
had bowed before the Qianlong emperor on his first audience, but 
thereafter had kowtowed during the second audience at the time of the 
celebrations of the emperor’s birthday. Amherst dismissed ‘this admission’, 
which he thought would have ‘been of considerable importance had it 
come from higher authority’ (Amherst to Canning, 12 February 1817, 
in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 237).
Discussions were interrupted with the arrival of the legates, Sulenge and 
Guanghui, who requested a private meeting. A vermillion edict written 
in the Jiaqing emperor’s hand had just been received. The emperor 
thought there were too many people in the embassy and accordingly 
ordered that the band return to the ships. This demand, in Morrison’s 
view, indicated the emperor’s ‘weak [and] capricious mind’ (1820, p. 36). 
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Staunton thought his objection was a ‘very ungracious act’ as the band was 
a ‘harmless addition’ to the embassy’s amusement and was necessary for its 
‘public state’ (1824, p. 56). Amherst stood firm. He told the mandarins 
that he was responsible for the band’s behaviour and wellbeing and it 
was impossible to separate it from the rest of the embassy. The emperor’s 
letter, Amherst noted privately, was written at a date prior to any formal 
discussions over the kowtow and before the emperor had any reason to 
suppose that Amherst was not going to perform the ceremony (Amherst to 
Canning, 12 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 238). Ellis 
(1817) noted ominously, ‘it was impossible to avoid supposing that it was 
only the first in a series of trivial exceptions that were about to be taken to 
the Embassy’ (p. 111). British attitudes towards the emperor’s disposition 
changed at this time. The emperor, in Hayne’s opinion, was ‘an illiterate, 
debauched sot, timid and tyrannical’ who, due to three attempts on his 
life, was ‘frightened at his own shadow, so that we have nothing to hope 
from such a man’ (n.d., vol. 2, p. 43).
Serious concerns arose that evening with the arrival of Sulenge and 
Guanghui in a highly agitated state, described by Jeffrey as being in 
‘a  considerable fuss’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Amherst was asked, 
in  a  most abrupt manner, ‘what is become of your ships?’ (Staunton, 
1824, p. 56). Provisions had been sent to Dagu, but it was discovered that 
the ships had already left. Their departure, undertaken without imperial 
permission, was blamed on Amherst and was viewed as a ‘great omission’ 
on the part of the British (Staunton, 1824, p. 57). Concerned that they 
would be blamed by the emperor, the legates enquired how the embassy 
planned to return to England. Amherst’s reply was cagey. He said that, as 
there had been no previous discussion on the question, he had assumed 
that the embassy was to follow Macartney’s precedent and travel overland 
to Canton. The mandarins were informed that he had no authority over 
the movements of the ships, which were respectively under the command 
of the Royal Navy and the Company.11 An early departure, Amherst 
added, was thought expedient due to the danger of inclement weather 
but that decision was beyond his control.
11  Staunton, as president of the Select Committee, ordered Captain Ross, Commander of the 
Company ship Discovery, to follow the orders of Captain Maxwell until the ‘latitude of the N.E. 
point of Shan-tung, when you will be permitted to separate from His Majesty’s ships, and are 
to proceed towards Macao with the Investigator under your orders, and to execute such parts of 
the survey … as you may find practicable, without giving any ground of suspicion or offence to the 
Chinese Government’. Orders were not to take a ‘regular Survey’ of the ‘Gulf of Pe-chee-lee’ but any 
‘observations’ made will be ‘exceedingly acceptable to the Honourable the Court of Directors’ (Orders 
signed Geo. Thom. Staunton, HMS Alceste, 9 August 1816, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) F 366).
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Guanghui became increasingly irritated. Informing Amherst that his 
behaviour in concealing the movement of the ships was highly improper, 
he blamed Morrison for wrongfully translating British intentions. 
Guanghui pointed his finger at Morrison, exclaiming, ‘It is your fault!’ 
(as quoted in Morrison, 1820, p. 37). Morrison, according to Staunton, 
‘very properly said, that if such was his opinion he must decline any further 
interpretation’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 114). Amherst now intervened using all his 
diplomatic skills. Staunton was requested ‘to express to both Mandarins 
his sense of the injustice done to Mr. Morrison, and to inform them that 
he considered such observations personally offensive to himself ’ (p. 115). 
Morrison was offered an apology, which was accepted. The fact that 
Guanghui would be held accountable by the emperor for not preventing 
the ships’ departure was obvious to the British (Amherst to Canning, 
12 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 242). Amherst said 
he would write a letter to the emperor explaining that the ships had to 
leave due to the dangers of remaining at anchor in the shallow waters of 
the Gulf. Ellis added, ‘We could not be surprised at the dissatisfaction 
shewn by the Mandarins at the departure of the ships, and still less at 
our silence upon the subject’ (1817, p. 115). The mandarin in charge of 
the ships at Dagu, the British were informed, had since been demoted 
(Morrison, 1820, p. 38).
The departure of the British ships without imperial approval was a major 
reason for the subsequent treatment of the embassy. News reached the 
Select Committee at Canton in late September 1816 that the emperor had 
made up his mind to refuse any presents and had given directions for the 
embassy to be dismissed at this time (Extract from Public Consultations 
1816/17, 21 September 1816, in BL MSS EUR F 140/48).12
16 August: Further Discussions on 
the Kowtow
Chang-wei and Yin visited Amherst the following morning. An imperial 
edict had arrived with instructions to dismiss the embassy if the kowtow 
was not agreed to (Staunton, 1824, p. 59). Sulenge and Guanghui were 
too distressed to come themselves and had deputised Chang-wei and Yin 
12  News of this had serious repercussions at Canton where permission to load the General Hewitt 
with teas was refused by the Canton authorities. A standoff with the Select Committee lasted some 
months.
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to deliver the emperor’s message. Amherst said he would answer only to 
the legates but informed them that he was prepared to follow Macartney’s 
precedent and enquired if a mandarin of equal rank would kowtow 
before a portrait of the Prince Regent. This, Chang-wei and Yin replied, 
was impossible, as Amherst would be in the presence of the emperor 
whereas the Chinese official would be paying homage to a mere picture 
(Amherst to Canning, 12 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) 
F 244). The proposal that a future Chinese ambassador at the Court of St 
James’s kowtow in front of the British sovereign was also dismissed with 
the mandarins adding that they dare not suggest such a proposal to the 
emperor. Amherst called a halt to the meeting and said he would defer any 
further discussion on the kowtow until he met with the legates.
Sulenge and Guanghui arrived shortly afterwards. Staunton wrote that 
they appeared most dejected. Efforts were made to convince Amherst 
to kowtow by pointing out that the ambassadors of Japan, Siam and 
other independent countries all kowtowed before the Chinese emperor. 
Amherst recorded indignantly in his report that analogies made with 
the courts of Portugal or Russia would have been more appropriate.13 
Amherst, accordingly, refused ‘any comparison to be drawn between the 
King of Great Britain and the feeble states which surrounded the Chinese 
Empire’ (Amherst to Canning, 12 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 
(Reel 2) F 245). ‘These nations’, Ellis reminded the legates, ‘could neither 
be classed in point of civilization nor power with the English’ (1817, 
p. 118). This point was accepted by the legates who stressed again that 
the British were being received by the court with far greater honours than 
any other country. Amherst refused to compromise. He told the legates 
that he would record and forward his proposals in a letter to the emperor, 
but was told it was not possible to communicate with the emperor in 
this way. Moreover, the legates said, they had already been chastised by 
the emperor and dared not anger him further (Morrison, 1820, p. 39).14 
In that case, Amherst replied, he was left with no alternative but to return 
to England. Guanghui and Sulenge became most distressed at this turn 
of events and expressed their regret by saying repeatedly that such was 
‘the will of Heaven’ (Amherst to Canning, 12 February 1817, in BL IOR 
G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 246).
13  Both of whom had refused to kowtow.
14  Morrison (1820) added that Amherst referred to the Kangxi emperor and the exception made at 
the time of the Ismailof Embassy where a mandarin kowtowed before an image of the Russian God, 
but Guanghui replied that, although he had heard of it, this was not in any authentic record.
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Guanghui and Sulenge’s refusal to forward any of Amherst’s letters to the 
emperor, in Staunton’s (1824) opinion, shifted the responsibility for the 
outcome of embassy onto the Chinese, ‘at least according to all European 
notions of diplomacy’. The Chinese would now be ‘completely responsible 
for the rupture, if a rupture ensued’ (p. 63). In the meantime, Guanghui 
and Sulenge told the British that some mandarins of an even higher rank 
were being sent to conduct the embassy. The embassy was halted and 
ordered to turn back to Tianjin.
17–21 August 1816: The Continuation 
of the Diplomatic Impasse
Chang-wei and Yin remained the chief interlocutors with the embassy. 
Morrison described Chang-wei as ‘grinding and gnashing his teeth’ due 
to the situation having become ‘extremely stern and severe’ (1820, p. 41). 
Amherst was informed that the embassy’s dismissal was considered most 
undesirable and appeals were made to him to reconsider his decision on 
the kowtow. Perhaps he could humbly request the emperor’s permission 
to follow the Macartney precedent and kneel on one leg as ordered by 
the British sovereign. Further, Staunton was asked to confirm that, while 
he was too young to remember whether Macartney had kowtowed, he 
had heard that Macartney had not. The emperor may be ‘induced to 
dispense with the strictness of the ceremonial, in consideration of such 
a solicitation’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 125).
Staunton was then subjected to a long harangue from one of the 
mandarins. The Jiaqing emperor was disappointed, Staunton was told, 
that he had not used his influence to pressure Amherst into performing 
the kowtow. This action was the least Staunton could do considering the 
gracious notice he had received from the Qianlong emperor. Amherst 
interrupted. Staunton’s opinion, he said, had nothing to do with his 
orders, which he received directly from his sovereign (Ellis, 1817, p. 124). 
Agreement was reached finally with Amherst undertaking to kneel three 
times accompanied by three bows. Amherst concluded the meeting and 
retired with his suite for breakfast.
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News of the Appointment of Heshitai 
and Muketenge to Take Charge of the 
Embassy
Chang-wei and Yin paid another call immediately after breakfast with the 
news that the embassy was to proceed to Tongzhou where they would be 
met by two Tartar mandarins of the most senior rank who were taking 
charge of the embassy. The first was Heshitai (referred to as ‘Ho’ by the 
British) who held the title of gongye, translated by Staunton and Morrison 
as ‘Duke’ (Tuck, 2000, p. xxix).15 Heshitai was also the emperor’s brother-
in-law and a Manchu of the Bordered Yellow Banner (Tuck, 2000, 
p. xxix). The second mandarin was Muketenge, referred to by the British 
as ‘Moo’, who was the president of the Board of Rites and one of the most 
senior administrators of the empire (Tuck, 2000, p. xxix).16 Their specific 
orders were to instruct Amherst in the performance of the kowtow before 
permitting him to proceed to Peking.
Heshitai and Muketenge’s appointment indicated to the British that 
Guanghui and Sulenge had failed in their handling of the embassy (Davis, 
1841, p. 97). Amherst was informed that he was due to meet the senior 
mandarins where he was expected to perform the kowtow before a yellow 
screen and a dragon tablet (Staunton, 1824, p. 66). Such a rehearsal, 
Amherst thought, was a Chinese trick to induce him to perform the 
ceremony in a public space (Amherst to Canning, 28 February 1817, in 
BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 254). Chang-wei and Yin next requested 
Amherst to practise the same ceremony he intended to perform before 
Heshitai and Muketenge at Tongzhou in front of them. Amherst ‘flatly 
refused’ and told them that the ceremony he would perform was a serious 
matter and was reserved for the emperor’s presence. He added that he 
proposed to inform the emperor of his intentions in a personal letter. 
The offer ‘of a written engagement for its performance’, Amherst noted, 
‘seemed to give them great satisfaction’ (Amherst to Canning, 28 February 
1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 255). He proposed to kneel on one 
15  He was awarded the title due to his services in the defence of the Imperial Palace during a rebel 
attack in 1813.
16  Muketenge was also a Manchu of the Bordered Yellow Banner. Representing the highest rank 
of the Eight Banners, members of the Bordered Yellow Banner comprised the elite of the emperor’s 
bodyguard (see Elliott, 2001, pp. 81, 366).
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knee three times, and to thrice bow each time (Staunton, 1824, p. 67). 
The letter was composed by Morrison and signed by Amherst. Its delivery 
to the mandarins resulted in permission for the embassy to proceed to 
Tongzhou, arriving there on 20 August.
Davis is Visited by a Cantonese Mandarin
While Amherst was engaged in discussions with Chang-wei and Yin, 
Davis received an unexpected visit from a Cantonese mandarin that was 
regarded by the British as an intelligence gathering exercise. The mandarin 
wished ‘to speak on the subject of the existing discussions’, referring to 
the kowtow (Davis, 1841, p. 95). Davis informed him that he had no 
authority to speak on behalf of the ambassador but could inform the 
mandarin of the ‘understood declaration’ that the British could never 
perform the ceremony. This statement was met with a list of possible 
ramifications if Amherst did not agree to the kowtow. First, it would 
be a great pity if the British left China without seeing the emperor and 
the king would be ‘incensed’ when he found out how the British were 
conducting themselves in their negotiations with the Chinese. Davis was 
next asked about the ceremony he would perform in the presence of the 
British sovereign. Davis replied that it would not be the kowtow and that 
he wished to have no further discussion on the matter. The mandarin 
then raised the importance of the Canton trade to Britain, which was 
permitted only with the benevolence of the Chinese emperor. The trade, 
Davis replied, was mutually beneficial to China and Britain. The mandarin 
then departed, having failed, Davis believed, to learn any new intelligence 
about British plans (Davis, 1841, p. 97).
20 August: Arrival at Tongzhou, 12 Miles 
from Peking and Nine Days Before the 
Reception at Yuanmingyuan
The British boats anchored at Tongzhou at five o’clock in the afternoon. 
Guanghui and Sulenge called on Amherst to enquire further about the 
ceremony Amherst proposed to perform before the emperor. They said the 
emperor was in a very good mood and it would be a shame if some mutual 
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arrangement could not be negotiated—everything would go smoothly 
once Amherst agreed to kowtow (Amherst to Canning, 28 February 1817, 
in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 254). The emperor’s decision to send two 
mandarins of exalted rank to henceforth conduct the embassy was proof 
of his regard and an acknowledgement of the superior status of the British 
sovereign compared to the tributary princes. Amherst referred once more 
to the Macartney precedent, whereby he would kowtow if a Chinese 
minister of rank performed the same ceremony before a portrait of the 
Prince Regent, or if an imperial guarantee was received that any future 
Chinese ambassador at St James’s would perform the kowtow in front of 
the British sovereign. He emphasised further that a British ambassador 
would never perform an act that could be construed by the Chinese as an 
act of homage from a dependent prince (Ellis, 1817, p. 140).
Guanghui and Sulenge were disappointed. Amherst reassured them that 
the exalted rank of the new mandarins was of little concern and that his 
decision was final. He would never be persuaded by any mandarin, no 
matter how exalted his rank, to change his mind (Ellis, 1817, p. 141).
The legates next made a fateful suggestion. Amherst was free to ‘make 
any report he pleased on his return to England’ regardless of whether he 
performed or did not perform the kowtow. The implication that Amherst 
would be prepared to lie before his sovereign met with predictable British 
outrage (Amherst to Canning, 28 February 1817, BL IOR G/12/197 
(Reel 2) F 256). Amherst, Ellis (1817) pointed out, had ‘seventy-four 
witnesses with him who would state the truth’ (p. 141).17
17  The Chinese claimed that Macartney kowtowed before the Qianlong emperor at the second 
reception when only he and the Stauntons, as well as the Chinese interpreter Mr Plumb, were present. 
The fact that this was a tightly inclusive group, where a performance of the kowtow would most likely 
be kept secret, hardly needs to be pointed out. If Macartney had kowtowed, the three witnesses could 
be relied on to keep to the ‘official’ British story. The presence of other visiting envoys, however, 
as well as the close proximity of 10 Russians at the College in Peking, guaranteed that news of 
Macartney kowtowing would have eventually found its way to Europe, which, as noted earlier (see 
fn. 6 of this chapter), is what Rockhill (1905, p. 31) claimed.
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21 August: New Mandarins Arrive 
to Take Charge of the Embassy, Seven 
Days Before the Embassy’s Arrival at 
Yuanmingyuan
The two senior mandarins sent to witness Amherst rehearsing the kowtow 
arrived on 21 August. Heshitai was described as ‘a young man of few 
words and of very firm character’ (Morrison, 1820, p. 44).18 Muketenge 
was ‘a thin old man’ who never spoke and was nicknamed the ‘Silent Moo’ 
by the British (p. 44). Their high rank impressed Morrison who noted 
that the embassy had three ‘Shang-soo or Presidents’ assigned to negotiate 
with the ambassador out of a total of seven in the Chinese Government 
(p. 44).19 Amherst arranged to meet them the next day.
The British dined together that evening under a veranda in the court. 
Hayne wrote:
Having got our plate, glass, and wine … we made a good display 
to the astonishment of the staring crowd who were mounted up 
in the surrounding trees overlooking our Court walls … watching 
every movement we made. (n.d., vol. 2, p. 57)
The meal was interrupted when Chang-wei appeared with news that 
a  deputation of mandarins was waiting to call on the ambassador. 
Amherst, Staunton, Ellis and Morrison left the table and went to Amherst’s 
apartment to greet them. Their visit, Davis wrote, ‘sounded extremely 
formidable’. He added, ‘it was right we should be duly prepared for such 
celestial colloquy sublime’ (as quoted in Hayne, n.d., vol. 2, p. 57).
The ‘Lads of Mougden’20
Six mandarins, dressed in their ceremonial robes, arrived. Some wore blue 
buttons and peacock feathers. Staunton and Ellis went forward to meet 
them but, much to their astonishment, were ignored as the mandarins 
18  Morrison further described Heshitai as ‘about 35 years of age, of the middle size; stout, and 
possessing apparently great bodily strength and warmth of temper’ (1820, p. 44).
19  Morrison added that ‘all three were destined to be dismissed from their employment’ on account 
of the embassy (1820, p. 44). ‘Shang-soo’ is likely to be shangshu.
20  Mukden, present-day Shenyang.
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‘brushed rudely’ past them and made straight for the sitting room where 
they ‘seized on the chief seats without waiting for an invitation’ (Staunton, 
1824, p. 74). Davis wrote:
We all stood aghast … when this half-dozen of savages rushed past 
without so much as a look, and proceeding to seize the six highest 
places, seated themselves down at once. (1841, p. 107)
Amherst, however, spectacularly ‘out-manoeuvred them by taking the 
principal seat’ at the other end of the room.
The mandarins, whom Jeffrey described as ‘understrappers’, were 
particularly haughty and acted in an ‘exceedingly rude and overbearing 
manner’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.).21 They enquired which of the 
Englishmen gathered before them was the ambassador for they had come 
to inform him that he was expected to perform the kowtow in front of 
Heshitai the following day. Amherst replied in an equally authoritative 
voice that he would only discuss such matters with Heshitai and 
Muketenge. The mandarins pretended not to understand and continued 
with a harangue about the importance of the ceremony to the Celestial 
Empire. Amherst repeated his answer in an even louder tone after 
which ‘they [the mandarins] bounced up and strutted out of the room’ 
(Davis, 1841, p. 108).
The meeting lasted only 10 minutes. The British made a point of showing 
their displeasure by ‘treat[ing] them on their departure with all the 
disrespect we could’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). The band was prohibited 
from playing and the marines were ordered to withhold their salute. The 
‘grotesque piece of diplomacy’ they had witnessed astonished the British 
who remained in their seats for some time in what can only be interpreted 
as a state of shock. The group of six mandarins hereafter acquired a new 
nickname and were referred to by the British as the six ‘lads of Mougden’ 
(Davis, 1841, p. 108). Their attempts to bully the British into complying 
with the ceremony reinforced a fundamental difference between Western 
and Chinese diplomacy where negotiation over disputes was not an 
option. Any preconceived notion the British may have had of a fruitful 
diplomatic encounter was finally dispelled. Davis wrote:
21  The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines an ‘understrapper’ as ‘a subordinate; an underling’.
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Nothing but the greatest ignorance of the character of Europeans 
could have led the Chinese to hazard such an attempt … Herein 
consists much of their weakness in negotiations; they are too proud 
to learn any thing about us, while we foreigners … never lose an 
opportunity of studying them in every relation of life … That 
‘power’ which consists in ‘knowledge’, therefore, preponderates on 
our side. We know, above all, that the most complete want of faith, 
the most unblushing perfidy, is one part of the Chinese system in 
their negotiations with strangers; and unless this be carefully kept 
in view during the existing crisis, they may play us some sad tricks. 
(1841, p. 109)
British apprehension was reflected with Ellis having second thoughts over 
the wisdom of refusing to perform the kowtow ceremony. The fact that the 
kowtow had become the only question under negotiation was extremely 
worrying, but the dice was thrown and the British had to stand by their 
decision (Ellis, 1817, p. 145). Abel thought the ‘despicable presumption 
of these men gave a foretaste of the treatment that His British Majesty’s 
Representative afterwards experienced from their superiors’ (1818, p. 93).
Amherst, who wished to sleep on board his boat, was requested with some 
urgency by Chang-wei and Yin to sleep ashore in the temple apartments 
arranged for him. Much to their relief, Amherst promised to do so once 
his furniture had been delivered. ‘The Emperor’, they said, ‘has very long 
ears’ and would suspect them of ‘making false reports and punish them 
for it’ (as quoted in Hayne, n.d., vol. 2, p. 61). Davis added in a superior 
tone, ‘We were of course too polite, and had too sincere a respect for his 
Majesty, to dispute the application of this asinine attack’ (as quoted in 
Hayne, n.d., vol. 2, p. 61). Amherst complained about the mandarins’ 
rudeness earlier in the day and pointed specifically to the insult paid to 
Staunton when they pushed past him. Chang-wei explained that this 
behaviour was typical of those mandarins who remained at court and 
who had never served in the provinces; he and Yin had also been ignored, 
as had his offer to escort them to meet the embassy (Staunton, 1824, 
p. 146).
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22 August: First Meeting with Heshitai 
and Muketenge
The meeting with the imperial commissioners, Heshitai and Muketenge, 
was arranged for midday. Amherst prepared himself for a termination of 
the embassy but still held a vague hope and a belief that a direct appeal to 
the emperor ‘was the only way to obviate such a proceeding’ (Amherst to 
Canning, 28 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 258). Ellis 
proceeded to draw up a letter that was carefully translated into Chinese 
by Morrison. With such in his possession, Amherst wrote, he accepted the 
invitation to a conference but stipulated ‘that I should not be called upon, 
for either practice or performance of any Court ceremony’ (Amherst to 
Canning, 28 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 258). His 
letter informed the emperor:
The great affairs of empire being best conducted by precedent, 
his Royal Highness has instructed me to approach Your Imperial 
presence with the same outward expression of respect that were 
received by your dignified father Kien-Lung [the Qianlong 
emperor], from the former English Embassador, Lord Macartney, 
that is to say, to kneel upon one knee and to bow the head, 
repeating this obeisance the number of times deemed respectful. 
(Lord Amherst to the Emperor of China, August 1816, in Ellis, 
1817, p. 497, Appendix 4(a))
Such a ‘particular demonstration of veneration from English Embassadors’ 
was shown only to Chinese emperors (Lord Amherst to the Emperor 
of China, August 1816, in Ellis, 1817, p. 497, Appendix 4(a)). ‘I shall 
consider it the most fortunate circumstance of my life to be enabled 
thus to show my profound devotion to the most potent Emperor in the 
universe’ (Lord Amherst to the Emperor of China, August 1816, in Ellis, 
1817, p. 497, Appendix 4(a)). The letter concluded with a request that 
Amherst be received in an imperial audience to personally deliver the 
Prince Regent’s letter. He hoped the emperor would ‘graciously consider 
the necessity of my obeying the commands of my Sovereign’ (Lord 
Amherst to the Emperor of China, August 1816, in Ellis, 1817, p. 497, 
Appendix 4(a)).
The meeting with Heshitai and Muketenge was due to be held at the 
Literary Hall situated in a small building in the middle of the city, some 
two miles from where the boats were moored (Morrison, 1820, p. 47). 
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Torrential rain was falling and the road was terrible. Amherst and the 
commissioners travelled in palanquins after refusing some ‘primitive 
carts’ drawn by mules. Chang-wei and Yin were fearful that this honour 
would come to the attention of the emperor given the close proximity of 
Tongzhou to Peking.
The Hall of Audience, the British noted, was ‘a mean, dirty looking 
house, with the roof overgrown by grass’ (Davis, 1841, p. 114). ‘Crowds 
of mandarins’ met the British in the courtyard where Amherst, Staunton, 
Ellis, Morrison and Jeffrey were conducted into a small hall to meet 
the imperial commissioners (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). The rest 
of the embassy had to wait either in the pouring rain or face the risk of 
‘suffocation in a crowded room of ill-savoured and importunate Chinese’ 
(Abel, 1818, p. 96).
Heshitai, Muketenge, Sulenge, Guanghui and the six ‘Lads of Mougden’ 
were waiting to receive the British. Amherst was informed by Heshitai 
that he and Muketenge were sent to instruct Amherst on performing the 
ceremony and that he now wished to see Amherst perform it correctly. 
Amherst reiterated that he had never intimated that he would perform 
the ceremony and had been ordered by his sovereign to follow the 
same ceremony as Macartney that had been acceptable to the Qianlong 
emperor. Heshitai replied:
What happened in the fifty-eighth year [1793] belonged to that 
year; the present is the affair of this Embassy, and the regulations of 
the celestial empire must be complied with; there is no alternative. 
(as quoted in Ellis, 1817, p. 148)
Amherst added he was confident that the Jiaqing emperor would accept 
the ceremony performed by Macartney before his father. Heshitai 
responded vehemently and informed Amherst:
As in heaven there are not two Suns, so on earth there are not two 
Sovereigns. The Great Emperor is Teen-tsze, ‘the Son of Heaven’; 
before him all Kings should bow down. (as quoted in Morrison, 
1820, p. 48)
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The commissioner then turned towards Morrison, who had earlier been 
seen reading a work by Confucius, and continued:
You know it … [the ceremony] has existed from the highest 
antiquity, and cannot be altered. Without the performance of this 
ceremony, the Embassador and his tribute will be … rejected and 
cast out. (as quoted in Morrison, 1820, p. 48)
Heshitai, Morrison (1820, p. 48) noted, gestured with his hands in an 
outward motion as he pronounced the last word.
This belief, in the British view, was an ‘absurd pretension’. Regardless of 
such absurdities, Amherst wrote, ‘I did not think this a reasonable moment 
to assert the perfect equality of my own Sovereign’ (Amherst to Canning, 
28 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 258). Rather, he praised 
the emperor as ‘one of the greatest Sovereigns in the world’ and it was for 
this reason that the Prince Regent had sent him to compliment His Majesty 
(Morrison, 1820, p. 48). Heshitai, Morrison (1820, p. 48) reported, smiled 
at this moment, and gave Amherst a small purse from his belt. The Chinese 
Government, Heshitai responded, considered the British with greater 
esteem than other nations because they spoke Chinese and read Chinese 
books. This was demonstrated by the honour bestowed on the British of 
delegating mandarins of such high rank to escort the embassy (Staunton, 
1824, p. 81). Nevertheless, the British must kowtow. Amherst remained 
calm and dignified. The British position on the ceremony was explained yet 
again. He told Heshitai that he had already written a letter informing the 
emperor of his position, but Guanghui now confessed that he had not dared 
pass it on to the authorities.
After 20 minutes, the British sensed the meeting was drawing to a close. 
Enquiring if another meeting was planned, Heshitai told Amherst that he 
never paid visits and that the present meeting was equivalent to one held 
before the emperor. He added, ‘lips quivering with rage’, that the embassy 
would be dismissed if Amherst did not comply with the proper ceremony 
(Ellis, 1817, p. 149). At this, Amherst placed his sealed letter to the 
emperor into Heshitai’s hands and turned to leave the room. His actions, 
the British were pleased to note, had the desired effect. Heshitai was taken 
by surprise and the ‘lofty tone assumed by the tartars was checked as their 
attention was arrested by the sight of the Emperor’s name’ (Amherst to 
Canning, 28 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 262). The 
British were shown a little more civility with the Chinese escorting them 
to the door. Amherst was confident that ‘negotiation might be considered 
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as still remaining open’ despite all that had taken place at the meeting 
(Amherst to Canning, 28 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) 
F 262).
Heshitai’s acceptance of Amherst’s letter was encouraging, although doubt 
remained of it ever reaching the emperor. In the event that it did, the 
British hoped it might persuade the emperor to accept their position on 
the ceremony. If, on the other hand, permission to proceed to Peking 
was denied, the conciliatory tone of the letter was thought to at least 
ensure a civil return to Canton ‘and allow us to part pretty good friends’ 
(Davis, 1841, p. 116).
23 August: Amherst’s Letter Dismissed
Chang-wei called on Morrison in the morning with news that Amherst’s 
letter was being returned. The mandarins, Morrison was informed 
unofficially, had opened the letter on a pretext of legal protocol over 
the manner in which the emperor’s address was written on the cover; 
while Amherst’s title ‘Ambassador’ had been included, his name had not. 
Such an omission, the British were told, was defined under Chinese law 
as an anonymous address to the emperor and could never be delivered 
(Ellis, 1817, p. 150). The letter, Chang-wei admitted, was a ‘very good 
one’, but it could not be forwarded to the emperor (Staunton, 1824, 
p.  82). He enquired once again about Amherst’s ‘final sentiments 
respecting the ceremony’, but Morrison told him that this would only be 
discussed after the ambassador had received a communication from the 
emperor (Staunton, 1824, p. 82).
Further strategic discussion took place among the British. As noted 
previously, Ellis, by this stage, was having serious doubts about the wisdom 
of refusing to kowtow. He wrote, ‘The bearing of my mind, uninfluenced, 
and unaided by local knowledge, [began] to regret that the reception 
or dismissal of the Embassy should entirely turn upon the question of 
ceremony’ (1817, p. 151). Regardless of Ellis’s reservations, Staunton 
decided it was expedient to complain formally about the mandarins’ 
refusal to send the letter to the emperor, pointing out that it was an 
official document and it would be the mandarins’ responsibility should 
the embassy be expelled (Staunton, 1824, p. 82). A short statement on the 
exchange of presents ‘and other arrangements’ was planned in the hope of 
preserving good relations between Britain and China.
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Negotiations at this time took place mainly between Chang-wei and 
Morrison, a fact that later drew criticism from one British commentator 
who pointed out, correctly, that Morrison was an interpreter and not 
vested with authority to conduct a diplomatic dialogue (Anonymous, 
1818).22 Chang-wei, meanwhile, made a second call later in the morning 
and handed Amherst’s letter to Morrison, requesting that he add Amherst’s 
name to the front cover. Heshitai had agreed to forward the letter to the 
emperor if this was done. Chang-wei again urged that Amherst comply 
with the ceremony but admitted privately to Morrison that he thought 
too much was being made of the issue. Morrison wrote:
He did not seem at heart favourable to submission; he always 
called it ‘their Tartar ceremony’, and disclaimed the idea of it 
being Chinese. ‘They were’, he said, ‘most tenacious of it; so much 
so, that old infirm people, who could no longer kneel or stand, 
were caused to raise themselves from the seat on which they sat, 
and fall down again with a bump, the number of times that others 
knocked their head’. (1820, p. 50)
Chang-wei explained that because the British had come to China in 
a voluntary capacity, it was the ceremony that was valued and not the 
presents. He added, significantly, that the Chinese could not make an 
exception for the Amherst Embassy as this would set a precedent for 
future diplomatic missions. Morrison replied that such ancient rules 
were no longer applicable to powerful nations—a good host would 
permit the British to observe their own ceremonies that, in turn, would 
serve to only increase the esteem of the emperor among foreign nations 
(Morrison, 1820, p. 51).
Chang-wei returned to the business at hand and suggested that Morrison 
change the wording in the letter from ‘the King of England had cultivated 
amity with Keen-lung’ to ‘Keen-lung had treated the King of England 
amicably’ (Morrison, 1820, p. 51). The British agreed to this change in 
the wording and also to the inclusion of Amherst’s full name on the cover. 
Chang-wei next requested that the phrase referring to Amherst performing 
22  A delicate enquiry into the embassies to China and a legitimate conclusion (1818) is an anonymously 
authored 30-page pamphlet published in response to the failure of both the Macartney and the 
Amherst embassies. Morrison was specifically criticised for not accurately relaying some of the 
mandarins’ comments, thereby placing Amherst at ‘his mercy’. The author argued that, had Amherst 
been properly informed, he would have immediately broken off negotiations and returned to 
England. Morrison’s role was questioned: ‘what right or authority [does] Mr. Morrison, [have] acting 
as interpreter?’ (p. 2).
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his ceremony on one knee be changed to ‘two knees’. Morrison dismissed 
this proposal as childish because such a change would render Amherst’s 
letter as useless (Morrison, 1820, p. 51).
Chang-wei now handed Amherst an extract from the imperial records that 
not only recorded that Macartney had performed the kowtow, but also 
that the Jiaqing emperor remembered his doing so. Ellis (1817) admitted, 
‘With this imperial assertion before us, however false or erroneous, it will 
be difficult, in the event of a renewed discussion, to press the precedent of 
Macartney’ (p. 154).
Staunton, in a rare reference to Manning, described a private conversation 
Manning had held with an inferior mandarin who had visited him 
ostensibly on the pretence of grounds of civility. Manning soon realised 
his real purpose was to acquire some further intelligence on the intentions 
of the British regarding the ceremony. Manning listened to what the 
mandarin had to say before informing him of the reasonableness and 
the ‘immutability’ of the British decision (Staunton, 1824, p. 83).
24 August: An Attack on Staunton
Chang-wei visited Morrison early the next morning. Heshitai had refused 
to send Amherst’s letter to the emperor and would only do so if the 
ambassador declared that he was prepared to perform the kowtow. The 
emperor, the British discovered, had seen the letter but had decided not 
to make a formal response, confirming instead that he had witnessed 
Macartney performing the kowtow before the Qianlong emperor. 
Amherst diplomatically suggested that because Macartney’s ceremony 
was so similar to the kowtow that the Jiaqing emperor had probably 
mistaken one for the other. Further, he probably viewed the ceremony 
at some distance where his view was obstructed by the crowd and where 
Macartney’s long robes would ‘have the effect, in the eyes of His Imperial 
Majesty, of a salutation such as his Imperial Majesty required’ (Amherst 
to Canning, 28 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 264).
Chang-wei paid yet another visit to Morrison in the afternoon. Amherst 
wrote, ‘New matters [now] arose, such as to make every step taken by 
myself in conjunction with my colleagues the subject of serious reflection 
and deliberation’ (Amherst to Canning, 28 February 1817, in BL IOR 
G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 264). The emperor, Morrison was informed, had 
205
8 . THE IMPERIAL BANqUET OF 13 AUGUST 1816 AND PROGRESS TO TONGzHOU
received a report from Canton informing him of the presence of ‘mere 
traders’ in the embassy suite—the embassy, therefore, was not legitimate. 
Staunton specifically:
Had been appointed … in consequence of his knowledge of the 
usages of the Celestial Empire; but [knowing these he] failed in his 
duty … as he did not inform the Embassador of them, and persuade 
him to comply with the ceremony. (Morrison, 1820, p. 52)
Amherst understood that the situation was now serious as British trade 
was being directly threatened by the Qing court. Chang-wei suggested 
that Staunton’s time at Canton was limited unless he gave Amherst proper 
advice. Stories of Staunton’s wealth had reached the court with reports 
of splendid apartments, fine aviaries, horses at Macao and that Staunton 
had bought his position in the embassy (Staunton, 1824, p. 85). Such 
information was symptomatic of the inaccuracies and shortcomings of 
Chinese intelligence as its facts were not true of Staunton but referred 
rather to another Englishman, Thomas Beale, a wealthy private trader 
and long-term resident of Canton who was also the Honorary Prussian 
Consul (Staunton, 1824, p. 89).23 The British tried to stop this very 
‘improper harangue’. Amherst asserted that he resented such accusations, 
adding that the British Government and the Prince Regent could appoint 
whom it liked to its embassies. Amherst took the initiative and asked 
Chang-wei to provide a set date of departure if the embassy was not to 
be received. Chang-wei ignored the request and turned the conversation 
back to the topic of the ceremony, which was argued over again at some 
length with no resolution.
Chang-wei paid another call in the early evening. The Chinese wanted 
letters written to the captains of the British ships ordering them to stop at 
the next port they visited. Amherst agreed. The British suspected that the 
report regarding Staunton was written by the acting viceroy of Canton on 
the advice of a Portuguese judge whose ‘badness of character’ as well as ‘his 
determined hostility to the English’ were sufficiently known to justify the 
suspicion (Ellis, 1817, p. 161). Amherst and the commissioners refused 
to enter into any discussion on the matter, although Morrison privately 
informed Chang-wei that the report was of an absurd and scandalous 
nature (Staunton, 1824, p. 87).
23  Eastberg (2009) noted that Beale had made his fortune through the private opium trade. 
The association made by the Qing court of Staunton with Beale, Eastberg suggested, was a scheme 
engineered to associate the embassy with opium smuggling (p. 187).
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The British read the personal attack on Staunton as a devious Chinese 
attempt to intimidate them and as a tactic designed to influence favourable 
outcomes. Staunton believed that such intelligence about him would 
never have been brought to the attention of the British had it not been for 
the impasse of the ceremony. He wrote:
The Chinese know perfectly well that the rank and station of 
the East-India Company’s senior servants at Canton is perfectly 
distinct from that of private merchants, and that the offices 
they hold are of a nature fully equivalent to those of their own 
magistrates, and this they have even specially acknowledged in 
a public edict … it is their object to seize upon any pretext to 
depreciate an Embassy they are threatening to dismiss; and thus 
their pretended objections to its constitution may be accounted 
for. (1824, p. 88)
25 August
Chang-wei informed the British that an imperial letter to the Prince 
Regent was in the process of being composed and it was planned to hand 
this to them in the event of the embassy’s dismissal. Arrangements for the 
reception of the Prince Regent’s presents also had to be organised. Chang-
wei gave Morrison some hope that the presents might still be accepted 
and told him there were still some ‘enlightened men in the emperor’s 
councils’ (Staunton, 1824, p. 90). Heshitai, however, was conspicuous 
by his absence and silence. The British had to sit tight and await events.
Chang-wei paid Morrison two more visits that day. News from his friends 
at the court reported that the emperor was ‘extremely enraged’ over the 
disappearance of the British ships. Further, the local viceroy had ordered 
the doubling of the guard around the British embassy to prevent Staunton 
from engaging in any communication with ‘evilly disposed Chinese’. 
Staunton found this news ‘rather mysterious and alarming’, but as the 
British were due to receive a copy of the edict the next day, he reserved 
his opinion until he had read it (Staunton, 1824, p. 91). The presence of 
the Chinese troops, in Abel’s opinion, kept the British in ‘a state of uneasy 
feeling’ but failed to alter Amherst’s decision on the ceremony (Staunton, 
1824, p. 97).
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Meanwhile, reports of ‘Two Russians, and a Frenchman in the service 
of Russia’ hovering near the British quarters reached the British. They 
wore Chinese dress, spoke in French and were from the Russian College 
at Peking, but were prevented by the Chinese guards from getting close 
to the British (Staunton, 1824, p. 83). On the first day, the Frenchman 
managed to strike up a conversation with ‘Vincent, the Negro drummer 
of the band’ (Staunton, 1824, p. 83). He told Vincent that he had been 
in China for nine years and wished to talk with Amherst, but the British 
thought it best not to encourage any communication with him or the 
other missionaries (Ellis, 1817, p. 162). The motive for the visit was not 
known. The fact that Chinese troops prevented them from contact with 
the British suggested that they had not been sent by the court. On the 
other hand, it may have been a genuine attempt to engage the British for 
the latest news on international events.
26 August: Amherst is Confronted with 
a ‘Severe Test’
Reports from the acting viceroy of Canton and the viceroy of Peking 
reached the British in the morning. The Canton report was a public 
version and contained none of the ‘disparaging insinuations’ mentioned 
by Chang-wei. On the contrary, Staunton wrote that it was favourable 
both to himself and to the embassy (1824, p. 92). But the report from 
the viceroy of Peking referred specifically to Staunton as ‘an object of 
suspicion’ as well as ‘a person who certainly has the power, and may have 
the will, of combining with the natives against the government’ (as quoted 
in Staunton, 1824, p. 92). Staunton attributed the suspicion and hostility 
shown towards him to the unsettled political state of northern China:
The province in which we are in, has been lately in a state of open 
rebellion … and estimating the invariable jealousy and suspicion, 
which, in the most favourable and quiet times, the Chinese look 
upon foreigners, especially the English, and most of all, those who 
are acquainted with their language, and are therefore, supposed 
to have the means of detecting the real circumstances of the 
country;—it may perhaps be pronounced that there is nothing 
very extraordinary in the Pekin viceroy’s edict. (1824, p. 92)
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The fact that the British were permitted to read the document suggested an 
alternative interpretation—a deliberate Chinese attempt at intimidation. 
Staunton thought that ‘the rejection of the Embassy [was] no longer the 
worst of the contingencies which may be apprehended’ (1824, p. 93). 
Rather, there was a serious possibility that Staunton could be arrested. 
Staunton warned Amherst that the embassy now faced a ‘severe test’ 
(p. 93). Amherst, acknowledging Staunton’s advice, wrote Heshitai a letter 
requesting specific notification as to whether or not the emperor intended 
to admit the embassy or expel it (p. 93).
Davis and Hayne delivered Amherst’s letter to Heshitai’s quarters where 
they handed it to Chang-wei. Amherst accepted an invitation to visit 
Heshitai the following day where a marked change in the commissioner’s 
attitude towards the embassy was noted. Bullying had obviously not 
worked and Staunton thought the time had come for the British to ‘decide 
finally upon the question of submission or resistance’ (p. 94).
Amherst’s Initial Thoughts on Performing 
the Kowtow
Some of the British read Heshitai’s conciliatory gesture as an encouraging 
sign. The idea of performing the Chinese ceremony was even considered 
if  the court gave a guarantee on the opening of negotiations on the 
embassy’s goals. Amherst and Ellis were ‘strongly against … closing 
the door to negotiation while anything like a hope remained of any of the 
objects of the Embassy being attained by concession’ (Staunton, 1824, 
p. 94). Compliance, in their view, was ‘preferable to damaging British 
interests at Canton by allowing the mission to fail’ (Staunton as quoted 
in Tuck, 2000, p. xxxi). Further, Amherst, it appears, was following 
Lamiot’s advice to delay as long as possible in giving into Chinese 
demands.24 Staunton, however, stood firm on the decision not to kowtow, 
arguing that its performance would represent Britain’s submission to the 
Jiaqing emperor, which would irrevocably threaten British honour and 
independence at Canton. He realised that being granted a mere audience 
with the emperor would serve no purpose and would result in only a 
few ceremonial pleasantries, at best, with no scope for serious negotiation 
24  Lamiot’s advice, as noted in Chapter 6 of this study, was referenced in Amherst’s ‘Notes on policy 
to be pursued by the British Embassy to China’ (BL MSS EUR F 140/36).
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on British goals. Staunton’s stand on the kowtow question, however, 
provides the evidence for Tuck (2000) and other historians to blame him 
specifically for the failure of the Amherst Embassy.
27 August: Meeting with Heshitai
The conference between the imperial commissioner and Amherst held 
on 27 August 1816 had important repercussions for the future conduct 
of the embassy. Heshitai had concluded that Amherst, ‘might be induced 
by certain concessions’ to kowtow (Ellis, 1817, p. 195). The British were 
received with much civility (p. 169). Heshitai, Muketenge, Sulenge and 
Guanghui rose to greet the British when they entered the inner court. 
The British were conducted to their chairs, which were placed on the left 
side of the courtyard. Heshitai took the upper seat, while Amherst sat 
in the chair on the right. Such an arrangement, Staunton noted, placed 
Amherst opposite Sulenge, while Morrison was seated so far down the 
line that communicating with him was impossible. Accordingly, Heshitai 
called for another chair for Morrison to be placed alongside Amherst. 
All the other mandarins, including Guanghui, stood.
Heshitai began the conference with the customary polite questions 
enquiring how far the embassy had travelled and the distance between 
Britain and China. He then turned to the topic of the ceremony and 
wanted to make sure that Chang-wei had adequately explained all its 
details. The emperor was insistent, Heshitai explained, that Macartney 
had kowtowed to his father and would accept no other form of ceremony 
(Amherst to Canning, 28 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) 
F 265). Although Heshitai spoke in a more conciliatory tone, Staunton 
thought his displeasure was never far from the surface. The exalted rank 
of the emperor, Heshitai maintained, outranked the status of a king. 
Amherst replied that his allegiance was to his own sovereign. Heshitai told 
Morrison, ‘take care how you persist, lest you expose your king himself to 
the emperor’s displeasure’ (as quoted in Staunton, 1824, p. 96). Staunton 
(1824) commented that Morrison ‘very properly checked the duke 
immediately, by saying that he did not dare to interpret to the Ambassador 
such a remark’ (p. 96). Morrison’s decision not to inform Amherst of this 
fact once again incited later British criticism in a review of the embassy 
(Anonymous, 1818, p. 4).
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Heshitai, attempting to ‘deflect tensions’, turned his attention to Jeffrey 
and called the boy to his chair. Jeffrey wrote that he ‘condescendingly … 
[gave] me with his own hands four purses and his fan upon which he 
wrote some Chinese characters’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Davis was 
sceptical of the mandarin’s kindness and thought it was proof of ‘the low 
estimate which the Chinese generally entertain of European intellects and 
feelings, to suppose for a moment that they could be influenced in such 
a way’ (Davis, 1841, p. 137).
The British took the opportunity to raise some of their objectives with 
Heshitai, specifically, the feasibility of opening consular representation 
in Peking, thereby enabling direct communication between the British 
merchants at Canton with one of the tribunals of the emperor’s court. The 
emperor, Staunton pointed out, had always ‘professed to extend his regard 
and protections to foreigners’ (1824, p. 97). The British desired only those 
rights accorded to the ‘meanest of the emperor’s own subjects’ who had 
the right to appeal through tribunals up to the highest authority to the 
emperor himself (p. 97). Heshitai thought this was a reasonable request 
and assured the British that he would be their ‘friend and advocate’ on this 
or on any other issue as long as they complied with the ceremony: ‘Comply 
with the Tartar ceremony, and I am your friend at Pekin’ (as quoted in 
Ellis, 1817, p. 170). But, he added, he could not anticipate the emperor’s 
response to British demands:
It might as well be asked of him, whether he thought it would rain 
or thunder to-morrow. The ways of the Son of Heaven were, like 
those of Heaven itself, inscrutable. (as quoted in Morrison, 1820, 
p. 54)
Testament to what was at stake, Amherst told Heshitai that he would 
reconsider his decision on the ceremony and would give a final answer in 
the afternoon.
The Final British Decision on the Kowtow
The British discussed the expediency of complying with the ceremony on 
return to their compound. Amherst and Ellis thought a performance of the 
ceremony in the emperor’s presence was expedient if there was a possibility 
of the goals of the embassy being discussed. Staunton’s (1824) memoirs 
explained their attitude in the context of the ‘considerable sacrifice of 
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private and personal feeling, to what they conceived to be the line of 
their public duty’ (p. 99). Their approach, according to Staunton, was the 
result both of Heshitai’s offer of support on one hand, and recent attempts 
to intimidate him personally and harm British commercial interests at 
Canton on the other (p. 100).
Amherst thought that his position was more complicated than it had 
appeared at the start of his embassy. Staunton’s initial briefing on the 
kowtow, given on board the ships before the embassy landed in northern 
China, did not reflect on the possibility of either harm to the Company 
and trade at Canton, or on the contingency of a personal attack on 
Staunton as the Company’s most senior executive. Amherst concluded:
Such a result would indeed have produced the very mischief against 
which I have been specially cautioned. Not only former grievances 
would not have been removed, but new misunderstandings would 
have arisen, and new evils would have been incurred. (Amherst 
to Canning, 28 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) 
F 268)
Amherst now asked Staunton if he had changed his mind on the potential 
risks to the Canton trade if he went ahead and kowtowed before the 
emperor. Staunton realised that the responsibility for the future of the 
embassy now fell to him and decided to consult with the other Company 
members of the embassy from Canton. He wrote:
Four of the five gentlemen who accompanied me had resided 
nine or ten years in China, and possessed such acknowledged 
talents, judgment, and local experience, as must necessarily entitle 
their opinions to considerable weight; and the fifth, Mr. Davis, 
though a young servant of the company, had displayed talents, 
and evinced a zeal in his application to the study of the language, 
which entitled his opinions to an attention beyond his years. 
(1824, p. 102)
Toone, Davis and Pearson were strongly against complying with the 
ceremony. Morrison and Manning had their reservations.25 Morrison was 
strongly against the kowtow in principle, but thought on this occasion 
that Company interests might justify compliance (Ellis, 1817, p. 172, 
25  Manning, as noted in Chapter 4 (fn. 6), had performed the ceremony of kowtow before the 
‘Grand Lama’ (who was seven years of age) at Lhasa during his visit to Tibet in 1811 (Markham, 1876, 
p. 265). A distinction needs to be made here between Manning, as a private individual travelling in 
a non-official capacity, and Amherst, who was an ambassador appointed by the British sovereign.
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note). On the conclusion of the consultations, Amherst decided to accept 
Staunton’s advice and that of his colleagues and refuse to perform the 
prostration ceremony. He was swayed by Staunton’s argument that to 
kowtow would not only represent a humiliating back down from the 
British position but would also ‘encourage the local government at Canton 
to assume a tone of official superiority fatal to the independence of the 
trade’ (Amherst to Canning, 28 February 1817, in BL  IOR G/12/197 
(Reel 2) F 270). Amherst wrote a note immediately to the mandarins 
informing them of his final decision not to kowtow. The historian Tuck 
(2000) has noted that, by this time, Heshitai had committed himself to 
‘ensuring the success of the Embassy’ and had sent a misleading report to 
the emperor on 28 August that the embassy, ‘despite not having rehearsed 
the Kotow, would certainly perform the full ceremonial at the imperial 
audience’ (p. xxxi).26
Amherst, obviously unaware of Heshitai’s report, wrote in his official 
report, ‘From this time, I am at a loss to account for the proceedings of 
the Chinese Authorities’ (Amherst to Canning, 28 February 1817, in BL 
IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 270). Heshitai visited Amherst immediately 
on receipt of his note. Rather than bringing news that the embassy was to 
be expelled, he told Amherst that the emperor had ordered the embassy 
to pack up immediately in preparation for leaving for Yuanmingyuan the 
next day. Amherst checked to make sure that it was understood he would 
not be performing the kowtow. Guanghui, according to Morrison (1820), 
seemed to say ‘yes’ and bowed his head, which the British understood as 
affirming, ‘You are to be received according to the forms you propose’ 
(p. 54). Guanghui, according to Ellis (1817), replied:
Both parties in the discussion had done their duty, but that now 
the affair was settled, and [the British] might be perfectly easy; the 
ceremony would not be again mentioned, and that [they] might 
rely upon the Emperor’s kindness, whose heart was truly liberal 
and expanded. (p. 173)
26  Tuck’s (2000) conclusion is puzzling as Heshitai had qualified his expression of support and had 
made it clear that he could not guarantee the attainment of any of the embassy’s objectives. Staunton 
later wrote that Heshitai’s assurances of support were quickly dismissed as unreliable and, after closer 
scrutiny, were not a sufficient basis on which to comply with the kowtow ceremony (see Minute of 
Sir George Thomas Staunton, 18 January 1817, in Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, pp. 303–304).
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This was a pivotal discussion for the outcome of the embassy for it 
firmly established in Amherst’s mind what was expected of him at any 
forthcoming imperial reception. He told Canning, ‘My invitation to the 
Tartar Court had been given upon an express understanding that I should 
not be called upon for the performance of prostration’ (Amherst to 
Canning, 3 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 280).
The British had another surprise. Chang-wei and Yin brought disturbing 
news that Guanghui and Sulenge were currently being investigated over 
the conduct of the embassy. The emperor had found them responsible 
for the expenses incurred by permitting the embassy to leave Tianjin 
and Guanghui had been stripped of his position in the Salt Department 
(Ellis, 1817, p. 174). Chang-wei added that further fatal consequences 
might befall Guanghui if the embassy did not arrive at Peking the 
following day.
Amherst refused to be hurried. His priority was to make a very dignified 
entrance at the Chinese capital and he was not prepared to leave Tongzhou 
until ‘every thing connected with the public appearance of the Embassy 
had been dispatched to Pekin’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 174).
So ended a couple of weeks of intense and stressful negotiations for both 
parties. Not only had Amherst been placed under increasing pressure 
to comply with Qing tributary diplomatic protocol, but the mandarins 
faced considerable pressure to ensure that the emperor’s instructions were 
carried out. The negotiations had gone into overdrive at the beginning of 
the official banquet on 13 August 1816 when Amherst was confronted 
with a concealed diplomatic ‘trip-wire’ to establish if he was prepared 
to perform the kowtow. Amherst, to his credit, had recognised the trap 
immediately on entering the banquet hall as a result of his pre-departure 
research on the Golovkin Embassy of 1806, involving a table handsomely 
dressed in yellow silk with embroidered dragons said to represent the 
presence of the emperor.
In retrospect, Amherst had been variously pressured and threatened in 
relation to Staunton, as well as cajoled and induced to kowtow if he wished 
to secure an audience with the Jiaqing emperor and avoid the immediate 
expulsion of his embassy. The British had landed some counter-punches of 
their own by demanding their performance of the kowtow be reciprocated 
by a mandarin of equivalent rank to Amherst before a portrait of the 
Prince Regent, which was rejected by the Chinese. The departure of the 
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British ships on a reconnaissance mission to Korea and the Ryukyu Islands 
immediately after landing the party at Dagu had infuriated the emperor 
and meant that the Chinese Government was responsible for the cost and 
safety of the embassy’s passage overland to Canton.
Admittedly, concessions and allowances had been made by both sides in an 
effort to keep the embassy on schedule for an audience with the emperor 
before his departure for Jehol. The dispatch of increasingly more senior 
mandarins by the Qing court as the embassy advanced closer to Peking 
indicated the court’s determination to achieve a favourable outcome to the 
impasse over the kowtow. The British became puzzled when, on a number 
of occasions, it appeared as though they were to be expelled, only to have 
the order rescinded at the last minute. Thus, the final instruction in late 
August to proceed from Tongzhou to Peking caught the British by surprise 
and it was with not a little foreboding that they set off for Yuanmingyuan.
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To Yuanmingyuan, Reception 
and Dismissal
The final leg of the Amherst Embassy’s slow, uncomfortable and often 
hazardous journey to the Summer Palace of Yuanmingyuan ended badly. 
The embassy’s reception, its expulsion and the immediate aftermath of 
its dismissal on its return journey to Tongzhou had a profound effect 
on British perceptions of the Qing court, confirming the futility of 
any future diplomatic overtures to achieve British objectives in China. 
The diplomatic encounter underlined the political and cultural differences 
between an increasingly powerful British national state whose diplomatic 
practice was based on notions of equality, free advocacy, negotiation and 
international law, and those of an ancient civilisation based on empire, 
Confucian values, obedience and despotic rule. Qing values and codes 
of behaviour were reflected in the actions and attitudes of high-ranking 
mandarins who, in British terms, represented the elite of courtly and civil 
society. Amherst himself was a courtier at St James’s whose familiarity 
with British and European courts would have raised expectations of at 
least a gracious reception at Yuanmingyuan. His experience, however, 
exposed the critical difference between the status of an ambassador within 
the Westphalian system of diplomacy and that in the Qing court where 
an ambassador was received as a mere messenger sent to deliver their 
sovereign’s letter and bear their presents or tribute to the emperor.
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Figure 8: Portrait of the Jiaqing emperor (r. 1796–1820).
Source: Wikipedia Commons .
28 August: Preparations for Leaving 
Tongzhou and the Journey to Peking
The sudden and unexpected summons for the embassy to pack up and 
proceed to Peking engaged the British and the Chinese in immediate 
preparations for the 12-mile journey to the Summer Palace. Chinese 
packers worked throughout the night unloading the British presents for 
the emperor. Chang-wei’s arrival the following morning with instructions 
for the embassy to hurry its preparations in order to leave as soon as 
possible because the emperor was waiting only added to the ‘bustle and 
confusion’. Amherst’s splendid carriage was unpacked and the coachman 
took great care to prepare it for the trip to the imperial capital, but Morrison 
(1820) thought that Bengal palanquins would have been better suited 
to the terrible roads and advised they be used in any future embassy to 
Peking (p. 55). Chinese wagons, pulled by teams of five horses, carried the 
embassy’s luggage, while individual members of the embassy travelled in 
small carts drawn by mules. These, the British said, were ‘bone breaking’, 
while Abel (1818) complained that his horse was a ‘miserable looking 
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animal … having all his bony points extremely prominent’ (p. 98). Davis 
and two British officers of the guard had planned to ride to Peking, but 
they too were disappointed with the very inferior horses provided. Further, 
Chinese saddles were most uncomfortable and the stirrups were far too 
short (p. 98). Similarly, Amherst’s London coachman was mortified 
at the appearance of the four mules assigned to pull the ambassador’s 
magnificent barouche. The coachman, according to Davis (1841):
Having prepared the carriage … with as much care and pains as 
for a birthday at St. James’s … gave an ‘exclamation of despair’ on 
first seeing the four mules provided to draw the carriage: ‘Lord, 
sir, these cats will never do!’ ‘But they must do!’ was the reply, 
for nothing better existed in the whole empire. The collars of 
the English harness hung down like mandarin necklaces, and the 
whole of the caparison sat like a loose gown. (p. 143, emphasis 
in original)
Jeffrey described the four mules as ‘poor wretches [who] made a sorry 
figure, when caparisoned with the magnificent English harness … which 
was made for horses sixteen hands high’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.).
Other circumstances held up the embassy’s departure including the 
arrangements for the transportation of two sick embassy personnel. 
The Chinese had provided two small wicker baskets carried by porters 
for their use, but these were considered as most unsuitable and Amherst 
accordingly allocated two of the palanquins (Staunton, 1824, p. 110). 
The sick men were also given large doses of opium to ease their pain.
The Embassy Sets Off for Peking
The embassy eventually left Tongzhou at four o’clock in the afternoon. 
Amherst, Ellis, Staunton and Jeffrey led the procession travelling in the 
barouche ‘drawn by four stout mules, the coachman driving on the box, 
and the postilion riding on one of the leaders’ (Staunton, 1824, p. 110). 
Four palanquins followed, including the two with the sick men. Next in 
line were Abel, Somerset and Lieutenant Cooke on horseback followed 
by ‘one-man’ carts carrying the rest of the embassy personnel. Bringing 
up the rear were the wagons carrying the band, servants, marines and 
baggage. Surrounding the procession were the ‘mandarins and soldiers in 
chairs and carts, on horseback and on foot’ (Abel, 1818, p. 99).
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Progress was at a snail’s pace. After skirting the city of Tongzhou, the 
procession eventually reached the paved granite road that led to Peking. 
While the road looked impressive, deep ruts between the large blocks of 
stone marred its surface and presented a danger to the barouche’s wheels. 
Despite a few jolts, Jeffrey pointed out, the passengers travelling in the 
barouche were more comfortable than the occupants of the covered 
Chinese carts who were ‘jumbled’ into ‘Mummies’ and whose journey was 
‘quite intolerable’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.; see also Staunton, 1824, 
p. 111).
The embassy had travelled only five miles before it grew dark. ‘It was 
evident’, Amherst wrote, ‘that altho’ no reason was alleged for its’ [sic] 
necessity, that we were to be exposed to the inconvenience of a night 
journey’ (Amherst to Canning, 8 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 
(Reel 2) F 285). Abel’s horse was so uncomfortable that he decided to walk 
but soon changed his mind when he was surrounded immediately by ‘a 
crowd of Chinese soldiers and porters … and peasants who had assembled 
from the neighbourhood’ (Abel, 1818, p. 100). He was rescued from the 
crowd’s attention with the appearance of Vincent, the black drummer, 
who diverted their curiosity:
This man, of a fine figure, six feet in height, of a jet black 
complexion, was an object of irresistible curiosity with the 
Chinese. Wherever he went, crowds followed, and left every other 
person of the Embassy to gaze upon him. To feel his hands, and 
to compare their colour with that of their own; to endeavour by 
signs to ascertain from what part of the world he came, was their 
frequent and eager employment. We always thought ourselves 
fortunate in our excursions when he had preceded us, and carried 
off the mob. (p. 100)
Walking in the dark, however, was difficult and after a couple of severe 
falls caused by holes in the road, Abel took refuge in the cart of a friend.
The procession came to a halt at an inn, described as a dilapidated building, 
at nine o’clock at night where the British were greeted by Guanghui and 
Sulenge and invited to dine. Amherst described the meal as ‘a disgusting 
repast where a scramble was … made for such food as extreme hunger 
only would have rendered palatable’ (Amherst to Canning, 8  March 
1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 286). Abel (1818) wrote of ‘fowls 
served up whole, but without any instruments to carve them. We were 
consequently obliged, much to the amusement of the bye-standers, to 
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separate the limbs with our fingers’ (p. 100). Morrison (1820) added 
that the food was ‘an attempt at English cookery, [but] it was neither 
English nor Chinese’ (p. 56). Hayne (n.d., vol. 2) was less diplomatic and 
complained of an absence of knives and forks and chopsticks. No wines 
were provided and the only thing to drink was some water in a bucket. 
The table was covered with some ‘nasty trash that none of us could touch 
[where] some hard boiled eggs and some of their bread were the only 
eatables’ (p. 82(a)). He added:
Nothing but L.A.’s [Lord Amherst’s] extraordinary good nature & 
his natural incapability of doing a rude, offensive thing to another, 
would have induced him to attribute this reception to indifference 
on the part of Su & Quang [Sulenge and Guanghui] who had 
doubtless taken excellent care of themselves in a room behind, 
whilst we were in a place little better than a stable yard. (p. 83)
Rumours that the emperor was planning to receive Amherst the following 
day were circulating at the time of the dinner but were dismissed by the 
British as ‘so strange and improbable … [we considered it] merely as a story 
invented at the moment, for the purpose of urging us upon our journey’ 
(Staunton, 1824, p. 112). Chang-wei informed Amherst that their late 
arrival at Peking meant the city gates would be closed but the governor 
was waiting to conduct the embassy through the city to the Summer 
Palace of Yuanmingyuan and orders had been given to ‘illuminate the city 
as [the Embassy] passed through’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.).
After an hour’s rest, the embassy entourage took to the road once more. 
Several carts had been moved in the interim and the Englishmen had 
trouble relocating them. Many ‘wandered [in vain] about for some time in 
the dark, without receiving any assistance … from the numerous Chinese 
… who only grinned on witnessing [our] dilemma’ (Abel, 1818, p. 101). 
Staunton faced the rest of the journey with some trepidation. He wrote:
Although to travel on during the whole of a dark night, on 
a strange and bad road, drawn by mules, never before harnessed 
to  an English carriage, was not in itself a very agreeable or 
promising arrangement, it certainly seemed preferable to any 
longer stay  at the dismal abode at which we had halted … we 
were almost as anxious as our Chinese conductors … to reach the 
termination of our journey. (1824, p. 113)
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The Embassy Enters the Outskirts 
of Peking
British preconceived expectations of entering the Chinese capital in 
a grand style befitting the power and grandeur of the British sovereign 
were soon dashed. The embassy arrived at Peking’s outer suburbs at 
11 o’clock at night in darkness and in disarray, reaching the eastern gate 
an hour later. The governor was not there to greet them, but an immense 
though orderly crowd had gathered and Abel was worried about driving 
over people (Hayne, n.d., vol. 2, p. 85; Abel, 1818, p. 102). Some people 
held little red paper lanterns suspended on sticks in front of them, hoping 
to catch a glimpse of the Englishmen and were most impolite. Hayne 
(n.d., vol. 2) complained, ‘If any of us spoke they endeavoured to repeat 
what we said which produced a loud laugh’ (p. 85). Instead of entering 
the gate, the embassy was turned sharply to the right and proceeded 
northward to skirt the city wall on an outside track described by Amherst 
as ‘a scarcely passable road between the wall and the ditch’ (Amherst to 
Canning, 8 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 286). Jeffrey 
expressed British perplexity at the detour: ‘What could be the motive of 
old Chong [Chang-wei], in inventing such a bouncing falsehood, I don’t 
know’. He complained that the road:
became worse and worse and we were in danger every moment of 
being upset. We were frequently obliged to get out of the carriage 
in order to lighten and enable the Chinese to lift [the carriage] out 
of the holes. (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.)
An accident was waiting to happen. Lieutenant Cooke rode alongside 
Amherst’s barouche to warn of impending dangers and Amherst and 
the commissioners had to vacate their carriage every five or 10 minutes. 
Staunton (1824) wrote:
Our chief danger arose from the ignorance or inattention of our 
Chinese guides, who, not adverting to the precautions necessary 
with a carriage so differently constructed from theirs, often suffered 
us to quit the road, and then called upon us to attempt to regain 
it across steep banks, which were dangerous or impracticable. 
(p. 115)
The men travelling in the carts also suffered from the ‘convulsive throes 
[of such a] primitive machine, without springs, on the rutted granite road’ 
(Davis, 1841, p. 148).
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The western road to Yuanmingyuan was ‘broad, soft, and unpaved’, but 
recent heavy rain had resulted in flooding that slowed the procession and 
caused vehicles to become bogged (Staunton, 1824, p. 115). Amherst and 
his commissioners had to leave their carriage on several occasions and wait 
on the side of the road while their carriage was pushed through the mud. 
He and his companions were tired and filthy while the mules pulling the 
carriage were exhausted.
29 August: Arrival at Yuanmingyuan
Yuanmingyuan came into view as dawn broke on the morning of 
29 August 1816. The road improved and the weather had cleared. A scene 
of ornamental parks and gardens indicated the procession had arrived 
at the grounds of the Summer Palace. Abel (1818) wrote that, ‘All the 
descriptions which I had ever read of the paradisiacal delight of Chinese 
Gardens occurred to my imagination’ (p. 103).
The embassy came to a halt at the village of Haidian where accommodation 
had been arranged at a fine property owned by Sungyun, the viceroy 
previously at Canton and Macartney’s ‘amiable friend’ who was currently 
‘absent in Western Tartary’ (Morrison, 1820, p. 59). Much to their 
dismay, however, Amherst and the commissioners were not permitted to 
alight but were informed they were proceeding directly to the palace at 
Yuanmingyuan where the emperor was waiting to receive them. The rest 
of the embassy, waiting at Haidian, became concerned over Amherst’s 
absence. Hayne (n.d., vol. 2) wrote:
I waited some little time with Yin, & he then sent a man back again 
with me to our quarters. I rushed in to hunt for L. A. [Amherst] 
and all the party … Toone … and one or two of the servants 
arrived, but they knew nothing of L. A. … we began to fear 
some accident had happened, knowing, as I did, that he was only 
a quarter of a mile before I quitted him. (pp. 86–87)
Amherst’s carriage came to a halt at five o’clock in the morning before 
a ‘very large building in the best Chinese taste, seated in the middle 
of a park’ (Staunton, 1824, p. 116). A large crowd of mandarins in full 
ceremonial dress surrounded the carriage where Sulenge ‘begged’ Amherst 
and the commissioners to alight (Staunton, 1824, p. 116). The British 
were astonished that they had not been taken straight to their quarters. 
Staunton (1824) wrote:
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Until now, it certainly never occurred to us, that the Chinese 
could think of taking us, after such an anxious, fatiguing, and 
sleepless night, spent in the carriage and on the road, to any other 
place than our intended lodgings; or that they would be guilty 
of such a breach of hospitality, and even common decency, as to 
attempt to call our attention to any kind of business until we had 
had some repose. (p. 117)
Sulenge was informed that Amherst wished to go straight to his apartment 
as he was tired and needed to rest, but this was not possible. Heshitai was 
waiting inside and wished to confer with Amherst briefly, after which, 
he would be free to retire to his accommodation. But for now, Amherst 
had to leave his carriage. He had no other option. Chinese insistence 
that Amherst follow the mandarins into the audience hall aroused 
British suspicion that ‘the Chinese intended some treachery towards us’ 
and that the date of reception planned for the following day was due 
to take place immediately (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). The British were 
conducted into a small room, 12 feet long and 7 feet wide, described by 
Amherst as ‘a mean and dirty dwelling belonging to the Palace’ (Amherst 
to Canning, 8 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 287).1
Amherst, accompanied by Staunton, Ellis, Morrison, Jeffrey and 
Lieutenant Cook who had escorted the carriage, took their seats on a hard 
bench covered in white felt. Crowds of princes and mandarins pushed 
towards them. Amherst complained of their ‘rude and overwhelming 
curiosity’ and of the ‘wretched out-house’ in which they were sitting 
(Amherst to Canning, 8 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) 
F 289). Ellis (1817, p. 178) referred to their ‘brutal curiosity’ treating 
the British more as ‘wild beasts’ rather than as ‘mere strangers of the same 
species as themselves’. Jeffrey confirmed Ellis’s view and described the 
mandarins:
who from their badges must have been of high rank, and who came 
to gratify their curiosity by having a good stare at the monsters 
such they took us to be. (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.)
1  Platt (2018) gave a different impression of the reception. He wrote of Amherst being received 
‘into a small, elegant waiting chamber with windows on four sides, about seven by twelve feet’ 
(p. 175). This misquotes Abel (1818) who wrote that the party was ‘pushed into a room, which, if a 
fair specimen of other parts, might induce the supposition that His Chinese Majesty was king of the 
beggars’ (p. 104).
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It became apparent that the British arrival at the palace was a deliberate 
Chinese strategy aimed to coincide with the assigned time set for an 
imperial audience. Staunton found the exposure of the British embassy in 
all its dishevelled appearance before the Chinese court ‘mortifying’, while 
Amherst wrote of the difference between expectation and the reality of his 
arrival at Yuanmingyuan:
Instead therefore of the brilliant appearance which from its 
numbers and equipment the Embassy was calculated to make, it 
was intended to bring into the emperor’s presence four persons 
only, fatigued and exhausted from the journey, in their travelling 
dress, and … without attendants of any description. I was, besides, 
without my credential letters, and was consequently unable to 
present myself in my public character. I therefore determined if 
possible to avoid the intended interview. (Amherst to Canning, 
8 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 288)
Matters grew worse when Chang-wei arrived and informed Amherst that 
the emperor had changed the day of their audience to that morning. 
Amherst was told to prepare himself to meet Heshitai who was waiting 
to usher him along with Staunton, Ellis and Morrison into the emperor’s 
presence. Amherst was outraged. He informed Chang-wei that he was 
deeply distressed, highly indignant and most surprised at the way the 
British had been treated and deceived. It was absurd to even contemplate 
seeing the emperor at this time. Besides, he did not have the king’s letter 
and the state of his appearance would be not only disrespectful to the 
emperor but ‘inconsistent with the dignity of the Embassy’ (Staunton, 
1824, p. 119). Amherst, Jeffrey added, told Chang-wei that the audience 
had always been arranged for the following day and he was ‘not in the 
least prepared to appear in the emperor’s presence until that time’ (Jeffrey 
Amherst, n.d., n.p.).
Chang-wei informed Amherst that it had never been their intention 
to deceive the British. Instructions to conduct the embassy directly 
to Yuanmingyuan had been received only on the road as the embassy 
was  proceeding to Peking. But the emperor had given his orders and 
it was too late to remonstrate.
Following Amherst’s insistence that the emperor be informed that he was 
tired and ill from the journey and, accordingly, was totally unprepared 
for the honour of an audience, he also wished it to be made known 
that he had been ‘distinctly informed that the Emperor had consented 
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to postpone [his] audience to the following day’ (Amherst to Canning, 
8 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 288). For the moment, 
the British were told, the emperor only desired to meet the ambassador 
and had no intention of conducting any business (Ellis, 1817, p. 178).
Heshitai next invited the British to follow him to his apartment to discuss 
matters. Amherst replied that he was too unwell to leave his seat and 
wished to postpone any discussions until the following day. Heshitai, 
on being joined by Muketenge, urged Amherst in a ‘very pressing and 
… indecorous manner for some minutes’ to go with him to prepare for 
a meeting with the emperor. Heshitai, according to Staunton, said that 
‘your own ceremony is all that will be required’ (Staunton, 1824, p. 121, 
emphasis in original). Amherst was then asked if he had the Prince 
Regent’s letter for the emperor in his possession (Morrison, 1820, p. 57).
Amherst pointed out his distress that the ‘greater part of his suite had 
been separated from him’ and that it was impossible to appear before the 
emperor at this time (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Heshitai, according to 
Jeffrey, departed with Amherst’s message but returned soon afterwards—
the emperor was insisting on an immediate audience. There followed, Ellis 
(1817) wrote, ‘a scene I believe, unparalleled in the history of diplomacy’ 
(p. 177). Heshitai, described by Morrison (1820, p. 57) as anxious with 
‘perspiration’ on his face, reached down and grabbed Amherst’s arm ‘with 
the seeming intention of raising him from his seat, and leading him away’ 
(Staunton, 1824, p. 121). Amherst, Jeffrey wrote, immediately ‘released 
himself from [Heshitai’s] grasp by shaking him off’ (Jeffrey Amherst, 
n.d., n.p.). This, according to Staunton, was not easy as Heshitai was a 
strong man of 36 years in contrast to the ‘old and infirm’ mandarins that 
the British normally dealt with. Amherst read the act as an attempt ‘of 
transporting me thither [before the emperor] even without my consent’ 
(Amherst to Canning, 8 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) 
F  289). He added, ‘I therefore shook him off, and prepared, as far as 
I could, to resist force by force; but I was glad to find that he desisted 
from further violence’ (Amherst to Canning, 8 March 1817, in BL 
IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 289). Things became heated as the crowd of 
mandarins pushed forward and Lieutenant Cooke had to be cautioned 
by Amherst not to draw his sword (Staunton, 1824, p. 120). Staunton 
attributed the crowd’s rude and uncivil behaviour to the fact that the 
mandarins and princes present were ‘Tartars’. He added:
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I doubt whether any assembly of the superior class, or indeed 
any class, of Chinese, would have shown themselves so totally 
regardless, not merely of the considerations of courtesy, but even 
of the common feelings of humanity. (1824, p. 121)
The British interpreted Heshitai’s invitation to adjourn to his apartment 
as a trick to remove Amherst to an isolated place inside the palace where 
further resistance over the kowtow would have been difficult. The 
query about the Prince Regent’s letter suggested that this was no casual 
encounter. Once in the emperor’s presence, it was felt, Amherst would 
have no alternative but to kowtow. Jeffrey recalled:
This was a very critical moment for us. The Chinese from their 
numbers might have forced us to perform any ceremony they 
chose, and separated as we were from the greater part of the 
Embassy, might have inflicted any punishment on us, without our 
being able to offer any resistance. (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.)
Other stressful incidents occurred while Heshitai was running back and 
forth to the emperor. Staunton was approached by an old prince who 
remembered him from the time of the Macartney Embassy, but Staunton 
‘very prudently avoided any intercourse with him’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 180). 
Another prince, with a long silver beard, came up to the British and 
‘uttered the words Fa-lang-ke’. Morrison told him, ‘We are not French 
but English’ (Morrison, 1820, p. 58). Some princes, distinguishable by 
round embroidered cloth badges on their robes, came into the room to 
stare rudely at the British and then left (p. 58).
Heshitai soon returned with a message from the emperor informing the 
British that he would see them the next day. In the meantime, it was 
arranged for the emperor’s physician to call on Amherst at his quarters. 
Heshitai’s manner towards the British became more civil. Amherst wrote 
that he:
not only acquiesced in my manifest determination to go … to 
my own residence, but even assisted me … by seizing a whip 
from one of the soldiers … dispersing a crowd of Mandarins in 
their court dress and with buttons of elevated rank, who received 
this chastisement as if it were a discipline to which they were not 
altogether unaccustomed. (Amherst to Canning, 8 March 1817, 
in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 290)
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Heshitai’s energetic actions, Morrison (1820) thought, were due to his 
‘showing off his anxiety and zeal’ before the emperor who was most likely 
watching the scene from a palace window. Alternatively, Heshitai was 
venting his anger on the crowd (p. 58). Jeffrey agreed, describing Heshitai 
as being in a state of ‘a great rage’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). When 
Amherst and his party entered the barouche, Heshitai got into his chair 
and departed, never to be seen again by the British. The British were 
conducted immediately to their quarters, situated a mile and a half away, 
where they arrived at half past seven in the morning.
29 August 1816: The Day of Dismissal 
from the Qing Court
The villa assigned to the British consisted of several buildings situated 
around three courtyards decorated with shrubs and flowers. Staunton 
thought the accommodation was not as grand as that provided for the 
Macartney Embassy, but its aspect was more ‘cheerful and airy’ and 
the rooms were neat and clean (Staunton, 1824, p. 123). The house, in 
Jeffrey’s view, was ‘very spacious and [was] by far the most comfortable 
house we had seen in China’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). The British 
looked forward to spending several days at the compound, recovering 
from their journey in the pleasant surroundings and unpacking their 
luggage, which had been delivered.
The British were joined by two Cantonese interpreters at the compound, 
newly arrived after their own very tiring overland journey from Canton. 
One was a linguist that the British called ‘A-chow’ whom Staunton had 
recognised in the crowd at Yuanmingyuan and who had followed the 
embassy back to Sungyun’s compound where he offered his services to 
the British. The other was a Cantonese silk merchant. Staunton discovered 
that the Canton Government had sent four interpreters, two of whom 
had been dispatched to Zhoushan in case the embassy had landed there 
as had been the case with Macartney.2 Staunton, noting that the need for 
2  The Jiaqing emperor had memorialised in an edict dated 25 June 1816 notifying the viceroys 
and governors along the China coast that ‘England wishes to present tribute by way of the sea route, 
landing at Tianjin to enter the Imperial capital, [which] has already been approved. However, the windy 
season makes sailing uncertain, so that we cannot tell exactly where the ambassador will land … The 
ambassador is not allowed to change his route. Nor is he allowed to land secretly. Both civil and military 
officials near the seacoast are ordered to take good care of their defence’ (Fu, 1966, vol. 1, p. 403).
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Cantonese interpreters on this occasion was superfluous, believed they 
were spies sent by the Canton Government. But he thought that, as it was 
not in their interests to jeopardise their standing with the British, it was 
unlikely they ‘would willingly take a part against them’ (1824, p. 124).
Amherst was soon paid a visit by the emperor’s physician who felt his 
pulse and diagnosed that his patient’s illness was due to the climate 
and strange food. He told the emperor, however, that Amherst was not 
sick and had only been pretending. Meanwhile, a very ‘handsome and 
plentiful Chinese breakfast’ was served, but only four members of the 
embassy turned up to the table. Amherst had some food in his room 
and tried to get some sleep, but this was impossible as curious mandarins 
kept entering his room trying to catch a glimpse of him (Jeffrey Amherst, 
n.d., n.p.). Davis (1841) related that they ‘peeped through the windows 
of [Amherst’s] private apartment, making holes with their fingers in the 
coloured paper windows’ (p. 154). Staunton (1824) also complained of 
mandarins ‘prying and intruding into our very bed-chambers’ (p. 124). 
Jeffrey managed ‘a very comfortable nap’ before being awakened by ‘the 
sound of plates and dishes in the adjoining room’. He added, ‘I found 
a capital Chinese breakfast prepared to which we all did ample justice’ 
(Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.).
Chang-wei’s arrival at the compound at around 11 o’clock in the morning 
further interrupted British rest. He came with the devastating news that 
because of the emperor’s anger over Amherst’s supposed feigned illness, 
the embassy was dismissed and was ordered immediately to leave for 
Tongzhou. A distraught Yin woke up Morrison: ‘All has gone wrong! 
Kuang [Guanghui] wishes to see you; you are to go away directly’ 
(as quoted in Morrison, 1820, p. 59). Yin and Guanghui were joined by 
Muketenge who was asked by Guanghui if it was true that the embassy 
had been ordered to leave. Muketenge, in a rare utterance, answered, 
‘They are to go’ (p. 60).
Jeffrey had been informed by the servants soon after breakfast that the 
luggage carts were not allowed to be unpacked. His father’s dismissal, 
according to him, was due to the emperor being offended that Amherst 
had failed to appear before him and had, therefore, determined that 
‘he should not see the light to the Sun’s countenance’ (Jeffrey Amherst, 
n.d., n.p.).
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The British were astonished by this unexpected turn of events. They were 
denied access to their luggage, although some of the embassy managed 
to obtain a basin of water and a change of linen (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., 
n.p.). The crowd, however, remained with several people persisting in 
‘rudely peering in the windows’ and ‘thrusting open the door to gaze on 
the foreigners’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Amherst deliberately took his 
time, hoping that the emperor would change his mind and permit the 
embassy to stay but was advised by Chang-wei to eat some lunch before 
embarking on the return journey to Tongzhou. Jeffrey wrote that it was 
his birthday and felt sure ‘no one ever passed a birthday in so singular 
a manner’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.).
British preparations for departure were interrupted in the early afternoon 
by the arrival of a large blustering mandarin storming into the courtyard 
of the compound and demanding to speak to an interpreter (Morrison, 
1820, p. 60). Received by Ellis and Morrison, as Amherst and Staunton 
were resting, the mandarin informed them that he had been sent by the 
greatest military mandarin in the empire, namely, the ‘general of the nine 
gates’ and one who ‘commanded a million men’, who insisted that the 
ambassador leave his domains at once. The King of England, the mandarin 
continued, was a respectful and obedient man, but Amherst was not. The 
emperor was writing to the king to complain about Amherst, especially 
over his use of disrespectful language. On being informed that the 
ambassador had not used ‘disrespectful language’ but had only requested 
a deferment of the audience, the mandarin replied that, ‘The ceremonies 
of the Celestial Empire are unalterably binding’ (as quoted in Morrison, 
1820, p. 60). He added that there was still a chance of the embassy being 
received if the ambassador agreed to kowtow. Ellis, according to Staunton 
(1824, p. 128), ‘very properly’ declined any discussion on the subject. 
The embassy was ordered to leave immediately.
Return to Tongzhou
Several of the Chinese attendants accompanying the embassy were 
disappointed and sympathetic to the British. Yin, Abel (1818) wrote, 
‘walked from person to person, consoling with each as well he could, and 
attributing our difficulties to the will of heaven’ (p. 109). The day was very 
hot and the British felt that the prospect of travelling at night was better 
than suffering the heat of the day. Abel described their departure from 
Sungyun’s compound taking place as ‘fast as possible’ where the ‘pomp of 
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imperial favour no longer attended us’ (p. 110). The British had an early 
dinner, served in the Chinese style, and set out on the return to Tongzhou. 
Amherst gave up the barouche for the sick and he, Jeffrey, Staunton and 
Ellis each travelled by separate palanquins.
The embassy was no longer accompanied by mandarins or Chinese 
soldiers and the crowds that had been present on the road from Peking to 
Yuanmingyuan had disappeared. Night was falling, but on arrival at the 
western city gate some Englishmen left their carts and picked up a piece of 
the city wall as a souvenir. Their route skirted the walls of the city again and 
passed the eastern gate where the embassy re-entered the road to Tongzhou 
(Staunton, 1824, p. 130). Curious crowds had now gathered to see the 
British as they travelled through Peking’s outskirts. Jeffrey described his 
palanquin being surrounded by numbers of inquisitive Chinese who had:
[come] out with their lanterns to have a look at me. Their lanterns 
were made of paper and thin Bamboo, and my amusement was 
to kick at them and break them when they thrust them into the 
Palanquin. (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.)
Heavy rain began to fall, making progress exceedingly difficult with carts 
upturned and luggage scattered on the side of the road. At ten o’clock 
at night, Amherst’s bearers abruptly stopped in the middle of the road 
and insisted that they needed to rest. The withdrawal of imperial favour 
had resulted in no dinner or rest stop being provided and the British 
were hungry. Some kind bearers offered Staunton tea and cakes procured 
from a nearby farmhouse, which touched him greatly (Staunton, 1824, 
p. 131). Hayne (n.d., vol. 2) wrote that this and similar acts of kindness 
shown by the bearers ‘showed more humanity that the Courtiers of His 
Majesty’ (p. 97). Jeffrey was very relieved when he made contact with the 
palanquins carrying his father and the other commissioners. He wrote 
that he could not leave his palanquin because he had his writing desk 
and his father’s robes with him (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). This is an 
important reference as it confirms that, while Amherst did not have his 
credentials with him at Yuanmingyuan, his robes were at hand, which 
in part contradicts historians who account for their absence as a major 
reason for Amherst’s refusal to appear before the Jiaqing emperor.3
3  For example, see Napier (1995, p. 80) and Kitson and Markley (2016). Kitson and Markley 
wrote that Amherst arrived at Yuanmingyuan, ‘Fatigued, separated from his diplomatic credentials 
and ambassadorial robes’ (2016, p. 1).
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British relief at meeting up with other members of the party at this time 
was expressed by Staunton (1824): ‘for to be entirely alone, in such 
a road at night, without the means of being understood, and in a strange 
country, would have been indeed desolate’ (p. 132). Jeffrey described 
one of the English coachman stumbling onto his palanquin during his 
search to find Morrison or some other person who could speak Chinese 
‘in order to procure assistance as he had left the carriage sticking fast in the 
mud’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Amherst was also hungry, but Jeffrey 
had some biscuits that he handed over to his father when his palanquin 
stopped alongside. The bearers, in turn, also gave Jeffrey some of their 
breakfast. ‘A consequence of the emperor’s displeasure’, Jeffrey wrote, was 
that ‘none of the marks of attention with which we had formerly been 
treated’ were present (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.).
Davis (1841, p. 157) described the return to Tongzhou as the most 
wretched night of his life, ‘except perhaps [for] the one immediately 
preceding’. Travelling in a Chinese cart without springs on the granite 
road was harder ‘than the emperor’s heart’ and was equivalent to being 
‘pounded in a mortar’. Davis attempted to walk but found this exceedingly 
difficult due to torrential rain, puddles and the holes in the road.
Amherst’s bearers, and those in charge of the palanquins carrying Staunton 
and Ellis, did not return to work until three o’clock in the morning. 
Staunton’s arrival at Tongzhou three hours later surprised the boatmen 
who, nevertheless, received him ‘joyfully and kindly’ (Abel, 1818, p. 111). 
The barouche carrying the sick had arrived a little earlier as well as several 
carts whose occupants, according to Jeffrey, were ‘almost jumbled to 
death’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Abel had arrived at four o’clock in 
the morning.
The British were dismayed to find that the houses where they had 
previously been quartered were boarded and shut up, while the triumphal 
arch that had been erected opposite Amherst’s boat had been torn down. 
Jeffrey, no doubt reflecting his father’s view, interpreted this behaviour 
as a calculated act ‘by the Chinese to mark the difference of our present 
situation to what it had been before’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Some 
of the luggage did not reach the embassy for a couple of days, but its 
appearance without any loss drew praise from Staunton (1824, p. 131) 
who commented on the honesty and diligence of the Chinese porters.
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A Partial Exchange of Presents
Guanghui and Sulenge paid a late visit to the British after their arrival at 
Tongzhou. Arriving at 10 o’clock at night, they were ‘tired and forlorn’ 
and were received by Ellis, with Toone and Davis acting as interpreters 
as Amherst, Staunton and Morrison were sleeping. Amherst was woken 
up and met the legates on his boat, but on this occasion made the 
point of refusing to offer his arm to Sulenge, which he had done on 
previous occasions out of respect for his age and ‘supposed infirmities’ 
(Staunton, 1824, p. 134). Imperial orders had been received, Amherst 
was informed, for a partial exchange of presents. The legates had three 
presents for the King of England, consisting of a white agate sceptre or 
ruyi, a string of sapphire beads referred to by Davis as ‘court beads’ and 
a box of embroidered purses. Three British presents had been chosen by 
the emperor: the portraits of the Prince Regent and his wife Caroline of 
Brunswick, a case of maps of the ‘United Kingdoms’, and a collection 
of prints and drawings (Minute of Conference between the Chairs and 
Mr. Barrow respecting Presents for China, in BL IOR G/12/196 (Reel 1) 
F 47). The British presents, according to Jeffrey, were more valuable, ‘yet 
the Chinese with their usual impudence observed that the Emperor in this 
instance had followed his usual custom of “Giving much and receiving 
little”’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.).
Davis (1841) agreed. He thought the emperor’s presents were of ‘paltry’ 
value, but nonetheless was pleased that the gesture of an exchange of 
presents had been made considering the fact that the British were facing 
a journey through the whole length of the empire to Canton. Amherst 
thought the legates seemed apprehensive that he might not agree to 
the exchange as they eagerly forced the presents into his hands before 
explaining ‘the object of sending them’ (Amherst to Canning, 3 March 
1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 296). An exchange of presents, 
the legates hoped, would ensure that the king would not be angry with 
the embassy on its return to England. The king, Amherst reassured them, 
would give him a favourable reception, well aware that he had done his 
duty. He took the opportunity at this time, however, to inform them of 
his indignation at the manner in which his embassy had been treated in 
contrast to Macartney’s (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Guanghui placed 
the blame on Heshitai. Deciding to pursue a conciliatory tone as one best 
suited to Company interests at Canton, Amherst told the legates that 
he consented to the exchange of presents and also had ‘no objection … 
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to extend the delivery of any other articles which might have attracted 
His Imperial Majesty’s notice’ (Amherst to Canning, 3 March 1817, in 
BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 297).
The British presents chosen by the emperor were laid out in a temporary 
enclosure and unpacked the following morning in the presence of 
Guanghui and Sulenge. Amherst made a deliberate show of bowing before 
the portrait of the Prince Regent as it was being unwrapped. He explained:
I took care myself to be present; and having required that the 
rabble should be sent to a distance as unworthy to contemplate 
it, I approached the Picture, and in conjunction with those of my 
countrymen present, pulled off my hat, and made a low bow. This 
proceeding was evidently mortifying to the Legate, but it answered 
two good purposes. It shewed that the Emperor of China was not 
the only Sovereign in the world entitled to respect, and it was the 
best confirmation I could give of what I had all along proposed 
to be the European ceremony. I then enquired particularly as to 
the place where it was intended to hang the pictures of the King 
and Queen, and having received satisfactory information on that 
head … I recommended them to Quong’s [Guanghui’s] care [and] 
took my leave. (Amherst to Canning, 3 March 1817, in BL IOR 
G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 298)
Davis (1841) wrote that Guanghui’s face at this time looked as ‘black as 
thunder’ from Amherst’s actions having ‘so completely … discomposed 
[Chinese] established notions of the universal supremacy of the great 
emperor’ (p. 170). Davis added later, ‘It might be well for Chinese 
assumption if lessons of this kind were more frequently taught it; and the 
increasing means of direct communications from the west seem calculated 
to multiply the opportunities’ (p. 170).
The presents, once inspected by Guanghui and Sulenge, were repacked 
and placed in Sulenge’s care who was leaving that afternoon for 
Yuanmingyuan. Staunton (1824) wrote, ‘we finally separated from this 
old gentleman, who has obtained a dispensation on account of his age, 
from the duty of further attendance on the Embassy’ (p. 135). Guanghui 
remained with the embassy until it left China, assisted for a short time by 
Chang-wei and Yin. The diplomatic part of the embassy, Davis (1841) 
noted, was now terminated.
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Immediate British Reactions to their 
Reception at Yuanmingyuan
The stressful and confrontational nature of negotiations over the kowtow 
that took place on the journey of the embassy to Peking has been noted in 
the previous two chapters. The duplicitous conduct of the high-ranking 
mandarins appointed by the emperor at this time shocked the British and 
failed to measure up to British notions of civility and politeness. Events 
at Yuanmingyuan not only confirmed British perceptions of the imperial 
court as a site of rough, rude and uncouth ‘Tartars’, but firmly established 
the futility of any further British diplomatic overtures to the Qing court. 
British disappointment at being denied access to Peking, let alone making 
a grand entrance befitting the status and dignity of the British sovereign, 
helped reinforce notions of the impenetrable access to China’s society at 
this time (Sample, 2008, p. 32).
While Staunton had serious doubts about a successful outcome of the 
Amherst Embassy, he was always certain that ‘we shall be received as well 
at least as the former Embassy’ (Staunton Letters, on board the Discovery, 
Ladrone Islands, 12 July 1816). The ‘very favourable Edict’ received by 
Amherst while the squadron watered at Hong Kong confirmed that the 
‘Emperor is very well placed to receive the Embassy’ (Staunton Letters, on 
board the Discovery, Ladrone Islands, 12 July 1816). His Imperial Majesty, 
Staunton informed his mother when the British arrived at the Gulf of Bei 
Zhili, was ‘particularly anxious to see us’. He added that the emperor:
even expressed his superior [crossed out] and ‘peculiar’ esteem 
for the British nation—on the other hand, it is already hinted 
that His Majesty does not calculate our making a long stay … it 
is therefore probable that we shall quit Pekin as soon, or sooner 
than the former Embassy—on this subject however I shall feel no 
kind of regret, provided our Entertainment while we are there, is 
gracious and friendly. (Staunton Letters, on board HMS Alceste, 
Gulf of Pechelee, 7 August 1816)
Their reception, it has been seen, was neither gracious nor friendly. Amherst 
noted the striking difference with the manner in which his embassy was 
received at the Qing court compared to Macartney’s reception. Hampton 
(2009) has written that an ambassador is first and foremost ‘a reader of 
signs’ who bases his interpretation largely on historical precedent where 
‘what has happened before is placed at the scene and service of political 
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negotiation’ (p. 5). The former embassy, Amherst noted, was marked 
by ‘decency and regularity’ (Amherst to Canning, 8 March 1817, in 
BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 284). Time was allowed for ‘decorous 
preparation’ and the needs of individuals were considered. Above all, not 
only Macartney’s honour, but also that of the king and the emperor, was 
maintained and appearances were upheld. Amherst’s reception, on the 
other hand, consisted of ‘hurry and confusion’ with a ‘total disregard’ 
for the comfort and composure of the individuals (Amherst to Canning, 
8 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 285).
Amherst was adamant, understandably, that his treatment at 
Yuanmingyuan was ‘inhospitable and inhuman’. He made it clear that 
his view of the Qing court as ‘little better than a Tartar camp’ was formed 
not from the ‘practices of the polished courts’ of Europe, but rather from 
Macartney’s reception at the time of the Qianlong emperor (Amherst to 
Canning, 8 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 293).
The Importance of Appearances
The British emphasis on Western diplomatic protocol, courtly appearances 
and the importance of making a dignified, elegant and grand entrance, 
befitting the status of Britain’s place in the world before the Qing court, 
was of vital concern to Amherst and his party and had been given 
prominence during the embassy’s preparations. But the lateness of the 
hour, weather conditions and travel arrangements ensured that a proposed 
grand entrance into Peking and Yuanmingyuan was impossible. Rather, 
Amherst complained that the Qing court acted on, ‘A pervading wish to 
remove away from us every thing that constitutes the splendour or even 
respectable appearance of an Embassy’ (Amherst to Canning, 8 March 
1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 294).
A specific insult was the manner in which Amherst arrived at 
Yuanmingyuan, separated from the rest of the embassy, including the 
marine guard, the band and attendants. While his credentials were 
missing, his ambassadorial robes, it has been noted, appear to have been 
at hand, but the circumstances of an exhausting and rushed arrival at the 
Summer Palace left no time to collect them (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). 
Adding to British judgements that the Qing court had an ulterior motive 
in the nature of their reception was the fact that only Amherst, Staunton, 
Ellis and Jeffrey were proposed to be received by the Jiaqing emperor 
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at the time. Amherst was acutely aware that, owing to the absence of 
his credentials, packed away in the luggage that had yet to arrive, he 
was ‘consequently unable to present [him]self in [his] public character’ 
(Amherst to Canning, 8 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel  2) 
F 294).
Amherst’s most damning assessment of his reception concerned the insult 
to Great Britain and the British sovereign in which, ‘The attempt to drag 
us before the Emperor in such a guise as would befit only his vassals from 
the meanest and most barbarous islands of the China seas’ (Amherst to 
Canning, 8 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 295).
The change in British status following its dismissal was humiliating 
and evidenced after their return to Tongzhou when a beggar remained 
standing and did not bow as Amherst passed by. Ellis (1817) commented 
that the ‘British Embassador’ was no longer considered worthy of respect, 
‘even from the lowest class of society’ (p. 191). The reason, of course, was 
that the embassy had dismally failed. Amherst’s failure to formally appear 
before the Jiaqing emperor ensured that the ritual cycle surrounding 
such a reception was never commenced, let alone completed. Amherst’s 
status, seen from the perspective of his rejection by the emperor at court, 
ensured that his position protocol-wise in China remained in a state 
of flux. His status as the representative of a powerful foreign sovereign 
required that he be placated and accommodated on the one hand, but he 
was not entitled to the respect normally accorded an anointed tributary 
ambassador. The British expected that they would be accorded the same 
respect as Macartney, achieved through his two receptions before the 
Qianlong emperor at Jehol, resulting in a further opportunity to build 
on the goodwill with the Chinese. However, it became clear following 
Amherst’s arrival at Tianjin that the Qing court was not prepared to grant 
him any dispensation based on the Macartney precedent, and that he was 
required as a new arrival to adhere to all the protocols of the Qing court, 
which were ultimately enforced without any concessions.
Amherst’s degrading treatment by the Qing court reinforced British group 
cohesion at this time and reaffirmed their belief that he had acted correctly 
in refusing to compromise British power to make an appearance before 
the Jiaqing emperor. Further clarification of Chinese actions came to light 
when the British received an account of the court’s view on the matter 
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from the judge of Bei Zhili province who was assigned as one of the early 
conductors of the embassy on its journey back to Tianjin. Staunton wrote 
(1824) that the judge was not a pleasant man; rather, he was:
Vain, boastful, professing to know a great deal about foreign 
countries, but puffed up with the most extravagant notions of the 
grandeur and importance of his own, and especially of the Tartar 
family now on the throne. He affected to consider the Embassy 
from England as quite a trifling concern to China. (p. 141)
The judge’s view of the ‘trifling’ importance of the embassy to China 
is understandable; the Qing court regularly received tributary missions 
and the Jiaqing emperor was in a hurry to proceed to Jehol and the 
Amherst Embassy was not invited. The British, of course, were specifically 
irritated on hearing the judge’s assessment of Britain and the status of 
their sovereign. Morrison noted that the judge had read only French 
missionary reports on European countries, resulting in outdated and 
inaccurate views. England’s importance, the judge informed them, was 
not as great as other European nations and it was absurd that her king 
was ‘pretending to compete with the Emperor of China’ (as quoted in 
Ellis, 1817, p. 196). The judge thought England was dependent entirely 
on commerce and, although it had a strong navy, the French were a far 
superior land force. He also thought England was divided into four parts 
and had four kings (Abel, 1818, p. 144). While Amherst and Ellis did not 
comment on this false assertion, it suggests that the judge thought Britain 
was divided into a number of petty principalities similar to those found 
in maritime Southeast Asia, which traditionally sent tribute to the Qing 
court. Nevertheless, Abel (1818, p. 144) thought the judge was the most 
informed Chinese on European geography and history encountered by 
the British in China.
The judge conceded that the embassy had certainly been rushed 
to Yuanmingyuan, but he thought the emperor was far too reasonable to 
have dismissed it if he had known the true state of affairs. The performance 
of the kowtow, however, was essential and non-negotiable. Moreover, the 
judge offered his opinion that the performance of the kowtow would not 
have altered Britain’s status in Chinese eyes nor relegated the British to 
tributary status. Rather, it would have permitted the British the honour 
of sitting on cushions in the presence of the emperor, thus according them 
with a privilege reserved for the princes and the highest mandarins, and 
one that was never given to envoys from tributary states. Amherst made 
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no comment on learning this except to remind the judge of the Kangxi 
emperor’s dispensation given to the Russian envoy in 1721 where an 
alternative was suggested.
The British Learn of the Reception 
Intended for Them at Yuanmingyuan
A book published in 1865 written by the surgeon attached to the first 
British Legation at Peking, D. F. Rennie, contains a reference to Amherst’s 
reception at Yuanmingyuan (p. 234). Rennie held a conversation with 
a 70-year-old assistant commissioner for foreign affairs, referred to as 
‘Tsoon-Luen’, who remembered the morning in 1816 and said that the 
embassy ‘miscarried through some unaccountable mismanagement’.4 
Of interest is Tsoon-Luen’s assertion:
The Emperor was actually sitting on the throne in the state 
apartment at Yuen-ming-yuen, waiting to receive the King of 
England’s letter, when the announcement was brought to him that 
the Ambassador had departed.  (Rennie, 1865, p. 235)
Rennie concludes that such ‘mismanagement’ refers to Amherst’s refusal 
‘to appear before the Emperor immediately on his arrival at Yuen-ming-
yuen, and also to perform the kow-tow in the presence’ (p. 235).
Platt (2018) has also written that it had been the emperor’s intention to 
have a successful meeting, even if it meant compromising on the protocol 
surrounding the kowtow, stating in an edict three days before Amherst’s 
arrival at Yuanmingyuan that ‘it is better to meet with them than to send 
them away’ (p. 179). In a critical breakdown of communication, Heshitai 
did not relay this vital information to Amherst as apparently intended; 
rather, he tried in his own brusque way to ‘deliver’ Amherst before the 
Jiaqing emperor when the former was clearly in no condition to proceed. 
Given Heshitai’s personality and reputation, it is not surprising that he 
misread or only gave lip service to the emperor’s intentions and, by his 
own actions, missed what could have been a cordial meeting between 
Amherst and the emperor. It was only subsequently when the Jiaqing 
emperor found out the true circumstances under which Amherst and his 
4  The present study has been unable to identify ‘Tsoon-Luen’.
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party had travelled overnight and been mishandled and mistreated on 
arrival at Yuanmingyuan that he issued a further edict severely punishing 
Heshitai and others involved (p. 178).
The members of the Amherst Embassy were given a different account at 
the time. Chang-wei told Morrison on 3 September that the emperor 
never intended to give the British an audience on the morning they 
arrived at Yuanmingyuan, but wanted only to pass by them seated in his 
palanquin to view their intended ceremony (Staunton, 1824, p. 139). 
If dissatisfied—in other words, if Amherst did not perform the kowtow—
the emperor planned to expel them without any other reception. Heshitai 
had hoped that Amherst might have been persuaded ‘by the lure of 
promises’ to have then kowtowed the following day at a public reception 
(pp. 139–140). Staunton added that, if true, the British were particularly 
glad they had escaped such humiliation ‘so unworthy’ of Amherst’s public 
character (p. 140). Hayne (n.d., vol. 2) summed up British feelings:
It is a pleasant reflection to feel persuaded had LA [Amherst] given 
way in that fight at Yuangming yuan, it most probably would have 
led to more disagreeable scenes than which actually occurred—
despite the Emperor’s presence … a little persuasive violence 
might have been used to get those in His Majesty’s presence [to 
fall] on both knees … So that all was for the best. (p. 115)
British relief at being spared a dishonourable reception was reinforced 
on 11 September when they learned of the intended program of three 
proposed receptions had they been formally received by the Jiaqing 
emperor.5 Handed to Morrison for translation by Chang-wei, the 
document revealed that the embassy’s reception was to have taken place in 
a hall with the emperor sitting at the upper end on a raised altar. Amherst 
was expected to enter and kneel by the altar while delivering the Prince 
Regent’s letter to a high-ranking mandarin who, in turn, would hand it 
to another mandarin who ascended the steps and gave it to the emperor. 
This was in contrast to Macartney who had delivered the king’s letter 
5  For a full translation of the ‘Outline of the Ceremonies to be observed on the English 
Embassador’s (Tributary Envoys etc.) presenting the Peaou-wan, or official document from his 
Sovereign’, see Morse (1926/1966, vol. 3. pp. 295–297). See Appendix F for a translation of the 
final ceremony, ‘Ceremonies to be observed at the Audience of Leave’, reproduced from Ellis (1817, 
pp. 499–500, Note No. 5).
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directly into the hands of the Qianlong emperor.6 Amherst was then to be 
conducted down to a lower level where he would receive a gift of a ruyi 
or jade sceptre for the Prince Regent. At this location, Amherst would 
address the customary questions presented in the name of the emperor by 
a mandarin and would next be conducted to further down the hall where, 
facing the throne on the distant altar, he would perform the kowtow with 
nine prostrations. Following this ceremony, Amherst was to be led outside 
the hall where he was to kowtow once more behind a row of mandarins. 
At this point Amherst would be permitted to sit down but would be 
required to prostrate himself again, along with the princes, while the 
emperor drank milk tea. Two other prostrations were required: one at the 
time when Amherst was presented with milk tea and the other when he 
finished drinking (Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, pp. 295–297).
Predictably, the British were astonished on reading this document, although 
Ellis (1817, p. 215) assumed that it reflected what the Chinese ‘wished to 
have happened’ and not, therefore, what they insisted on. Nevertheless, the 
sheer audacity of the intended program was breathtaking and represented 
a reception for the Amherst Embassy that, when measured by previous 
European embassies, was marked as the most humiliating and degrading. 
The issue was the number of prostrations expected. Ellis confessed that 
his earlier support for one kowtow in the actual presence of the emperor 
and at a reasonable distance from him was very different from the four 
prostrations expected on this occasion. This expectation, Ellis admitted, 
placed the performance of the kowtow in a considerably ‘different 
character’ (p. 215). The reception would have been even more degrading 
than that experienced by the Dutch in 1795, especially the expectation 
that Amherst would kowtow behind a row of people out of view of the 
emperor. The extra ceremonies, Ellis thought, were more indicative and 
expressive of inferiority and more objectionable than the kowtow itself, 
and it was inconceivable for a British ambassador to submit to a reception 
less honourable than those given previously to other European monarchs 
(p. 217). Staunton (1824) summed up the British view: Heshitai had 
done them a great favour in sparing them from a potentially embarrassing 
and humiliating experience where Amherst’s status and character as 
a British ambassador would have been compromised leading to a ‘more 
disparaging’ scene than their actual dismissal (p. 140).
6  Macartney wrote that he delivered the king’s letter ‘into the Emperor’s own hands, who, having 
received it, passed it to the Minister, by whom it was placed on the cushion’ (Cranmer-Byng, 1962, 
p. 122).
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On 14 September, Chang-wei called on Staunton to tell him that he 
was due to leave the embassy in a couple of days. He further informed 
Staunton of the latest news from Peking, published in the Peking Gazette, 
that the emperor had since learned the truth of the conditions under 
which Amherst had arrived at Yuanmingyuan. The emperor had noted in 
his letter to the viceroy of Canton at the time of the expected arrival of the 
embassy that Amherst would be received at his court within the context of 
bearing presents and tendering ‘good-will with feelings and in a language 
respectful and complaisant’.7 Arrangements were made to receive the 
embassy in a ‘liberal, gracious, safe and suitable manner’ where it would 
‘graciously be presented with gifts’. Problems started, according to the 
emperor, from the time of the banquet at Tianjin when Amherst did not 
return thanks for the feast or banquet by obeying the regulated form of 
three kneelings and nine knocks of the head on the ground (Imperial edict 
in the Peking Gazette, 4 September 1816, as quoted in Ellis, 1817, p. 501, 
Appendix 6). If he had, the Jiaqing emperor made clear, the embassy 
would have been brought to Yuanmingyuan the same day (Imperial edict 
in the Peking Gazette, 4 September 1816, as quoted in Ellis, 1817, p. 501, 
Appendix 6; Vermillion edict, ‘Paper respecting the Embassy’, drawn up 
by the Emperor, in Ellis, 1817, pp. 506–508, Appendix 11). Guanghui 
and Sulenge should not have permitted the embassy to proceed to 
Tongzhou and matters were exacerbated by their connivance in allowing 
the clandestine departure of the British ships. The deception became even 
more apparent once the embassy arrived at Tongzhou where Heshitai 
and Muketenge sent a ‘confused and obscure’ report that Amherst had 
practised the ceremony (Imperial edict in the Peking Gazette, 4 September 
1816, as quoted in Ellis, 1817, p. 501, Appendix 6; Vermillion edict, 
‘Paper respecting the Embassy’, drawn up by the Emperor, in Ellis, 1817, 
pp. 506–508, Appendix 11).
The Jiaqing emperor reported that he ascended the throne at half past 
five in the morning and called the ambassador to an audience. Heshitai 
made three reports on this occasion; in the first, he told the emperor that 
Amherst was not able ‘to travel fast’; he next reported that Amherst was 
ill and a short delay was necessary; finally, he confirmed that Amherst 
was too ill to present himself for an interview before the emperor. While 
Amherst was being escorted to his lodgings where he was afterwards called 
7  The Jiaqing emperor’s reply to the viceroy of Canton, respecting the embassy sent from the 
Prince Regent, which reached the viceroy on or around 12 July 1816.
241
9 . TO YUANMINGYUAN, RECEPTION AND DISMISSAL
on by the emperor’s physician, the assistant commissioners (Staunton and 
Ellis) were also ordered to appear in an audience before the emperor but 
they too refused, claiming they were also ill and needed to defer their 
audience until the ambassador was well.
Their response caused the Jiaqing emperor to expel the embassy and 
send the ‘Embassadors back to their own country, without punishing the 
high crime they had committed’ (Imperial edict in the Peking Gazette, 
4 September 1816, as quoted in Ellis, 1817, p. 501, Appendix 6; Vermillion 
edict, ‘Paper respecting the Embassy’, drawn up by the Emperor, in Ellis, 
1817, pp. 506–508, Appendix 11). The emperor added that China was 
‘the sovereign of the whole world’. For what reason, therefore, ‘should 
contumely and arrogance like this be endured with quiet temper?’
The emperor only discovered some days later that Amherst and his 
party had travelled overnight to Yuanmingyuan and that their ‘court-
dresses’ had yet to arrive; he added that Amherst thought, ‘how can I in 
my ordinary garments lift up my eyes to the great Emperor’ (Imperial 
edict in the Peking Gazette, 4 September 1816, as quoted in Ellis, 1817, 
p.  501, Appendix 6; Vermillion edict, ‘Paper respecting the Embassy’, 
drawn up by the Emperor, in Ellis, 1817, pp. 506–508, Appendix 11). 
The emperor also blamed his courtiers, present at the time of Amherst’s 
arrival at the anteroom at Yuanmingyuan, for not informing him of the 
true state of affairs, which would have seen the audience moved to a later 
date. The mandarins and princes, it has been seen, were more intent at 
gaping at the British than reporting to their emperor. He complained, 
‘yet they sat immoveable while the affair was going on’ (Imperial edict in 
Peking Gazette, 4 September 1816, in Ellis, 1817, p. 501, Appendix 6). 
Heshitai was immediately blamed and was dismissed from his position 
in the court and lost the honour of wearing his yellow riding jacket. He 
and Muketenge were blamed also for allowing Amherst to proceed to 
Tongzhou without first rehearsing the kowtow and for sending confused 
reports on the matter to the emperor. Chang-wei, on the other hand, was 
promoted because he had told the emperor the truth that Amherst had 
no intention of kowtowing. Yin, meanwhile, was relieved that he was 
sufficiently junior in rank that he ‘happily fell below the emperor’s notice’ 
(Staunton, 1824, p. 147). Guanghui and Sulenge were not so fortunate. 
Both were censored for allowing the embassy to proceed beyond Tianjin 
after Amherst had refused to perform the kowtow ceremony. Sulenge 
lost his position as president of the Board of Works and was degraded to 
a blue button of third rank. He also lost the rank of general in the army 
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and was ordered to pluck out his peacock’s feather (‘Substance of Imperial 
Edicts inflicting Punishments on Soo, Ho, and Kwang’ in Ellis, 1817, 
p. 509, Appendix 12). Guanghui was reduced to a secretary of the eighth 
rank, dismissed from his position as salt commissioner and was posted to 
‘Man-chow Tartary’ the following spring.
The emperor was ‘much appeased’ on learning the truth and decided to 
accept three presents from the British sovereign. To have accepted any 
more, Chang-wei said, would have been ‘indecorous … unless he had 
also determined to receive the ambassador’ (‘Substance of Imperial Edicts 
inflicting Punishments on Soo, Ho, and Kwang’ in Ellis, 1817, p. 509, 
Appendix 12). Further, as the emperor was due to leave for Jehol, it was 
too late to recall the embassy and it would have been too costly to invite 
the embassy to accompany him. All these details, Chang-wei said, were 
printed in the Peking Gazette and he promised to obtain a copy and hand 
it secretly to Staunton. He begged Staunton not to tell Guanghui or any 
of the others that the British had received this from him (‘Substance of 
Imperial Edicts inflicting Punishments on Soo, Ho, and Kwang’ in Ellis, 
1817, p. 509, Appendix 12).
The diplomatic encounter between the British and the Qing court 
formally  ended with the embassy’s departure from Yuanmingyuan. 
As preparations were made for the journey to Canton, paid for by the 
Qing Government, customary within the context of even a failed tribute 
mission, the emperor issued orders for it to proceed on the shortest route 
via Nanjing and the Poyang Lake and for his officials to treat it with 
civility ‘and silence’ thereby causing ‘gratitude and awe’ (‘Substance of 
Imperial Edicts inflicting Punishments on Soo, Ho, and Kwang’ in Ellis, 
1817, p. 509, Appendix 12). It must not be forgotten, the emperor 
emphasised, that the embassy had come to his court with ‘the intention of 
offering tribute’ and must accordingly be treated with respect and honour 
on its journey to Canton (‘Translation of an Imperial Edict addressed to 
the Viceroy of Kiang-nan (Jiangnan), respecting Treatment of Embassy, 
received October 8, 1816’ in Ellis, 1817, pp. 502–503, Appendix 8). 
Amherst later told Canning in his official report that:
The precipitate and unwarranted rejection of the Embassy from 
the Palace Gates has left an injury to repair. Even in the eyes of 
the Chinese themselves the rules of hospitality have been violated. 
Possibly some apprehension may be entertained of the manner in 
which the transaction will be viewed in Great Britain. (Amherst 
to Canning, 21 April 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 379)
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Chang-wei and Staunton thought there was now a need for conciliation 
between the British and the Chinese. The occasion of travelling together in 
a four-month journey to Canton appeared to offer a unique opportunity 
to repair relationships. Staunton (1824) wrote that he and Chang-wei 
‘agreed in sentiment, that the best thing now to be done, was to think 
as little as we could of the past, and to consult together from time to 
time, how matters might be placed on the most amicable footing for the 
future’ (p. 168). The intended ‘honourable treatment’ of the embassy on 
its return to Canton was attributed by Amherst as ‘a wish for reparation 
in the only way which the pride of the Emperor would allow’ (Amherst to 




Overland to Canton: 
The British Cultural 
Encounter with China
The only worthwhile objective left for the embassy following its premature 
dismissal from Yuanmingyuan was the opportunity to expand British 
knowledge of China during its four-month journey from Tianjin to Canton. 
Representing only the second group of Englishmen to visit the interior 
of China, this aspect of the embassy has received little attention from 
historians apart from a 2014 article by Gao. However, Gao’s arguments are 
contentious, especially his assertion that the men of the Amherst Embassy 
were permitted ‘greater opportunities to explore the real state of Chinese 
society’ than their compatriots in the Macartney Embassy (p. 570). While 
Gao appears to base his opinion on Amherst’s statement that his embassy 
was permitted ‘a greater degree of liberty than had been granted to any 
former Embassy’, the evidence does not substantiate this claim (Amherst to 
Canning, 8 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 281). A closer 
reading of the accounts of the Amherst Embassy reveals that British 
freedom to explore towns and cities was prohibited by a series of imperial 
edicts whose strictness of implementation was determined on the whim of 
provincial officials and severely restricted by the presence of large crowds. 
While Staunton (1824) expressed the hope that the presence of Mandarin 
speakers would enable them to ‘throw some new and interesting light on the 
moral character and condition of this singular people’, he acknowledged the 
power of preconceived notions for strengthening, rather than correcting, 
existing prejudices regardless of the impact of direct experience (p. 206). 
Any exploration of the ‘real state of Chinese society’ remained impossible. 
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What follows is an exploration of the British encounter with China in this 
phase of the embassy with a focus on its members’ reactions and judgements 
of the country and its people.
Figure 9: The routes of the Macartney Embassy (1793) and Amherst 
Embassy (1816).
Note: Amherst’s route deviated from Macartney’s by travelling down the Yangtze River 
to Nanking and through the Poyang Lake before rejoining Macartney’s route at Nanchang 
and onto Canton .
Source: CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU. Based on map in Cranmer-Byng 
(1962, p . 157) .
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British perceptions of Chinese society, of course, were formed inevitably 
within the context of the embassy’s personal standards of civilised conduct 
founded on good manners, appropriate behaviour and appearances. British 
assessments of the Chinese countryside, towns and villages were measured 
not only in comparison with England, but also, and significantly, with the 
earlier accounts of the Macartney Embassy where evidence of economic 
decline since that time was widely noted. Barrow’s main aim in his book 
Travels in China (1804) of ascertaining China’s place on a scale of civilisation 
was not a major concern for any of the Amherst Embassy’s commentators. 
Rather, their collective British response to China was overshadowed by the 
Chinese insult to British honour at Yuanmingyuan, which they attempted 
to counter by stressing the imperative of maintaining an impressive and 
dignified British appearance as the embassy travelled through China.
British accounts of their journey follow a timeline of daily occurrences 
and detailed descriptions of the countryside and towns passed on the way. 
The approach of this chapter is thematic rather than chronological, and an 
attempt is made to portray what a British embassy would have looked like 
to Chinese observers and how its personnel felt and responded to the alien 
environment in which they found themselves. Emphasis is placed on the 
cross-cultural encounter with the Chinese, rather than a simple travelogue 
of visits to specific cities or temples.
The chapter concludes with Amherst’s arrival and reception in Canton 
in early January 1817 and his departure on the Alceste at the end of the 
month. The homeward voyage saw the shipwreck of the Alceste off the 
coast of Sumatra and Amherst’s subsequent meeting with Napoleon 
on the island of St Helena. The former emperor’s views on the outcome 
of the embassy provide an alternative ‘imperial’ perspective on Amherst’s 
approach to his diplomatic mission.
The embassy left Tianjin on 8 September 1816, travelling to Canton in a 
series of straggling convoys and reached its destination on 1 January 1817. 
It followed Macartney’s route down the Grand Canal as far as ‘Kwa-choo’ 
(Guazhou). From there, it made a detour following the Yangtze River and 
proceeding through the Poyang Lake, thus traversing 280 miles (over 450 
kilometres) of country not visited by the Macartney Embassy. Arriving 
at Nanchang, the capital of Jiangxi province, the embassy rejoined 
Macartney’s route into Canton. The last stage of the journey was a short 
overland hike across the Meiling Mountains on the boundary between the 
provinces of Jiangxi and Guangdong.
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The cost of the embassy’s journey to Canton, it has been noted, was 
borne by the Chinese Government. An initial fleet of 60 boats carried 
the 73 Englishmen and 400 Chinese boatmen, trackers and Chinese 
officials accompanying the embassy. Massive amounts of British luggage 
and stores, including crates of the bulky presents refused by the emperor 
(consisting of a fire engine, sedan chairs, delicate crystal chandeliers and 
fragile chinaware and glassware) were packed on board.
Guanghui was left in sole charge of the embassy after the early departure 
of Chang-wei and Yin.1 Hayne (n.d., vol. 2) described Yin coming at 
breakfast time to say farewell along with his staff who had been handsomely 
rewarded by the British. To offer their gratitude, Yin’s ‘underlings’ 
proceeded to prostrate themselves before Amherst. Hayne wrote, ‘The 
very idea of prostration [was] so repugnant to Englishmen’s feelings that 
L. A. [Lord Amherst] could not bear to see them and would not permit it’ 
(p. 160). The conduct of the embassy was overseen by Manchu officials, 
either a judge, treasurer or general, who joined Guanghui as the embassy 
progressed through their respective provinces (Morrison, 1820, p. 65). 
Reactions towards the embassy, in particular the amount of freedom 
permitted to its members to visit towns and roam the countryside, varied 
according to the disposition of the various provincial officials. Official 
meetings with Amherst were rare, a fact that angered the British who read 
this as a further insult to his status as their sovereign’s representative.
Referring to events at Yuanmingyuan, Amherst wrote that the Chinese had 
violated ‘the rules of hospitality’ and he was not looking forward to the 
long journey to Canton (Amherst to Canning, 21 April 1817, in BL IOR 
G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 378). Staunton (1824, p. 205) quoted Morrison who 
succinctly summed up the British feeling that they were now travelling to 
Canton ‘under the frown’ of the Chinese Government. He added that ‘the 
unwarrantable and inhospitable treatment … the mission experienced’ at 
Yuanmingyuan had disposed the British to ‘look on surrounding objects, 
in some degree, with a jaundiced eye’ (p. 206). Ellis (1817) thought the 
fact that Guanghui had been delegated to conduct the embassy to Canton 
1  Both Chang-wei and Yin had left the embassy by 18 September 1817. Chang-wei was appointed 
the judge of Shandong Province. Morrison (1820) said he ‘owed this promotion to the Duke 
[Heshitai] who was himself downgraded’ (p. 64). Davis (1841) spoke highly of Yin, praising his 
frankness and kind treatment when Amherst and his party arrived at Haidian: ‘when the rest deserted 
us. We had formed a pretty intimate acquaintance with both of them … and knew how to make 
allowances for the servants of such an autocrat as their emperor, whose single word was sufficient to 
consign them to death, in the event of any suspicion of a collusion with foreigners’ (p. 168).
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indicated ‘an additional punishment’ to his dismissal from the office of 
salt commissioner at Tianjin (pp. 193–194). Nevertheless, Ellis hoped 
that new experiences would change his view of China as an ‘uninteresting 
nation’ (p. 198).
The changed status of the embassy was apparent immediately with 
the removal of special honours traditionally accorded to a tribute 
embassy. Staunton (1824) complained on arrival back at Tianjin from 
Yuanmingyuan, ‘No [mandarin] visited … or message of congratulations 
took place’ (p. 145). Honours such as ornamental arches and columns of 
soldiers dropping to their knees in salute as the embassy flotilla passed 
through towns were evident, but this was in response to the presence of 
high-ranking mandarins accompanying the embassy rather than respect 
paid to the British ambassador. Abel (1818) appreciated the unique 
circumstances in which the embassy’s journey was being conducted and 
how it coloured British reactions to China. He wrote:
I apprehend … that any person travelling through a country in 
a hurried journey, under a suspicious surveillance, must always 
be unqualified to pronounce on a question that respects a whole 
nation. (p. 205)
Abel (1818) and Ellis (1817), who gave the fullest descriptions of China in 
their accounts of the embassy published in Britain, candidly acknowledged 
the limitations of their perceptions. Dangerously ill during the journey to 
Canton and largely bedridden, Abel’s (1818) account ‘on  the progress 
of the Embassy, and the nature of the country through which it passed’ 
(p. 142) was dependent largely on the reports of others, notably Morrison 
and Cooke. Ellis (1817) admitted also to short sightedness.2 Staunton, 
whose account was printed privately for family and friends, complained 
petulantly that the Macartney accounts had left him nothing new to say 
about China. He wrote:
The comparative novelty of a first discovery, are wanting on the 
present occasion; on which we are continuing, under circumstances 
which are certainly somewhat unsatisfactory and discouraging, to 
trace a route, which has of late been repeatedly and fully described 
by others. (1824, p. 205)
2  Ellis (1817) wrote, ‘indeed my powers of observation of visible objects in general are very 
limited, partly from shortness of sight, but principally from negligence’ (p. 222). Later in his journey, 
on 30 November, Ellis wrote, ‘Orange groves have been seen this morning; the shortness of my sight 
has prevented me from remarking them’ (p. 361).
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Figure 10: ‘Sunrise on the Grand Canal of China’, painted by the official 
artist of the Amherst Embassy, William Havell (1782–1857), depicting 
the ‘British’ boats moored at anchor along the Grand Canal.
Source: Image courtesy of Bonhams, Sydney, and with acknowledgment of Sphinx Fine 
Art, London, original owners of the copyright .
Barrow (1817a) wrote later, somewhat facetiously, that the journey down 
the Grand Canal from Peking to Canton was ‘now nearly as well known 
as the road from London to Edinburgh’ (p. 465). Yet, Staunton hoped the 
detour through Nanjing and the Poyang Lake would prove not only ‘one of 
the most pleasant and interesting circumstances’ of the voyage, but would 
also present the opportunity of making new discoveries (1824, p. 207). 
While Staunton’s account of the embassy was published in 1824 for private 
distribution only, it seems not unreasonable to suggest that he may have 
published his journal for a general readership had he discovered anything 
new or novel about China that had not been described in previous British 
accounts. To have done so would have enhanced his already considerable 
reputation and fame as Britain’s foremost sinologist by bringing his name 
before the wider British public.
The Macartney Embassy accounts of China, specifically Alexander’s 
impressive and broad pictorial representation of China based on 2,000 
sketches and paintings and Barrow’s Travels in China (1804), which was 
widely referenced on the journey, had effectively established a template 
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for British perceptions of the country and its people (see Legouix, 1980). 
Staunton (1824) wrote in the context of the British anticipation of 
learning the true moral character of the Chinese people at this time:
We may find that experience is not always profitable to 
knowledge—and that our ingenuity in adapting every thing to 
our preconceived notions is such, that our erroneous prejudices 
are often strengthened, instead of being corrected, by those facts 
and occurrences, which, had they been dispassionately considered, 
must have effected their removal. (p. 206)
Barrow’s views on China, it has been noted, were scathing. The Chinese 
did not enjoy freedom or liberty, individualism was crushed by reverence 
and submission to a despotic ruler, and life was governed by ancient 
custom marked by filial piety of juniors to their seniors. Rationality and 
scientific enquiry based on experiment and observation was not only alien 
to the Chinese, but also the mass of the people lived under the yoke of 
superstition and idolatry. China’s failure to interact with the wider world 
brought a lack of both social and commercial progress, leaving it backward 
and incapable of change. China, Barrow concluded, was worn out by ‘old 
age and disease’ (1804, p. 258). Henry Hayne, Amherst’s private secretary, 
who made constant reference to Barrow’s (1804) book, summed up the 
prevailing mood of his countrymen at the time of the Amherst Embassy. 
He agreed with Barrow and wrote in his diary: ‘What a government to 
serve under—what a country to live in’ (n.d., vol. 2, p. 125).
Of interest is the fact that markers of abhorrent Chinese customs described 
by Barrow (1804), such as female infanticide, foot binding and their habit 
of eating strange and unclean foods such as cats and dogs, received little 
attention in the accounts of the Amherst Embassy. This suggests either that 
they were so entrenched in the British imagination that there was no further 
interest in describing them, or that little evidence was available to substantiate 
them.3 However, other earlier British perceptions of China were confirmed. 
China was a ‘curious’ but boring place. Ellis (1817) especially thought his 
journey to Canton was ‘dreadfully dull’.4 Havell, the embassy’s draftsman, 
left only a handful of sketches and paintings of China, in contrast to the 
3  On the subject of female infanticide, Abel (1818, p. 233) wrote that, in travelling through the 
country, there was not a ‘sufficient number of facts for estimating the … credibility’ of the earlier 
estimates of 2,000 infant deaths in Peking alone noted by Sir G. L. Staunton.
4  Ellis (1817) commented that ‘taking a walk was the only amusement afforded in this dreadfully 
dull journey’ (p. 199).
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voluminous visual record left by Alexander at the time of the Macartney 
Embassy, thereby contributing little to enhance British knowledge of China 
and suggesting that he found little to inspire him.
General British impressions of China, however, changed as the embassy 
travelled south into more fertile, picturesque and prosperous areas of the 
country, and where they received more civil treatment from the Chinese 
authorities. Staunton learned in discussions with a military mandarin, 
who remembered him from the occasion of entertaining viceroy Sungyun 
on board the Perseverance at Whampoa in 1811, that the emperor had 
ordered that ‘every kind of public attention and honor should be paid 
to the Embassy’, evidenced by the rank of the great officers designated 
to escort the embassy (Staunton, 1824, p. 188).5 Official confirmation 
arrived in the form of a copy of an imperial edict, received by the British 
on 8 October, that instructed the officers conducting the embassy to treat 
it ‘with all the civilities due to an Embassador’. The edict read:
The said Embassy came with the intention of offering tribute; still 
treat it with civility, and silently cause it to feel gratitude and awe; 
then the right principles of soothing and controlling will be acted 
on. (‘Translation of an Imperial Edict addressed to the Viceroy of 
K’iang-nan (Jiangnan), respecting Treatment of Embassy, received 
October 8, 1816’ in Ellis, 1817, pp. 502–503, Appendix 8)
British expectations of an open exploration of Chinese towns, however, 
were soon thwarted when another imperial order arrived prohibiting such 
excursions.
The visitors noted the vast and sophisticated network of internal commerce 
evidenced by the great number of grain junks returning from Peking and 
admired the physical beauty of the lakes and mountains while sailing 
down the Yangtze River, but visits to temples or ‘joss houses’ presented 
numerous examples of gross idols and Chinese superstition. The embassy 
read the number of dilapidated buildings and lack of new construction as 
evidence of economic decay, but the presence of some prosperous Chinese 
farmers in the southern provinces reminded them more of the dignity and 
industriousness of the British yeoman. Although Ellis (1817) noted some 
fine ‘gentlemen’s country-houses’ on the banks of the Poyang Lake, he 
sought to qualify his observation: ‘it being understood that gentlemen’s 
applies only to the houses, and not to the owners’ (p. 333).
5  The conversation took place on 26 September 1816.
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Contact with local Chinese was random and communication restricted, 
even for the Mandarin speakers. Staunton and Havell ‘rambled’ together 
whenever possible: ‘We met but few of the country people on the course 
of our walks, and those we did meet, appeared unusually indifferent and 
incurious’ (Staunton, 1824, p. 297). Peasants stood respectfully aside as 
the British passed but rarely raised their eyes from the ground (p. 297). 
Other social encounters were with shopkeepers and monks during visits 
to various temples.
China was experienced overwhelmingly from the decks of the boats that 
represented a British space in much the same way as modern-day tourists 
encounter alien cultures from the air-conditioned comfort of luxury buses 
or Western-style hotels. Accommodation on board was comfortable with 
furniture brought from England and a kitchen at the stern where cooks 
prepared English-style food and footmen served European wines. In their 
alien surrounds, British camaraderie and attitudes persisted, reinforced 
by regular communal dinners and the odd cricket match played on 
Chinese riverbanks.
Sensory historians have explained the importance of the senses in 
people’s perceptions of an alien culture. David Howes explained in his 
Introduction to Empire of the senses (2005) that sensory perception is 
primarily the product of culture and is the major medium through which 
people classify and understand different societies (p. 3). The ‘senses’, 
according to Mark Smith (2007), are a product of place and especially 
time. Historians have noted a change in the European hierarchy of the 
senses during the eighteenth century where the visual, or sense of sight, 
defined by objectivity, logic and reason, emerged as the most important 
sense for classifying alien cultures (Howes & Lalonde, 1991).
British perceptions of China experienced the country as a visual and 
objective encounter. Hence, notes were taken of the distant appearance 
of cultivated fields, housing, waterways, wildlife and farming practices. 
Closer to hand, the daily sight of the Chinese boat trackers pulling the 
boats through the Grand Canal informed the British about the condition 
of the lowest class of Chinese society. Ellis (1817) described these men, 
who were at once simultaneously ‘objects of compassion and disgust’, as 
‘deformed, diseased, emaciated, and covered with rags’ (p. 251). Trackers 
observed later in the voyage were more presentable. Those of Jiangxi 
province, for example, were ‘stout well looking men’ who wore ‘neat blue 
uniforms bordered with red braid’. The pleasing demeanour of the ‘lower 
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orders’ as well as the neat and clean appearance of the general population 
seen at this stage of the journey reminded Staunton (1824, p. 186) of 
Europeans of the same class.
Chinese smells persistently caused the British great discomfort. Abel 
(1818) wrote on nearing Canton, ‘A stranger in China rarely experiences 
a pleasing emotion without it being destroyed by some circumstance 
offensive to the senses’ (p. 198). Moorings close to towns resulted in 
British complaints of smells and foul air, while Chinese noises were 
especially grating to English ears. Ellis (1817) complained that ‘nothing is 
done in China without noise and rout’ (p. 384).
Cultural curiosities constantly amused or irritated British sensibilities. 
The propitiation of the river spirits at local temples by the ritual slaughter 
of cocks by the Chinese boatmen who prostrated themselves ‘before a 
table covered with yellow silk, ornamented with the figures of dragons’ 
at local temples was noted (Abel, 1818, p. 147), and no doubt recalled 
comparisons with recent British experiences at Tianjin.
Chinese attitudes to the value of human life mortified the British. Ellis 
witnessed a man falling into the Grand Canal: ‘The Chinese would 
not make the least effort to save [him] and seemed to regret … the 
perseverance of one of the ambassador’s guard and of our servants [who] 
succeeded in recovering the body’ (1817, p. 249). British reactions to the 
corpse amused the Chinese who laughed at their response (Journal of Sir 
William Fanshawe Martin, 1817, p. 50, in BL ADD MSS 41346-41475). 
The Chinese reluctance to help, Staunton (1824, p. 183) explained, was 
due to the absurdity of Chinese law where witnesses who interfered in life 
and death situations were in danger of being liable to either imprisonment 
or torture if a fatality occurred.6
British disembarkation from the boats onto alien Chinese soil replaced 
the visual sensorium with those of other senses. Immersion in Chinese 
crowds especially ensured an acute awareness of cultural differences 
through the senses of smell, sound and touch. British access and freedom 
to ‘ramble’ through the countryside and towns was constrained constantly 
by crowds of curious onlookers whose closeness distressed them. Sensory 
6  On 23 September, during the first day of travelling on the Grand Canal, a Chinese boatman fell 
off Ellis’s boat and, despite British attempts to rescue him, drowned. The mandarin who eventually 
arrived to inspect the coffin ordered Chinese witnesses to kneel before him and he interrogated them 
as culprits (Ellis, 1817, p. 249).
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historians, such as Alain Corbin (1986), confirmed the discomforting 
touch of the ‘alien other’ in which the unease and annoyance of the 
‘putrid masses’ make crowds dangerous. Walking through the crowded, 
narrow streets of Chinese towns assailed British senses affected by strange 
noises, smells, touches, and indecipherable dialects and signs. Volatile 
crowds presented a potential danger for unrest, conflict and a restriction 
on personal movement. The presence of Chinese soldiers, endeavouring 
to keep curious crowds at bay, often exacerbated the conditions in which 
the British found themselves. At other times, however, Chinese crowds 
were polite. Such behaviour, the British thought, was in marked contrast 
to the rudeness of the Qing court at Yuanmingyuan.
Although Amherst informed George Canning, President of the Board of 
Control, that his embassy was permitted greater freedom to travel around 
the countryside than the men of the Macartney Embassy (Amherst to 
Canning, 3 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 281), this 
view is contentious given that British access to Chinese towns was tightly 
controlled. Daily itineraries were planned on the basis of the flotilla arriving 
at its anchorage near a town late at night and departing early in the morning, 
thus leaving little or no time for visits. Additionally, imperial edicts were 
issued periodically during the journey to Canton that forbade the British 
from going ashore. The first was received on 10 October while the embassy 
was halfway through the Grand Canal.7 Staunton (1824) wrote in response, 
‘the interior of towns, we are aware, [are] in some degree forbidden ground’ 
(p. 244). Ellis (1817) added that the Chinese ‘jealousy of the cities is equally 
ridiculous and inhospitable’ (p. 250).
Nanjing
The embassy entered the Yangtze River in 50 boats on 19 October at the 
start of a month-long journey along a route not previously undertaken 
by Englishmen. The ancient capital of Nanjing was a highly anticipated 
stopover, especially as Macartney had not visited the city, and it was hoped 
that new discoveries would be made serving to inform and expand British 
knowledge of China. The city was currently under the rule of a viceroy 
who had been governor at Canton in 1809 and shown great hostility 
towards the British at that time (Davis, 1836/1851, vol. 2, p. 14).
7  See Appendix G.
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Some members of the embassy, led by Amherst and Staunton and 
accompanied by a British marine, a military mandarin and a Chinese 
soldier,  set out to explore the town. Stopping first at a couple of 
‘remarkable joss-houses’ containing highly decorated representations of 
Buddha, referred to as Fo by the British, they continued walking towards 
the city when they were startled by a Chinese soldier on horseback who 
rushed past them ‘and ordered the [city] gates to be shut’ (Staunton, 
1824, p.  264). On being told that foreigners were not permitted to 
enter Nanjing, Amherst refused to leave until the gates were opened and 
complained of the personal insult to the dignity of a British ambassador. 
Crowds of local Chinese, also denied access to the city at this time, 
gathered. The gates remained closed despite the embarrassed pleas from 
the Chinese mandarin accompanying Amherst as well as Staunton’s 
‘strongest expression’ of British indignation at the gates being slammed in 
the ambassador’s face (p. 265). A stand-off ensued. Amherst and Staunton 
stood firm while Ellis and Davis were ordered to return to the boats to 
make a formal complaint to the legate Guanghui.
Fortunately, the matter was resolved quickly. Ellis and Davis returned 
within an hour with news that orders had been issued to throw open the 
gates. Guanghui apologised for the misconduct and ignorance of the officer 
issuing the order who turned out to be the district’s civil governor and the 
soldier who had ‘rushed’ past the Englishmen. The gatekeeper, who had 
followed instructions to shut the gates, was in danger of being bambooed or 
punished by being struck by bamboo poles, but Amherst intervened and, 
with some difficulty, procured the man’s pardon and release.8 Amherst 
was invited to enter the city, but ‘his Lordship refused and said he would 
not have stopped a day [at Nanjing] but for the wind’ (Journal of Sir 
William Fanshawe Martin, 1817, p. 66, in BL ADD MSS 41346-41475). 
Guanghui intercepted the British on their return to the boats and issued 
a rare invitation to tea. He apologised to Amherst who reassured him 
that it was never his intention to contravene Chinese rules or regulations 
(Staunton, 1824, p. 266). Guanghui’s diplomatic and cordial manner at 
this time impressed Staunton who thought him a man ‘of sound sense 
and above common Chinese prejudices’ and who, on the whole, ‘was not 
8  In contrast to the Macartney accounts, the Amherst Embassy references several occasions of 
‘bambooing’. Soldiers or guards who were lax in their duty and who failed to keep a proper eye on 
the British were punished in this way (see Ellis, 1817, p. 324). British disgust at the practice was 
countered by Staunton who pointed out that ‘bambooing’ was no more reprehensible than the cat-of-
nine tails used in the Royal Navy (Staunton, 1824, p. 423).
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unfavourably disposed toward us’ (p. 267). Amherst’s firm stand on this 
occasion was seen by Ellis (1817) as initiating ‘our unrestrained liberty 
of excursion’ (p. 300), at least at Nanjing. Only a week later, however, 
British movements were restricted by another imperial edict prohibiting 
them going ashore.
Earlier Jesuit accounts had described Nanjing’s famous white porcelain 
tower, but Ellis noted that it was ‘useless and unpleasant both to myself and 
to those who may chance to toil through these pages’ to describe it further 
(p. 303). Nanjing was depicted as consisting of ‘four principal streets … 
through one of the larger a narrow canal flows, crossed at intervals by 
bridges of a single arch’ (p. 303). British attempts to climb a nearby hill to 
enjoy the view of the countryside were interrupted by a crowd that grew 
in number from a couple of hundred to thousands of people surrounding 
the sightseers. Plans to visit adjoining temples were shelved as Ellis and 
his party faced the challenge of forcing their way back to the boats. Once 
back in the secure and ordered space of ‘home’, Ellis reflected on the 
reasons for China failing to incite British interest, let alone admiration, 
despite its antiquity. Significantly, he made an important distinction 
between Chinese antiquity and the classical antiquity of Western Europe:
In viewing this city, [Nanjing], striking from its situation and 
extent, and important from its having been the capital of an 
immense empire, I felt most forcibly the deficiency of interest in 
everything relating to China, from the whole being unconnected 
with classical or chivalrous recollections. Here are no temples, 
once decorated, and still bearing marks of the genius of Phidias 
and Praxiteles; no sites or forums once filled with the eloquence 
of Cicero or Demosthenes, no plains once stained with the scared 
blood of patriots, and heroes; no, it is antiquity without dignity 
or veneration, and continuous civilization without generosity or 
refinement. (p. 305)
Ellis’s colleagues agreed with his assessment, which reflects both their 
ignorance of Chinese history and literature as well as the influence of 
a  classical education in providing upper-class Englishmen with their 
historical and literary frame of reference for classifying culture. China, 
Davis (1841, p. 4) thought, had been civilised when Europe was 
still a barbaric society, but the country had never progressed due to 
its resistance to foreign commerce and technological improvement. 
Chinese submissiveness to one man, Davis thought, equated to a 
mechanical obedience best described as a ‘control over animals’ (p. 3). 
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Guanghui paid Amherst a long visit at this time that was notable for its 
informality. The legate, according to Ellis (1817, p. 307), was ‘unusually 
communicative’ and proceeded to tell the British about the public life of 
the emperor. This rare piece of intelligence on the Chinese court grabbed 
even Barrow’s attention and he referred to it later in the Quarterly Review 
(Barrow, 1817a, p. 478). The ‘Son of Heaven’, Ellis (1817) reported:
is [also] a victim of ceremony; he is not allowed to lean back 
in public, to smoke, to change his dress, or in fact to indulge in 
the least relaxation from the mere business of representation. 
It would seem, that while the great support of his authority is the 
despotism of manner, he himself is bound with the same chain 
that holds together the political machine; he knows freedom in 
his inner apartments, where probably he consoles himself for 
public privations by throwing aside the observance of decency and 
dignity. (p. 307)
Havell Goes Sketching
William Havell, the embassy’s artist, left only a handful of sketches and 
paintings of China. His body of work did not contribute any new or 
unique representations of the country or its people in contrast to the 
impressive and broad pictorial representation of China produced by 
Alexander at the time of the Macartney Embassy. His work was not 
used to illustrate any of the accounts of the Amherst Embassy and Ellis’s 
journal, published in 1817, was illustrated with aquatint plates based on 
drawings by Charles Abbot. While at Nanjing, however, Havell displayed 
an interest and appreciation of Chinese sculptures seen in a local temple 
that was not shared by his compatriots.
British preconceived assessments of Chinese art forms in general, and 
religious art forms in particular, were governed by images represented 
on Chinese porcelain and lacquerwares that flooded into Britain from 
Canton during the chinoiserie craze throughout the eighteenth century. 
Images of Chinese deities on these wares portrayed the Buddha as 
a  portly, laughing character, whose depiction was geographically and 
representationally removed from its true context as sculptures made for 
the tomb or temple (see Rawson, 1992, p. 165). Havell was not concerned 
with the symbolism of the ‘representations of the divinities’ he found in 
the temple at Nanjing but focused instead on the form and composition 
of the images. These delighted him because they were ‘very superior 
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to any thing … he had imagined, Chinese art could have produced’ 
(Staunton, 1824, p. 271). His astute, educated eye recognised artistic skill 
and represented a very different assessment of Chinese religious art from 
the usual British abhorrence of the gross forms of Chinese ‘idols’ and 
animal forms found in Chinese temples.9 Chinese sculpture, perceived 
universally by Englishmen as an inferior and primitive art form compared 
to Western aesthetics founded on Greco-Roman classical traditions, 
had found an unexpected admirer. Unfortunately, Havell was unable to 
complete his assignment as large crowds of curious locals interrupted his 
view and impeded his sketching. Staunton’s (1824) assessment of the 
crowd’s behaviour on this occasion, however, was laudatory, and he drew 
an analogy with British crowds, where:
A solitary Chinese, while surrounded by an English mob, would 
have been rather … hazardous … and if made by a foreigner, in 
Turkey or Persia, would probably have been expiated by his instant 
destruction. (p. 272)
Reflecting on the sculptures at the temple at Nanjing, Ellis (1817) wrote:
On viewing the works of art of the Chinese, whether painting, 
drawing, engraving, sculpture, or architecture, I am surprised that 
they should have stopped where they have done; there were but 
a few steps to make, and they would have got into the high road 
of good taste; as it is, they are grotesque and uselessly laborious. 
(p. 310)
This conclusion reflected Barrow’s stadial theory of civilisation expounded 
in Travels in China (1804) where he sought to ascertain China’s status. 
China’s natural progression in the arts, traced to antiquity, suddenly 
stalled. No further progress had taken place due to Chinese arrogance 
and belief in its superiority, which had prohibited embracing any foreign 
innovations that may have assisted its progress and improvement. This 
view also correlated nicely with Barrow’s much-quoted assessment of 
Chinese innovation: ‘they can be said to be great in trifles, whilst they 
are really trifling in everything that is great’ (1804, p. 355). Ellis (1817) 
9  Grotesque stone figures of animals guarded the piers along the Grand Canal, where highly 
decorated temples with ornamental roofs were noted by the British near the city of ‘Tong-chang-foo’ 
(Ellis, 1817, p. 249).
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had the last word, not only on Chinese art, but, on China in general: 
‘It has been said, that there is nothing new under the sun, certainly there 
is nothing new in China; on the contrary, everything is old’ (p. 310).10
Staunton and Amherst, meanwhile, climbed the summit of the hill in 
Nanjing and gazed on the view of the surrounding countryside where little 
evidence was seen either of a sizable population or the fact that Nanjing 
had once been a great imperial city. The men of the Amherst Embassy, 
however, had at least discovered ‘the actual state of this celebrated city’. 
Staunton (1824) pointed out:
Although the gates of Pekin had been shut against us, those 
of Nan-kin at least had yielded to our summons, and thus the 
original and most ancient capital of the empire, which had been 
visited, I believe, by no former Embassy, fairly laid open to our 
curiosity. (p. 271)
General British Views of China
British accounts of Chinese life were, inevitably, cursory. City streets 
were ‘composed entirely of eating houses’ and crowded with barbers 
who skilfully shampooed their customers on street corners (Abel, 1818, 
p. 134). At least six imperial edicts were imposed as the British travelled to 
Canton. These were posted on city walls and houses and throughout city 
streets. Staunton (1824) recorded on 30 October that there were three 
edicts regarding the embassy pasted on the walls of a house within sight of 
the English boats: ‘One of them was written in characters so large, as to be 
legible from our boats by means of a telescope’ (p. 285). The British were 
prohibited from entering city limits and, if they did, the local population 
was ordered not to talk or laugh with them and women were told to hide. 
Shopkeepers were not allowed to sell them goods and the sale of Chinese 
books was prohibited. Manning, on a visit to Datong in early November, 
set off on his own and visited a bookshop where he managed to select 
some volumes that were stacked up on the shop counter, but a stranger 
appeared and ordered the sale be stopped (Staunton, 1824, p. 316).
10  Ellis (1817) commented that the best Chinese art dated from the Ming period and that the 
‘tartar conquerors of China would seem to have communicated the barbarism without the energy of 
their ancestors’ (p. 380).
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The British did manage to purchase some local souvenirs during their 
travels. These consisted mainly of small pieces of chinaware, specifically 
tea cups with covers, destined, presumably, for an English mantelpiece.11 
Chinese shopkeepers showed a discerning ability to distinguish between 
the gentlemen of the embassy who were charged higher prices than the 
members of the band, while Chinese soldiers accompanying the British 
shoppers ‘winked at the shop-keepers to increase their prices’ (Hayne, n.d., 
vol. 2, p. 127). Service in some towns was excellent. The very civil and 
well-behaved shopkeepers of Guazhou were praised by Staunton (1824): 
‘They served us, and tied up and delivered the parcels just as a respectable 
grocer would do in England’ (p. 249). Staunton purchased some tea on 
this occasion, while Havell bought a roll of paintings at a picture shop 
although these were ‘indifferently executed’ (p. 249). The shops of Wuhu 
in the province of Anhui, Ellis (1817, p. 314) noted, were excellent and 
would not disgrace those found in the Strand or Oxford Street. Some sold 
European knives and bales of woollens stamped with the Company logo. 
Porcelain shops were extensive, but the British were unable to purchase 
any pieces because of the large crowds following them and the fear of 
shopkeepers that their stock might be damaged (p. 190). Hayne (n.d., 
vol. 3) described one scene where some in a crowd were:
noisy and frolicsome amongst themselves and mischievous, 
throwing over stalls, pulling down signs, and they pushed one 
of their comrades down on a pile of coarse crockery-ware and 
enjoyed the joke at the expense of the poor shop-keeper. These are 
the sedate Chinese! (p. 14)
The presence of the imperial edicts referred to earlier, however, operated to 
restrict any meaningful contact with Chinese locals and were interpreted 
by the British as evidence of the ‘contemptuous and despotic indifference 
to our comforts, which animates the sovereign of these dominions’ 
(Staunton, 1824, p. 287). Hayne (n.d., vol. 3) recorded that the general 
who officiated over the embassy while in Nanjing had informed the British 
that in the past some ‘Tartars passing thro’ the Country had grossly violated 
decorum with their women’ (p. 7). Similar precautions were now taken 
with the British, but their lack of interest and good conduct, whereby 
they ‘did not even notice the females’, had resulted in a relaxation of some 
11  Staunton earlier informed his mother of a gift from the Hong merchant Puankequa of some 
chinaware of 10 cups and covers of a ‘very pretty light pattern which will do well enough upon [your] 
mantle piece’ (Staunton Letters, 18 March 1811).
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of the rules (p. 3). A more practical reason, in Hayne’s view, was the need 
to secure city streets against the onslaught of the immense curious crowds 
that gathered and followed the Englishmen, although an edict posted in 
the city of Wuhu expressly forbade the British ‘carrying away with us any 
women or children’ (p. 13).
Despite the edicts, some worthwhile social encounters did take place. 
Staunton visited a Chinese school where a group of eight to nine year olds 
of the poorest class were reading aloud and learning by heart the Shee-shoo 
and She-king.12 Staunton gave the teacher a black lead pencil and some 
English paper with the names of the children written in Chinese and 
English; graphite pencils were a European invention and would have been 
a novel gift for a Chinese child.13 While unconvinced of the value of rote 
learning, Staunton was very impressed with Chinese attitudes towards 
the value of education. Discipline was not harsh and the children were 
described as enjoying their time at school (Staunton, 1824, p. 305). Davis 
(1836/1851, vol. 1) quoted Morrison regarding the Chinese regard for 
education: ‘In China there is much to blame, but something to learn. 
Education is there made as general as possible, and moral instruction is 
ranked above the physical’ (p. 240). Davis thought this state of affairs 
resulted from the ‘industry, tranquillity, and content’ of the Chinese 
people (p. 240).
Apart from walks in the countryside and visits to towns and temples, 
the British also spent time playing cricket, which, according to Hayne 
(n.d., vol. 3, p. 68), was undertaken without seeking official permission, 
which was unlikely to have been granted. Jeffrey wrote that the carpenter 
‘made us some bats from the Camphor wood and from this time 
whenever we came to a good piece of ground we had a game of cricket’. 
‘The Chinese’, he added, ‘thought we were all gone mad’ (Jeffrey Amherst, 
n.d., n.p.). The sight of energetic English gentlemen running around the 
fields of China contrasted with the sedentary behaviour of the Chinese 
upper classes who ‘seldom mount a horse’ and on whom the ‘benefits of 
walking’ were lost (Davis, 1836/1851, vol. 2, p. 35). Davis concluded 
that, ‘Nothing surprises … Chinese gentlemen more than the voluntary 
exertion which Europeans impose on themselves for the sake of health 
12  The Sishu (The Four Books) and the Shijing (The Book of Poetry).
13  Graphite pencils were made by the Germans and English. During the Napoleonic Wars, the 
supply of British graphite to France was stopped. A French chemist created pencil leads by mixing 
powdered graphite with ground clay and firing it, a process still used today (see Blaxland, 2008, p. 6). 
Amherst used a graphite pencil for many of his notes.
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as well as amusement’ (p. 35). Cricket matches attracted large crowds of 
Chinese spectators who ringed the field. ‘The Chinese’, Staunton (1824) 
wrote, ‘soon ascertained enough of the game, to be sensible of the necessity 
of keeping a respectable distance’ (p. 368).
British Lack of Access to Chinese Society
Lack of contact or access to Chinese domestic life remained the greatest 
disappointment for the British. Chinese domestic architecture closed 
off any glimpse of family life as compounds were hidden from view and 
rendered the British passive observers of China. Davis (1841, p.  183) 
described the ‘dead walls in front of dwelling-houses, which were always 
secluded within an inner court’. Ellis (1817) saw some scenes of home life 
portrayed on glass paintings at Nanchang, but the only other exposure to 
Chinese domestic rituals were street processions connected with weddings 
or funerals witnessed in the streets of Chinese towns (p. 352). Ellis 
lamented, ‘I only regret that our situation precludes all hope of seeing 
any [other] domestic ceremonies’ (p. 203). Opportunities for a deeper 
understanding of the Chinese national character were thus denied to the 
British. Abel (1818) wrote:
Persons travelling in a country in which they are looked upon by 
the government as objects of jealousy, and by people as beings 
in all respects inferior to themselves, must have continually to 
contend with prejudices likely to defeat their attempts at forming 
a correct estimate of the inhabitants. (p. 232)
Any access to the higher ranks of Chinese general society, corresponding 
to the social status of the gentlemen of the embassy, was impossible. 
Abel affirmed:
With the higher or better informed classes of society, for they are 
essentially the same in China, we had very little social intercourse 
that was not purely official or ceremonious; and on all these 
occasions found them so cased in the armour of form that it was 
impossible to reach their natural character, or to depend on their 
information as the simple statement of matters of fact. (p. 232)
British access to the ‘middling class’ was confined to shopkeepers, or those 
encountered as part of the crowds in towns and cities, and Abel lamented 
the fact that these occasions provided little opportunity for judgement 
on the state of Chinese society (p. 233). During an earlier walk in the 
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countryside along the Baihe River, Abel had encountered a  group of 
‘handsomely clothed’ Chinese women who, with the arrival of some 
Chinese soldiers, ‘hobble[d] off as fast as their crippled and stunted feet 
could carry them’ (p. 88). A few women at Nanchang defied imperial 
orders and looked at the Englishmen (Ellis, 1817, p. 353). Ellis noted that 
their painted faces presented a ‘carnation tinge to the complexion’ and 
their fine eyes ‘though angularly shaped were together tolerably attractive’ 
(p. 353). Hayne (n.d., vol. 3) suspected that these were ladies of ‘dubious 
virtue’ (p. 29). British appearances, Abel noted (1818), also made an 
impact on the Chinese:
We were to these people as the inhabitants of another world. Our 
features, dress, and habits were so opposed to theirs, as to induce 
them to infer that our country, in all its natural characters, must 
equally differ from their own. ‘Have you a moon, and rain, and 
rivers in your country?’ were their occasional questions. (p. 131)
Ordinary Chinese were sometimes very friendly to the British. Villagers 
helped Abel with the collection of plant specimens, while some members 
of the embassy established a strong rapport with their boatmen who were 
a  great source of gossip on the embassy’s progress. Thus, the British 
were  told that Guanghui’s reluctance to travel in rough weather was 
due to his ‘small liver’ that made him timid and afraid (Hayne, n.d., 
vol. 3, p. 24).14 On a couple of occasions, military mandarins invited the 
Englishmen onto their boats for refreshments. Ellis (1817) related that he 
and the young midshipman Charles Abbot were invited on board a boat 
of a military mandarin ‘for the usual purpose of looking at us’:
Abbot, as the youngest, was the principal object of his attention, 
and [our host] amused himself by dressing [Abbot] in Chinese 
clothes: he seemed to live in great familiarity with his servants, and 
put my hat on to excite their merriment; I, in return, took his cap, 
and the buffoonery was complete. (p. 211)
Abel’s (1818) account included several occasions where he interacted with 
ordinary Chinese in the time before he fell ill. Removed from the pressures 
of official business, Abel spent time mingling with itinerant barbers and 
hawkers who set up stalls at the sites where the embassy docked to cater 
to the Chinese on the boats. He visited a food stall ‘arranged with great 
neatness and order’ whose cook was a ‘plump and sleek old man, naked 
14  Here the British are mistaken. Rather than the liver, the boatmen were probably referring to 
Guanghui’s gallbladder. In traditional Chinese medicine, a small gallbladder makes one cowardly.
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to the waist’ and whose complexion suggested he had ‘passed all his life 
within the influence of a furnace’ (p. 90). The cook insisted on showing 
Abel all the secrets of his art and begged him to ‘partake of its produce’, 
but Abel found the hot sesame cakes too oily for his taste (p. 91).
Abel was also asked to join some Chinese soldiers camped on the riverbank 
who were sitting around red lamps suspended from three sticks, smoking 
pipes and playing dominos. Time was spent comparing the respective size 
of their hands with Abel, much to everyone’s amusement, while Abel’s 
gilt buttons and fine linen shirt were much admired. Abel declined some 
offerings of clothing but accepted some white cloth badges inscribed with 
Chinese characters worn by the soldiers around their necks.
Keeping up British Appearances: 
Dinner Time
Amherst maintained embassy morale during the long journey through 
China with formal dinners marking British ceremonial occasions held on 
shore whenever the terrain permitted the setting up of tables. Hayne (n.d., 
vol. 2, pp. 151–152) referred to Saturday night drinking sessions held in 
accordance with the ‘old ship custom of drinking on Saturday night at sea 
to the wives, sweethearts and absent friends’. These were elaborate affairs 
governed by strict protocols of etiquette characterised by cordial conduct 
consisting of refined manners, politeness and fine conversation that 
defined rank and personal civility. A formally laid dining table complete 
with fine silverware, cutlery, crockery, crystal glassware and a countless 
range of serving dishes, all brought from England, added to the opulence 
and formality of the occasion. The strong social bonds resulting from 
shared experiences of China evinced at these times by the 20 ‘gentlemen’ 
of the embassy reaffirmed British identity and values and endorsed the 
perceived superiority of British civilisation in the alien environment of 
China (see Elias, 1939/2000, pp. 5–6).
The sensory anthropologist Lisa Law has written on the power of food to 
‘articulate national identity’ by evoking memories of the taste, aroma, and 
texture of home (2005, p. 236). Its potency derives from its classification 
as a category of ‘cultural separateness’ (Tannerhill, 1995, p. 230). 
A variety of fine produce was provided to the British by their Chinese 
hosts. In northern China, these consisted of sheep, bullocks, pigs, fowls 
and a variety of vegetables and fruits. On reaching the Yangtze River and 
BRITAIN’S SECOND EMBASSY TO CHINA
266
Poyang Lake, the British were supplied with vast quantities and varieties 
of vegetables, deer, game fowls, geese, ducks and fresh fish, as well as 
white grapes, apples and mandarins. Breakfasts, given information from 
British cookbooks of the time, consisted of rolls, cakes, eggs and fruits. 
Dinner, served at four o’clock in the afternoon, was the main meal of the 
day. Three cooks were in charge, namely, two British cooks and Staunton’s 
Cantonese cook. Normal meals took place on individual boats among 
small groups of only two to four, attended by several staff.
English cookbooks of the period suggest the menus that may have been 
offered during the Amherst Embassy. Food historians have noted the change 
that took place in British cuisine at this time where the preference was for 
bland, honest food, cooked simply and without the embellishment of fancy 
sauces thought to disguise the integrity of original ingredients (Turner, 
2004).15 French cuisine, notable for sliced meats or fricassees smothered in 
sauces, was not to British taste. Southern European cooking, characterised 
by dishes of greasy food, reeking with garlic and swimming in olive oil, 
was considered most unpalatable (Margaret Visser as quoted in Howes & 
Lalonde, 1991, p. 127). The similarity of this continental style of cooking 
with Chinese cuisine familiar to the members of the Amherst Embassy was 
noted by Davis (1836/1851, vol. 2), who wrote that ‘Chinese cookery has 
a much nearer resemblance to the French than the English’ (p. 25). British 
preference for hearty soups such as a country-style vegetable broth with 
shredded cabbage was eminently suited to the ingredients supplied to the 
embassy. Soups were followed by meat dishes consisting of hams, braised 
goose and roast chicken. Accompanying the main dishes was a variety of 
entrees such as boned crumbed chicken breasts, sautéed fish, and boned 
game of pheasant and stuffed partridges in aspic.16
The sensory experience of the British meal enjoyed by the embassy 
members functioned momentarily to transform the Chinese environment 
into a part of Britain (Law, 2005, p. 226). Smells of food cooked in 
the British manner wafted across the landscape, while strange sounds 
of cutlery scraping plates would have puzzled Chinese witnesses. The 
accompanying music provided by the ambassador’s band assisted the 
cultural transformation, as well as attracting large crowds of Chinese. 
15  Turner (2004) wrote that British tastes by the nineteenth century had shifted to ‘simpler and 
more local flavors … the new ideal was that food should taste of itself ’ (p. 301).
16  This menu is an adaptation of a formal dinner given for the Prince Regent at the Brighton 
Pavilion in January 1817. It is referred to as an indication of dishes that may have been prepared at 
the time of the Amherst Embassy (see Tannerhill, 1995, pp. 298–300).
267
10 . OVERLAND TO CANTON
People climbed up surrounding trees to see the table laid and hear the 
band more distinctly. Curious mandarins often visited the British at table 
where their presence caused an annoying, hot and stuffy atmosphere; an 
alien presence that might spoil the ambience of the occasion. The band, 
however, was culturally adaptable and took advantage on occasions to 
entertain both the British and Chinese. Staunton (1824) described its 
playing on shore at the time when the embassy was due to enter the 
Yangtze River:
Our band played on the bank opposite Lord Amherst’s boat, for 
some time during the afternoon, and drew together a considerable 
audience of mandarines as well as country people, who all 
appeared, by their manner and attention, much pleased with our 
music—The band played, among other pieces, the Chinese tune 
of Moo-lee-wha, which the natives readily recognised. (p. 249)17
A constant source of amusement for the British during their travels 
through China was the shabby military appearance of the Chinese 
soldier. The victors over Napoleon were unimpressed and critical of what 
they saw. Primitive weapons of bows and arrows, rusty flintlock rifles 
and effeminate uniforms resembling dresses attested to China being an 
unwarlike nation (Ellis, 1817, pp. 225, 267). The British passed some 
forts made up of temporary structures of matting and ‘rudely painted, so 
as to have the appearance of brick or stone at a distance’ that reminded 
the visitors of a production seen in country theatres and a ‘good laugh’ 
was had by all (pp. 225, 267). Davis, whose account of the embassy was 
published after the First Opium War, was a harsh critic of the primitive 
nature of Chinese  weaponry and the childishness of its soldiers and 
officers. The Chinese commander of Amherst’s boat, for example, was 
fond of a game where an Englishman was invited to blow in his face, 
after which he turned his face away, but then turned around and ‘ran in 
and seized his antagonist by the leg to upset him’ (Davis, 1841, p. 178). 
Davis believed this action indicated the importance of bodily strength 
and dexterity in the Chinese military, but thought it also proved ‘the low 
state of the art of war among them’ (p. 178).18 Nonetheless, some Chinese 
17  Molihua or ‘Jasmine Flower’.
18  Davis’s (1841) account contained his opinion on the strategic importance of Tianjin for any 
future British engagement: ‘It must be viewed as the first object of attack to any force which should 
make an attempt in the neighbourhood of the capital, and try the strength of Chinese troops in 
that quarter. Its vicinity to the sea, and its vast importance as the depot for grain and salt, render it 
extremely obnoxious to foreign invasion’ (p. 189).
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military officers were singled out for acting with great civility. One lent 
John Griffith, the embassy’s chaplain, his horse so that Griffith could ride 
back to the entrance of the junction of the Grand Canal, which he had 
missed (Staunton, 1824, p. 193).
Even Ellis admired a military parade seen on the beach at Anqing in 
Anhui province. Four hundred and fifty Chinese soldiers, decked out in 
‘full armour, drawn out on the beach with their officers in their stations, 
and their colours, music, tents, &c, duly arranged and displayed’, saluted 
the British boats (Staunton, 1824, p. 317). Davis (1841), however, 
played down the occasion. The soldiers made a ‘good theatrical show’ 
and reminded him more of an opera chorus than ‘men whose trade was 
slaughter’ (p. 225). In his view, the small marine guard accompanying the 
Amherst Embassy could have taken Tianjin with ease (p. 89). This early 
assessment of the primitive state of the Chinese military was reinforced as 
the embassy travelled through China.
Insulting Chinese behaviour remained a constant source of irritation 
for the British. Morrison, acting on Amherst’s orders, wrote a letter of 
complaint to Guanghui, notable for harbouring a veiled threat:
This morning—when His Lordship went out of his boat, there 
were native soldiers who several times rudely stood and intercepted 
his path. [Further] as Mr. Ellis passed Chin-tazin’s boat, his 
servants rudely began to laugh. It is seriously apprehended that to 
treat us who are visitors in a foreign country with such rudeness, 
may provoke some unpleasant occurrences, and therefore Your 
Excellency is now [requested] to take some means to prevent so 
unfortunate an affair. (Correspondence During the Embassy to 
China (September 1815 – September 1817), in BL IOR MSS 
EUR F 140/38 (a))
Although Morrison was aware that Chinese officials who acted civilly 
towards the British exposed themselves to the ill will of the mandarins, 
concern with external appearances befitting the status of the embassy 
drew complaints when their dignity was thought to be compromised 
(Correspondence During the Embassy to China (September 1815 – 
September 1817), in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/38 (a)). Chinese officials 
acted most ‘unhandsomely’ when complaints were made about Guanghui 
being assigned a superior boat to Amherst. Morrison informed Amherst 
in a private letter that they ‘deserved any trouble it may occasion them’ 
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(Morrison to Amherst, n.d., in BL MSS EUR 140/38 (a)). He continued 
in a passage that succinctly summarises much of the British frame of mind 
during their journey to Canton:
There was at first on the part of the Chinese who spoke to 
me a  disposition to be rudely familiar and assuming. Having 
withstood the Emperor and the Duke at the door of the Court, 
it would perhaps be wrong to submit to the gross neglect of the 
Legate … at the extremity of the Empire. (Morrison to Amherst, 
n.d., in BL MSS EUR 140/38 (a))
Troubles also arose over incidents involving quarrels between the 
members of the band and some Chinese. Morrison told Amherst, ‘some of 
our people—the band it is supposed—have struck some Chinese, which 
gave occasion to … ill-natured [complaints]’ (Morrison to Amherst, n.d., 
in BL IOR MSS EUR 140/38 (a)). Accordingly, Amherst imposed a curfew 
on the band and the British servants who were not allowed to leave their 
boats after dark without special permission (Staunton, 1824, p. 251). On 
the whole, however, the lower orders of the embassy acted with ‘a very fair 
character’ and there were only a few instances of drunkenness and quarrels 
among themselves (p. 360). The earliest Chinese complaint  about bad 
British behaviour on the journey to Canton occurred as the boats were 
entering the Yangtze River. An investigation revealed, however, that this 
was ‘a boyish piece of fun of Jeffrey Amherst’s in pushing a boy into the 
water’ (Hayne, n.d., vol. 2, p. 248).
British respect for Guanghui increased on the sad occasion of the death of 
a British marine who slipped on the deck of Morrison’s boat and drowned. 
Morrison informed Amherst, whose boat was moored some distance away 
down river, that:
The Chinese, by order of the Legate, afforded every assistance, & 
at my request, during the night, cut a grave-stone the following 
Epitaph: ‘The Tomb of Millidge, one of the Body-guards of 
the British Embassador; Nov 11. 1816’. This is a translation. 
The  words were in Chinese. (Morrison to Amherst, n.d., in 
BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/38 (a))19
19  Morrison also informed Amherst that a death certificate had been issued in order for it to be 
registered with the Qing court and the viceroy at Canton. It read, ‘On the 11th Nov 1816, one of 
the British Embassador’s Body-guard named Millidge, aged 31 years, in passing from the head to the 
stern of the boat, the plank being rendered slippery by rain, lost his footing; fell into the water & was 
drowned’. Staunton (1824, p. 320) incorrectly referred to the marine as ‘Millage’.
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Guanghui’s response at this time was praised by Staunton (1824, p. 321) 
and described as ‘very civil’ and expressing ‘great concern’.
Apart from observing the Chinese people in the towns and villages they 
visited, the British took the opportunity of mapping their route through 
the Yangtze River. Amherst informed Canning that because this was 
country ‘hithertoo unexplored’ by any Englishman:
I was anxious to preserve the best memorial of it which our very 
limited means would allow: and this has been effected by the 
industry and accuracy of Mr. Charles Abbot, the eldest son of 
the Speaker of the House of Commons … who accompanied me 
on my landing in China. He had prepared as detailed a map & 
memoir of the country as could be accomplished without the aid 
of some of the most essential instruments, and with occasionally, 
but little time for observation. (Amherst to Canning, written 
aboard the Caesar at sea, 21 April 1817, in BL IOR G/12/198 
(Reel 2) F 256–257)
The Arrival of the Alceste at the 
Pearl River
The HMS Alceste arrived at Lingding Island, outside of Macao, on 
2 November after a journey of almost three months exploring the Gulf of 
Bei Zhili, the eastern coast of Korea and the Ryukyu Islands.20 Captain 
Maxwell, following the precedent of the HMS Lion at the time of the 
Macartney Embassy, was under orders from the Admiralty to proceed 
to Whampoa to refit in preparation for Amherst’s arrival. Dispatches 
were received on board announcing the failure of the Amherst Embassy, 
followed soon after by an edict sent by the viceroy of Canton prohibiting 
the Alceste from entering the Pearl River to meet Amherst. Amherst, it 
seems, was expected to find his own way to the British ships anchored 
outside the Pearl River, travelling by a back passage ‘without suffering to 
call, much less to stop, at Canton’ (Barrow, 1817a, p. 479).
20  Restrictions of space prohibit discussion of the Ryukyu Islands in this study. For the account 
of these, see M’Leod (1818/1820) and Hall (1840/1865).
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Maxwell received conflicting orders from the Canton Government. It was 
initially confirmed that a passport and pilot would be assigned to the 
Alceste, permitting the ship to proceed to Whampoa, but this order was 
countermanded three days later by a senior mandarin sent by the viceroy. 
Maxwell told the mandarin that an imperial edict had specified that the 
Amherst Embassy be treated with the same respect as that accorded to 
Macartney, and that consequently he was allowed to go to Whampoa. 
The mandarin offered no response. Maxwell remained calm in the face 
of the mandarin’s ‘rudeness’ but responded in a tone and manner that, 
according to Basil Hall (1840/1865), ‘made the Mandarin’s button wag 
on top of his bonnet’ (p. 69). On being asked by the mandarin if the 
Alceste was carrying any cargo that would have required the ship being 
registered as a trading vessel, Maxwell replied:
Cargo, did you say!—Powder and shot, sir, are the cargo of 
a  British man-of-war! Did you see his Majesty’s pendant flying 
at the mast-head? If you did not, I desire you will take a good 
look at it on your way to Canton, where you may tell the Viceroy 
you have seen a flag that has never been dishonoured—and please 
God, while it waves over my head it never shall. (as quoted in Hall, 
1840/1865, p. 69)
Several days passed with no resolution of the stand-off. Maxwell gave 
orders on 12 November for the Alceste to approach the mouth of the 
entrance to the Pearl River where she was surrounded by 17 Chinese war 
junks and the shore batteries were seen making full preparations to repel 
the ship. The junks ‘beat their gongs, fired guns, and threw up sky-rockets, 
to give the alarm’, but no damage ensued (M’Leod, 1818/1820, p. 104). 
Maxwell, deciding to take matters into his own hands, loaded one of the 
quarterdeck guns and personally fired it at the Annanhoy fort, destroying 
an outside wall and invoking from the crew of the Alceste ‘three roaring 
cheers’ (p. 104).21 The result, according to Hall (1840/1865, p. 71), was 
‘instantaneous and most ludicrous’. Maxwell told him that the Chinese 
‘fell flat on their faces … like Persians at sunrise’.
21  M’Leod (1818/1820) added that this was a deliberate action taken by Maxwell who was 
aware that, in the event of the Chinese ‘demanding who fired, instead of those who ordered, or of 
seizing upon any innocent person, he might fully place himself in the situation of being individually 
responsible for all consequences’. Staunton (1822, p. 313) added later that by this act Maxwell placed 
the whole weight of responsibility on himself.
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Figure 11: The engagement in 1816 of the HMS Alceste under Captain 
Sir Murray Maxwell with the Chinese fortresses on the Bocca Tigris, 
both of which he immediately silenced.
Note: Drawn by John M’Leod, surgeon on board the Alceste . Engraved by Dubourg and 
published and sold in 1818 by Edward Orme, Bond Street, London .
Source: Image from Wattis Fine Art, Hong Kong, and now in the author’s collection .
The breeze sprung up soon after, and the Alceste sailed through the 
Bogue on its way to Whampoa. Captain Maxwell later received an 
official explanation that the junks did not fire at the Alceste in anger but 
were merely saluting the ship. The British read this as a flagrant lie but 
were afterwards gratified to learn that Maxwell’s actions had resulted 
in ‘a remarkable improvement in the condition of foreign residents’ at 
Canton (Hall, 1840/1865, p. 75). The Indiaman General Hewitt, which 
had been involved in a serious altercation with the Canton authorities 
and prevented from loading teas for her return voyage to England on the 
grounds that she was a tribute ship, was now allowed to take on cargo.22 
The Alceste, anchored at Whampoa, also began taking on provisions and 
making preparations for Amherst’s return expected in late December.
22  The General Hewitt had arrived at Lingding Island on 12 September 1816 but was refused 
permission to travel up-river to Whampoa to load tea. The Hong merchants refused to deliver the 
Select Committee’s letter to the viceroy and the suggestion that Captain Campbell would go in person 
to deliver the letter was received with much alarm as he had not been granted permission to travel 
to Canton. Following the committee’s suggestion that tea would be loaded at Lingding, the General 
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Amherst’s Return to Canton 
and Reception
The local people grew ruder and the crowds became less interested in 
the British as the embassy procession approached Canton. Progress was 
slow and difficult through the rapids and shallow streams as the trackers 
struggled to keep the boats under control. The picturesque countryside 
was conducive for walking and Staunton (1824) was amused to see 
‘pinnacles of hills dotted with parties of Englishmen’ from the embassy 
(p. 395). The mountains separating the British from Canton were seen on 
the morning of 16 December and, three days later, preparations involving 
3,000 men were made to cart the baggage over the mountain pass. 
Amherst was transported in a ‘glazed palanquin’ carried by 12 soldiers 
and the commissioners travelled in palanquins borne by six soldiers. The 
servants, guards and band members were each carried in small open chairs 
by two bearers (p. 439). Nights were spent at rest houses where graffiti 
on the walls revealed the names of the Dutch embassy of 1795 and some 
of the Amherst party added their signatures (p. 445). Five days out from 
Canton, the flags on the British boats were changed to ‘tribute flags’ (Ellis, 
1817, p. 399). Lines of handsome soldiers were drawn up as the British 
passed and Amherst was moved to a superior boat, while Guanghui was 
thought to be increasingly cordial and civil in his manner. A small white 
cottage, passed on 30 December, reminded Ellis of England ‘to which 
indeed all our thoughts begin now to turn’ (p. 404).
Some British Conclusions on China
While many of Barrow’s (1804) earlier assessments of China were 
confirmed by the members of the Amherst Embassy, especially that the 
Chinese were a ‘frowzy people’, some new judgements were made at this 
time. Ellis (1817) commented on Chinese affection for their children and 
thought that ‘their civil institutions’ enforced the ‘reciprocity of good 
Hewitt was surrounded by Chinese war junks. An impasse lasted for several weeks. The ship eventually 
reached Whampoa on 23 October after a series of visits by some mandarins and the committee’s 
letters not being received by the Hoppo resulted in the committee sending a naval officer to force his 
way into Canton to deliver a letter to the viceroy. A compradore from the British Factory was arrested 
for having been complicit in the officer’s visit. The stand-off continued into November and was not 
resolved until the compradore was released and Captain Maxwell had forced his way up the river 
(Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, pp. 265–269).
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conduct’ (p. 204). Evidence of Chinese familial love was illustrated by 
Chang-wei’s 18-year-old son having to return home to live with his mother 
‘as she could not endure being separated from him’. This, Ellis thought, 
showed that Chinese ‘ladies’, as distinct from women of the lower classes, 
had ‘their full share of influence in Chinese families’ (p. 204).
The reports of the Amherst Embassy confirmed Macartney’s earlier views 
on the clear distinction between the Manchu or ‘Tartars’ and the Han 
Chinese. Macartney wrote that China consisted of:
Two distinct nations … the Chinese and the Tartars, whose 
characters essentially differ (notwithstanding their external 
appearance be nearly the same) and whose minds must naturally 
be differently bent by the circumstances which respectively govern 
them. They are both subject to the most absolute authority that 
can be vested in a prince, but with this distinction, that to the 
Chinese it is a foreign tyranny; to the Tartars a domestic despotism. 
(Cranmer-Byng, 1962, pp. 221–222)
Macartney thought that China’s failure to progress higher on the scale 
of civilisation was due to the impact of the Manchu conquerors who 
had held China back while their European contemporaries were ‘every 
day rising in arts and sciences’ (pp. 221–222). In Davis’s (1841) view, 
the ‘Tartars’ were too proud to learn from foreigners, in contrast to the 
progressive and inquisitive British who never missed an opportunity to 
study them (p. 109). ‘Knowledge’, for the British, was ‘power’, reflecting 
the value they placed on intelligence at a time of an expanding maritime-
based empire that was global in nature. Davis further noted the coarse 
manners of the ‘Tartar’ military officers, who he thought were also 
‘illiterate’ (p. 203). He added that, ‘The very inferior consideration of the 
military, as compared with the civil mandarins, is purely Chinese, and 
appears under Tartar despotism, as a singular anomaly’ (p. 203).
The British did have some positive experiences in their dealings with 
Qing officialdom. Thus, the ‘gentlemanly behaviour’ of an officer from 
Shandong province was found to be ‘extremely pleasing’ (Ellis, 1817, 
p. 264). Specific praise was accorded to the escort who accompanied the 
embassy through Jiangxi province due to his ‘conversation [which] was full 
of expressions of the highest consideration’ of England and with ‘humble 
allusions’ to China (Staunton, 1824, p. 391). Staunton praised the civility 
and attention shown by local officers on the Yangtze River for their efforts 
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in overseeing the British boats (p. 239). Even Davis (1841) approved of 
Chang-wei, the Han Chinese junior legate, who had accompanied the 
embassy since it first arrived off Dagu:
The ease and good breeding of the better sort of Chinese, when 
they are on friendly terms, is very striking, and by no means 
what might be expected from the rigid nature of their ceremonial 
observances. (p. 191)
Chang-wei’s ‘real politeness’ and pleasant manner resulting from a daily 
familiarity with the British represented a state of mutual admiration 
between him and the senior members of the embassy. Chang-wei sat 
with the British at dinner, although he did not much ‘relish’ English 
cooking, and expressed his warm admiration of ‘the blunt integrity and 
straight-forwardness of the English character’ (p. 191). Such, however, 
were exceptional relationships. The other Manchu mandarins involved 
with the embassy displayed little or no interest with either Amherst or 
the commissioners. The British saw their arrogance and disinterest as 
indicative of a regime clinging to past glories and grounded in the belief 
that China was the centre of the universe. The presence of highly educated 
Mandarin-speaking Englishmen in the Amherst Embassy, eager to learn 
as much as they could about China, presented a unique opportunity 
for the senior mandarins of the Qing Government to learn more of the 
outside world in general and of Britain in particular. The opportunity, 
however, was not taken up. Instead, Amherst, the British complained, 
was treated by the senior mandarins with the most ‘wilful neglect … of 
all the common courtesies and rights of hospitality’ due to the envoy 
of a foreign state (Staunton, 1824, p. 408). Staunton, in particular, was 
scathing of the lack of honours accorded to Amherst in contrast to those 
paid to the Chinese conductors of the embassy. He concluded that the 
‘complimentary display’ showed to the embassy was ‘as worthless, as their 
military shew is contemptible’ (p. 409). Amherst was insulted late in the 
journey when the conductors of the embassy were given a three-gun salute 
on passing a military post while he was ignored. Morrison was instructed 
to send a formal note of complaint regarding this ‘piece of inattention’ 
(p. 425).
Staunton sought to sum up the attitude of the ordinary Chinese people 
towards the British. Their predominant feeling, Staunton thought, was ‘an 
overpowering curiosity, perfectly inoffensive and good-humoured’, which 
contrasted with the ‘contemptuous and malignant spirit’ displayed to the 
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British by the Cantonese (p. 409). Ellis’s (1817) assessment of China, 
on the other hand, reflected ambiguous British feelings of the country 
resulting, in part, from the failure of the embassy and the nature of its 
reception at Yuanmingyuan. He concluded:
However absurd the pretensions of the Emperor of China may 
be to universal supremacy, it is impossible to travel through his 
dominions without feeling that he has the finest country within 
an imperial ring-fence in the world. (p. 323)
Return to Canton
On New Year’s Day 1817, seven miles from Canton, the members of 
the Amherst Embassy noted the ambassador’s barge from the Alceste, 
flying the royal standard and bearing Captain Maxwell and Metcalfe, 
approaching them at a rapid rate followed by 21 other boats of the British 
ships anchored at Whampoa (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Two lines of 
barges belonging to the Lyra and the Indiamen were lying downstream 
waiting to escort Amherst to his lodgings prepared at ‘the temple of 
Ho-nan’ (Haizhuangsi), situated on the banks of the Pearl River opposite 
the British Factory, which had been ‘splendidly fitted up’ in a European 
fashion by the order and expense of the Chinese Government (Staunton, 
1824, p. 479). Hayne (n.d., vol. 3) commented that the Chinese 
‘bishops’ had been ‘cajoled and bribed’ to give up their own apartments 
(p. 115).23 ‘The paraphernalia of idol worship’, Abel (1818) wrote, ‘had 
given place to the commodious furniture of an English home’ (p. 206). 
Jeffrey added that the Chinese had consented ‘to the removal of their 
Josses from the part of the temple which we inhabited and they were 
stowed away in a lumber room’ (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Hayne (n.d., 
vol. 3) elaborated that the ‘gods and goddesses were either out of doors or 
shut … up in cupboards’ that were now replaced by ‘stoves, and British 
furniture’ (p. 115). The temple had been transformed into ‘a palace fit for 
a British Embassador’ (p. 115). Charles Abbot wrote a long letter to his 
father dated 2 January 1817:
23  Hayne (n.d., vol. 3) added that the gateway or ‘portico’ to the temple was guarded on each side 
by gigantic statues representing Chinese gods, or guardians of the temple. These were painted and 
gilded in the ‘most gawdy colours and with hideous fierce countenances’ (p. 117).
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Here I am comfortably settled in an arm-chair by the fire-side, in 
a Chinese temple, which has been appropriated to the Embassy 
during their stay here, and been made to look like an English house 
by the kindness of the gentlemen of the British Factory. (The Hon. 
C. Abbot to his father, Lord Colchester, Canton, 2 January 1817, 
in Colchester, 1861, vol. 2, pp. 13)
Amherst and the embassy dined that evening at the British Factory. 
The function was attended by over 100 people, all of whom were English 
apart from the American Consul. It was a splendid evening with toasts after 
dinner, complimentary speeches and songs (Hayne, n.d., vol. 3, p. 117). 
‘Every heart was glad’ and the Englishmen ‘experienced in the heartiness 
of the reception a pleasing contrast with the pretended hospitality of 
the Chinese’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 407). Amherst took the opportunity to 
scrupulously maintain the appearance of His Majesty’s ambassador and 
informed George Canning later in his official report that it was only now 
that he was able to do so (Amherst to Canning, 21 April 1817, in BL IOR 
G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 358).
Amherst had a final formal engagement to attend, namely, an imperial 
banquet held for the delivery of the letter from the Jiaqing emperor to 
the Prince Regent. Informed that he was expected to kowtow, he replied 
he would bow on receiving the letter. On 3 January, a letter from the 
mandarins notified the British that the ceremony had been downgraded to 
a reception for the delivery of the letter and that the prostration ceremony 
was dispensed with.
An unauthorised copy of an imperial edict dated 6 September addressed 
to the viceroy of Canton found its way into British hands the following 
day. Its wording differed from other edicts and blamed the failure of 
the embassy at Yuanmingyuan on the actions of the British ambassador 
and commissioners, specifically, for not observing ‘the laws of politeness 
toward their own sovereign’ who had sent presents at great cost and 
across great distance to indicate his respect and obedience to the emperor. 
A reception for the British was to be held where the viceroy was to instruct 
Amherst of his failure ‘to lift [his] eyes to the face of Heaven’ and to give 
thanks to the emperor for the benefits received while in China (see Ellis, 
1817, pp.  505–506, Appendix 10). The British found themselves in 
a  predicament. Decisive action was required to stop the viceroy from 
making an insulting address, but care also had to be taken not to reveal 
how a copy of the edict had come into their possession (p. 411).
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The reception was held on 7 January in a large yellow tent constructed 
outside the temple. Preceded by the band and the marine guard, Amherst 
and his party, dressed in their ambassadorial robes and uniforms, made 
a splendid appearance. The emperor’s letter, housed in a bamboo tube 
covered with yellow silk, was placed on a small sedan chair carried by 36 
bearers. The viceroy handed the letter to Amherst who received it with 
a  profound bow and handed it to his secretary, Henry Hayne. Jeffrey 
noted in his journal, ‘The viceroy seemed astonished at the little respect 
with which the Imperial letter was handled, but said nothing’ (Jeffrey 
Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Entering a side apartment, Amherst and the viceroy 
held a brief discussion during which the mandarin asserted in a haughty 
tone that the British had benefitted from Chinese trade for about 100 
years (Amherst to Canning, 21 April 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) 
F 362). He claimed that Britain could not ‘dispense with the commodities 
of China’, whereupon Amherst replied that these were not indispensable 
and that both Britain and China mutually benefited from the trade, 
which was equal and reciprocal (Amherst to Canning, 21 April 1817, in 
BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 363). Both men then adjourned to the tent 
for fruits and refreshments. Jeffrey described a ‘most ridiculous scene’ that 
took place as the viceroy and Amherst walked to the tent:
The Viceroy and ambassador walked together at the head of the 
Party, but the former wishing it to appear that he was of the highest 
rank endeavoured to get a little ahead of my father, but my father 
perceiving his object stepped out also, until our arrival at the tent 
put an end to the race. (Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.)
The British read Amherst’s performance in front of the viceroy as a moral 
victory. Abel (1818) described the mandarin as a ‘character of cunning’ 
who endeavoured to adopt an overbearing attitude but who soon ‘grew 
pale, and his eyes sunk under the stern and steady gaze of the English 
Ambassador’ (p. 210).24
Father Lamiot, the only French missionary still at Peking, had sent 
a Latin translation of the emperor’s letter (Amherst to Canning, 21 April 
1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 364). Its contents were the same 
as noted in the earlier copy where the encounter at Yuanmingyuan was 
attributed to ‘the pertinacious and successful refusal of the ambassador 
24  Barrow, in his review of Abel’s book in the Quarterly Review in 1819, commented: ‘We did not 
think that Lord Amherst could assume so formidable a look—at all events we are inclined to think 
that the presence of Captain Maxwell and the recollection of the guns of the Alceste … were not 
without their due share in “blanking the once bold visage” of the viceroy’ (p. 83).
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and Commissioners to attend the emperor, under the absurd pretext of 
sickness’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 413). It also contained some assertions, referred 
to as ‘falsehoods’ by Abel (1818), that Macartney had kowtowed and 
that Amherst had at first promised to do so, but afterwards refused. 
Abel concluded, ‘We felt no regret in learning that with a government 
so faithless, the delivery of the letter had terminated the Ambassador’s 
official intercourse’ (p. 211).
Amherst had a busy social calendar at Canton. He paid a visit to Guanghui 
who was ‘cheerful and chatty’ and who sent a communique suggesting that 
some of the British presents might still be accepted by the emperor. The 
British believed that this indicated that ‘the Imperial court is not without 
apprehension of the possible consequences of the abrupt dismissal of the 
Embassy’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 414). A decision was taken to decline all such 
suggestions as conciliating the emperor would add to British humiliation. 
Amherst was also invited to a dinner held in his honour by Chun-qua, 
one of the principal Hong merchants. Ellis hated it. He complained of the 
infernal noise of the ‘sing-song’ and instruments and noted the mandarin 
buttons worn by the Hong merchants were purchased at a high price to 
provide immunity from government punishments (p. 419). Guanghui, in 
contrast, enjoyed a breakfast held at the British Factory where ‘his manner 
and conduct was perfectly unembarrassed, easy, affable, and cheerful: he 
seemed to feel himself among friends, and lost no opportunity of shewing 
attention to those within his reach’ (p. 414).
Amherst’s Departure from China
Amherst prepared to leave Canton on 20 January 1817. Guanghui paid 
a call in the morning ‘and seemed quite sorry to leave us’ (Jeffrey Amherst, 
n.d., n.p.). Amherst, accompanied by all the boats of the Company’s ships, 
was given three cheers as he left the pier. Ellis (1817) wrote:
It was impossible to hear [these] without strong emotions. There 
was an awful manliness in the sound so opposite to the discordant 
salutations and ridiculous ceremonies of the nation we were 
quitting. (p. 421)
The viceroy, who was watching the departure from a distant boat moored 
in the river, sent Amherst his card, but Amherst chose to ignore it. The 
viceroy’s action, the British thought, was not meant as a point of civility 
but, rather, as concern to witness the departure of the embassy. The Alceste, 
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moored at Whampoa, was reached at three o’clock in the afternoon. The 
man-of-war was decorated with her colours and her yards were manned 
(Jeffrey Amherst, n.d., n.p.). Amherst informed George Canning that, 
on boarding the Alceste, ‘I considered my intercourse with the Chinese 
Authorities as at an end’ (Amherst to Canning, 21 April 1817, in BL IOR 
G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 374).25 A parting dinner was held in the evening 
for Staunton who was travelling to England separately on the Indiaman 
Scaleby Castle. Three days later, the Alceste arrived at Macao after passing 
the forts whose personnel paid the ‘utmost respect’ with the guard turned 
out and saluting as the ship passed (Amherst to Canning, 21 April 1817, 
in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 374).26 The governor of Macao sent 
his apologies for not receiving Amherst as all appointments had been 
suspended because a state of mourning was declared for the late queen of 
Portugal. Metcalfe suspected that this was deliberately timed to coincide 
with Amherst’s arrival so that the Portuguese ‘may boast to the Chinese’ 
that the British ambassador had received ‘no mark of attention from them’ 
(Metcalfe to Amherst, Macao, 21 January 1817, in BL IOR MSS EUR 
F 140/38 (a)). Amherst was also informed that several Chinese troops 
had entered the settlement and had set up camp opposite the intended 
landing place of the embassy at Macao, ostensibly as a mark of respect. On 
28 January 1817, Amherst left Macao and ‘finally took leave of the Coast 
of China’ (Amherst to Canning, 21 April 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 
(Reel 2) F 374).
Postscript
The Alceste and Lyra left Macao together, but separated at Manila from 
where the Lyra sailed for India. A little after seven o’clock in the morning 
of 10 February 1817, the Alceste hit a reef in the Gaspar Straits off the 
coast of Sumatra. Jeffrey wrote to his sister:
The shock which it gave was tremendous; I was walking up & 
down in my father’s Cabin & could hardly keep my legs … there 
was a large hole in her [the Alceste’s] bottom … water had already 
filled one store room … the bumping was dreadful, as whenever 
25  Amherst’s notes and letters, and subsequent career, reveal that he chose not to pursue any further 
interest in China.
26  The Asiatic Review (August 1818, p. 192) quoted the Madras Courier for 9 February 1818: 
‘In China all was quiet. The Chinese were busily employed about rebuilding the fort that the Alceste 
bombarded with such effect. They are also building new ones in different parts of the river’.
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the ship rolled, she struck again against one of the rocks … all the 
pumping was useless. (Jeffrey Amherst to his sister, 2 March 1817, 
in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/230)
The boats were hoisted out and loaded with ‘such provisions as were not 
wet’ and set off with the members of the embassy to a small uninhabited 
island situated three miles away (Jeffrey Amherst to his sister, 2 March 
1817, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/230).27 Jeffrey wrote that Captain 
Maxwell joined the group the following day, where it was decided:
That the barge with my father & the gentlemen of the Embassy 
should start at three o’clock for Batavia; each gentleman was 
allowed to take a change of linen … We did not start till six 
o’clock, & had some difficulty in clearing the rocks. We were 
thirty three persons in the barge, & fifteen in the cutter which 
came with us. We had the good luck the second day to have some 
rain by which we got some water to drink. We arrived on the 
fourth day at Batavia, and the first sight of the [British] ships was 
the most cheering sight we ever saw. (Jeffrey Amherst to his sister, 
2 March 1817, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/230)28
The 200 Englishmen, and the boatswain’s wife, who remained on the 
island were in constant danger of attack by large numbers of Malay pirates 
who had already burnt the wreck of the Alceste and threatened an assault 
on the island. Help reached the besieged group 12 days later with the 
arrival of an Indiamen, Ternate, that scared off the Malays. Maxwell’s 
conduct throughout the calamity was widely praised in England and Ellis 
(1817) commended him for his ‘firmness and commanding character 
… [which ensured] sufficient security for the maintenance of discipline’ 
(p. 452). Maxwell was later called before a court martial for the loss of the 
Alceste but was completely exonerated.
A Meeting with Napoleon on St Helena
The members of the embassy set sail for England from Batavia in the 
Indiaman Caesar. Returning via South Africa, the Caesar arrived at 
St Helena on 27 June 1817 where Amherst met Napoleon. Napoleon’s 
views on the fate of the Amherst Embassy are not mentioned in Ellis’s 
27  The island was situated 240 miles (386 kilometres) from Batavia.
28  Abel’s plant specimens, collected under the orders of Sir Joseph Banks and destined for Kew, 
were mistakenly discarded at this time for a change of linen for one of the members of the embassy.
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(1817) account, but are instead recorded in a book written by his 
English surgeon, Barry O’Meara, published in 1822. Napoleon was 
very knowledgeable on the impasse of the kowtow and displayed a most 
pragmatic attitude to the issue. Amherst, he thought, should have bribed 
the mandarins: ‘If a million of francs had been given to the first mandarin, 
everything would have been settled’ (as quoted in O’Meara, 1822, vol. 2, 
p. 69).29 The embassy, in Napoleon’s view, had not been sent on behalf of 
British national honour; rather, it was ‘as an affair of merchandize’ sent 
on behalf of ‘the tea-merchants in England’ (p. 44). Therefore:
Advantages might with great honour be purchased. Besides, when 
you send ambassadors to those barbarians, you must humour 
them and comply with their customs. They do not seek you. They 
never have sent ambassadors in return for yours, nor asked you to 
send any. (p. 44)
Napoleon told Amherst that the consequence for his embassy, in which 
£100,000 pounds had been ‘thrown away’ and ill blood between the British 
and Chinese had resulted, was caused ‘by a ridiculous misunderstanding’ 
(p. 178). Amherst had been informed ‘by bad advisors’ and had proceeded 
to act under the misguided apprehension that an ‘ambassador represented’ 
his sovereign. Napoleon, as a former emperor himself, made it clear that 
he believed Amherst’s rank equated to that of the princes or the ‘grandees’ 
of the court, who, in China, were expected to perform the kowtow before 
the emperor. The emperor, therefore, ‘had a right to require it’ (p. 176). 
Further, Amherst was chastised on his presumption whereby he attempted 
‘to regulate the etiquette of the palace of Pekin by that of St. James’s’. 
England and Russia, according to Napoleon, should:
instruct their ambassadors to submit to the ko-tou, upon the sole 
condition that the Chinese ambassador should submit in London 
and Petersburg to such forms of etiquette as are practised by the 
princes and grandees. (p. 178)
Napoleon did not consider the kowtow a humiliating act, but thought that 
in respecting the customs of another country, ‘you make those of your own 
more sacred’ (p. 178). He had, of course, missed the fundamental point of 
Chinese tributary diplomacy. The kowtow for Napoleon, it appears, was 
29  Gabriel de Magalhaes, in his account of the Dutch embassy sent to China in 1655, acknowledged 
that the Dutch bribed the viceroys of Canton and a number of Chinese officials, especially the Manchu 
president of the Board of Rites, which almost secured Dutch success in their objectives (see Kops, 2002, 
pp. 568–569).
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just theatre or mere ceremonial, and it meant nothing beyond an act to 
please the emperor. In this respect, the British had more in common with 
the Chinese than they did with Napoleon. Both knew the kowtow was 
an act of profound political significance, changing forever the basis of the 
relationship between the actor and the recipient. They did differ, however, 
in the role of the ambassador. For the Chinese, the role of an ambassador 
was not simply to pay respect or deliver messages, but to portray the 
submission of his sovereign. In any event, the victors over Napoleon 
were in no mood to be lectured. The Literary Gazette commented in its 
November 1817 issue:
The conversations with the Ex-emperor are rather hacknied, and 
we shall only offer one remark on the dicta ascribed to him, - that 
if he had sent an Embassy to China, he would have taken care to 
dispatch a person who would have observed all the prostrations 
required. We trust the difference between the Prince Regent of 
England and a Corsican adventurer will always be held a sufficient 
answer, at least in this country, for our not being prone to pursue 
exactly the same course; and it may be further added, that what 
would have been a disgrace to a British nobleman, might have 
been unobjectionable in one of the revolutionary dignitaries of 
the new order.
Staunton had the last word on Napoleon’s views. He wrote to Amherst 
from St Helena after a conversation with the governor, Sir Hudson Lowe, 
on the issue of the kowtow: ‘I shall only say that it will not be the first time 
that England and Bonaparte have differed upon matters of State policy’ 




Aftermath: Britain’s Reaction 
to the Failure of the 
Amherst Embassy
The Amherst Embassy’s fate was announced to the British public by 
The  Times on 10 May 1817. The Company ship Prince Regent, newly 
arrived from India, had met the General Hewitt at St Helena and brought 
the news that ‘The Embassy has wholly failed, and the presents which 
were to have been the pledge of amity and intercourse have been returned 
so we have not lost all’ (The Times, 10 May 1817). Some of the presents 
had been sold at Canton, but the bulk of them were returning to England 
on board the General Hewitt. Reasons for the embassy’s failure were 
not yet known, but it was hoped that trade at Canton had not been 
affected. The General Hewitt’s arrival in England was ‘hourly expected’ 
(The Times, 10  May 1817). The Times published an extract of a letter 
written by a junior member of Amherst’s retinue five days later on 15 May 
that described the honourable treatment the embassy received on its 
travels through China to Canton. The English had enjoyed walks in the 
countryside due to ‘a liberty rather taken than a liberty given’ (emphasis 
in original); had travelled over ‘a considerable portion of new ground, or 
more properly speaking water’, and had received a ‘very sulky’ reception 
at Canton where the embassy was not saluted (The Times, 15 May 1817). 
An  article published on 26 August 1817 contained some more details 
of the embassy, but a full account was not available until Ellis’s (1817) 
journal appeared in British bookshops in late October.
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The importance of the Amherst Embassy in shaping British views of 
China in the crucial period leading to the First Opium War (1839–
1842) is the subject of this chapter. While Staunton informed Morrison 
in a  letter dated  April 1818 that ‘the whole question of this Embassy 
[in England] is now passing fast into oblivion’, Amherst’s hostile reception 
by the Qing court was important for providing new intelligence on 
Chinese officialdom and contributing to a reassessment of China that 
informed later British policy (see Hampton, 2009, p. 4).1 Henceforth, 
British reviewers in popular journals portrayed the Chinese emperor and 
his court as a barbaric Tartar horde and praised Amherst’s firm actions 
in upholding British honour and the status of the British sovereign. 
Although the embassy failed in the short term in achieving its goals, its 
long-term significance remained and is traced here through references to 
it in the period leading to the First Opium War. Ellis’s and Staunton’s 
opinions were canvassed both at the time of debate over the review of 
the Company’s charter in 1833 and also in the House of Commons in 
1840 on the eve of British military intervention in China. The true legacy 
of Amherst’s reception at Yuanmingyuan was to confirm the futility of 
further diplomatic initiatives to achieve British commercial goals in China 
and to promote the expediency of using force, if necessary, to achieve 
these aims. Such sentiments were shared by some American traders at 
Canton and stated bluntly by one trader, Isaac Bull, who commented 
later in 1840, ‘The English may talk reason with the Chinese until the day 
of judgment, [but] the latter will not give them what they want without 
force’ (as quoted in Miller, 1974, p. 98).
Amherst arrived back in England on 16 August 1817. Captain Maxwell 
sent a letter expressing ‘the honour, the heartfelt pride, and gratification 
of being ship mates with Your Lordship for eighteen months’ (Maxwell 
to Amherst, Ship Caesar, Isle of Wight, 16 August 1817, in  BL  IOR 
MSS EUR F 140/39).2 The Dowager Amherst wrote, ‘Welcome! Thrice 
Welcome! To thy native land My Dearest, Dear Lord Amherst, & your 
Dear Boy. How thankful I am’ (Dowager Amherst to Amherst, 20 August 
1817, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/39). The Archduke of Austria 
summed up the delight and relief of Amherst’s friends: ‘The joy I have 
felt in your safe escape outweighed by far that which the most successful 
1  Hampton (2009) referred to the diplomatic space ‘where knowledge of the Other is produced, 
where interest is weighed and gauged’.
2  Maxwell informed Amherst that his luggage was boarded on wagons and was on its way to his 
house in Grosvenor Street. Customs had mistakenly opened and inspected his bags, but they were due 
to be severely reprimanded by the collector, who had been attending church at the time.
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result of your Embassy or scientific enquiry would have given me’ (John, 
Archduke of Austria, to Amherst, Vienna, 1 October 1817, in BL IOR 
MSS EUR F 140/39). Lord Morley was the only one of Amherst’s friends 
who expressed doubt over his decision not to kowtow before the emperor, 
but these thoughts were accompanied by qualifications. His ‘uninformed 
feeling’ was that he would have ‘complied with any ceremonial [and] 
… would have gone in any state of fatigue or in any dress … into the 
presence of the Emperor’, especially when accompanied by Mandarin 
speakers able to explain the truth of the ambassador’s appearance (Lord 
Morley to Amherst, Paris, 21 September 1817, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 
140/31). But if Amherst had evidence of a ‘generally hostile feeling’, then 
he was ‘right to refuse’ (Lord Morley to Amherst, Paris, 21 September 
1817, in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/31).
Amherst’s chief grievance was the contrast in his reception with that of 
Macartney’s. Macartney had maintained that there were ‘a considerable 
number of great people at Court who [had] expressed their being much 
pleased with us, and who wished that we had continued here longer’ 
(Cranmer-Byng, 1962, p. 155). Rather than being received in an orderly 
and regular manner where the dignity of the Chinese emperor and the 
King of England had been maintained, Amherst’s reception was marked 
instead by ‘hurry and precipitation’ (Amherst to Canning, 8 March 1817, 
in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 285). Amherst was offended especially 
with the removal of every mark of splendour and ‘respectable appearance’ 
of his embassy, serving to reduce it to the degrading appearance of one 
of China’s meanest tributary vassals. His uncompromising stance in 
China, on the other hand, was praised in the highest circles of the British 
Government. The governor-general of Bengal, the Earl of Moira, wrote:
I am perfectly persuaded, and it seems the universal opinion here, 
that Your Lordship has gained more by your firmness than you 
could have done by any compliances with the arrogant proposition 
made to you. I do not speak merely as to the impression of the 
British character so worthily upheld by you. We are all convinced 
that for the Company’s trade more advantage will flow from 
the anxiety of the Chinese to repair an affront which they 
apprehend may be seriously resented than could have arisen out 
of any Disposition infused into that Government by conciliatory 
submissions. (Earl of Moira, Calcutta, to Amherst, 13 April 1817, 
in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/39)
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Staunton agreed with Lord Moira. He pointed out later in his privately 
printed memoirs in 1856 that, although the Amherst Embassy had been 
‘stigmatised as a failure’:
It was practically, perhaps, the most successful of any that had ever 
been sent to Pekin by any European power; for it was followed by 
a longer interval of commercial tranquillity, and of freedom from 
annoyance, than had ever been experienced before. (p. 68)
This view was repeated by Davis in his later study The Chinese (1836/1851), 
where he stated that from 1816–1829 there was not a single stoppage 
of British trade at Canton apart from the incident involving the Topaze 
frigate in 1822, in which the Canton authorities made the first advance to 
a resumption of trade (vol. 1, p. 81).
Staunton’s belief in the value of the moral example left in China by the 
Macartney Embassy applied also to the Amherst Embassy. Amherst’s 
defiant stand and firm assertion of British values and honour in his 
dealings  with the mandarins had achieved a more beneficial outcome 
for British interests than would have resulted from a mere ceremonial 
reception, ‘had there been one’, at the Qing court (p. 67). Davis was 
of the same opinion. Barrow, he pointed out, had observed that ‘a tame 
and passive obedience to the degrading demands of this haughty court 
serves only to feed its pride, and … the absurd notions of its own vast 
importance’ (as  quoted in Davis, 1836/1851, vol. 1, p. 77). Amherst’s 
strong stand based on his advice not to kowtow, Staunton argued, had 
a most positive effect on the Cantonese authorities resulting in a peaceful 
period of trade with few interruptions until the late 1820s. It seems 
ironic that the Amherst Embassy was judged by some as achieving a more 
successful outcome for British interests than its predecessor.
However, the reaction of one of the missionaries at Peking, presumably 
Lamiot, to the reception of the Amherst Embassy at Yuanmingyuan was 
one of concern. Amherst had in his possession an extract of a letter 
which read:
Here [at Peking] it is much dreaded that the English will demand 
some satisfaction, for in truth, very unjustly have they been treated, 
and with great baseness. This may be attended with important 
consequences for us, and it will be well that we should be prepared 
beforehand. (Extract of a letter from one of the Missionaries at 
Pekin, n.d., in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/38 (a))
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Reactions of the British Media to the 
Amherst Embassy
In September 1817, the publisher John Murray wrote to Lord Byron 
informing him of his busy schedule:
I have just come to town for a few days and have my hands quite 
full—I am preparing two accounts of the unfortunate China 
Expedition including one by John M’leod and one by Mr. Ellis 
(Ld Buckinghamshire’s son). (Cochran, 1922, p. 78)3
Attention to the Amherst Embassy in England coincided with the 
publication of books on the embassy in 1817 and 1818. Further interest is 
not evident again until 1821 when reviews of Morrison’s (1820) account 
of the embassy were published. Staunton’s English translation of the 
Chinese account of a Narrative of the Chinese embassy to the Khan of the 
Tourgouth Tartars in 1717 was also published in that year and reviewers 
made passing reference to the Amherst Embassy. The spotlight on the 
embassy resurfaced again in 1821 during the proceedings of an enquiry 
into trade with the East Indies and China before the Select Committee 
of the House of Lords.
The published accounts of the embassy, in particular Ellis’s journal 
published in 1817 as intimated previously, confirmed Barrow’s earlier 
views of China. Ellis’s book was the first and acknowledged ‘official’ 
account of the embassy, and his views were significant in consolidating 
the first assessments of China to emerge from the Amherst Embassy. 
The American historian Stuart Creighton Miller (1974) has more recently 
summed up Ellis’s contribution as one revealing:
The alleged pretentions and arrogance of Chinese officials; Chinese 
propensity for filth, lying, cheating, and cruelty; the primitive 
state of Chinese science and medicine; and the slavish adherence 
to customs—all were present. (p. 52)
Ellis portrayed China as a stagnant and dull country whose people suffered 
from a lack of freedom and progress due mainly to the oppressive rule of the 
usurping Manchus. A letter to the editor of the Asiatic Review in January 
1818, signed with the nom de plume ‘Yen Kwang’, not only repeated 
3  The letter continues that he also had ‘Two novels left by Miss Austen—the ingenious Author 
of Pride & Prejudice—who I am sorry to say died about six weeks ago’.
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these judgements but added that Chinese pride and self-sufficiency only 
debased them among other nations due to their ignorance and misguided 
belief that the ‘world is a plain with China in the middle surrounded 
by all other nations, kindreds, and tongues as tributaries’. While the 
experiences of both the Macartney and Amherst embassies had begun to 
‘open the eyes of the world at large’ to China, much remained ‘hidden 
from view’. The writer concluded, ‘we plainly see that the inhabitants 
of the celestial empire are neither so great, so wise, or so powerful’ as 
their eulogists have claimed (Yen Kwang to the editor, The Asiatic Review, 
January 1818, vol. 5, p. 4).
British readers were disappointed, however, that Ellis’s (1817) book 
contained little new information or insight on China. The track from 
Peking to Canton, Barrow complained in his review in the Quarterly Review, 
was as earlier noted, ‘nearly as well known as the road from London to 
Edinburgh’ (1817a, p. 465). Although the Amherst Embassy had deviated 
from Macartney’s route and travelled via Nanjing, ‘the sameness, which is 
characteristic of China, seems everywhere to have occurred in the constant 
repetition of the same kind of objects’ (p. 465). While the members of 
the Amherst Embassy took advantage of their opportunities to explore 
the Chinese countryside, these excursions had failed to produce any new 
knowledge of China. British rambles covered only a narrow range of terrain 
radiating from the boats where social contact was limited to peasant farmers, 
shopkeepers and temple priests. Crowds restricted any serious exploration 
of Chinese cities encountered en route and entry into Peking did not occur. 
Contact with Chinese women and insight into Chinese domestic life 
remained inaccessible. Barrow (1819) reminded his readers:
We should always remember that we view the Chinese character 
only as drawn by foreigners, who, from the nature of the 
government, have at all times been the objects of suspicion, and 
who hold a very limited intercourse with the natives. (p. 76)
China’s persistent refusal to communicate with the outside world was 
summed up by the Eclectic Review in 1821:
We are completely shut out from personal communication with 
[the Chinese], being merely permitted to peep at them from 
Canton or Macao, as through a grate, where our Factory converse 
with them through the medium of a mercantile jargon, intelligible 
only to themselves and the individuals with whom they traffic. 
(vol. xvi, p. 37)
291
11 . AFTERMATH
The most noteworthy outcome affecting British perceptions of China 
from the accounts of the embassy was a revised assessment of the Qing 
emperor and his ministers. Accounts of the Macartney Embassy had 
portrayed the Qianlong emperor as a venerable old gentleman-statesman 
who was healthy, vigorous, affable and pragmatic, and who had received 
the British with graciousness and politeness. The Qianlong emperor had, 
at least, engaged with the British personally, exemplified famously by his 
brief conversation with the young Staunton, which signified an interest 
in the outside world.4 The Jiaqing emperor’s reputation, on the other 
hand, based on his treatment of Amherst, whereby the ambassador was 
not even received, was judged by British popular journals in the most 
vitriolic of terms. At best, the emperor was ‘a weak and capricious ruler, 
little acquainted with the affairs of government, or the condition of his 
people’ (Barrow, 1819, p. 75).5 At worst, he was ‘a man of impetuous 
and capricious disposition, increased by a habit of constant inebriation’ 
(The Times, 26 August 1817).6 An official report on the state of China 
presented to the British Government in 1847 summed up the Jiaqing 
emperor’s legacy: ‘His life and reign is blank, as no just, noble, or generous 
action can be discovered’ (Martin, 1847, p. 285). Modern historiography 
has revealed, on the contrary, that the Jiaqing emperor was pragmatic, 
sober, frugal, energetic and intent on instigating a series of new reforms in 
his reign (see Rowe, 2011; Wang, 2014). He was challenged not only with 
curbing the financial excesses of his father that had left the imperial coffers 
in a depleted state, but also by serious internal insurrections, assassination 
attempts and a serious pirate problem on the southern China coast (Wang, 
2014, p. 128). His treatment of Amherst, however, served to define and 
denigrate the office of the Chinese emperor as a caricature of an oriental 
potentate in the British imagination. The emperor’s ministers fared no 
better. China’s despotic government was revealed to British readers as one 
characterised by ‘childish vanity’, insolence, meanness and ‘unblushing 
falsehoods’ (Barrow, 1817a, p. 465). Chinese mandarins, according to 
Ellis (1817), were arrogant, pretentious, rude, devious and liars. British 
reviewers were outraged by the Chinese suggestion at Tongzhou that 
Amherst perform the kowtow in private but was free to lie in making 
a false report to the king. Barrow, writing again in the Quarterly Review, 
4  The interest or otherwise of Qing emperors in the ‘outer world’ was noted by Will (2008, p. 125).
5  Abel (1818) also described the Jiaqing emperor as ‘a timid’ man with a ‘vacillating temper, 
sufficiently proved by his conduct to the British Embassy’ (p. 118).
6  This comment was subsequently reprinted in the Gentleman’s Magazine (July–December 1817, 
p. 231).
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wrote that this proposition ‘affords no bad illustration of the notions of 
the Chinese respecting the conduct of men in public situations’ (1817a, 
p. 470).
Not surprisingly, British reviewers vilified Heshitai in particular who was 
portrayed as arrogant, rude and lacking in any sense of propriety. His 
suggestion to Amherst that he was prepared to ‘be his friend’ at Peking 
if Amherst agreed to kowtow was seen as an attempt to pressure, if not 
blackmail, the British into complying with the ceremony. Significantly, it 
was after this meeting that Amherst made his final decision not to perform 
the kowtow based on Staunton’s advice, as well as his own judgement as 
to the best course of action available to him. Heshitai’s subsequent report 
to the Jiaqing emperor, sent from Tongzhou confirming that the ‘English 
tribute-bearer is daily practising the ceremony, and manifests the highest 
possible respect and veneration’ (‘Heshitai’s Report from Tongzhou 
to the Emperor’ in Ellis, 1817, p. 509, Appendix 13), exemplified for 
Barrow (1817a) ‘the utter disregard of the Chinese for the truth, from the 
emperor on the throne to the lowest of his minsters’ (p. 472). Heshitai’s 
rude behaviour at Yuanmingyuan of grabbing Amherst’s arm still angered 
the British many years after the event. A review in the Asiatic Journal and 
Monthly Register for British India and Its Dependencies of an account of the 
recent Russian embassy to Peking in 1820–1821 thought it relevant and 
appropriate to refer to the Amherst Embassy where Heshitai’s act of:
taking his Lordship [Amherst] by the arm in order to conduct 
him to another apartment, was nothing less than a brutal attempt 
to drag him into the presence chamber, where he would most 
probably have been compelled to undergo other humiliations. 
(Review of ‘Travels of the Russian Mission through Mongolia 
to China, 1820-21’ by George Timkowski, Asiatic Journal and 
Monthly Register for British India and Its Dependencies, 1827, 
p. 826)
Heshitai’s behaviour, according to Peter Auber’s account of China 
published in 1834, represented the ‘most singular specimen of inhospitable 
and unmanly treatment’ befitting the barbarity of a Tartar camp more 
than any ‘which could have been expected even from the most uncivilised 
of crowned heads’ (p. 263). The Pocket Magazine, which catered for 
a  poorer educated clientele, was also scathing of Heshitai’s insult to 
the representative of the British sovereign, describing it as a ‘disgusting 
nonsense; insisting on the superior dignity of his Emperor over our King’ 
(1818, vol. 1, p. 111). Amherst, the magazine concluded, would have been 
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well within his rights to have thrown the insolent ‘Ho [Heshitai] and Mu 
[Muketenge]’ into the Baihe River (p. 110). The Chinese belief of there 
being ‘only one sun in the firmament, so there was only one sovereign 
in the universe, the Emperor of the Heavenly Empire’ was, in Auber’s 
(1834, p. 261) opinion, absurd. The only interesting part of Ellis’s (1817) 
account, The Times (8–9 October 1817) concluded, was that which:
describes the Ambassador in some danger of being introduced 
into the presence of the Emperor of China in the same manner as 
an unwilling creditor would be introduced into a sponging-house 
by a couple of bailiffs.
Conversely, the Edinburgh Review presented a contrarian view of  the 
Amherst Embassy’s reception in its review of Ellis’s (1817) book. 
The  Chinese Government’s right to deny entry into their country of 
restless, ambitious and intriguing European visitors ‘who have played 
the game of war and ambition, for near three hundred years, in their 
immediate vicinity’ of India was acknowledged (Edinburgh Review, 1818, 
vol. 29, p. 29). Amherst, described as a nobleman of the ‘most amiable 
character’, had in fact little diplomatic experience and was assisted by 
a man—namely, Staunton—who was ‘considered by the Chinese as a 
dangerous person’. Amherst had been poorly briefed on his mission and 
many in England were ‘prepared for the catastrophe of the Embassy’, 
especially following the fate of the Golovkin Embassy. The kowtow, in the 
Review’s opinion, was no more humiliating than other court ceremony, 
and it was reasonable to expect that an ambassador visiting a foreign court 
should subscribe to local ceremonies and not ‘attempt to prescribe a new 
one’ (p. 29).
Although British public interest in the Amherst Embassy subsided after 
the appearance of the first accounts in 1817 and 1818, reference to it 
resurfaced throughout the following 20 years. Two books on China, it 
has been noted, were published in 1821. Reviews of Morrison’s (1820) 
memoir of the embassy focused on the ‘senseless state of idolatry’ and 
superstition in China and the decay of its temples (see e.g. The Eclectic 
Review, 1821, vol. 16, pp. 569–571). The second book, mentioned 
previously, was Staunton’s (1821) translation of Narrative of the Chinese 
embassy to the Khan of the Tourgouth Tartars in 1717. Its publication 
presented Barrow with yet another opportunity to voice his opinion on 
China through a review in the Quarterly Review. The Chinese, Barrow 
(1821) concluded, were a shrewd and ingenious people, excelling in the 
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arts, manufacturing, agriculture, civil polity, literature and morals, and 
were indisputably far superior to other Asiatic peoples (pp. 414–415). But 
their condition suffered from a bad government and a terrible religion: ‘the 
one, we think, renders them selfish and distrustful; the other superstitious 
and hypocritical’ (p. 415). Chinese society had been made ‘cold and 
repulsive’ due to its exclusion of women shut behind family compound 
walls (p. 415). While Barrow thought a ‘closer intimacy’ with the Chinese 
people ‘might incline us to entertain a somewhat more favourable opinion 
of them’, this opportunity was prevented by government policy that 
was ‘hostile to all international connections’ and the difficult Chinese 
language prohibiting any communication with foreigners (p. 415). 
A final assessment of the emperor reflected the impact of the Amherst 
Embassy. The Qing emperor, in Barrow’s opinion, was not a despot, but 
was little more ‘than a puppet in the hands of a few great officers’ (p. 415). 
Staunton’s translation revealed further that the true status of a foreign 
mission ‘in Chinese eyes’ was one that was ‘so little desirable’ (p. 420).
The Legacy of the Amherst Embassy in 
the Period Leading to Free Trade
In 1821, an enquiry of the Select Committee of the House of Lords, 
initiated in part due to the current viceroy stopping trade at Canton, 
sought to investigate avenues for trade concessions in China. Reference 
was made to diplomacy’s failure to secure positive outcomes:
All the efforts of the Company since the splendid Embassy of Lord 
Macartney from the King of Great Britain, could not procure 
the liberty of a second port; and so things continue to this day. 
Another recent Embassy from the sovereign of this country, 
intended also to procure ameliorations in the trade, was not even 
admitted into the emperor’s presence. (Charles Grant as quoted 
in Report [relative to the trade with the East Indies and China] from 
the Select Committee of the House of Lords, 11 April 1821, p. 165)
The insolvency of the Hong merchants, through whom the British 
conducted their trade, resulted in a serious dispute at Canton in 1829. 
The viceroy had refused to discuss the issue with the Select Committee, 
which threatened to withdraw the Company ships to Manila as well as 
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sending in the Royal Navy in an attempt to secure a dialogue. The viceroy 
eventually backed down and agreed to new concessions at Canton, 
including the appointment of three new Hong merchants.
The Select Committee’s firm and decisive action in the face of Chinese 
intimidation at this time was a direct legacy of Staunton’s resolute stand 
both at Canton in 1814 and during the Amherst Embassy where British 
submission was thought only to aggravate and promote Chinese demands. 
A further legacy of the Amherst Embassy, and arguably the major one, 
was the British recognition of the value of military force in assisting 
the procurement of British concessions from the Chinese Government. 
Captain Maxwell’s success in silencing the Bocca Tigris forts and forcing 
his way up the Pearl River had broken the serious stalemate over the 
loading of teas on board the General Hewitt in 1816, and had resulted in 
the viceroy ameliorating his hostile stance towards the British by insisting 
that the shots fired at the Alceste were intended as a salute rather than an 
aggressive act. British views on dealing with China arguably changed as 
a result of Maxwell’s action, reflecting the efficiency of enlisting British 
power to achieve national objectives. The former president of the Select 
Committee, Charles Marjoribanks, informed the president of the Board 
of Control, Charles Grant,7 in 1833 that diplomacy had failed in China 
and recommended:
Commissioners be sent, accompanied by a part of the naval 
squadron in India; for to command the slightest attention or 
respect in China, you must appear with an appropriate force; let 
your requisitions be such as you are justified in making, and be 
prepared to insist upon them if refused. This may be readily done 
by occupying … one of the numerous islands in the Canton river, 
and, if necessary, seizing the forts which command its entrance. 
They have no force, either military or naval, to oppose to you, that 
is not contemptible. Under such circumstances I feel satisfied your 
demands would be granted in a very brief period. (Marjoribanks, 
1833, p. 53)
Ellis and Staunton were also called on to give their views on the 
extension of the Company’s charter in 1833. At issue was the question 
of maintaining the Company’s tea monopoly in China in the face of 
growing pressure from British public opinion and manufacturers who 
7  Charles Grant, later Lord Glenelg, was the son of the former chairman of the East India 
Company of the same name.
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petitioned the government for opening up the China trade to all traders. 
Ellis presented a series of letters on the East India question to members of 
the two Houses of Parliament in 1830 in which he addressed the major 
question: ‘In what manner can the trade with China be carried on with 
most advantage to the English nation?’ (Ellis, 1830, p. 26). His answer 
reflected views consolidated at the time of the Amherst Embassy. The 
Chinese Government, he argued, had ‘peculiar opinions’ regarding any 
contact with foreigners who were considered a danger to national security 
and a threat to Chinese morals and political and domestic harmony. 
China’s great internal trade, observed by him during his travels with 
the embassy, meant they had no need for commerce with other nations 
(p. 29).8 Their trade with Britain was not founded on treaties between 
independent states but was solely in the hands of the Hong merchants 
who, in turn, were responsible for their dues to the Chinese Government. 
Ellis argued that, regardless of any change the British might make to the 
Company monopoly, the Hong merchants would retain their monopoly. 
Private traders, acting in an individual capacity in contrast to the powerful 
Select Committee, would be powerless to bargain with them, and control 
would soon fall into the hands of the more prosperous Hong merchants 
who would manipulate prices and the trade to their own advantage 
(p.  33). Diplomatic representation at Canton, in Ellis’s view, was also 
useless. The presence of an American Consul had made no difference to 
the conduct of American private trade, whereas:
The power possessed by the Company’s supercargoes of stopping 
the whole British trade … has been found to be infinitely 
more calculated to prevent fresh exaction, than any diplomatic 
proceeding whatsoever, when addressed to a government so totally 
different, from the rest of the civilised world, in the laws and 
usages regulating international intercourse. (pp. 40–41)
Staunton held similar views.9 He addressed the House of Commons on 
13 June 1833 with a series of recommendations during the debate on the 
renewal of the Company’s charter. The valuable tea trade still contributed 
almost £4 million annually into the British Treasury’s coffers, he reminded 
8  Davis also believed that free trade with China was ‘fraught with great evil’ that would result in the 
rise of tea prices and a degradation in tea quality (see East-India Committee, The Times, 24 February 
1830, p. 3).
9  Staunton was elected first to the House of Commons as MP for the rotten boroughs of St Michael’s 
in Cornwall and Heytesbury in Wiltshire between 1818 and 1833 (Staunton, 1856, p. 76). He was later 




the House, but was governed solely by the arbitrary control of Chinese 
local authorities at Canton and subject to severe and vexatious restrictions 
(Staunton, 1840, Appendix, p. i). Company agents, acting as a powerful 
united group, were able to oppose the arbitrary and oppressive acts of the 
local government, which was not possible by individuals acting alone. 
Such influence was the ‘sole check operating to control and counteract 
the corrupt local administrators of the peculiarly arbitrary and despotic 
government’. Staunton, unlike Ellis, still believed that diplomacy had a 
role to play in gaining trade concessions:
Notwithstanding the failure of all complimentary embassies to 
the court of Pekin, however otherwise beneficial in raising and 
procuring the due recognition of the national character, [Chinese] 
treaties with Russia prove there are no insurmountable obstacles to 
such an agreement. (p. ii)
The Charter for the East India Company was renewed in 1833 for 
another 20 years. The old title of governor-general of Bengal was changed 
to governor-general of India and the position of ‘Chief Superintendent 
of Trade’ in Canton replaced president of the Select Committee.10 
Significantly, the China trade was opened to all (Mersey, 1949, p. 53). 
Staunton’s views on how to deal with the Qing Government changed in 
1840, largely in response to the Chinese seizure and destruction of British 
property, consisting of opium valued at £2 million, at Canton (Eastberg, 
2009, p. 221). Staunton asked the following question in an address to 
Parliament on the eve of the First Opium War: ‘Is the contest in which 
we appear to be on the eve of embarking with the Emperor of China, 
a just and necessary war, or an act of cruel and iniquitous aggression?’ 
(Staunton, 1840, p. 5). He still preferred a diplomatic solution for re-
establishing British trade in China on a satisfactory and secure footing, 
but had reluctantly reached the conclusion:
that the context in which we are about to engage with China is 
perfectly just … I rejoice to see that it has received this night the 
tacit approbation, at least, of the House. (p. 7)
While Staunton abhorred the opium trade and wished to see it abolished, 
he felt the current conflict was not about opium, but rather that the 
Chinese Government had breached international law in seizing British 
10  Lord William Napier was the first appointed to this position, but his credentials were rejected 
by the viceroy of Canton when Napier arrived in 1834 (see Lovell, 2011, p. 6).
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property and had broken their trust of safely protecting the trade and 
British citizens (Eastberg, 2009, p. 221). Asked how he would have 
responded to Commissioner Lin Zexu’s actions at Canton in confiscating 
British opium, Staunton told Parliament:
I must beg to tell … the House what I did do when I was in Pekin 
with Lord Amherst, and under somewhat similar circumstances. 
When threatened in a similar manner by the Commissioner’s 
Imperial Master himself, because I refused to advise my noble 
colleague to perform the Chinese ceremony, I neither trembled 
nor obeyed; and all the world knows that that Embassy was not 
only allowed to return safety [sic], but traversed the whole Chinese 
Empire afterwards with greater convenience and equal honors to 
the preceding Embassy of Lord Macartney. (p. 20)
Eastberg (2009, p. 223) has argued, convincingly, that Staunton’s views 
on China were largely outdated and overtaken by events by the time of 
the First Opium War. Western perceptions of China had consolidated. 
Pertinently, Miller wrote in the context of some American opinion, which 
is applicable also to British views, that China’s defeat in the Opium War 
was hardly a surprise given earlier reports of its military backwardness. 
He added:
The Amherst mission and the action of Captain Maxwell in 
Canton provoked one [American] editor in 1818 to declare that 
the country ‘slumbers, like a drowsy and emasculate Mammoth … 
till invasion, from the East and West shall enter her realms, and 
with fire and sword, purge away the gross and stagnant humors 
that clog her distempered frame’. (American Monthly Magazine 
and Critical Review, 1818, vol. II, p. 443 as quoted in Miller, 
1974, p. 92)
Western abhorrence of the kowtow had become inextricably linked with 
Chinese identity and cultural imperatives in the Western imagination. 
John Quincy Adams, a former United States president and diplomat, 
wrote at the time of the First Opium War that its cause was not opium 
but the kowtow, blaming:
The arrogant and insupportable pretensions of China, that she 
would hold commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind, 
not upon terms of equal reciprocity, but upon the insulting and 
degrading form of relations between lord and vassal. (as quoted in 
Blusse, 2008, p. 88)
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Retrospect: Reflections on 
the Amherst Embassy
Amherst and his embassy have not been judged kindly by history.1 
The causes and the goals of the embassy have been lost in the scholarly 
debate over Amherst’s failure to appear before the Jiaqing emperor as 
a  result of refusing to kowtow. Amherst’s own performance has been 
viewed  as lacklustre, even inept, indecisive and overly cautious, and 
captive to the uncompromising pro-Company views of Staunton.2 
The embassy has been described as not merely a failure but ‘a fiasco’ 
(Tuck,  2000, p.  viii) and compared unfavourably with its predecessor 
the Macartney Embassy, although both failed to achieve their objectives 
(Platt, 2018, pp. 159–177). Both implicitly and explicitly, Amherst has 
been apportioned a substantial part of the blame for the mission’s failure.
Amherst has been judged unfairly. The embassy did not fail because of 
his leadership or as a result of his final decision not to kowtow. Amherst 
was not  a great leader by any measure, but he was a competent one 
1  Douglas Peers wrote in his entry on Amherst in The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
‘Neither historians nor his contemporaries and successors have been kind to Amherst; John Malcolm 
wrote of him that he was being compared to “the person who brought the blue flies into the butcher’s 
shop”’. This refers to his later appointment as governor-general of Bengal. The dictionary also referred 
to Amherst admitting to Lord Morley, ‘I would not have you suppose that I deem myself a man of 
sufficient calibre to govern India in difficult times’. In both China and later in India, he faced very 
difficult situations not of his own making and coped admirably under extreme pressure, eventually 
being vindicated for his decisions in India and leadership choices.
2  Gao (2016) wrote, for example, ‘Amherst had to yield to Staunton’s “experience-based” 
assessment of the situation’ (p. 610).
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whose style was low key but effective.3 He was charming and his strong 
personal qualities of honesty and integrity stood him in good stead 
with his colleagues. He was focused on the major issues and engaged in 
their resolution at all the stages of the embassy. As the record shows, he 
kept up the morale of  the party throughout a long and trying voyage 
and a  very difficult journey through China, especially in the period 
before and  immediately after Yuanmingyuan. He was clearly respected 
as a man  and as a leader who was considerate, even tempered, good 
humoured and fair-minded, and who set an example to his men by his 
own behaviour.4 He was very capable but not intellectually superior, 
wrote competently but without flair, and was considered a decent man. 
Under the most difficult of circumstances, the party never split into 
factions, nor was the leadership group marked by jealousy or rivalry.5 
Amherst’s leadership style won him loyalty as he was consultative and 
inclusive, balanced in his judgements, hardworking and approachable. 
Despite criticism to the contrary, Amherst was calm under pressure and 
comfortable making decisions, usually having first canvassed the views of 
his colleagues. Ultimately, the record shows he took full responsibility for 
his decisions. Throughout the whole enterprise, Amherst was a very steady 
hand on the tiller.
Both the Chinese and British thought of themselves as exceptional—each 
being utterly convinced of their own superiority—and found little to 
admire or emulate in the other. A major difference was that the British, 
as an emerging maritime-based empire that was global in nature, were 
keen to learn as much as they could about the Chinese political and 
commercial systems and decision-making in order to better exploit the 
3  Canning wrote of him on his appointment as governor-general of Bengal in 1822, 
‘the appointment … is not a very strong one; but … Amherst is at least blameless. He is in good 
political principles; a Government man without implicitness and a courtier without subserviency’ 
(Canning to Huskisson as quoted in Philips, 1940, p. 239, emphasis in original).
4  Amherst’s friends spoke highly of his character. Lord Sidmouth summed these up in a letter 
dated 31 December 1815: ‘I have no doubt of the success of the Embassy, upon the judgment, temper 
and address of the Person, in whose hands this important entity is fortunately placed’ (in BL IOR 
MSS EUR F 140/35).
5  Eastberg (2009, p. 217, fn. 560), in her chapter on British debate on China and Lord Napier’s 
appointment as the chief superintendent of British trade to China in 1834, mistakenly ascribed 
Lord Napier’s dislike of Staunton to Amherst. Eastberg wrote, ‘No love was lost between Napier and 
Staunton. According to Priscilla Napier [1995, p. 82], Amherst recorded in his notes from his studies in 
preparation for his mission that Staunton “may be deeply versed in Chinese literature … but in politics 
his [sic] a Driveller”’. A review of Amherst’s notes revealed no mention of Staunton, and a close reading 
of Priscilla Napier (1995, p. 82) showed that these were Lord Napier’s words, not Amherst’s. Further, 
Amherst’s notes were written in 1815, before Staunton’s subsequent political career.
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trading opportunities that China offered. In contrast, the Qing court, in 
the British view, still saw itself as presiding over the centre of the universe. 
The court was ignorant of foreign nations, especially those of Europe, 
and was not interested in better understanding the British, continuing to 
ascribe to them the role of a traditional vassal who had travelled from afar 
to pay tribute.
The period following the Macartney Embassy of 1793 saw a substantial 
growth in British knowledge of China. The accounts of earlier embassies 
were augmented by the observations of men like Staunton, Morrison and 
Davis whose scholarship, knowledge of Mandarin and practical experience 
of dealing with the Canton authorities represented a fundamental shift 
from the Macartney Embassy in the depth of British understanding 
about China.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is not difficult to identify where the 
Amherst Embassy failed; indeed, it is difficult to see how it could have 
been successful in achieving its objectives. From its conception, it was 
hostage to the legacy of the Macartney Embassy. The widely held British 
belief in the positive impact on the Qing court made by the Macartney 
Embassy, which suggested that any future British mission would 
be treated as a special case and not within the narrow confines of the 
tribute system, turned out to be a myth. Rather, it has been seen, the 
Jiaqing emperor was determined  to reassert Qing ceremonial protocol 
and insist on proper observances in order to not create an awkward and 
unacceptable precedent.
Nonetheless, the legacy of the Macartney Embassy had an indirect but 
important impact on the Amherst Embassy’s reading of China. Barrow’s 
book, Travels in China, published in 1804, was especially influential, 
as  has been seen, in shaping and influencing the views of China held 
by the senior members of the Amherst Embassy. All of them had read 
Barrow’s book and several carried copies with them to China. Ellis, in 
particular, whose first published account of the embassy was accepted as 
the official record of the embassy, makes no secret of his indebtedness to 
Barrow. Staunton (1824) complained in his private account that Barrow 
and others of the Macartney Embassy had left him with little new to 
report on China: ‘The comparative success of the former mission, and the 
interest and novelty of first discovery, are wanting on the present occasion’ 
(p. 205).
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The remedies to the identified deficiencies of the Macartney Embassy, 
such  as its lack of British linguists and local expertise on the inner 
workings  of the Qing bureaucracy, were ironically to prove especially 
damaging. Although Staunton and Morrison were highly talented men 
and certainly had the required skills and attributes, they were both viewed 
with deep suspicion by the Qing court and the emperor, evidenced by the 
imperial edict received at Canton in January 1815 (Imperial edict, 8 January 
1815).6 This was on account of their linguistic skills in Mandarin and, in 
the case of Staunton, his tough stance during the course of several disputes 
with the local authorities at Canton. Morrison was also the subject of 
concern; he had come to the attention of authorities for illegally teaching 
Mandarin at the British Factory, for illegally setting up a Chinese printing 
press at Macao, and for illegally translating and publishing Christian and 
other texts from English into Chinese, all of which were strictly forbidden 
under the Canton trading system. Foreigners, long viewed as a potential 
threat to the fabric of Chinese society and a source of political insecurity, 
were of particular concern during the Jiaqing emperor’s reign due to 
assassination attempts on the emperor’s life, internal rebellions and piracy 
in southern Chinese waters throughout the first decade of the nineteenth 
century. Moreover, because of their Company status, the members of the 
Amherst Embassy were viewed by the imperial court and mandarins as 
mere traders and not worthy of inclusion in a mission sent in the name 
of the British monarch (Morrison, 1820, p. 52).
Cranmer-Byng (1962) has concluded that the Macartney Embassy was 
doomed to fail ‘from the very beginning’ and ‘never stood the slightest 
chance of success’ (p. 34). This judgement is even more applicable to the 
Amherst Embassy where the burden of the Macartney Embassy precedent 
inevitably doomed it to fail. The Amherst Embassy’s fate was effectively 
sealed at the imperial banquet held in Tianjin on 13 August 1817, only 
three days after Amherst arrived in northern China. There the issue of the 
kowtow was raised formally, the Chinese asserting that Macartney had 
performed the ceremony before the Qianlong emperor and that Amherst 
was required to do the same. This claim became impossible to refute when 
the Jiaqing emperor asserted that he had personally witnessed Macartney 
kowtowing to his father in a large yellow yurt in the Garden of the Ten 
Thousand Trees (Wanshuyuan) (Fu,  1966, vol. 1, p. 326).7 Ellis (1817), 
6  Reference to Staunton as ‘young and crafty’ and as someone who was likely to ‘make trouble’ is 
made in Chapter 4 of this study.
7  This reception took place on 14 September 1793.
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it has been seen, noted on 23 August: ‘With this imperial assertion before 
us, however false or erroneous, it will be difficult, in the event of a renewed 
discussion, to press the precedent of Macartney’ (p. 154). Amherst 
subsequently wrote in his report to George Canning that Guanghui and 
Sulenge informed him at the time of the imperial banquet at Tianjin 
that, ‘the late Emperor, tho’ he had accepted Lord Macartney’s European 
homage, had in fact disapproved of it, and that therefore, could not be 
made a precedent on any future occasion’ (Amherst to George Canning, 
12 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 226). Either way, 
Amherst was left with no room to manoeuvre. He either had to kowtow, 
or refuse to kowtow and face the full wrath of the emperor’s displeasure. 
He chose the latter after weighing up the options of what would cause the 
least damage to the Crown and British interests. This wedging of Amherst 
on the question of the kowtow in the context of the Macartney precedent 
was a central cause for the failure of his embassy. Ellis (1817) described it 
as ‘the rock upon which the Embassy was wrecked’ (p. 227).
Gao (2016) has suggested that there was an ‘inner kowtow controversy’ 
among the members of the Amherst Embassy. This characterisation is not 
borne out by a detailed examination of the embassy’s negotiations with 
the Qing court. It needs to be stated that no member of the embassy was 
attracted to the prostration ceremony nor proposed kowtowing for its own 
sake simply to please the Chinese, not least because compliance was not 
reciprocal nor based on any notion of equality. Those who were prepared 
to consider kowtowing only did so reluctantly as an expediency to achieve 
a stated objective for the embassy. All agreed that unless there was a return 
in the form of Chinese concessions then it was not worth considering 
further. The latter view was certainly the position of Amherst who held 
out the possibility of kowtowing until the very end of negotiations. His 
pre-departure instructions had been ambiguous, even contradictory, but 
permitted him to use his ‘own discretion’ if the success of the mission 
warranted it. Amherst had tried to make sense of his instructions, first by 
asserting the Macartney precedent (and offering to enhance it by kneeling 
and bowing three times), and when this approach failed, he kept open 
the possibility of kowtowing up until it became apparent that further 
negotiation was fruitless. He offered, like Macartney, to perform the 
full ceremony if a court official of equal status would kowtow before a 
portrait of the Prince Regent, or, if the emperor would supply a written 
commitment undertaking that any Chinese official appointed to the 
Court of St James’s would kowtow before the British monarch.
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Ellis initially argued that refusal to comply with mere court ceremonial was 
not a sufficient reason to consign the embassy to certain failure, a position 
to which Amherst was prepared to give serious consideration.8 However, 
by the time Amherst made his final decision, Ellis had conceded his earlier 
position and stated that he readily deferred to the weight of Staunton’s 
local knowledge and arguments against kowtowing. Acknowledging this 
stance, Ellis (1817) wrote:
Whatever may have been my private opinion … of compliance 
with the Chinese ceremonial, I am not disposed to maintain any 
substantial advantage would have resulted from the mere reception 
of the Embassy. (p. 437)
It appears that Ellis may have had a personal financial motive for 
advocating compliance with the kowtow. He wrote that while some 
members of ‘our crew’ may have rejoiced in Amherst’s refusal to kowtow:
[For] my part, as I undertook the voyage to these distant seas more 
for profit than reputation I cannot but regret that I have lost the 
opportunity of bringing my venture to the market. (p. 227)
Ellis’s admission drew a sharp rebuke from Barrow (1817a), who wrote 
in the Quarterly Review that ‘the value of his opinion [on the kowtow] 
is greatly diminished by a candid, though we think rather indiscreet, 
avowal’ that he had private business interests riding on the outcome of 
the embassy (p. 477). Ellis did not elaborate on the nature of his ‘venture’, 
but it likely involved the importation into China of some form of British 
manufactures or other products.9 Ellis did admit later on occasions 
throughout his subsequent career that he believed complying with court 
protocol might have given the embassy a better chance of success but 
made no attempt to substantiate this claim in any meaningful way (‘Note’ 
attached to Ellis, 1830, pp. 63–64).10 Amherst’s final decision against 
kowtowing came down to the fact that, in the end, he could not satisfy 
8  This, as seen in Chapter 10, was also Napoleon’s view.
9  Staunton had been involved in an unsuccessful business venture in 1811 importing ‘Salisbury 
flannels’ into Canton, but the Chinese merchants offered only half the cost (Staunton Letters, 9 February 
1811).
10  Ellis wrote, ‘I have never seen reason to change the opinion … that no success could attend the 
mission, without complying with the particular usages of the Chinese court’. He qualified his decision 
by emphasising that this view referred to the kowtow ‘in the presence of the Emperor’.
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himself that it would guarantee obtaining the principle objectives of 
the embassy or would open a dialogue with the emperor or his senior 
ministers on these objectives.
Tuck’s (2000) account of the embassy, as has been noted, is the most 
comprehensive analysis of the mission, but his conclusions are 
ambiguous. He argued that Amherst was planning to perform the 
kowtow after receiving an assurance from Heshitai that he would be a 
friend and advocate of the British at the Qing court on the condition 
that he performed the ceremony. However, Amherst changed his mind 
after consulting with Staunton, leading to the embassy’s failure and Tuck’s 
assessment that Staunton was to blame for the outcome. Tuck argued 
that, had Amherst agreed to kowtow, an imperial reception or ‘the formal 
encounter, would almost certainly have passed off successfully’ (p. xxxv). 
But he never explained what he meant by ‘successfully’ and proceeded to 
contradict himself in his conclusion when he added:
However, even if the audience had taken place, it is unlikely, despite 
… Ho’s [Heshitai’s] ambiguous promise to help, that Amherst’s 
negotiating proposals would have received any more sympathetic 
hearing than the requests made by Lord Macartney, which had 
been summarily rejected twenty-two years before. (p. xxxv)
Staunton immediately understood the nature of Heshitai’s ‘ambiguous 
promises’. He recognised that the mere reception of the embassy before 
the emperor would not have resulted in any subsequent opportunity 
for negotiation of British goals, thereby rendering any such reception as 
meaningless in practical terms. His views were validated on receipt of the 
official Outline of the Ceremonies to be observed by the British ambassador 
where it was proposed that numerous kowtows be performed and that, 
at best, the emperor would be seen only from a distance.
While Amherst was swayed by Heshitai’s promise, which formed the basis 
of his initial intention to kowtow, Staunton immediately saw through 
the mandarin’s largesse. Staunton’s judgement was based on a number 
of factors. The first arose from his ability to understand Mandarin and 
‘having heard, in the original language’ Heshitai’s ‘utterances’ (Staunton, 
1824, p. 100). Staunton related that Heshitai’s displeasure was never 
far from the surface. Second, Staunton’s views were influenced heavily 
by the series of personal threats made towards him by the Qing court 
and his awareness of the Qing court’s declared suspicion of him. Finally, 
the court’s persistent assertion that Macartney had kowtowed in 1793, 
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a proposition strenuously denied by the British, served to confirm to them 
that the Qing court was lying and could not be trusted. Staunton put 
forward his conclusions in a minute dated 18 January 1817 in which he 
declared that Heshitai’s motives of assistance were ‘easily disposed of ’:
They were not voluntary given but elicited by our own remarks. 
They proceeded from a man, who was evidently extremely anxious 
as well as personally interested to gain his point, a point which 
he had previously tried to accomplish by intimidating and gross 
insults without effect—(for instance … asserting loudly that 
the Emperor was the Sovereign of all Nations, and threatening 
our immediate dismissal if we persevered in refusing to perform 
a ceremony, which the Emperor in that character required from us). 
[Heshitai’s promises] were … in themselves vague, inconclusive, 
and unworthy of credit, being merely confined to assurance of 
a gracious reception, the ungracious nature of which we already 
could pretty well anticipate from information gained from other 
quarters, and to his promises of personal aid and friendship in the 
subsequent furtherance of our views, promises which it was easy 
to make and still more easy to violate. (Staunton Minute dated 
18 January 1817 in Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 303, emphasis 
in original)
Staunton opposed performing the kowtow for several reasons. The act of 
obeisance was not mere court ceremonial but, rather, an act of the utmost 
significance: an act of homage that, under the tribute system, relegated 
the practitioner to vassal status and his sovereign to an inferior status 
below the Chinese emperor. On this point, he was strongly supported 
subsequently by Morrison.11 Equally, while performing the kowtow 
might secure an audience with the emperor, it did not guarantee that a 
positive outcome would follow, as Amherst learned after his expulsion.12 
Once relegated to vassal status, the holding of negotiations would be 
impossible; negotiations implied equal status and the Chinese did not 
negotiate with vassals.
11  ‘Those nations of Europe who consider themselves tributary and yielding homage to China, 
should perform the ceremony’ (Morrison, 1820, p. 9). Morrison objected particularly to the lack 
of reciprocity in the ceremony and its ‘interference with the idea of equality’.
12  See Appendix F for the proposed final court ceremony signifying the conclusion of Amherst’s 
mission, after which he was to leave Peking.
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In Staunton’s view, a British ambassador’s performance of the kowtow would 
adversely affect not only the hard-won status enjoyed by the Company 
representatives at Canton, but also would have profound implications 
for the future of British standing in China, as well as undermining the 
achievements of the Macartney Embassy 23 years earlier. The effects on 
British relations with China resulting from a ‘submission to intimidation’, 
Staunton felt, would be ‘certain and permanent’ (Staunton Minute dated 
18 January 1817 in Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, p. 304, Appendix 5). 
Ultimately, Staunton (1822, p. 150) blamed the ‘precipitate dismissal’ 
of  the embassy on the ‘peculiarly untoward character’ of the Jiaqing 
emperor. Amherst’s sound judgement, thought Staunton (1822, p. 71), 
not only maintained British honour and promoted British commercial 
interests, but also ensured that ‘Our character as the subjects of a free and 
independent state, has remained unsullied and entire’.
Amherst’s record shows that he consulted with the senior members of 
his suite throughout the mission and formally sought their views both 
on arrival off Dagu and before making a final decision not to kowtow 
at Tongzhou. Some have criticised these consultations as weakness on 
Amherst’s part, but it was clearly good leadership practice because, in the 
end, he was always going to be the one who had the responsibility for 
the final decision. It was only Amherst who had to perform the prostration 
ceremony, and it would be his name that would go down in infamy as the 
first British ambassador to kowtow before the Celestials. As a courtier at 
the Court of St James’s for much of his earlier career, and as the bearer of 
a famous military name in Britain, these must have been considerations 
that weighed heavily on his reaching a final decision, knowing as he did 
that it would almost certainly lead to his expulsion from Peking.
Those who have sought to blame Staunton’s influence for the decision 
not to kowtow have underestimated Amherst. Although Amherst was 
impressed initially by Ambassador Ismailof ’s compromise in which a 
single kowtow before the Kangxi emperor had led to a long stay and some 
concessions, he had come to realise by the time he made his final decision 
at Tongzhou that this option would not be entertained. Moreover, he had 
come to the conclusion that he could not trust his Chinese interlocutors 
and could not be reassured that kowtowing would lead to any positive 
outcomes for the embassy. Staunton’s arguments and the example 
of the Dutch embassy of 1795, which had left empty handed despite 
kowtowing on every occasion when required, were no doubt considered 
and evaluated. Amherst acknowledged the importance of Staunton’s views 
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and opinions and thanked him in a letter five years later (Staunton, 1822, 
p. 68). Accordingly, in the end, Amherst followed the Prince Regent’s 
instructions where he was to refer ‘on all occasions to the supercargoes 
for the best information and advice’ and decided on the option that he 
thought would do the least lasting damage to British long-term interests 
both in Canton and Peking (Amherst to Canning, 28 February 1817, in 
BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 270).
Several other factors contributed to the rupture in the relationship 
between the British and Qing court arising out of the Amherst Embassy. 
The actions of a number of the mandarins contributed significantly to 
a breakdown of trust between themselves and the British, and with the 
Jiaqing emperor. Their duplicitous mishandling of the kowtow issue, 
which resulted in stressful and prolonged negotiations and false reports 
informing the emperor that Amherst had rehearsed the ceremony, 
incurred the emperor’s anger when he learned the truth that Amherst 
was not prepared to kowtow. The mandarins’ failure to keep the Jiaqing 
emperor accurately informed of the state of these negotiations as well 
as other matters, specifically the departure of the British ships after 
landing the ambassadorial party at Dagu and the conditions under which 
the embassy was suddenly transported to Yuanmingyuan, resulted in the 
demotion and punishment of several key mandarins. From the above, 
it is obvious that the mandarins were in an invidious position and were 
subject throughout the course of the negotiations to similar, if not greater, 
stresses and pressures to those faced by the British. This is illustrated by 
the succession of ever more senior mandarins consigned to take over the 
negotiations to ensure the recalcitrant British complied with the emperor’s 
wishes. The instructions the mandarins had to follow allowed them little 
or no room to manoeuvre. Moreover, they were only too aware that failure 
to deliver acceptable outcomes would incur the emperor’s displeasure, 
thus resulting in severe and humiliating punishments, which proved to 
be the case. The historians Backhouse and Bland (1914) concluded that 
the mandarins:
therefore lied to the Emperor about the [Amherst] Mission’s 
attitude, and to the Mission about the emperor’s, until at last, in 
order to extricate themselves, they were compelled to get rid of the 
foreigners at all costs. (p. 386)
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This assessment seems a fair summation. Once expelled, the embassy 
was a potent irritant and embarrassment to the Qing court as well as an 
unwelcome financial burden. The choice of the shortest route to Canton 
is evidence of the emperor’s eagerness to rid his realm of the unwelcome 
visitors as soon as possible.
The British were guilty of a series of miscalculations both before and 
during the Amherst Embassy that, in retrospect, can be seen to have 
damaged their prospects of success on a range of issues.
First, the repeated assertion that the grandeur of the Macartney Embassy 
and deportment of its members had led the Chinese to view the British 
as an exceptional people and a special nation that would henceforth be 
handled outside the tributary system was flawed. This belief derived from 
Macartney’s own reporting, whereby he sought to put the best possible 
gloss on his embassy’s achievements despite its failure to achieve any of 
its goals. This view was kept alive and repeated by Barrow and Staunton 
to protect Macartney’s legacy and their own involvement in the embassy, 
and in Staunton’s case, the need to also guard his father’s legacy.
Second, Macartney’s success in negotiating an alternative ceremony and 
avoiding the kowtow in front of the Qianlong emperor led to the mistaken 
British assumption that this would also be acceptable to his son. This 
proved to be the final nail in the Amherst Embassy’s coffin. Significantly, 
the further assumption that compromise resulting from negotiation was 
possible at the Qing court was born at the time of the Macartney Embassy 
and led to the erroneous belief that it would be possible for Amherst to 
enter into negotiations with the Qing court on British trade requests.
Third, after deferring a decision on another embassy to China for at least 
a decade, the decision to dispatch the Amherst Embassy was made in 
relative haste and based almost solely on Barrow’s personal initiative. 
As the private correspondence over many years between Staunton and 
Barrow reveals, the real push behind Barrow’s actions was his private 
objective to help enhance the career and reputation of Staunton with 
another embassy seen as the perfect vehicle. Barrow was deeply indebted 
to Staunton’s father and Lord Macartney, and throughout his early career 
at the Admiralty was always on the lookout for ways to repay the debt by 
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helping the young Staunton.13 Moreover, Barrow had based his arguments 
for another embassy on Staunton’s reports from Canton—information 
that by 1816 was either out of date or no longer relevant. In addition, 
the British deliberately withheld notifying the Chinese of the impending 
embassy in order to limit the prospects of rejection and to present the 
Qing court with a fait accompli. The Chinese Government learned 
on 25 May 1816 of the expected arrival of the embassy, only 45 days 
before Amherst reached Chinese waters off Macao. Its arrival, shrouded 
in secrecy, aroused suspicion and concern for the Cantonese authorities. 
That the immediate pretext for the embassy, namely, the breakdown of 
trade relations in Canton between the Select Committee and the local 
authorities in 1814, had been resolved by the time Amherst arrived in 
China in July 1816 only complicated the issue.
Fourth, the belief that it was possible to negotiate with the Jiaqing emperor 
or his senior ministers on the attainment of British objectives proved false. 
Those dispatching the embassy knew that formidable obstacles lay in 
Amherst’s path but thought that his personal charm, conciliatory manners 
and high aristocratic rank would facilitate a rapport with the Jiaqing 
emperor, ably assisted by Staunton’s linguistic abilities and in-country 
knowledge. Access to the emperor based on an ability to communicate 
with him reflected Staunton’s early belief that a knowledge of Manchu 
would assist him to converse with the Jiaqing emperor. Unfortunately, a 
diplomatic encounter conducive to negotiation on the basis of equality, 
or any negotiation for that matter, was always most unlikely if not, to the 
Chinese at least, inconceivable. The British received proof of this realisation 
after their expulsion from Yuanmingyuan when a copy of an imperial 
edict came to their attention (Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, pp. 295–297, 
Appendix 4). This edict set out the program planned in the event that the 
embassy had been received. It made clear that Amherst would not have 
had any opportunity to engage personally with the emperor during the 
three planned receptions. He was required to perform numerous kowtows; 
most of which were to take place out of the emperor’s sight, at the far end 
of the reception hall and behind rows of other princes and mandarins 
(Morse, 1926/1966, vol. 3, pp. 295–297, Appendix 4). Moreover, the 
13  In a letter dated 30 December 1805, Staunton requested his mother to thank ‘Mr. Barrow’ for 




emperor was scheduled to leave for Jehol less than two weeks later without 
any invitation extended to Amherst and his party to join him there, unlike 
the invitation offered to Macartney and his immediate retinue in 1793.
In attempting to establish a more stable trade relationship, the British 
were not offering the Qing court anything that it wanted or needed and, 
therefore, possessed no bargaining power from which to negotiate. From 
the Qing perspective, the ‘Canton trade system’ was working satisfactorily 
and no Chinese entity was seeking closer or expanded trading relations 
with the British. Of specific importance to the political context in which 
the Amherst Embassy was received by the Qing court was the deterioration 
in Anglo–Chinese relations at the time. The Jiaqing emperor regarded 
the British and their motives with a high degree of mistrust as a result 
of their two attempted occupations of Macao in 1802 and 1808, and 
the aggressive British naval actions in intercepting foreign shipping in 
Chinese territorial waters in 1814. Staunton wrote later:
The Chinese had … seen our troops more than once landed on 
their shores; and our naval forces had, during successive years, 
hovered about their coasts, with no hostile intention it is true, but 
in a way, which even the most unsuspicious nation might have 
considered in some degree questionable. (1822, p. 238)
Reflecting the emperor’s concern, an imperial edict dated 11 January 1815 
called for a strengthening of Chinese naval defence in the waters around 
Macao and the Pearl River Delta (‘Imperial Edict, New Regulations 
to Control Foreign Merchants in Kwantung’, 11 January 1815, in Fu, 
1966, vol. 1, p. 395). The British occupations of Macao, Wang (2014) 
has argued, resulted in their being ‘regarded as the most troublesome of 
Westerners’ and raised serious alarm about Britain’s imperial ambitions 
and expanding naval power (p. 248). The hardening of Qing attitudes at 
this time, Wang concluded, ‘partly explains the emperor’s rejection of the 
Amherst mission of 1816’ (p. 248).
Davis, the 20-year-old interpreter in the embassy, destined to be the 
second governor of Hong Kong from 1844 to 1848, attributed the failure 
of the mission to the intrigues of the provincial Canton Government 
that had bribed the mandarins at Peking to prevent ‘our obtaining any 
effectual access to the emperor’ (Davis, 1841, p. 162). Citing their alarm 
at the ‘sudden appearance’ of the embassy only a year after Staunton had 
succeeded in getting his way with the local viceroy, Davis added:
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There could be no doubt whatever that every exertion had been 
made by that officer, through his connexions at Peking, to frustrate 
the success of the Embassy; and to this must be attributed the 
fruitless results of the mission, fully as much as to the difficulties 
of the ceremony. (p. 123)
Lamiot had written earlier in October 1807 of the obstacles facing any 
prospective European embassy to the Qing court. Amherst’s pre-departure 
‘Notes’ referred, somewhat prophetically, to Lamiot’s conclusions on the 
role played by the mandarins:
If the Chinese admitted the injustice of their proceedings 
a  necessary consequence would be the punishment in various 
degrees of a considerable number of persons, all of whom are 
therefore united against you and use any means of intrigue, 
deception and bribery to circumvent you. (Amherst’s ‘Notes’ in 
BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36)
The Chinese mandarins, in Davis’s (1841) opinion, were susceptible to 
bribery due to their meagre salaries and the fact that, unlike their British 
equivalents, they did not possess hereditary titles or enjoy substantial 
private incomes (p. 162). He thought that the best way to gain Chinese 
respect was to act in ‘a manner dramatically opposed to themselves’ 
(p. 191).
Qing distrust of the British also included the Jiaqing emperor’s concerns 
about both Staunton and Morrison in Canton and their subsequent 
inclusion in the Amherst Embassy as the second commissioner and 
senior interpreter, respectively. Moreover, the Qing court considered their 
linguistic abilities as dangerous, allowing them to communicate directly 
with native Chinese in those provinces that had recently experienced 
uprisings against the government.14 Amherst referred to Staunton’s 
knowledge of the language in his official dispatch to George Canning, 
which ‘was brought forward as furnishing the means of holding improper 
communications with traitorously disposed Chinese’ (Amherst to 
Canning, 28 February 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 266). He 
added that the ‘Chinese guard round the British quarters was ordered 
to be doubled’ to prevent any ‘traitorous correspondence between the 
Emperor’s subjects, and the persons in the Embassy who were familiar 
14  See Wang (2014, pp. 72–73) for the rise of the White Lotus movement in Shandong and Anhui 
province in the late Qianlong period.
313
12 . RETROSPECT
with the Chinese language’ (Amherst to Canning, 28  February 1817, 
in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 266). These concerns would certainly 
have helped stiffen the resolve to ensure that Amherst complied fully with 
court ritual if he were to be granted an audience with the Jiaqing emperor. 
While the emperor was criticised by Amherst in his reporting, it was in 
fairly low key and measured terms. The real vilification of the emperor 
followed Amherst’s return to England when the British press took up the 
cudgels.
Throughout their respective embassies, both Macartney and Amherst 
stayed within the boundaries and rules of European Westphalian 
diplomatic practice, even when it was obvious that it was proving totally 
ineffective in securing their official aims. Neither appeared to have an 
alternative plan to fall back on and neither gave any serious thought to the 
use of threats of coercion, although both Macartney and Amherst noted 
privately that British power could assist in the achievement of British 
goals. Macartney wrote:
If, indeed, the Chinese were provoked to interdict us their 
commerce, or do us any material injury, we certainly have the 
means easy enough of revenging ourselves, for a few frigates could 
in a few weeks destroy all their coast navigation and intercourse 
from the island of Hainan to the Gulf of Pei-chihli. (Cranmer-
Byng, 1962, p. 211)
He added:
The forts of the Bocca Tigris might be demolished by half a dozen 
broadsides, the river would be impassable without our permission, 
and the whole trade of Canton and its correspondencies annihilated 
in a season. The millions of people who subsist by it would be 
almost instantly reduced to hunger and insurrection. (p. 211)
Amherst stressed in his pre-departure notes that Britain acted as 
a  responsible international citizen despite its power. If confronted by 
threats at the Qing court to either stop the British tea trade at Canton or, 
alternatively, to place it into the hands of the Americans, he was prepared 
to remind the court that:
A proof of our moderation is the restoration of Java and the 
Moluccas, while the conquest and the expulsion by our navy of 
every other European flag from the Eastern seas is proof of our 
power. The consequence of the Chinese breaking with England 
would be our immediate occupation of their valuable islands 
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to the Eastward, particularly Formosa and Lieukieu, and the 
interruption of their Asiatic maritime trade. (Amherst, pencil 
notes on ‘The  objects of the Embassy’ in BL IOR MSS EUR 
F 140/36)
Nevertheless, Amherst was guided in his actions by Barrow’s advice that 
the diplomatic encounter should be conducted in a spirit of cordiality and 
equality but backed up with firmness, dignity and patience. Ultimately, 
the Amherst Embassy’s reception proved the futility of engaging in any 
future diplomatic negotiation with the Qing Government to achieve 
British commercial aims in China. Morrison had expressed a view in early 
1815 that the Chinese Government would never acquiesce to the demands 
of a few foreign merchants until forced to do so by an enemy ‘nearer [to] 
their gates’ (Morrison to Staunton, 10 January 1815, in Morrison, 1839, 
p. 425). Barrow (1819) commented that it was clear that the emperor, or 
‘Supreme Sovereign of the earth’, had little regard for the truth and that he 
wished to decline any further diplomatic intercourse with Britain (p. 86). 
He added that, although trading conditions at Canton had improved 
since the embassy, the Chinese were nevertheless:
busily engaged in building forts on every accessible part of the 
coast from the Bocca Tigris to the Pei-ho, His Imperial Majesty’s 
ministers being under great apprehension that their treatment 
of Lord Amherst may be yet visited upon them by a less pacific 
mission than the last. (p. 86)
A revised British assessment of China, framed by the failure of the Amherst 
mission, arose from the diplomatic ashes. The publisher John Murray 
wrote to Lord Byron with his view on the reception of the Amherst 
Embassy at Yuanmingyuan:
I wish I could shew you extracts from the Peking Gazette in which 
the Chinese speak of our Embassy—such contempt—we have got 
near to them by means of Nepaul [sic] and before I die I hope we 
shall have a war with them. (Nicholson, 2007, p. 207)15
It was clear that the Chinese Government would never voluntarily receive 
an ambassador as a means of redressing British grievances. China and its 
culture had nothing to offer the West apart from tea and a potentially large 
commercial market for British goods based on the fact that ‘the Chinese 
are important because they are numerous’ (Slade, 1830, p. iii). The final 
15  I thank Professor Tim Barrett for bringing this reference to my attention.
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word on the Anglo–Chinese diplomatic encounter was proclaimed by 
the Jiaqing emperor who informed the Prince Regent in a letter dated 
11 September 1816:
There will be no occasion hereafter for you to send an ambassador 
from so great a distance, and to give him the trouble of passing 
over mountains and crossing the ocean. If you do but pour out 
the heart in dutiful obedience, it is by no means necessary, at any 
stated time, to come to the celestial presence, ere it be pronounced 
that you turn towards the transforming influences which emanate 
from this empire. (Jiaqing emperor to the Prince Regent in Asiatic 
Journal, 1819, vol. 8, p. 342)
Amherst told Canning:
Judging from what has occurred in the instance of the present 
Embassy, and of the Embassy from Russia in 1805, I conceive 
that no foreign Embassador is likely to be admitted into the 
presence of the Emperor Kia-King, unless he agrees to perform, 
to its full extent, the Tartar Ceremony of the Ko-tou. Perhaps the 
present emperor, whose reign has been frequently and very lately 
disturbed by insurrections of his subjects, may less readily dispense 
with outward forms of respect than his Father, whose reign was 
long and victorious, and who, being firm in the possession of real 
power and authority, might attach less consequence to any show 
of external homage. (Amherst to Canning, 21 April 1817, in BL 
IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 377)
Amherst thought that ‘the precipitate and unwarranted rejection of the 
Embassy from the Palace Gates has left an injury to repair’ (Amherst 
to Canning, 21 April 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 378). He 
described his reception at the court as one of:
hurry and confusion, of irregularity and disorder, of insult, 
inhumanity, and almost of personal violence, sufficient to give to 
the court of the emperor Kia-King the manners, character, and 
appearance of the roving-camp of a Tartar Horde. (Amherst to 
Canning, 8 March 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 285)
The Chinese were aware that the rules of diplomatic hospitality had 
been violated and were possibly apprehensive of ‘the manner in which 
the transaction will be viewed in Great Britain’ (Amherst to Canning, 
21 April 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F 379). Evidence of this, 
Amherst thought, was found in the ‘honourable treatment of the Embassy 
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on its’ [sic] return’ to Canton, and for the emperor’s proposal for a partial 
exchange of presents as ‘a wish for reparation in the only way which the 
pride of the Emperor would allow’ (Amherst to Canning, 21 April 1817, 
in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) F  379). He  requested that it be made 
known to the Prince Regent and his government, and to the Company:
whose interests have been committed principally to my care, that 
I have executed my trust with fidelity, and that my want of success 
is not to be attributed to want either of zeal or discretion in the 
performance of my duty, [and] I shall be amply rewarded for 
the vexation and disappointment, for the difficulty and danger, 
without which it has not been my lot to execute this service. 
(Amherst to Canning, 21 April 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 
(Reel 2) F 380)
Amherst arrived back in England on 16 August 1817. The final line in his 
diary noted with happiness that he ‘once more [had] the satisfaction of 
setting foot in old England’ (as quoted in Ritchie, 1894, p. 20).16 Having 
signed off his commission in late 1817, Amherst, unlike Staunton and 
Ellis, chose to avoid any public comment on China or Anglo–Chinese 
trade relations. Rather, he retired to his estate, ‘Montreal’, where he 
pursued a busy life commuting between Sevenoaks and London until 
called on to replace Lord Moira as governor-general of Bengal in 1823.
16  Ritchie’s (1894) book includes several references to Amherst’s handwritten diary at the time of 
his embassy to China. Peyrefitte (1992, pp. 513, 598) also refers to a ‘handwritten journal’ held in 
the private collection of Mr Michael Galvin of Santa Barbara, California. Attempts by the author to 
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Appendix A: List of Persons 
and Their Salaries
This document is a copy of the original handwritten text found in the 
British Library, but reformatted for ease of clarity.
Proceeding in the Embassy under the charge of the Right Honourable 
Lord Amherst on board His Majesty’s Ship Alceste, and the Company’s 
Ship General Hewitt (in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/36)
Name Position Salary (£)
His Excellency the Right 
Honourable Lord Amherst
Ambassador 12,000
Henry Ellis Esq Secretary to the Embassy 3,000
Mr Henry Hayne Private Secretary 750
Reverend Mr Griffith Chaplain 300
Lieutenant Cook In Command of the Guard 300
Mr Abel Surgeon 300
Dr Lyn (proceeds without salary) Surgeon –
Mr Havell Draftsman 300
Mr Marriage Accountant, in charge of presents 200
Edward Vaughan Butler 73 .10
Thomas Mosely Valet de Chambre 63
V . S . La Roche 1st Cook 105
Haynes Harrison 2nd Cook 52 .10
Isaac Head Behennal To take care of Lustres & Act as Footman 63
James Metcalf Carpenter & Joiner & Act as Footman 63
Thomas Lindsey Tailor, to act as Footman if required 63
Thomas Ives Footman 26 .5
George Norman Footman 26 .5
William Joiner Footman 26 .5
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Name Position Salary (£)
John Pritchard Footman 26 .5
James Dennison Coachman 31 .10
Thomas Heath Postilion 15 .15
Thomas Hancock Gilder in charge of the Frames & for 
glasses and mirrors
63
Thomas Hooper Gardener 100
A . Clarke Master of the Band 88 .4
Daniel Price Musician 50 .8
William Godso Musician 50 .8
Thomas Wray Musician 50 .8
Joseph Garbett Musician 50 .8
Thomas Patterson Musician 50 .8
William Gooch Musician 50 .8
Thomas Clarke Musician 50 .8
James Pybus Musician 50 .8
Geo Thompson Musician 50 .8
Lewis Vincent Bass Drum 50 .8
Of the above Musicians the following have absence Money allowed to their 
Families &c:
A. Clarke Master 10/6 per week to be paid to his Father-in-law 
for the support to his son
Daniel Vice half of his wages every three Months to be 
paid to his father
Thomas Wray to pay his Father one guinea every Month
Thomas Patterson to pay his wife two guineas every Month
William Gooch to pay his wife one Pound every Month
Geo Thompson to pay his wife two guineas every Month
People included in the Amherst Embassy not mentioned above:
Right Honourable Jeffrey Amherst Page to the ambassador
Charles Abbot Midshipman
T. B. Martin Midshipman
Zachariah Poole Assistant to Clark Abel
Lieutenant Charles Somerset Attached to the Guard
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Company people who joined the Amherst Embassy off Macao:
Sir George Thomas Staunton Second Commissioner
Rev. Dr. Robert Morrison Senior Interpreter
F. Hastings Toone Chinese Secretary
J. F. Davis Chinese Secretary




Presents and Cost of the 
Amherst Embassy
This document is a copy of the original handwritten text found in the 
British Library, but reformatted for ease of reference.
Articles Ordered for the Embassy to China (in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/38a)
Presents ordered for the emperor:
From Rundell & Bridge
1 Gold Box with the Prince Regent’s Portrait Set with Jewels £1,575
1 Gold Salver & Vase £840
£2,415
From Green & Ward
1 Silver Waiter £210
1 Silver Epergne £187
4 Silver Dishes £240
4 Silver Baskets £200
4 Silver Stands £240
1 Silver Plateau £100
2 Pair Silver Cups & Saucers £100
1 Pair Silver Candelabra £250
1 Additional Set Glass Covers £33
£1,560
From the Plate Glass Company
1 Looking Glass (134 inch by 70 inch) £20
1 Looking Glass (132 inch by 67 inch) £1,200
2 Convex Mirrors each 36 inch in diameter £50
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Presents ordered for the emperor:
£1,270
From Parkers & Perry
1 Large Glass Chandelier £945
Sundry Articles, Cut Glass £150
£1,095
From Blades
2 Superb Candelabra £530
Sundry Articles, Cut Glass £150
£680
Total Carried over £7,020
Other presents:
• Broad cloths of the finest kinds made of soft Spanish wool—blue, 
plumb and yellow—the softer and finer the better
• Ermine and other superfine furs
• Portraits of their Majesties in their Coronation robes, to be housed 
in a gold box set with diamonds
• Another gold box set with stones to carry the Prince Regent’s letter 
to the emperor
• Ornamental clocks—two for the Hall of audience
• Perfumes
• Liqueurs
• Porcelain sent to the emperor: a dessert service—white and gold 
scroll border with paintings of landscapes in colours consisting 
of 24 dessert plates, four shell dishes, four oval dishes, four square 
dishes, one centre dish and two cream bowls (£84.00)
• A large centre vase in French grey with white scrolls in relief with 
embossed gold and superb painting (£73.10.0)
• Large vases (Warwick form) rich white and gold design with borders 
of flowers richly painted in a straw colour (£42.00)
• A centre vase handles and gold designs with groups of flowers 
(£18.18) and a case (£6.5.0)
• Sedan chairs—two superb and elegantly finished and most richly 
ornamented packed in four cases (£802.12.6)
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• Glassware/bottles/liqueurs including brandy and dried fruits 
(£399.12.6)
• Painting of Doncaster races packed in a case (£712.00)
• Engravings of the coast of England and Wales
• Presents for the ministers
• Lustres and chandeliers
• Hanging lamps
• Paintings of buildings and flowers, and views of the Thames 
including bridges and shipping
• Prints of distinguished persons
• Maps of Russia, England, Scotland and Ireland
• Charts of navigation from Europe to China
• Broadcloths, damasks, cutlery, razors, scissors and pen knives
• Porcelain, glass, cut glass, watches and clocks
Presents actually sent to the ministers included:
• Mirrors and frames
• Shades, glass and dessert services
• Decanters, centre bowls and cups
• Linens including 24 damask table cloths, superfine cloths, six reams 
of superfine and milled blue and gilt edge paper
Presents actually sent to the mandarins:
• Two silver liqueur frames with cut bottles and large oval dish
• Snuffs including Brazil snuff and Red Havana snuff
• Eight dozen glass bottles
• 12 Morocco Pocket books with gold locks
• 12 military telescopes
Presents Cost (£)
Presents ordered for the emperor 16,416 .6 .01
Other presents 668 .1 .08
Presents actually sent to the ministers 4,887 .19 .11




Appendix C: The Total Cost 
of the Amherst Embassy
This document is a copy of the original handwritten text found in the 
British Library, but reformatted for ease of reference. Source: BL IOR 
MSS EUR F 140/38a.
Item Cost (£)
Cost of presents per invoice 22,005 .13 .7
Presents to be made personally by the ambassador 305 .9 .0
Presents sent to the viceroy of Canton previously to the sailing 
of the embassy
311 .8 .3
Dollars for use on the voyage 4,556 .14 .0
Bones for ditto 10 .8 .0
Maps of China, not sent as presents 45 .17 .6
Articles for the use of Mr Abel 558 .14 .6
Ambassador’s carriage 814 .17 .3
Articles provided by Captain Maxwell* 14,295 .18 .7
Articles provided by Lord Amherst 1,316 .14 .2
Outfit of band exclusive of salaries 574 .17 .9
Advances of salaries, etc . 5,594 .16 .7
50,391.9.5
Add balance in Lord Amherst’s hands of his last account 163 .19 .4
Total 50,555.8.9
Note: * It is not clear what this amount covered; it could possibly refer to the refitting of the 
HMS Alceste or supplies for the embassy .
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Appendix D: Ball’s Secret 
Report (Commissioner 
of Teas at Canton)
A Secret Report on the Expediency of Opening a Second Port in China: 
2 July 1816
Staunton’s doubts of a successful mission in 1816 were not reflected by 
the author of a secret report written for Amherst and dated 2 July 1816 to 
coincide with the Amherst Embassy’s arrival off Macao. Samuel Ball, Chief 
Inspector of Teas at Canton, was commissioned by the Select Committee 
to report on the Expediency of opening a second port to British trade in China. 
Reference to the document has not been made in any previous historical 
account of the Amherst Embassy and only a brief abstract is given here. 
The detailed report, printed at Macao, presumably on Morrison’s press 
‘for private circulation only’, is important for revealing Britain’s ulterior 
motive for the embassy if negotiations had been permitted as well as 
making clear the very limited intelligence they had on the state of China’s 
internal trade. Ball’s sources were confined to the publications of Du 
Halde, Father Amiot, Sir George Leonard Staunton and John Barrow. 
The Chinese Repository refers to the report in an article published in July 
1834 and a full copy was printed in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 
in 1845 at a time when the question of access to new ports in China was 
of paramount British importance.1
1  The preamble to its publication written in 1845 reads, ‘The time is now come when we are called 
upon to decide what new privileges we have to demand of the Chinese: and since a more unrestricted 
intercourse with that country is looked for, it becomes an object of the first importance to ascertain at 
what Ports these privileges may be best obtained’ (Observations on the Expediency of Opening a Second 
Port in China, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1845, vol. 6, p. 182).
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Ball’s report focused on the Chinese port thought to be the most 
favourable for the tea trade. Canton, it was pointed out, was unsuited due 
to its distance from the tea-growing districts and its role as an emporium 
useful only for the consumption of foreign imports. Further, ‘the Canton 
people are neither the carriers of the imports to the distant provinces, nor 
of the exports to Canton’, while black tea had to be transported overland 
to Canton, which cost the Company an additional charge of £150,000 
per annum (Observations on the Expediency of Opening a Second Port 
in China, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 
1845, vol. 6, p. 214). Other teas were transported by sea, suggesting that 
it was far more economical for the British to be allowed direct access to 
the ports of the tea-growing areas of Fukien. The report advocated that 
the port of ‘Fu-chew in Fo-kien’ (Fuzhou) province was ideally situated to 
advance British trade in China, enabling the easy access of British woollens, 
lead and other products into the markets of the Chinese interior. Ball 
had a further vision, namely, a British monopoly of the lucrative Chinese 
coastal trade. To date, Ball argued, the coastal trade was in the hands 
of the numerous ‘Fokien junks’ that daily passed ‘to and fro at Macao, and 
along every part of the coast of China’ (p. 196). He thought:
Doubtless in a free and open intercourse with this country, the 
superior construction and security of European vessels, and 
knowledge of insurance, would enable foreigners not only to 
participate in, but perhaps monopolize, this branch of commerce, 
and even attract to the coast much of that still more valuable 
trade, which, from the risks and fears of a sea voyage, is at present 
conducted by inland carriage. (p. 196)
Ball concluded that the advantages of moving the bulk of British trade 
from Canton to Fuzhou were not remote and speculative but ‘immediate 
and real’ (p. 200). He considered this aim achievable:
Perhaps it might not be difficult to show [the Chinese Government] 
that a change would be mutually beneficial; and whatever may 
have been said of the jealousy and suspicion of these people, it may 
be doubted whether they are so bigoted to forms as to sacrifice 
even their smallest interests where a change seems to involve no 
radical injury to their institutions. They have no objection to 
trade, if it can be carried on peacefully; and nothing can appear 
more reasonable on our part, or more intelligible to them, than 
our wishing to carry it on where we can purchase the articles we 
require the cheapest. (p. 201)
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Ball’s misguided assessment of a likely Chinese response to such a plan 
reveals a significant British misunderstanding of Chinese attitudes and 
policy towards the British and other Western traders. The British belief in 
the mutual benefits of international trade as the engine for driving greater 
prosperity and progress for both sides was not shared by the Chinese. 
Ball’s report reveals that there was no British appreciation of the rationale 
behind the Canton trading system initiated as a mechanism for controlling 
and restricting foreign contact with the Chinese people. The expectation 
that China would open a second port to British trade in anticipation of 
mutual benefit was certainly a British illusion, and one that lies at the core 
of the issues that Amherst was expected to be able to negotiate with the 
Chinese Government.
It is worth noting that the Chinese Repository in 1834 reported Staunton’s 
opinion that British trade be withdrawn from Canton altogether and 
be re-established ‘in some insular position on the coast, beyond the 
reach of acts of oppression and molestation; where it may be carried on 
securely and honourably’ (Chinese Repository, July 1834, vol. 3, p. 132). 
British frustration at the absence of defined regulations embodied 
in a formal treaty  governing the important trade, thereby leaving it 




Appendix E: List of Chinese 
Officials Responsible 
for the Conduct of the 
Amherst Embassy
The two junior provincial officers sent to conduct the Amherst Embassy 
after it arrived in the Gulf of Bei Zhili were:
• Chang-wei (referred to by the British as ‘Chang’)
 – a Chinese and a civil officer, wore a blue button
 – came on board the HMS Lyra on 29 July 1816 and the HMS 
Alceste on 31 July 1816
 – left the embassy on 12 September
 – promoted to a judicial commissioner at Shandong at the conclusion 
of his role in the embassy.
• Yin
 – a Manchu and a military officer wearing a red button
 – came on board the HMS Lyra on 29 July 1816 and the HMS 
Alceste on 31 July 1816
 – left the embassy on 17 September.
The two senior mandarins in charge of the embassy, referred to by the 
British as the ‘legates’, were:
• Guanghui (referred to by the British as ‘Kwang’ or ‘Quong’)
 – a Manchu, age 58
 – Changlu Salt Commissioner stationed at Tianjin
 – remained with the embassy throughout its stay in China
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 – duties concluded at Canton on 19 January 1817
 – demoted at the time of the embassy’s conclusion to a gold button 
and to a secretaryship of the eighth rank and posted to Manchuria.
(See Appendix I for Morrison’s letter to Amherst dated 26 November 
1821 on the death of Guanghui.)
• Sulenge (referred to by the British as ‘Soo’)
 – a Manchu, aged in his seventies or eighties and infirm
 – president of the Board of Public Works
 – wore a red button
 – Hoppo at Canton in 1793 and received Lord Macartney on his 
return from the Qianlong court
 – left the embassy at Tongzhou in early September 1816
 – demoted at the time of the embassy’s conclusion
 – lost his position as president of the Board of Works and rank as a 
general in the army
 – ordered to pluck out his peacock feather and reduced to a button 
of the third rank (Tuck, 2000, p. xxviii).
(Not to be confused with Sungyun, Staunton’s friend at Canton in 
1811. Sungyun had accompanied Macartney as far as Hangzhou, 
during his journey from Peking to Canton [Cranmer-Byng, 1962, 
p. 369, fn. 38].)
The highest ranking mandarins sent to Tongzhou to oversee Amherst 
rehearsing the kowtow were:
• Heshitai (referred to by the British as ‘Duke Ho’)
 – a Manchu of the Bordered Yellow Banner and the emperor’s 
brother-in-law
 – promoted and rewarded in 1813 after helping to repel a rebel 
attack on the Imperial Palace and foiling an assassination attempt 
on the Jiaqing emperor
 – had two meetings with Amherst prior to proceeding to 
Yuanmingyuan. The first was held on 22 August 1816 and the 
second on 27 August 1816
 – conducted affairs at Yuanmingyuan where he unsuccessfully 
endeavoured to deliver Amherst before the Jiaqing emperor
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 – last contact with the embassy was on the early morning of its 
reception at Yuanmingyuan
 – lost emoluments as a ‘kung-yeh’ or ‘Duke’ for five years and 
forfeitied the honour of wearing the ‘yellow riding jacket’ following 
the failure of Amherst to appear before the Jiaqing emperor 
 – allowed to retain his title and his private duties at the palace (Tuck, 
2000, p. xxix).
• Muketenge (referred to by the British as ‘Moo’ or the ‘Silent Moo’)
 – a Manchu of the Bordered Yellow Banner and President of the 
Board of Rites
 – stripped of his presidency of the Board of Rites and retired following 
the dismissal of the embassy
 – died in 1829.
(See Appendix I for Morrison’s news on the above sent in 1821.)
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Appendix F: Imperial Edict: 
‘Ceremonies to Be Observed 
at the Audience of Leave’
This is a British translation of one of two imperial edicts handed to 
the British on 11 September 1816 of the ceremonies to be observed 
at the public audience of Amherst, quoted in Ellis (1817, pp. 499–500, 
Note No. 5).
On the day that the English Embassador takes leave, music and cushions 
shall be placed in the Hall of Light and Splendour (as on the two 
proceeding occasions).
About five o’clock in the morning his Majesty shall be most respectfully 
requested to put on the Imperial dragon-robes, and to ascend the Hall of 
Light and Splendour. The Princes, the Royal Personages, the Dukes, &c. 
shall be arranged in two wings withinside the hall, in the same manner 
as at the presentation. Whilst the band plays ‘a glorious subjugation’, 
his Majesty shall ascend the throne.
Soo [Sulenge] and Kwang [Guanghui] shall conduct the Embassador and 
suite, as on the first occasion, to the west side of the passage by the altar 
of the Moon, where, at this word given, they shall arrange themselves in 
order, It shall then be proclaimed ‘Kneel!’ the Embassador and his suite 
shall kneel, and wish his Majesty repose. Soo and the others shall then lead 
the Embassador through the western folding partition door to the level 
area within the hall, where he shall kneel down and wait till his Majesty 
himself confers upon the King of his country court beads and a purse. 
Meen-gan shall receive them, and deliver them to the Embassador, and 
also communicate, authoritatively, such orders as his Majesty may be 
pleased to direct on dismissing the Embassador.
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This being ended, Soo, &c. shall conduct the Embassador out of the 
western folding door to withoutside the hall, where Soo shall take in 
charge for the Embassador the beads and purse, and then conduct him as 
before to the west side of the altar of the Moon. On the word ‘Be arranged’ 
being proclaimed, the Embassador and suite shall arrange themselves 
standing; the crier shall proclaim, ‘Advance and kneel!’ the Embassador 
and suite shall advance and kneel. It shall be proclaimed, ‘Bow the head 
to the ground and arise!’ The Embassador and suite shall then, toward 
the upper part of the hall, perform the ceremony of san-kwei-kew-kow 
(thrice kneeling and nine times bowing the head to the ground), and the 
music shall stop. The Princes, &c. shall next conduct the Embassador and 
suite to behind the western row of persons, where they shall perform the 
ceremony once and sit down.
Whilst his Majesty takes tea, the Princes, &c. with the Embassador and 
suite, shall arise from their seats, kneel and perform the ceremony once. 
After his Majesty has drank tea, they shall again approach their places 
and sit down. The attendants shall then confer tea upon the Princes, the 
Embassador, and the rest, for which, before and after drinking, they shall 
perform an act of reverence. They shall then stand up, and the music 
shall  play ‘subjugation manifested’. Whilst his Majesty retires to the 
interior of the palace the music shall stop, and the Princes, Embassador, 
and suite shall go out.
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Appendix G: Substance of an 
Edict Seen on the Walls of a 
Building in the 8th Moon of 
the 21st Year of Kia King
This is a British translation of the imperial edict from Secret Consultations, 
East India Company, 1 January 1817, in BL IOR G/12/197 (Reel 2) 
F 367.
Whereas the English Envoy & Suite are returning to their Country, 
and their Language and Dresses are totally different from those of this 
Country, His Imperial Majesty has been pleased to order, that they should 
not anchor any where on their route, nor any one of them be permitted 
to go on shore; and whereas their Excellences the Viceroy and Fooyuen 
have ordered in conformity therewith, that no persons attempt to gather 
about them for the purpose of looking at them, or conversing with them; 
that none to trade with them in Books & Furniture or other Articles; that 
no women do come out to shew themselves to them, but that all persons 
pursue and attend their respective occupations as usual. This Edict is 




Appendix H: Itinerary of the 
Amherst Embassy
August 1815
10 The British Government approves an embassy to the Qing court to be 
sent on behalf of the Prince Regent, paid for by the British East India 
Company (the Company). ‘Its main purpose was—not to propose any 
innovation, but merely to secure and consolidate’ commercial trade 
between China and Britain at Canton (Staunton, 1822, p. 239).
October 1815
2 Lord William Pitt Amherst’s appointment as British Ambassador 
of the Special Mission to the Chinese Empire announced officially 
by the Prince Regent.
February 1816
8 The HMS Alceste, HMS Lyra and Company Ship General Hewitt 
depart Portsmouth.
18 One-day stopover at Madeira.
March 1816
10 Ships separate; the Alceste heads for Brazil, and the Lyra and General 
Hewitt for Cape Town.
21 The Alceste arrives at Rio de Janeiro.
31 The Alceste departs Rio de Janeiro.
April 1816
13 The General Hewitt arrives at Cape Town.
14 The Lyra arrives Cape Town.
18 The Alceste arrives Cape Town.
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June 1816
7 The Lyra arrives Anjere Roads, Batavia.
9 The Alceste arrives Anjere Roads, Batavia, with the General Hewitt 
in sight.
10 Amherst sends a letter to Canton with an American ship.
12 The Lyra dispatched to China to announce the approach of the 
embassy to George Staunton at Canton with instructions for a secret 
rendezvous off Macao to be arranged.
18 Amherst attends a ball in Batavia held by the Dutch in honour of the 
anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo.
21 The Alceste and General Hewitt depart Batavia for China.
July 1816
9 The embassy meets up with the HMS Orlando whose commander, 
Captain Clavell, informs Amherst that Staunton and other members 
of the Company had embarked on the Company ships Discovery and 
Investigator for the Lemma Islands off Macao where they and the Lyra 
were waiting for the Alceste.
10 Amherst arrives at the Lemma Islands and meets with the waiting 
ships and the Company men from Canton.
11 Squadron weighs anchor at Hong Kong Island. Staunton comes on 
board the Alceste.
13 Imperial permission received to proceed to the Yellow Sea. Embassy 
is informed that mandarins have been dispatched to Zhoushan and 
Tianjin to await Amherst’s arrival and conduct him to the Court 
at Peking.
27 The Lyra arrives at the mouth of the Baihe River and anchors closer 
to shore because of her shallow draft.
Toone and Campbell visit some fishermen at sea and request that they 
take a note to inform the authorities of the arrival of the embassy. 
The fishermen refuse.
28 The rest of the squadron anchors off the Baihe River, further out to sea.
31 Two mandarins, Chang-wei and Yin, come on board the Lyra and 
take charge of Lord Amherst’s letter to the viceroy. They comprise 
two of the four mandarins designated to escort the embassy after 
arrival at Dagu. Arrangements made for Morrison and Cooke to go 
ashore at Dagu to meet with the mandarins in charge of the embassy.
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Morrison learns that the embassy would not remain long at Peking 
and that it was not invited to accompany the emperor to Jehol.
August 1816
4 Chang-wei and Yin visit the Alceste. The embassy was to receive high 
honours. First mention of the intended ceremony—the kowtow—
that the British were required to perform before the emperor and that 
Amherst was to rehearse beforehand.
8 Preparations made for disembarking the embassy and landing on 
Chinese soil. Discussion among the British on the expediency of 
performing the kowtow. Staunton informs Amherst in a letter that to 
comply with the ceremony was inadvisable, even though its refusal 
might result in the total rejection of the embassy.
9 The embassy lands at Dagu. Amherst is informed that a higher ranked 
mandarin, Sulenge (President of the Tribunal of Works), was waiting 
at Tianjin to receive him. Twenty-three boats are provided to carry 
the ambassadorial party.
12 The embassy arrives at Tianjin. Amherst is informed that an imperial 
banquet is being given in his honour the following day.
13 The embassy attends an imperial banquet hosted by Guanghui and 
Sulenge. Long drawn out discussion on the ceremony the Chinese 
intend Amherst to perform before the emperor. Legates insist that 
Macartney had kowtowed before the Qianlong emperor and that 
Amherst should do the same. Amherst refuses to kowtow and performs 
the British ceremony of respect before an altar table, representative 
of the emperor, following the precedent of Macartney. The issue of 
compliance with the prostration ceremony is left unresolved.
14 The embassy proceeds up-river towards Tongzhou. Staunton pressured 
to use his influence to get Amherst to agree to kowtow. Sulenge and 
Chang-wei admit that Macartney had performed the British ceremony 
on the first reception but afterwards performed the kowtow.
15 The legates, Guanghui and Sulenge, arrive late in the evening in an 
agitated state. They ask, ‘What has become of the British ships?’
16 The legates demand a ‘yes or no’ answer on the kowtow. The embassy 
boats are turned back towards Tianjin after Amherst refuses to commit 
to the prostration ceremony.
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18 The embassy boats permitted to proceed towards Tongzhou after 
Amherst agrees to present a written declaration of the ceremony he 
proposes to perform in the presence of the emperor. Amherst informed 
that two mandarins of very high rank will receive him at Tongzhou.
20 The embassy arrives at Tongzhou.
21 Heshitai, called ‘Duke Ho’ by the British, and Muketenge (President 
of the Tribunal of Ceremonies) arrive at Tongzhou to observe Amherst 
rehearsing the kowtow.
Later that day, six high-ranking mandarins call on Amherst. Their 
rude manner is commented on by the British who refer to them as 
‘the Lads of Mougden’.
22 Conference with Heshitai—Amherst is informed that the kowtow 
could not be dispensed with. If complied with, the British would 
be conducted to the Qing court. Amherst hands Heshitai his letter 
for the emperor informing him of the proposed ceremony he plans 
to perform. The letter also contains a respectful and conciliatory 
approach to a solution on the ceremonial impasse.
23 Little official business takes place. Three Europeans dressed in Chinese 
costume from the Russian College at Peking visited the British boats 
but were treated with suspicion and ignored.
24 The emperor asserts he witnessed Macartney performing the 
kowtow. News received that Staunton is under suspicion by the Qing 
authorities.
25 News received that a letter is being prepared by the emperor for 
the king should the embassy be rejected, and that the emperor was 
particularly angry at the unauthorised departure of the British ships.
26 Affairs critical: Staunton fearing arrest, Amherst and Ellis still 
reluctant to close the door on negotiations regarding the reception 
of the embassy, and Amherst yet to make his final decision on 
the kowtow.
27 Meeting with Heshitai and Muketenge. Amherst stands firm—he 
is following his sovereign’s orders to follow Macartney’s precedent 
and will not kowtow. The British put forward their objectives for the 
embassy; these are not dismissed by Heshitai who offers his support 
on the condition that Amherst performs the kowtow.
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On return from the meeting, Amherst and Ellis, following Heshitai’s 
more agreeable and accommodating attitude, tend towards agreeing 
to kowtow. Staunton stands firm, concerned that recent intimidation 
might lead to a direct attack on him personally or Company interests 
at Canton. Staunton consults his Company colleagues—Toone, 
Pearson and Davis—who remain strongly against performing the 
kowtow. Morrison and Manning are prepared to consider kowtowing 
but only if concessions are made to the British. After weighing up the 
arguments, Amherst finally decides not to perform the ceremony.
That afternoon, the embassy receives a directive to proceed to Peking. 
The British confirm that their decision not to comply with the 
ceremony was understood. They are reassured by the mandarins that 
they will not be required to kowtow.
28 The embassy leaves Tongzhou for Yuanmingyuan at four o’clock in the 
afternoon.
29 The embassy arrives at Yuanmingyuan at daybreak after a very tiring 
overnight journey. Amherst, Staunton, Ellis, Jeffrey and Morrison, are 
separated from the rest of the embassy and conducted straight to the 
imperial compound. Requested to enter directly into the emperor’s 
presence, Amherst refuses, pleading fatigue and the absence of his 
ambassadorial robes and credentials. Amherst is manhandled by 
Heshitai in an attempt to drag him into the emperor’s presence where 
he will have no option but to kowtow. Amherst strongly resists.
Amherst retires to his quarters at the estate of Sungyun, considered 
a friend of the British from his time as the viceroy of Canton in 1811 
and earlier from his role in the Macartney Embassy.
The emperor’s physician arrives between 8 and 9 o’clock in the 
morning to examine Amherst. By noon, reports are received of 
the embassy’s dismissal due to the emperor’s anger over Amherst’s 
‘feigned illness’. Orders arrive for the embassy to return to Tongzhou.
A mandarin wearing a red button visits the embassy and hints that 
assent to kowtow might still save the embassy, but this is dismissed 
by the British.
The embassy leaves the compound at four o’clock in the afternoon.
30 After a tedious night journey, the embassy arrives back at their 
Tongzhou base. Everything is shut, and indications make clear that 
the embassy is no longer being treated as a tribute mission.
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At 10 o’clock at night, arrangements for a partial exchange of 
presents take place. Guanghui and Sulenge are dejected over events 
at Yuanmingyuan.
31 The formal exchange of presents from the King of England to the 
Jiaqing emperor, and from the emperor to the king takes place. 
Amherst performs the same ceremony as the Lords before the vacant 
throne of the king in the House of Lords, in front of a portrait of the 
Prince Regent.
Sulenge leaves the embassy. Guanghui, Chang-wei and Yin remain as 
its legates and conductors.
September 1816
2 The embassy sets out for Tianjin. The British are concerned over 
reduced provisions.
3 Chang-wei tells Morrison that the emperor had no intention of 
receiving the British on the early morning of 29 August; he only 
wished to view them from his palanquin to witness the ceremony 
the English proposed to perform before him. If he did not approve, 
the embassy was to be dismissed.
The British learn that the request for the embassy to proceed to 
Yuanmingyuan was a plot devised by Heshitai who hoped that 
Amherst, lured by his promises of support, would perform the 
kowtow at a public audience.
5 The British are informed that the emperor is now aware of the 
circumstances in which they had travelled overnight to Yuanmingyuan 
and is very angry with Heshitai who is deprived of his great offices at 
court. Muketenge and Sulenge are removed from their positions and 
Guanghui is reduced to the rank of a gold button.
6 The embassy reaches Tianjin but is not greeted with any ceremony.
8 News received that Chang-wei had been promoted to judge of 
Shandong province.
The embassy leaves the Baihe River and proceeds down a subsidiary 
stream towards the Grand Canal.
12 Several members of the embassy are very ill, including Abel and 
Toone.
13 The embassy is forced to leave ports of call at midnight or early 
daybreak to avoid access to towns.
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14 Staunton notes a decline in prosperity compared to the time of the 
Macartney Embassy. Chang-wei informs Staunton that he is due to 
leave the embassy. News is received that the emperor is not cross with 
the British but with his own officers conducting the embassy.
15 The embassy arrives at Dongguan with its pleasing scenery of willows 
and poplars. Chang-wei (secretly) sends Staunton a copy of the 
Peking Gazette with an account of the embassy’s dismissal.
16 Staunton meets the judge of Bei Zhili who provides him with an 
unflattering account of England and fears that the rejection of the 
embassy might cause the interruption of trade at Canton which 
would bring ruin to England. The judge asserts that the kowtow is 
indispensable and that the Chinese emperor is the sovereign of the 
world and the supreme head of all nations.
The treasurer of Shandong replaces the judge as the official overseeing 
the embassy.
17 The embassy enters Shandong province. There is a change in the 
officers attending the embassy. Guanghui visits the British for 
the  first time since Tongzhou and blames Heshitai for the failure 
of the embassy. The British are informed that their route to Canton 
is to deviate from Macartney’s and will go via Nanjing.
22 The embassy arrives at Linqing to an amiable reception. There is 
competition among provincial conductors of the embassy to provide 
the best supplies. The British squadron is made up of 50–60 boats 
of different descriptions.
23 The embassy enters the Grand Canal. The Chinese temporary forts 
are derided by the British.
25 The embassy journeys through well-cultivated open country; pleasant 
farm cottages surrounded by trees and distant mountains to eastward 
seen for the first time. Staunton notes that the lower orders are cleaner 
and more presentable than those of Europe.
26 Staunton informed that the emperor has instructed that every kind 
of public attention and honour be paid to the embassy as it travels 
to Canton.
30 The embassy enters Jiangsu province but deviates back into the 
Shandong countryside as Jiangsu is devastated by floods.
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October 1816
1 Great numbers of grain junks (20,000) are observed by the British as 
evidence of a vast inland commerce.
2 Guanghui is noted as an infrequent visitor and not open in his 
communications with the embassy (in contrast to Sungyun and 
Macartney).
3 The judge of Jiangsu province joins the embassy.
4 Abel reported to be very sick—there is concern as to whether he will 
survive.
6 The embassy approaches the Yellow River. Huge number of boats 
observed, but nowhere near the amount observed in the Pearl River 
at Canton.
7 A sojourn ashore is undertaken due to danger of the boats’ passage 
into the Yellow River. A rare meeting of Amherst, Guanghui and 
the other mandarins. There are problems of precedence in seating 
arrangements as both sides stand on their dignity.
8 The embassy makes good progress due to travelling under imperial 
orders that keep the channel cleared—innumerable boats detained 
under a temporary embargo while the embassy squadron passes. An 
increasing Chinese disposition of civility towards the British is noted.
9 An improvement in the appearance and habits of the people are noted 
by the British since crossing the Yellow River. Blue-brick houses and 
white-washed military barracks are seen and rice fields are noted for 
the first time.
10 The British received civil treatment by the local Chinese when out 
walking and are served tea. The British observe that they are restricted 
from landing at cities during the day due to an imperial order.
11 The most striking temple yet seen, the Temple of Gaomingsi. The 
British gain access to the temple through the obliging and civil 
kindness of two mandarins. Amherst given a conducted tour. Evidence 
of neglect noted. British go to the top level of the temple.
Change of boats carried out with good humour. From now on 
communal meals are not possible.
12 Guanghui visits Amherst; very affable, but no official talks.
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13 Toone and Martin (a midshipman on the Alceste) take a walk to 
visit a  temple four miles away. They cause much alarm among the 
Chinese, even though the pair are accompanied by Chinese soldiers.
Morrison learns that the British ships had passed Zhejiang on their 
way to Canton and that the emperor had issued an edict to treat the 
embassy with civility and attention on their journey. One of the local 
officers said it was their duty to provide everything in their power and 
an honour to accommodate those ‘who have travelled from so vast 
a distance to honour our country. China is indeed a great empire, but 
yours ranks in the world next to it’ (Staunton, 1824, p. 230).
14 Amherst escorted around an imperial compound and garden (Garden 
of Wuyuan, last visited by the Qianlong emperor in 1780). Garden 
noted as very run down. Amherst is notified of the Jiaqing emperor’s 
birthday celebrations are due to be held at Nanchang and is asked if 
he was willing to participate in proposed ceremony. The British make 
it clear there will be no kowtow. The British were prevented from 
visiting the islands where the ‘Golden Mountain’ is located.
15 A long walk in the fields. Still prevented from visiting the island.
16 Ellis crossed a bridge and entered the streets of Guazhou—a bustling 
city with shops and attractive women ‘approaching our notions of 
beauty’, but only a hasty glimpse as the soldiers were most active in 
enforcing the imperial edict that Chinese women not look on the 
strangers.
The mandarins in conversation with Morrison mention a favourable 
edict concerning the embassy’s treatment and suggest that Amherst 
renew a direct intercourse with the Chinese Government, which 
was regarded as suspicious by Ellis. The British believed the emperor 
was obviously feeling dismayed by the treatment of the embassy, but 
none of these overtures were official. The British remained silent, 
which operated to keep Chinese apprehension alive of the possible 
effects of British resentment. The consent to exchange the few 
presents at Tongzhou was ‘enough for conciliation’ in Ellis’s (1817) 
view: ‘anything further, with ungenerous minds, might be mistaken 
for abject submission, if not positive alarm’ (p. 290). Should the 
proposed acceptance of presents be rejected, ‘the ground of dignified 
silence under provoked injury would have been lost, the regret of the 
Emperor for his conduct would have been removed’ (p. 290).
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18 The British walk around the town of Guazhou, but soldiers prevent 
their entry.
19 The embassy enters the Yangtze River.
20 Morrison receives a private copy of an imperial edict addressed to the 
viceroy of Jiangnan regarding the treatment of the embassy. The edict 
made clear the emperor’s position:
 – It was discovered that the ambassador had travelled overnight 
from Tongzhou and did not have his robes; because he dared 
not perform the ceremony in his ordinary clothes, he affirmed 
sickness.
 – Heshitai did not report this correctly—his mistake—and the 
embassy was sent back.
 – The emperor could not bear to reject the embassy, considering 
Britain had ‘sent tribute of a sincere and devoted kind from so 
far in an expression of veneration and obedience’ (as quoted in 
Ellis, 1817, p. 503).
 – The emperor decided to accept the most trifling articles of 
tribute and bestow the kindness of receiving them.
 – The emperor accepted maps, paintings and prints and 
conferred on the British sovereign a Jo-ee, purses and court 
beads to manifest the idea of giving much and receiving little.
 – The ambassador received these with extreme joy and gratitude 
as showed by his manner, contrition and fear.
 – The emperor instructed his officials to treat the ambassador 
civilly and appoint soldiers to conduct the safety of the 
embassy.
 – The members of the embassy were not permitted to land or 
make disturbances throughout the whole route.
 – The emperor instructed the military to have their armour fresh 
and shining, and weapons disposed in a commanding manner 
to maintain a formidable and dignified appearance.
 – The emperor concluded that the embassy had come to China 
with the intention of offering tribute and ordered that it be 
treated with civility ‘and silently cause it to feel gratitude and 
awe’ (Ellis, 1817, pp. 502–503).
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21 The viceroy of Jiangsu province paid a visit to Guanghui. Ellis 
observes the ceremonial formalities of their meeting. While no notice 
was taken of the embassy, Amherst ordered the guard and band to be 
drawn up for inspection. The embassy proceeded on its way. The city 
of Nanjing is seen in the distance.
Ellis says we ‘may date our unrestrained liberty of excursion from this 
day’. It was promoted by Amherst’s resistance at the gate.
Nanjing is rapidly decaying and the British express disgust at the filthy 
communal baths.
The viceroy was called away on a visit to an outlying district in the 
province and did not meet Amherst.
25 Amherst has a conversation with Guanghui on the public life of the 
emperor.
27 The embassy anchors at a small island, ‘probably to render our 
intercourse with the inhabitants less easy’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 309). 
The treasurer leaves the embassy without paying Amherst a farewell 
visit. The military officers are friendly in contrast to the civilian 
mandarins. Two are aware of the Duke of Wellington; Amherst 
gives one a medal containing a series of drawings representing the 
duke’s battles.
30 Ellis (1817, p. 314) comments on the womanish appearance of the 
mandarins or total absence of manliness.
Another edict prohibiting the British from going ashore is issued.
November 1816
1 The British observe the beautiful variety of the banks of the Yangtze—
mountains, hills, valleys, streams and woods—most picturesque 
combinations and delightful climate, ‘but this only pleases the eye 
for a moment, and leaves the mind unsatisfied’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 317).
3 The embassy arrives at Datong and stays for four days. Delightful 
walks noted.
4 Ellis much struck by the presence of the Chinese middling classes.
5 The embassy personnel see the tea plant for the first time. The local 
peasants civilly offer tea, although their exclamations at seeing the 
British are at first mistaken for insolence.
6 Another edict preventing the movement of the British is issued.
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7 The embassy leaves Datong.
9 Despite the imperial edict, the shopkeepers of Anqing show no 
hesitation in selling the British any article they wish to purchase. 
There are lots of things to buy—necklaces, old china, agate cups, 
vases, etc.—but the British had neither money nor time to make 
purchases.
11 Heavy rain and boats leaking. A marine, Millidge, on duty at 
Morrison’s boat, slips between the boats and drowns. Every assistance 
is afforded by the Chinese.
12 Funeral held for Millidge. Freshwater porpoises later seen.
14 Embassy leaves the Yangtze River and enters the Poyang Lake. 
The embassy reaches Dagu and stays for two days due to bad weather.
15 Rain delays. Purchases made at fine porcelain shops at very reasonable 
prices. British visit first halls or temples of Confucius and remark 
on their being no idols, but instead tablets bearing the names of 
‘deceased worthies’.
20 Embassy leaves Poyang Lake.
21 Guanghui sends Amherst a message requesting that no one enter 
the  city of Nanchang because it is the emperor’s birthday as well 
as the day of public examinations (the crowds would be disruptive).
22 Guanghui replies to Amherst’s offer to fire a salute for the emperor’s 
birthday: please decline because it is not the Chinese custom.
23 The embassy reaches Nanchang and resumes Macartney’s route.
In shops it is observed that furs, porcelain, silks and glass paintings 
are not ill executed ‘and interesting from the subjects being chosen in 
the scenes of domestic life’ (Ellis, 1817, p. 352).
24 Guanghui expresses concern due to the presence of a military 
mandarin, second in command at Canton, who was passing through 
the city on his way to Peking and would report on what he had 
observed.
25 Guanghui, accompanied by the treasurer and judge of the district 
of Anhui, calls on Amherst. He voices regret at having to leave his 
friends in due course. Staunton expresses a hope that, like Sungyun, 
he would dine on board the British ships at Whampoa. He replied 
that although he was inferior to that distinguished mandarin, his 
feelings towards us were the same.
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26 The embassy holds a cricket match.
27 The embassy leaves Nanchang.
New boats noted as inferior (mat coverings). Constant rain. 
The Fuyuan at Nanchang had taken no notice of the embassy and 
Amherst sends a message regarding such rudeness with Morrison 
to Guanghui. The embassy enters a picturesque part of China—
camellias noted.
December 1816
1 The embassy holds a cricket match. The British are prevented from 
visiting the town.
2 Reference made to the personal character of the governor preventing 
the British from visiting the town.
3 Over the last few days, the British anchorage has been enclosed by 
a railing to keep the local inhabitants out.
5 Very difficult and dangerous conditions for the boatmen—submerged 
rocks and strong currents. Boatmen navigate freezing water with 
a diet of only rice and a small quantity of meat.
7 Beautiful scenery described—river flowing between mountain 
ranges, highly picturesque wooded views, terraced valleys, pine trees 
and orange trees.
8 Abel reported as feeling better and collects tea plant samples.
11 The embassy visits the city of Ganzhou. The British note recent 
repairs to the city wall, presumably in anticipation of their visit. 
The ‘commercial halls’ of the Fukien merchants trading with Canton 
are mentioned.
13 The Chinese ‘water-wheel’ is admired as an outstanding piece 
of technology.
14 Staunton refers to the fact that the embassy has seen 27 pagodas 
during its journey.
15 The British learn that the five ships of the embassy have arrived at the 
port of Canton.
17 Amherst has a rare meeting with Guanghui, but as there were no 
British interpreters present, only ‘A-chow’ the Canton linguist, 
Amherst refused to hold any conversation conducted through ‘that 
channel’.
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18 The British leave the boats at Nankang for the land journey over the 
Meiling Mountains.
19 Noted in the town of ‘Kong-quan’ are several store houses through 
which all goods must pass into the Chinese interior. The ‘invigorating 
influence’ of European commerce is noted on the town and its people.
The British luggage and articles are in the process of being packed up 
for the journey over the mountain into Guangdong province.
20 Some of the British hear the term ‘fan-quei’ as well as other forms 
of rudeness directed at them, as witnessed at Canton.
Evidence of graffiti left by the Dutch embassy of 1795 seen engraved 
on the doors of a house.
25 The embassy reaches Shaoguan.
The British are outraged that the legate is assigned a much superior 
boat to that of the ambassador. Appearances are important as the 
British draw closer to Canton.
January 1817
1 The embassy arrives at Canton.
2 Guanghui pays a call.
3 Amherst holds a function attended by all the gentlemen of the 
Factory and the American Consul.
7 A formal ceremony with the viceroy is held where a letter from 
the Jiaqing emperor to the Prince Regent is handed to Amherst.
9 Amherst and the commissioners pay a formal call on Guanghui.
Afterwards, Amherst holds a function for the Hong merchants who 
attend wearing their ‘state dresses’.
13 Staunton hosts a public breakfast for Guanghui at the British Factory.
19 Guanghui pays a final call on Amherst.
20 The ambassador, commissioners and suite embark at Whampoa, 
on board the HMS Alceste, to depart China.
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Appendix I: Morrison’s 
Letters to Amherst (1821)
Copy of Morrison’s first letter to Amherst (date unknown, but written 
prior to November 1821) (in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/50 (b))
My Lord,
I had the honour to receive the Letter you sent me in reply to my request 
concerning the Anglo-Chinese College; & beg to [give] … sincere thanks 
for your kindness.
The Monarch who in anger drove us from his Court, died in Tartary, 
suddenly on Sep 2 1820. His eldest son living has ascended the throne, and 
adopted the Title Taou-kwang [Daoguang] which means ‘Season’s glory’.
There remains a good deal of mystery in this part of the Empire respecting 
the demise of His late Majesty - the prevailing report is that he died 
a violent death, & that his successor has usurped the throne, Kia King 
[Jiaqing] having intended it for his fourth son.
My family Mrs Morrison & two children returned to China this year, 
& by divine goodness we all enjoy tolerable health.
I observe in the Peking Gazette that the Nobleman we called Duke Ho, is 
much employed by the new Monarch. He was restored & degraded more 
than once since his degradation on account of his behaviour to us.
The venerable Soo remained in high offices till the late Emperor’s death - 
I have not seen his name mentioned since.
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The Legate Kwang [Guanghui] has been a salt Commissioner at a place 
near the Po-yang Lake ever since his restoration; he is expected here 
as Commissioner of import & export duties, an Officer here called 
the Hoppo.
I beg my remembrance to my old acquaintance the Hon. Mr. Amherst 
[Jeffrey]. I pray God to keep him from the many temptations to which his 
rank & circumstances expose him.




Copy of Morrison’s second letter to Amherst, Canton, China, 26 November 
1821 (in BL IOR MSS EUR F 140/50 (b))
My Lord,
Kwang Tajin [Guanghui] concerning whom you wrote to me, departed 
this life before I received your Letter. Instead of coming to Canton he was 
appointed Judge of the Province of Chih-le, and died in his boat just as he 
reached the borders of the region over which he was to preside: it was at 
the place where we were together about this time of the year in 1816. 
The officer who attended the Embassy whilst at the Joss-house in Canton 
is also dead. Duke Ho is still Commissioner of the Troops in Fo-kien 
Province.
Death, my Lord has also visited my family since I parted with you: 
Mrs Morrison fell a sacrifice to Cholera Morbus at Macao in June last. 
She was ill only 14 hours. I hope she “fell asleep in Jesus” - & that her 
immortal spirit is happy in heaven.
I had a good Letter from Hayne; he was well, but did not seem to like 
his situation.
Canton has been a good deal agitated this season by a case of homicide, or 
accidental death. A Chinese boat woman was drowned and an American 
seaman was charged … The Americans resisted the man’s being delivered 
to the Chinese after which they relinquished the poor man, who protested 




The present Emperor is deemed more decided in his conduct than his 
Father. During the 8th moon an epidemic prevailed in Peking which 
appears to have been a sort of Cholera… His Majesty gave considerable 
sums to buy medicines for the sick, & coffins for the dead. And according 
to the usage of the Imperial Family, he has sent to prepare his own tomb 
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